

वीर सेवा मन्दिर
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The हेयपक्ष of योग

or

Towards—

**A Constructive Synthesis
Of Psychological Material in Indian Philosophy**

यथाप्रतो दूरमुदेति देवं तद् द्युतस्य तथैवेति

दुर्गमं ज्योतिषा ज्योतिरेकं तन्मे मनः शिवमकल्पमस्तु ॥ शु० यजु० ३४ ॥

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मनसा ह्येव पश्यति, मनसा दृणोति, कामः संकल्पो विचिक्लिता

अद्वाऽअद्वा प्रतिरप्रतिर्हीर्षीर्भीरित्वेतत्सर्वं मन एव । वृ. १. ५. ३. ।

(also appearing in मै. ६. ३०.)

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"But what then am I? A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, that imagines also and perceives. Assuredly it is not little, if all these properties belong to my nature."—On the Nature of the Human Mind; and that it is more easily known than the Body.—Meditations II.—Descartes.

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तद्द्वैराग्यादपि दोषबीजक्षये कैवल्यम् ॥ पा. ३. ५० ॥ अस्यैवं भवति
हेतुकर्मक्षये सर्वस्यायं विवेकप्रत्ययो धर्मः सर्वं च हेतुपक्षे न्यस्तं पुरुषापरिणामी
ब्रह्मोऽन्यः सत्त्वादिति । भा. ३-५० ॥

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"In this sense, *i. e.* as presented to an individual, 'the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth' may belong to psychology."—James Ward.

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Section I. Introduction

The earliest beginnings of Indian thought have come down to us from the hoary pre-historic past. The Vedas contain innumerable hymns and they show different strata of thought, from the invaluable to what now might seem to be valueless. The highest reflections about the nature of man and the universe are mixed up with the strangest superstitions; the Gods invoked are definitely the different hypostatised aspects of natural phenomena,¹ and still in the midst of such 'henotheism' we find several flights to reach the Beyond or the Supreme Spirit, or the One, the '*hen*' underlying, or lying beyond the various natural phenomena.

Javons has applied the theory of bifurcating and cross planar evolution as opposed to the theory of linear evolution to the field of religions development.² He has maintained that religious thought does not progress from polytheism to deism or to monotheism in a straight line, but that all these are different attempts to reach the essence of concrete religious experience. Hence according to this theory all religious 'isms' come out of the original fund of that nebulous religious sense which is often mixed up with baser ore of superstition and magic. The form which any religion might take depends much upon the stage of society and the level of civilization at which the individual leads his life. All religions in this way are a sort of blind alley leading to no further form of development through itself to any other religion. After a time the outward crust of any religion gets fossilised, and a seer with true religious insight is born with a power to look into the very centre of that original fund whence all life springs up, and a new beginning is made.

We already find such an attempt to reach the inapproachable, when the R̥gvedic sage put the question— 'What was

1 Six Sys. Pp. 36-40; Vedic India : By Z. A. Ragozin. Pp. 137, 139-40.

2 F. B. Jevons 'On the Evolution of Religion' in 'Recent Developments in European Thought.' P. 65 s. s.

the wood, what was the stuff out of which he made this universe etc; or when the never resting spirit of human enquiry is pushed beyond the antinomies of thought, and the duality of subject and object as in R̥gveda X. 129. There the agnostic gets the better of the naive believer. He goes beyond existence and non-existence, beyond 'Rajas,' beyond the skies, to a state which never suffers death nor is immortal, with no difference of day and night; the One breathing without breath, with no other than it. Even 'Tamas'-darkness came after, with indistinguishable waters, and all that was developed by the power of 'Tapas.' 'Kāma' (desire) grew after Tamas and that was the primal germ of Mind. " And here who can tell who created it. The gods came later. But he from whom this creation sprang, the All-seer in the highest heaven he knows it whether he made it or not, or he even does not know ! "

In शाङ्ख्यसूत्रेण अ. ३५, we find a definite attempt to describe the nature of मनस् which is taken to be a principle of both the individual as well as the social mind. That divine entity which goes to distant realms while waking and while sleeping, is also the undying flame in the race. It is प्रज्ञान—knowledge and चेतस् the principle of life and वृत्ति—the principle that holds on, resolution. It is Manas, that is able to grasp past, present and future and thus knows it. All knowledge is said to be held by it, just as all the spokes of a chariot's wheel are fixed to the nave.¹ And here the individual mind shows itself superior to the social mind for after all the social mind exists only through the individual mind—यस्मिंश्चित् सर्वमोदप्रजानाम् ... ।² Finally it is the mind that leads on men, just as a good driver leads the horses by the reins.³ It is the Luminous of all luminous bodies, and has its abode in the heart (हृत्प्रतिष्ठम्).

1 Cf. कौशी—३-७

2 We shall see in the section on the Nature of Mind that the individual was always given priority to society.

3 Here we find in germ the well-known simile we meet with in कठ. व. ३. ३-४ in its more elaborate form. In Plato we find it in his Phaedrus.

Here we find the fateful words *Rajas, Tamas, Manas, Kāma* etc, that were to play their roll in the arena of Indian Philosophy for a long time (and perhaps for all time!) What is important in the former passage from our point of view is that the poet tries to know the secret of existence by the instrument of introspection. हृदि प्रनीष्या कवयो मनीषा। -the poets seek in the heart with the instrument of thought (मनीष). This is one of the earliest references to introspection as applied to mind. In both the passages we also find the earliest trace of localisation of the mind in the heart. The *Kāma* or Desire mentioned is not any specific desire for a particular thing, but stands for the Desire-to-be the 'first stirring of the Sentient Will' the will-to-be of Schopenhaur, the तण्डुल of Buddhism-the root of all existence

In the Vedas we find that "objective" stage of religion, and in the Upanishads its "subjective" phase.¹ Comte would call the one the "theological" the other a transition to the "metaphysical" period of human thought. We can call the Vedic stage the "projective" and the Upanishadic the "reflective" stage of development. From 'the knowledge of human history and of the development of Indian thought in particular', scholars maintain that there must be an interval of about a thousand years or more between the hymnological period of the Vedas and the philosophical productions of the Upanishads². In between the two lie sandwiched the dry ritualistic period of the *Brāhmaṇas*.

1 Vide Prof. Ranade's *Const. Sur. Up. Phil* : P. 2.

2 'Both B. G. Tilak and Il Jacobi simultaneously (1893) and independently of each other' calculated the vedic era from the fact that the Orion मृगशीर्ष is mentioned as the point of the vernal equinox. The former takes it to 6000 B. C, the latter to about 4500 B. C. Some western scholars are interested in assigning as late a date as possible to Indian productions. Thus Hertel's extravagance goes so far as to say that "the collection of these songs was not yet completed in the second century B. C." Vide *His. of Ind. Lit.* Vol. I Pp. 296-96 by Winternitz. When Max Müller lays down 1500 B. C. it is as the lowest limit to which the latest hymns can be brought down. He definitely regards the Vedic Hymns to be older than the oldest Babylonian and Accadian hymns. Vide *Six Sys.* Pp. 34-35.

Even in the old Vedic times the caste system must have existed in some form or other.¹ In itself there is nothing very strange about it. The principle is worked out by Plato in his Republic where he divides society into different groups by projecting the different elements of an individual's constitution upon the larger social canvas. Whether such an unmodified projection is true or not, or whether it is at all desirable for the sake of the individual, it is not within our province to pass a judgment. But it is a relevant fact to note that even so eminent a psychologist as Wm. MacDougall puts the democracy-'the rule of the vulgar'-lowest on the rung of political institutions, and posits a sort of aristocracy of the best, 'the rule of the philosophers' as the only possible solution of the present world situation in his book on Ethics and Some Modern World Problems. Here we are not principally concerned with the social system of caste, but only with that Ās'rama Dharma which always went with it in ancient India. The Varṇa Dharma fixed for the individual his place and function, his obligations and rights in society, while the Ās'rama Dharma placed before him his spiritual goal as ultimate salvation. Ās'rama Dharma was the basis of Varṇa Dharma inasmuch as only a one-fourth of an individual's life was under it.² Three fourths of his life, the individual spent after preparation for or the realisation of his own spiritual well-fare. It is but natural that under such circumstances man should be given to reflections about the nature of his self, and that a mass of thought be accumulated treating of man's place not in society, but in the universe.³ Originally it must have been this peculiar combination of Varṇa Dharma and Ās'rama Dharma that must have given the ancient Indians ample leisure for philosophic speculation,

1 Z. A. Ragozin interprets the quarrel between Vasīṣṭha and Viśvāmitra as between the reactionary and the reformer.—Vedic India Pp. 318-322.

2 It is the highest tragedy of human institutions that this very spiritual basis—the Āśrama Dharma in Varṇa Dharma is lost—while the caste system still lingers on.

3 Cf. Const. Sur. Up. Phil: 59-60

turning the social fabric into a *Realm of (spiritual) Ends* and not of exploitation. Prof. Ranade tells us that "in the history of Indian Thought, every revival of the study of the Upanishads has synchronised with a great religious movement." It is so because in the Upanishads we find that real religious passion to dwell as near as possible to the fountain head whence all religious experiences or systems spring. The negative aspect of this positive mystic content is exhibited in the utter lack of any attempt at systematization in the Upanishads; for people generally think of systematising their thoughts when they do not live them.

Schlegel has said that every man is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. We cannot indeed separate the processes of synthesis and analysis in thought, for every act of true synthesis is based upon analysis and *vice versa*. Even then we might draw a distinction between analysis followed up for the sake of an ultimate synthesis, and synthesis prosecuted for the sake of analysis. This gives us all the difference between a Platonist and an Aristotelian. Much is made of, the distinction between an introvert and an extrovert in modern psychology.¹ We shall not try to say that the modern psychological division corresponds to the one given by Schlegel. Our complete life is a mysterious blending so unique and perfect in its nature, of different elements, that without trying to formulate any physiological theory, we might note a difference between men who while trying to understand outward nature always look to the general principles and even find them as mere aspects of that higher principle exhibited in the working of their own minds, and those who always take things as they are, so to say externally.

1 Vide: McDougall's—Character and Conduct of Life—41-45—An Outline of Psychology.—357-358, An explanatory theory of the two types is attempted in 'An Outline of Abnormal Psychology.'—441-442. There he says that the difference is due to "some chemical influence... of a hormone...or some complex chemical resultant of the general metabolism," resulting in a difference of temperament as distinguished from disposition and character.

We meet with the former type in the philosophic thought of ancient India.

Under a positive spiritual urge, and aided by vast leisure, generation after generation, sages, recluses, monks and people belonging to all the religious orders that renounced the world must have tried to find the way out to the individual's salvation. Psychology tells us that in trying to learn walking, or to take a simpler case, in trying to open a box, a baby or an animal reacts in an infinite number of ways, till at last it hits upon the right sort of reaction and the problem is solved. From a materialistic point of view it might seem a hopeless task, capable of being performed only at the end of eternity, but the processes of life are not mechanical. It is but the furtherance of the same mental activity on a different plane when an individual tries to find his own salvation. Many must be the blind alleys from which he is forced to turn back, till at last he strikes upon the right path, and teaches his fellow-men the truth he has found, or the revelation that has dawned upon him

In Indian thought there is no recognised branch of science called psychology. Some of the oldest references about positive sciences that we find are those of Medicine. As the "*Methods of Science*" react upon philosophic thought in our days, so they did in ancient India. For instance in the four Buddhistic Ārya satyas—(1) दुःख-Suffering, (2) समुदय-Cause, (3) निरोध-Suppression, (4) प्रतिपद-the path or the way—all the cardinal articles of ancient medical science were applied to spiritual healing. In the following passage उत्पन्नो वैद्यराजः प्रमोचकः सर्वं दुःखेभ्यः प्रतिघातको निर्वाणयुक्ते etc., Buddha is compared to a spiritual healer of mankind.¹ In Yogadarsāna bhāṣhya on 2-15 it is definitely stated that the method is the one followed in the Ayurveda. यथा चिकित्सा शास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहम् ... एवमिदमपि शास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहमेव etc; the difference being that while Ayurveda deals with physical disease, causes of disease, health as a state to be

¹ Passage from Lalitavistara quoted by H. Kern-Man. of Ind. Bud. P. 47.

regained, and the means of regaining it by overcoming the disease; Yoga deals with existence, cause of existence, final liberation and the means of attaining to it.

A thorough and critical interpretation of the positive Sciences of ancient Indians has been given by Sir B. J. Seal from various scattered original sources in his remarkable book on "The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus." But it is a significant fact that in it no place has been given to psychology. There are indeed stray reflections; for instance in the treatment of "movements not caused by contact with matter" we come across *वर्मायम* as *अदृष्ट* causes; but they are left, as required by the stand-point of physics, adrift without any moorings in an individual mind. In the treatment of *संस्कार* it is *गतिसंस्कार* and not *वित्तसंस्कार* that is treated. *गतिसंस्कार* is the momentum due to which the potter's wheel goes on moving even though his stick rests.¹ Over and above this there are a few lines devoted to the nature of the *Prāṇas* and the principle of life as viewed in *Sāṃkhya* and *S'āṃkara* philosophy and that ancient emergent evolutionist *Chārvāka*.

The reason is not far to seek. The points of views of all sciences including biology are in a sense externalistic and abstract. The most abstract of all is mathematics, for it deals with mere space and numbers, the conceptions of which are arrived at by emptying out all the content of concrete experience. Even physics now-a-days is nearing the ideal set to it by mathematics, in that, the modern theory of Relativity has freed it from a reference to the axes of a particular observer and interpreted the phenomena or the "events" that merely happen from a mathematically universal point of view! In so doing it has become purely formal.² As we ascend from chemistry through physiology to biology, science takes in more and more of

1 Pos. Sc. An. Hin. Pp. 137, 159. and *Saṃp. Phil.* by A. B. Keith. P. 86. See also *सं-का-१७-विष्ठिति संस्कारवशात् चक्र-प्रसिद्ध इतद्वरीः* ॥

2 Vide Substance, Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity: Ernst Cassirer—Chap. on Relativity. Also—*Sc. the Mod. W.*: Prof. Whitehead. chap. 2. P. 27 e. p.

concrete experience. From a purely spatial or an externalistic point of view it goes to the more and more 'intensive' if not an internal point of view. The stand-point of a science and its subject matter are bound up in an organic unity. We might say that the view-point is the function of which the subject-matter is the structure.¹ On the spatial, abstract level it is the structure that draws our attention more. So it is with mathematics and physics. But as we go higher up, functional explanation takes the place of external causality. We know that in biology the conception of unity supersedes the idea of mere number, and function explains structure. In our passage from mathematics to biology, new entities come up like those of chemical compounds showing a difference of quality, and those of organic substances, and of the principle of life. These new entities are accepted by science upto biology but when it comes to Psychology it at times stolidly refuses to accept the subject of experience.—“ But the stand-point of psychology is individualistic : by whatever methods from whatever sources its facts are ascertained they must be regarded as being part of some one's consciousness.”² In Psychology it is purely the function or the view-point that sets a limit to its subject-matter.¹ Thus all “ ‘ the choir of heaven and furniture of earth ’ may belong to psychology ”—qua the experience of a subject. Psychology is a science of experience not in its absolute sense, for then it would be nothing but metaphysics; it is a science of experience considered as belonging to a subject.

Such a point of view if put along with those of other sciences would require a change in definitions of terms as well as a change in its subject treatment. The three *Guṇas* would no longer remain substantive entities, but must change

1 Vide Psych. the M. Self-B. Bosanquet. Chapt. 1. “ In Psychologythe limit is one of ‘ point of view ’ only, and no special province can be marked off.” Bosanquet has compared the relation between the stand-point and the subject-matter of a science to that between connotation and denotation in Logic. The relation between function and its structure is more primary than the above one.

2 Psych. Prip. Ward. P. 27.

into "tendencies" exhibiting themselves at different levels of consciousness. Tamas can no longer mean mere inertia, but that lowest state of life like that of Leibnitz's "sleeping monad" or more properly Bergson's 'Torpor.' Rajas becomes not merely the principle of motion forcing things either to disintegration or to differentiation, but that driving force of lower will, to be supplanted afterwards by Sattva-Pure activity, which we might compare favourably with Aristotle's conception of "*Theoria*."

Experience implies duality between subject and object. The true Self was at times posited as a ground beneath this duality, while at times it was approached either by consideration of the mere object or by that of the pure subject. It was not arrived at by a process of abstraction in thought, though it might seem to be so, when it was conceived purely through the Subject of experience. For instance in षो० ८, ७-११, where Indra stays on with Prajāpati for an epically long period of hundred and one years, to get from him the knowledge of the true Self, Prajāpati seems to take him down the precipitous slope of thought abstraction, wherein they leave behind one after another all the elements of the phenomenal self. But when he rejects even the concept of the self in deep sleep, and posits the true Self as deathless, we understand that the Self is no abstract concept, but the true reality underlying all its presentational manifestations. Here we have to take note of only the psychological approach to Brahman, and as a further instance of that we might mention a passage from the तैत्ति० २. १-३-४ where one travels from the most rudimentary concept of self that we meet with in the savages to that highest conception of "inner Self consisting of bliss." In the मै० १. ११. all the doctrines are reviewed from a developmental point of view. We read — "that sign of him who has no sign, is like the pervading heat of fire, the purest taste of water, thus say some (ऋषि० १. ११). It is speech, hearing, sight, mind, breath, thus say others (ऐत० १). It is intellect, retention, remembering (i. e. recollection), knowledge, thus say others (ऐत० ३. २.)." From all such passages, we can say that the

idea of Brahman was not arrived at merely by the process of impoverishing the subject side of experience, but by a sort of synthesis of both subject and object¹ in an attempt, as Caird would put it, to reach the underlying principle of both the factors of experience in a third something, a *tertium quid*. The subject-object relation, or the duality² implied in experience was known to the Upanishadic thinkers. In §. २.v.१३. we read :—"For when there is as it were duality, then one sees the other, one smells the other, one hears the other, one salutes the other, one perceives the other—one knows the other, but when the self only is all this ... how should he smell another ... etc." and it was towards that Self as the underlying stuff or ground of both phenomenal subject and object, that the Yoga praxis tried to reach. Yoga meant both the approach to, as well as the result namely, Self-realization.

In the Upanishads there are stray psychological reflections, but in a way they make a start in almost all the possible directions that were developed later on. As observed by Prof. Ranade³ the Upanishadic thought forms as it were a sort of watershed from which the different rivers of thought flow down. As with philosophical thought so with psychological theories. The distinct psychological references to be met with are about the nature of sense experience (1), co-ordination between different senses (2), the morally indifferent character of sense organs (3), the origin of senses (4), the relation between the senses and the Prāṇas (5), the prevenient character of attention in perception (6), mind as an internal sense organ of knowledge (7), mind as constituting functional attention in perception (8), Manas as equivalent to the whole chitta (9), constitution of the human body with different elements finding an abode in it (10), and ideas about the nature of self, along with some references and theories about sleep and dreams

1 Taking the line of argument taken by Caird in his book on "Development of Theology in Greek Philosophers."

2 Duality implied in experience as distinguished from Dualism. The distinction is ably drawn in Ward's Nat. Agnos. Pp. 298, 304ff.

3 Const. Sur. Up. Phil. Pp 178-179

and signs of death etc. [(1) ब. ३. २.; कौषी. ३. ६.; (2) कौषी. २. २. कौषी. ३. ६.; (3)-छां. १. २.; ब. १. ३.; (4) मं. २. ६.; ऐत. २. ४. also cf. ब. १. ३. १८. (5) छां. ५. १.; कौषी. ३. ३.; ऐत. ३. १-६. ब. ६. १, ७-१४., प्रश्न २. ३-४.; (6) ऋ. २. १.; (7) कौषी. ३. ४.; ३. ७. (8) ब. १. ५. ३.; कौषी. ३. ७.; (9)-ब. १. ५. ३. मं. ६. ३०. (10) ऐत. २. ४-५.]

At the time of Buddha's birth there was a large floating population of S'rāmaṇas, ascetics, and bhikshus, who held the cult of Yoga or Self-realization in their possession. A. B. Keith finds the earliest traces of yogic practices in the RigVeda. He says "there is a mention of the mad Muni, (१०. १३६) probably a precursor of the later Yogin." According to Gough something might have been added to the impulse of yogic sādhanā from the side of the aboriginals of ancient India.¹ It is said that science does not busy itself with absolute beginnings. So we shall rest satisfied by noting that the references to Yoga in the Maitrāyaṇa-brāhmana² and the S'vetās'vatara-Upanishads are so very explicit that one can safely conclude that the practice was definitely followed at the time. In early life, Buddha spent many of his years under spiritual quack doctors without any true gains whatever. His deliberate silence in after life when he was put the question whether the soul exists or not, tells us that his Anattāvāda was only an outward reaction and a protest against a whole class of spirit-mongering ascetics. His quarrel was firstly with the people who identified the soul with the phenomenal self, and secondly with those who went on talking about it without any concrete experience.³

Buddhism cut the Gordian-knot of metaphysical substantialism, by positing its Anattāvāda, according to which the mind was merely a संतान—a flow in which there was ceaseless mutation and creation. No doubt, later on it had to make room for

1 R. Garbe in his art. On Yoga in E. R. E. pushes such borrowing to "the most hoary antiquity of the Indo-Germanic race."

2 In मै. ६-१८ a धर्माद्योग is propounded. Later on only यम and नियम were added. Vide also Const. Sur. Up. Phil. P. 189.

3 Vide आपणो धर्म—गौतमबुद्ध विनियमसूत्र के सेवकवार्ता—By Prin A. B. Dhruva Pp. 385-389 ff.

continuity as such, with the help of such concepts like those of the भवेत्सोत or the आक्यविज्ञान, which worked as the bases for so many atomic Vīthichittas. But even then it remained a psychology *ohne Seele*. In the west possibly such psychology would bear on its ethical side a fruit of rankest hedonism. But the most remarkable fact about Buddhism is that in it such a psychological view has been made serviceable to the highest ethical ideal, giving a full *raison d'être* to all the yogic practices of the idealists.

The doctrine—सर्व क्षणिक क्षणिकम्—of subjective as well as objective flux necessitated Buddhism to explain our actual perception of the external world as static.¹ In trying to solve the problem they cut the very ground from beneath the instrument that yielded us such knowledge, by holding it to be invalid. Thus for the Buddhists the निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष, without any admixture of the operations of thought upon it, was valid, as it alone gave an intuitive insight into the original flux, while the सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष giving us percepts of static or solid things was regarded as invalid. In psychology, however, Buddhism made ample room for full fledged perception; it was only on metaphysical reasons that they left their "middle path" which they preached so much.

In this sense Jainism stood between the orthodox staticists and the Buddhistic dynamists.² In epistemology it had the theory of स्वावज्ञाद maintaining the relativity of knowledge. As regards its view of the soul, it was defined as a principle that synthesized change in permanence, as opposed to the everchanging चित्तसंतान without a substrate of the Buddhists on the one hand, and the absolutely unchanging individual Soul of the Ātmavādins.

1 According to Buddhism the subject-object relation is between two purely dynamic series. Vide—Bud. Psych. P.—64.—quotation from Samyutta N. The modern theory of relativity tells us that relations subsist between things which are themselves relative—giving us a relative relation between relative things—i. e. Relativity². A modern Buddhist would subscribe to this view.

2 Owing to the labours of H. Jacobi and others it has now been established that Buddhism and Jainism began their career almost simultaneously. Mahavira was an elder contemporary of Buddha.

So too in their theory of perception Jainism posited a progress of thought from indeterminate to determinate perception, beginning from अवग्रह at the निर्विकल्प level and ending in धारणा which is only another name for the सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष—definite perception capable of being recalled. Between these different view-points, those of Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Nyāya on one side, and the absolutely dynamic one of the Buddhists with the intermediate Jain stand-point, we find sufficient data for a synthetic construction of psychological material.

In spite of comparative non-existence of books, Indian philosophic thought has come down to us in a practically unchanged form on account of the system of संप्रदाय, defined as संप्रदायो नाम शिष्योपाध्यायसम्प्रदायविच्छेदेन शास्त्रप्राप्तिः¹ (उद्योतकर-न्याय-वार्त्तिक P. 24. Bibli. Ind.). It is this which has preserved for us the Vedic hymns and the ageless prose or poetry of the Upanishads intact. Some centuries after the death of Buddha, need must have been felt to commit the Yogic praxis and experiences to writing, and if we follow the tradition of holding the महाभाष्यकार and the योगसूत्रकार Patañjalis to be identical, we would have to put down the योगसूत्रs to about 150 B. C. - We are not principally concerned here with the question of locating the different dars'anas and their writers in the time series, for our treatment is going to be logical and not chronological. This does not mean that we should be careless about the time perspective and that the general order in which the several works, consulted in the thesis, appeared could be neglected. As regards the question of exact dates, "we must content ourselves with the belief that between the dates of the chief Upanishads and the third or fourth century A. D., there proceeded an active stream of investigation which we have only in its final form."² In our time perspective we might class together the Nyāya and the Yoga sūtrās and put Umāswāti and Īś'varkrishṇa, though coming a little later, almost together. If we take the Yoga-sūtrās to be later than the Nyāya-sūtrās from the point of

1 The word संप्रदाय has since then degenerated in its meaning.

2 His. San. Lit. A. B. Keith P. 472

view of their exact formulation, they are certainly earlier from the point of view of their substance. Perhaps the **Bharatanāṭyasāstra** falls prior to any one of these (about the beginning of the Christian era.¹) The commentators, **Vyāsa** and **Vatsyāyana** might be dated, with a wide margin, between 500-700 A. D., while **Vāchaspati**² **Dhanamjaya**, **Dhanika** and **Vajideva-sūri** (author of **प्रमाणनयनतत्त्वालोकलंकार**) may safely belong to the 9th and the 10th centuries.³ **Hemachandrāchārya**, the author of **काव्यानुशासन** lived in the 12th century—(1088–1173).⁴ The principal work consulted in the thesis for Buddhistic theories is **Anuruddha's** **अभिधम्मसंस्कृतो** translated by **Aung** under the title "Compendium of Philosophy". It seems a far cry from the time that **Buddha** taught his theory of **Anattāvāda**, to the exposition of the Buddhistic system in the 11th century made by **Anuruddha** in Cylone! But we might safely say that the philosophy of **Hinayāna** is put down there without any distortion. Time was not always a medium of refraction or perversion in Indian Philosophy.⁵ The latest work consulted for the following treatise is the **सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह** put about 1350 A. D. (Keith P. 484), and along with it we might place the **रत्नाकरावतारिका—टीका** on **प्रमाणनयनतत्त्वालोकलंकार**

In spite of metaphysical differences, all the schools of Indian thought are at one in accepting the realization of **Brahman** or **Self-realization** as the final goal. Even **Buddhism**, if it did not posit a soul to be realised, at least accepted the negative side of **Self-realization** inasmuch as it insisted on the sup-

1 Dr. De puts the lower limit of the **Natyasāstra** to 4th or the 5th century A. D., though holding that "it existed in its present shape in the 8th cen. A. D." "The upper limit cannot be put too clearly," but "the suspected sutra-text of **Bharata** belongs apparently" to the beginning of the Christian era. Vide—**His. San. P.**—Pp. 23, 29, 36f.

2 About 850 A. D. **Hist. San. Lit. Pp.** 483, 489

3 "Dhanika...was probably one of **Dhanamjaya's** numerous illustrious contemporaries." **Dhanamjaya** lived during **Mumja's** rule (974–995 A. D.). Vide **His. San. P.**—Pp. 129, 131.

4 **His. San. P.**—P. 204 also, **Found. Ind. Poetry. J. Nobel. P.** 33

5 The remark is not meant to carry the sense that there has been no development in the sphere of philosophic thought in India.

pression of the phenomenal self. Buddhistic thought is nihilistic only in the sense that it did not want to commit itself to any view about the ultimate nature of Self. In the practice of Yoga we find a common basis upon which, or the *forum* where all the schools of thought meet and forget their differences.

Science tells us that a fluid howsoever thick takes a longer time to crystallize, if left to itself, than when it gets a solid particle which affords it a readier nucleus for the process. The small particle precipitates the whole process. In case of our constructive synthesis of psychological material, the **पातञ्जल योगदर्शन**¹ affords such a nucleus. In science a particle of foreign matter might as well work, but the Yogadars'ana is not foreign to the fluid psychological material, for it is per-eminently a psychological dars'ana. As soon as we take it as our nucleus, all the viscous thought of other schools begins to crystallize round it. In the background of this common meeting place, even behind the Sāṃkhya dualism, lies the mysticism of the Upanishads like the glow of an evening sky against which we find silhouetted the specific developments of different schools.

Locke, Hume and even Kant made enquiries into the human mind and its capacity of understanding, before trying to dogmatize about the nature of the real. One should know the range and adjustment of a telescope before one could presume to look at a heavenly body through it. In the same sense a sādḥaka ought know the mechanism of his mind

1 "In the second century before Christ the Yoga philosophy was founded by Patanjali." R. Garbe : Phil. An. Ind. P. 14. In his art. on Yoga in E. R. E. he says—"H. Jacobi has made it probable on philosophic—historical grounds that the Yoga-sutras were composed after 450 A. D. by another man of the same name. On the other hand Bruno Liebich has asserted noteworthy philological-critical grounds for the identity of the two Patanjalis. The question therefore still awaits solution. But in any case the Yoga system is in the main essentially older than the Yogasutras of Patanjali." The last sentence gives us what M. Muller terms the "chronology of thought not of years." Six. Sys. P. 315,

including both its structure and function¹ before he could hope to suppress it. In the Yogadars'ana all psychological treatment is given only from the point of view of this higher Self-²realization. The enquiry into the nature of the human mind is undertaken keeping clearly this final goal in sight. Hence too the operations of the whole mind, considered as a functioning unity, are described and explained with an acumen which the western psychology displays only now, after overcoming its undue analytic or 'mosaic' bias. The sūdhaka had to free himself from the phenomenal manifestations of his mind with the help of the Dhyāna processes, which, though beginning negatively in श्रुत्याहार or "introversion" ended by developing the positive, spiritual factor of Self. The final goal was complete freedom not of, but *from* mind. Hence we find that even the purest part of mind with its active functioning in knowledge is regarded as *हेय-* something from which the spirit has to be free. Thus the whole subject matter of Psychology forms one vast '*हेयपक्ष of योग*'

This brings us to another aspect of the treatment of psychological material in Indian thought. The end being the ultimate union with Reality or the Self, the sūdhaka worked directly upon his mind in the present. So we find a good deal of discussion regarding the nature of psychological experience in the present. A system of metaphysics that places Intuition at its centre necessarily gives greater space to the treatment of the present. We find this in Bergson, and so it was with Indian psychological thought. The discipline of Yoga is calculated to take the subject from lower expressions or levels of attention to higher ones, at the same time that the structure of his mind is changed and overhauled. The structure principally consists of the dispositions, cognitive affective and conative, that have been deposited on the floor³

1 Vide Attention: Pillsbury—P. 200. Out. Psych: Pp. 35, 36, 418, also Out. Ab. Psych. P. 30-31. Psych. Pnn. Pp. 412, 414, 425f

2 Purusha rendered by the word Self following Max Muller. Six. Sys. P. 31]. Fn. 1.

3 cf. यो.—विपाकानुगुणाः वासनाः ताः त्रितभूमौ आशेरत इति आश्रयाः । वाच, टीका-१. २४

of the mind' by past actions. As the dispositions lie within the subconscious depths of our mind, they cannot be directly worked upon but only indirectly through creation, by effort, of new habits of thought and action. Hence the subject is required constantly to keep a watch on the different states or modes of mind in order to transform the inner structure of his mind. We accordingly find that a good deal has been said about the mental structure that lies as a product of past actions, while the conative aspect of consciousness on which so much stress is laid in modern Psychology is only taken for granted. For even externalization of inward will has to cease in *प्रत्याहार*. That the mind always runs after objects, that attention always presses onwards into future and outwards into space through action, that the three *gūṇas* are always on the move—was for them a mere description and no sublimation of what we term the mind. चले च गुणवृत्तम् इति क्षिप्रपरिणामि चित्तमुक्तम् (यो भा 2-15), and we find the same thought in the *गीता*—6-34 चंचलं हि मनः कृष्ण प्रमाथि बलवद्दुदम् ।

Indian thought in all its speculations has always been synthetic, and the reason for the absence of any definite recognition of Psychology as a branch of science is the same as that of a similar non-recognition of Ethics. The very ideal posited by any philosophic system in India was to be approached ethically, for the exposition of which a fairly good system of Psychological thought had sprung up. The goal of Self-realization was to be reached by a process of self-purification, of *Katharsis*; but the purging was not to be made according to the method of the Stagirite, by indulging in the passions. The subject had to allow only those emotions that were ethical in their nature. That a strong passion or an emotion stands in the way of purer perception must have been noticed early. The Stoics regarded all emotions as faulty perceptions; to Leibnitz as well as to Hegel feeling was a mode of obscure knowledge.¹ That was because they all leaned too much on the side of reason, rationalizing all the content of sensation as well as of feeling. As Dr. Ward

1 Vide *His. of Psych.* by James Mark Baldwin. II 41

has observed, feeling, emotion or the affective states of consciousness have suffered most in Psychology as they have been lost sight of either in cognitive or in conative states. This was not the reason for the non-recognition of emotions in Yogic discipline. The real reason lay rather in the ultimate nature of mystic catastrophic union, which could not be achieved without a complete freedom from the distracting emotions. Hence those emotions that stood as definite obstacles to spiritual development were summarily dismissed. In this sense the treatment of emotions in Indian Philosophy is doubly negative.¹ Emotions that were held to be *sāttvika* in their nature were to be developed, and in this *Yogādars'ana*, Buddhism and Jainism are at one in allowing only मैत्री, करुणा, मुदित्वा and उपेक्षा—friendship with the spiritually advanced, kindness for the weak, joy at the spiritual gains of others, and indifference towards the fallen or the wicked. But these are such rarefied forms of emotions, so intellectual or so very full of the consciousness of the purpose to be achieved, that perhaps in a modern treatment of emotions, they would find no place.

From such a step-motherly treatment of emotions we have not to infer that the Indians had made no investigations into the nature of emotions. The different schools of philosophic thought were precluded from any such enquiry because of their peculiar point of view. So to gather any material on emotions, we have to leave the comparatively dry philosophical systems and go to works on dramaturgy and Poetics. That the ancient Indians possessed in the भरतनाट्यशास्त्र a work on dramaturgy at so early a date as the beginning of the Christian era shows that the drama must have been known much earlier.² The motive with which the enquiry into the nature of human emotions was undertaken in the *Nāṭyas'āstra*

1 Because Psychology in itself is treated only negatively.

2 "These scholars [Hertel and others] in accordance with older suggestions of Max Müller and Lévi see in the so-called *Akhyāna* hymns of the *Rigveda*...actual remains of ritual dramas." Macdonell and Keith. *Vedic Index* Vol. I. 77-78 quoted in आयुर्विद्याव्याख्यानमाला P. 235.

was that, knowing their expressions, an actor would be able to convey specific emotions to the audience through them. As we saw above the psychological treatment of the human mind in philosophic thought was given from a negative point of view, mind and its expressions being regarded as something that were to be shunned or suppressed, so here we find almost the diametrically opposite view of studying emotions in order to convey them through their expressions !

We have already defined Yoga as the practical side of Self-realization posited theoretically by metaphysics as its goal. Because of this, the practice of Yoga may be tacked on to any metaphysical spiritualism. From one point of view Yoga is dependent upon other systems for its metaphysics, while from another point of view other systems are dependent upon Yoga for a practical guidance in the realization of their ideal.¹

This perhaps is the main reason why as a system of philosophic thought, the Yogadars'ana has not drawn the attention of scholars to an extent that other systems of Indian philosophy have done. "After we have once understood" says Max Muller, the position of the Sāṃkhya-philosophy towards the great problem of the world, we shall not glean many new metaphysical or psychological (?) ideas from a study of the Yoga."² That we may not hope to "glean many new psychological ideas from a study of the Yoga," seems to be, in the opinion of the writer, a hasty remark. From a purely theoretic view-point, metaphysics might occupy much the larger part of a philosophical construction ; but the outstanding characteristic of Indian Philosophy has been that only those, who had truly achieved a spiritual synthesis, constructed metaphysical systems and they never lost sight of the truth that the ultimate ideal was to be realized and not merely known intellectually. Lesser souls always wrote, at best, commentaries over the original systems. So the traditions of the different paths of Self-realization were kept alive. It was around such traditions that the practices of Yoga grew up.

1 Vide. Sāṃ. Sys. P. 55 His. San. Lit. P. 490,

2 Six Sys. P. 312.

Because of this, in each and every system we find deep-rooted ramifications of the Yoga-praxis. Inasmuch as the Pātañjala Yogadars'ana gives the whole of such Yoga praxis it has a central place in all Indian philosophic thought. When, however, we come across the same thoughts and theories in other dars'anas as are laid down in the Yogadars'ana, it becomes hard to decide, in the absence of definite data, as to who were the real borrowers. Perhaps none were borrowers. For we shall be nearer truth when we say that they were the common property of the race at the time, which Patañjali laid down in his Yogadars'ana.

A few instances will show us the tenor of philosophic thought in all different schools. In the Nyāyadars'ana we read:—अथ कथं तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यत इति !—समाधिर्विशेषाभ्यासात् ॥ ४-२-३८ ॥ तत्र समाधिविशेषो नोपपद्यते—क्षुधादिभिः प्रवर्तनाच्च ॥ आ. क्षुत्पिपासान्यां...व्याधिभिश्चानिच्छतोऽपि बुद्धयः प्रवर्तन्ते तस्मादेकान्यानुपपत्तिरिति—॥ ४-२-४० ॥ तदर्थं यमनियमाभ्यामात्मसंस्कारा योगाभ्यासमविध्युपाये ॥ ४-२-४६ ॥ Not only is samādhi mentioned as the only means of attaining that true knowledge (and that too after all the talk on logic etc.) but hunger, thirst, disease are mentioned as so many obstacles to ekāgratā. (cf. बो. १-३०). In the bhāṣhya on 4-2-38, प्रत्याहार and अभ्यास figure as means to samādhi. Yama and Niyama too are enjoined upon. The sūtra—अरण्यगुहापुल्लिनादिषु योगाभ्यासोपदेशः ॥ ४-२-४२ ॥ might favourably be compared with a passage appearing in श्र. २-१०, which reads “Let him perform his exercises in a place level, pure, free from pebbles fire or dust, delightful by its sounds, its water and bowers, not painful to the eye, and full of shelter and caves.” In the Vais'eshika-dars'ana too we find references to Yama, Niyama, S'uchi etc mentioned in the अष्टांगयोग of the Yogadars'ana. In that dars'ana, Yoga is definitely mentioned in 5-2-16 where it is defined as तदनारम आत्मस्थ मनसि शरीरस्य दुःखाभावः स योगः ॥ ५-२-१६ ॥ In the Sāṃkhya-sūtras we come across स्थिरसुख-मासनम् ॥ ३-३४ ॥ रागोपहृतिर्धनम् ॥ ३-३० ॥ वृत्तिविरोधात्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ३-३१ ॥ We do not know to which Yogadars'ana S'āṅkara refers, when in his Brahma-sūtra bhāṣhya, before trying to refute the meta-physical assumptions of that Yogas'āstra, he says—योगशास्त्रेऽपि

“अथ तत्त्वदर्शन-अभ्युपायो योगः” इति सम्यग्दर्शनाभ्युपायत्वेन योगोऽंगीक्रियते । The Sūtra mentioned अथ तत्त्वदर्शन-अभ्युपायो योगः । does not turn up in the Pātañjāla Yogadars'ana, which yields the conclusion that there must have existed another Yogadars'ana now extinct.¹ In the Bhagavadgītā one might roughly find three divisions of six adhyāyas each—the first dealing with Karmayoga, the second with Bhaktiyoga, and the third with the Jñānayoga.

The influence of Yoga on Jainism can best be shown by taking the case of Umāsvāti's तत्त्वार्थाधिगमसूत्र. In it we no doubt find greater importance attached to asceticism, still it is on the inner coefficient of asceticism, as the moral equivalent of physical war² that stress is laid in the तत्त्वार्थ. Its terminology differs from that of the Yogadars'ana³ but the whole background is almost the same. The freedom to be attained is by the process of चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध, आस्रवनिरोधः संहरः (तत्त्वार्थ १-१.) reads much like योगः चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः (पा. १-२.) For the secondary meaning of Āsravas comes near enough to the Vṛttis of the Yogdars'ana; and the ultimate goal defined as मोक्षयात... केवलम् (तत्त्वार्थ १०-१) is the same as “... दोषबीजक्षये कैवल्यम् (पा. ३-५०) or as expressed in the Sāṃkhya terminology as—“ पुरुषार्थशून्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यम् (पा. ८-३४). The classification of evil deeds mentioned in पा. २-३४ along with their degrees of intensity, and their degree in remoteness from the agent played a great part in Jainism. Thus one was not to kill, nor cause some one else to kill, nor even abet another one to kill- कृतकारितानुमतकषायविशेषैर्जिज्ञिषिष्वतुर्वैकल्यः ॥ तत्त्वार्थ ६-९ ॥ bears the stamp of आद्ये मरेमसमारंभारंभयोग-वितर्काः हिंसादयः कृत-कारितानुमोदिता दुःखाऽज्ञानाऽनन्तफला-इति प्रतिपक्षभाषनम् ॥ पा २-३४ ॥ And the classification of Karma or acts into good, bad, good-bad, and neither-good-nor-bad is the same as the fourfold classification of Karmas given in :—कर्माऽशुक्लाऽकुण्डं योगिनस्त्रिविधमितरेषाम् ॥ ४-७ ॥ where acts are divided into शुक्ल, कुण्ड, शुक्लकुण्ड and शुक्लकुण्ड.⁴

1 हिंदुतत्त्वज्ञानमो इतिहास-पूर्वार्ध-११२.

2 Vide Var. Rel. Ex. Pp. 363-367 ff.

3 For instance the word Yoga is used in the sense of being the cause of existence through कर्तृ, the word ज्ञान being used in the ordinary sense of योग.

4 Over and above such similarities in thought, there is at one

Up to now we have kept apart Buddhism from our comparative review, because of its Anattāvāda ; but from the point of view of psychological material or the negative goal that was to be reached, we can no longer keep it apart. We have already seen how the same cardinal method of Indian Medicine was applied to the science of mokṣa. The अष्टांगयोग becomes here the आर्य अष्टांगमार्ग, and the fourfold ध्यान or समापत्ति¹ figure here as the fourfold रूपध्यान namely—वितर्क, विचार, पीति, and सुख, afterwards rarefied on the अरूप level into four more ! Following Kern² we might push this parallel between Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Buddhism into spheres other than psychological. He finds some similarity between the Sāṃkhya conception of प्रत्यक्षवर्ग and the Buddhist theory of प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद, though "not enough to prove a borrowing." As regard the evolutionary series he puts down:—

place a very great verbal similarity between the Vyāsa bhashya and the bhashya on the तत्त्वार्थ. We quote the two :—

योगदर्शन—आयुर्विपाक कर्म द्विविधं सोपक्रमं निरुपक्रमं च । तत्र यथाद्वै वितानितं हृत्तीयसा कालेन शुष्येतथा सोपक्रमम् । यथा च तदेव संपिण्डितं चरेण संशुष्येदेव निरुपक्रमम् । यथा वाग्निः शुष्के कक्षे, युक्तो वातेन समन्ततो युक्तः क्षेपीयसा कालेन दहेतथा मापक्रमम् । यथा वा म एवामिस्तृणराशौ क्रमशोऽवयवेषु न्यस्ताध्वरेण दहेतथा निरुपक्रमम् । तद्वत्कम-
विक्रमायुष्करं कर्म द्विविधं सोपक्रमं निरुपक्रमं च । भा. ३. २२ ॥

तत्त्वार्थ—शेषा मनुष्यास्तिर्यग्यानिजा. सोपक्रमा निरुपक्रमाधापवत्यायुधोऽनपवत्या-
युध धमवन्ति । ... संहतशुष्कतृणराशिदहनवत् । यथाहि संहतस्य शुष्कस्यापि तृणराशेरवयवशः
क्रमेण दह्यमानस्य चिरेण दाहो भवति, तस्यैव शिथिलप्रकीर्णोपवितस्य सर्वतो युगपदापीपितस्य
पवनोपक्रमाभिहतस्याशु दाहो भवति तद्वत् । ... । यथा वा धौतपटा जलाद् एव संहतध्वरेण
शोधमुपयाति स एव च वितानितः सूर्यरश्मिवाय्वभिहतः क्षिप्रं शोधमुपयाति न च संहते
तस्मिन् प्रभूतस्तेह्यगमो नाऽपि वितानितेऽकृत्स्नत्वाद्य तद्वद् यथोक्तं निमित्तापवर्तनैः कर्मणः
क्षिप्रं फलोपभांगो भवति । भा. २. ५२ ।

Pt. Sukhalalji in his masterly Introduction to तत्त्वार्थ सूत्र (गूज.) says that instances of the सोपक्रम and निरुपक्रम कर्म are not met with in the existing Jain works. Vide Intr. P. 13.—Pt. Sukhalalji in his scholarly art. on योगदर्शन-आर्यविद्याव्याख्यानमाला has most ably dealt with the similarities between different dars'anas from the Yoga view-point.

1 सवितर्क, निवितर्क, सविचार, निर्विचार of the Yogadars'an1 or पृथक्प्रवितर्कस-
विचार, एकप्रवितर्क, सूक्ष्मक्रियाप्रतिपाति and व्युत्पत्तिक्रियानिवृत्ति—the four kinds of
शुक्लध्यान given in the तत्त्वार्थ.

Buddhistic Series

अविद्या,
संस्कार,
विज्ञान,
नामरूप
षडायतनम्

Sāṃkhya Series

प्रज्ञान,
बुद्धि,
अहंकार,
तन्मात्राणि
इन्द्रियाणि

Any student of Sāṃkhya will notice that the derivation of the last two terms in the Sāṃkhya series is not quite correct. Still it is a significant thing to note a similarity between the Buddhistic संसार and the Sāṃkhya बुद्धि, between विज्ञान and अहंकार. At the time when Buddha lived and even for some centuries after that, there must have been an exchange of thoughts on such a vast scale, that at our distance of time it becomes an impossible task to trace their real origins. For instance in the Yogadars'ana bhāṣhya on 1-47 we find a 'Pāramarshī gāthā' quoted—

“प्रज्ञाप्रसादमाख्या असोच्य शोचतो जनान् ।
भूमिष्ठानि च शैलश्चः सर्वान्प्राज्ञोऽनुपश्यति ॥

This very verse turns up in the Dhammapada in its Pāli form—

पमादं अप्पमादेन यदा नुदति पण्डितो ।
पञ्चापासादमाख्या असोको सोकिनि पवे ।
पण्णतट्ठो व भुम्मट्ठे धीरो बाले अवेक्खति ॥ अप्पमादवग्गो-२८ ॥

and it would be difficult to say whether the gāthā did not originally belong to the Buddhistic literature.

Other schools of Indian thought devoted themselves to problems other than that of Yoga. The Pātañjala Yogadars'ana is one of the oldest works, now before us, dealing primarily with the Yoga-praxis. If we look to its metaphysical side it has very little to say anything which is quite new, when compared with other systems. But on its psychological side we find an immense wealth of material and insight which it would be hard to find to the same extent in any other dars'ana.

Patañjali accepted the Sāṃkhya metaphysics and its Sat-kārya-vāda. From an ultimate point of view it also accepted a further implication of the Sat-kārya-vāda, by holding substance

and its attributes to be identical. It would be hard for us to see how they could keep to the Sāṃkhya Dualism, for if substance and its attributes were one, the dualism between Puruṣa and Prakṛti would reduce itself to duality, and would finally bring us to Upanishadic spiritualistic monism, a conclusion which was logically drawn by S'āṅkara.

Such metaphysical incompleteness had certain advantages in the sphere of Psychology. Everybody's salvation was in his own hands; the dualism between Puruṣa and Prakṛti helped in clearing the distinction between subject and object of experience in Psychology. Prakṛti as the undifferentiated *object* gave the actual objects of sense, as evolved therefrom, some organic unity (बो. भा. १-४३; ३-४४; ४-१३; ४-१५-१६.) The same organic unity belonged to the mind to a higher degree. This unity of the mind which is already presupposed in our knowledge of a similar unity in the object, bore at its perceptual level a theory coming, in its own way, nearest to the most modern theory of auditory perception. Secondly the view of ultimate identity between substance and attribute had to be made amenable to our judgments of relation between them, and in an effort to reconcile these two apparently contradictory things, they hit upon the real characteristic of any process of thought and posited *विकल्प* as one of the *Vṛttis* of our mind. *Vikalpa* as one of the specific modifications of our mind has been recognised only in the *Yogadars'ana*, and we can safely take it to be its most important contribution to psychological thought.

Over and above this, we find in the *Yogadars'ana* a definite recognition of Dispositional Masses, forming the structure of our mind, created by its past acts and through which it functions in the present. We have already said that the path to Self-realization lay through a complete overhauling of the mental structure. That could only be done through a voluntary effort of attention. The truth of what modern psychology terms sublimation lies in passing from a lower level of attention to a higher one; and in the *Yogadars'ana* we find laid down a

*Theory of Levels of Attention.*¹ The levels of attention give us corresponding *Levels of Perception and Reality*, above the threshold of consciousness, while below it they imply similar different *Levels in Subconscious Structure*.

Lastly we find in the Yogadars'ana a purely dynamic view of chitta. The theory of the ultimate identity of substance with its attributes when applied to Prakṛiti gives us the inseparability of motion from the thing moving, of process from result. These, according to the Yoga view, could only be distinguished by a process of vikalpa. Hence chitta and its several modifications come to mean a single dynamic process, a view which was held by Buddhism though it worked at it from the opposite direction.

The theory of auditory Perception; the treatment of चिक्लप; recognition of Dispositional Masses and of Levels of Attention, with a truly dynamic view of mind—these points from the Yogadars'ana are such as can be bodily incorporated in any modern treatise on Psychology. They give us a sufficiently solid nucleus to arrange our thoughts.

In order to understand the psychological thought of Indian Philosophy, it is necessary for us, to define its metaphysical gamut.

All the schools of Indian Philosophy, including Buddhism take अविद्या to be the root cause of existence and its misery; and knowledge was held to be the only deliverer from such misery.

It could be attained through Yoga which is the only thread running unbroken through all the philosophic systems of India. In the Upanishads it is based upon a spiritualistic monism. योगवासिष्ठ and हृदयोगप्रदीपिका follow the Upanishads in accepting this metaphysical basis. The Pātañjala Yogasūtras and the Jain literature on Yoga are based upon a spiritualistic pluralism. The former accepts Sāṃkhya dualism, while the latter is moulded by atomism.

1 In Yogadars'ana we do not find any treatment of "consciousness" as such. बुद्धि is not a state of consciousness, for sleep is regarded as one. Even in modern psychology the question is raised as to whether the word should be kept up in psychology at all. Vide Psych. Prin. P. 60. e. s.

The *saṁkhyasūtra* of *Īś'varakṛishṇa* is a rather late production. But we meet with *Sāṁkhya* ideas in the *S'vetās'vatara* and the *Maitrāyaṇa-Brāhmaṇa* Upanishads. We find almost the whole of the *Sāṁkhya* evolutionary series in कठ. १. ३ १०-११. It reads:—"Beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, the great self (आत्मा) is beyond the intellect. (10) Beyond the great there is the Undeveloped, (अव्यक्त), beyond the Undeveloped there is the Self (पुरुष). Beyond the Self there is nothing—This is the goal, the highest road " In spite of all such *Sāṁkhya* references,¹ the whole tenor of Upanishadic thought is towards a spiritualistic monism or mysticism, and in the *S'vetās'vatara* there are passages that definitely speak against *Sāṁkhya* dualism.² There is a likelihood that this *Sāṁkhya* was originally theistic. .. Guṇaratna in his commentary on षडदर्शनसमुच्चय refers to the original *Sāṁkhya* being theistic as opposed to the later *Sāṁkhya* System that we have in the *Karikū*.³ In that case the theism of the *Yogādars'ana*, which some scholars go to the extent of maintaining as an after insertion, cannot be regarded as an innovation made by Patañjali upon the *Sāṁkhya* system. It is just possible that Patañjali accepted the old *Sāṁkhya* as the basis of his *Yoga Sūtras*

The conception of Soul varied with different schools *Yogādars'ana*, after *Sāṁkhya* takes it to be absolutely unchanging or static, not giving it even the attribute of, or capacity for, knowledge, which it reserves for the purest part of *Prakṛiti* viz.—the *Buddhi-sattva*. The Soul is nothing but pure consciousness.⁴ According to the *Nyāya* view—दृच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञाना-

1 श्वे. ६. १३ mentions सांख्ययोग, 'तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाधिगम्यं ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपापैः'। Max Muller translates it as a 'देव'; but it seems probable the reference is to सांख्ययोग and not to 'सांख्य and योग'.

2 e. g. श्वे. ६. १. "Some wise men deluded speak of nature and others of time (as the cause of everything), but it is the greatness of God by which this ब्रह्म wheel is made to turn." Vide also अ. १ २.

3 हिंदुत्वज्ञाननो इतिहास. पूर्वार्धे पृ. ४४. also आपणो धर्म-कपिल निरीश्वरवादी हता के केस? पृ. ३७४ c. ६.

4 यो. १-९; १-२०; ४-१८; ३-५०; ४-२९

न्यात्मनो लिङ्गमिति ॥ १-१-१० ॥ We come to know of the existence of Soul through desire, aversion, power to make an effort, pleasure, pain and knowledge, for these cannot exist without an enduring soul. The final state to be reached is that of absolute freedom from such phenomenal contact with the outside world, the *manas* and the *Buddhi*, to be achieved through *तत्त्वज्ञान* (which is absolute knowledge attained through *Samādhi* न्या. ४-२-३८) Thus we find that, in a sense, the कूटस्थनित्यता, a characteristic of the Soul according to the Sāṃkhya-yoga, is given up at least in its *vyutthana* state, though posited as an ideal to be reached.¹ Jainism must have felt the untenable nature of such a position, and it struck a comparatively modern note by defining Soul as a principle of permanence in change.²

Over and above the nature of the Soul, there remains the whole evolutionary series of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, to be defined before we can go to our subject proper. Sāṃkhya Kārikā, 22, and the Patañjala sūtra 2. 19. with its Bhashya give us the whole series

प्रकृतेर्महास्ततोऽहंकारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।

तस्मादपि षोडशकार्त्तवचभ्यः पञ्चभूतानि ॥

The series is here meant to give the cosmological evolution of the universe, but it has been derived by projecting the elements arrived at by an analysis of the human mind. Thus man himself is made up of all these, along with the supreme principle of consciousness, the *Purusha*, through whom the series gets its significance. The individual was the microcosm of which the universe was the "*makranthropos*" a word substituted by Prof. Ranade in place of "macrocosm". We are here concerned with the structure of the individual only. The knowledge of the external world comes up to him through the channels of the senses.³ From within the sense data some are

1 The Vais'eshika view is the same. प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषजीवनमनोगतीन्द्रियान्तर विकारः सुखदुःखेच्छाप्रयत्नाद्यात्मनो लिङ्गानि ॥ ३. २. ४ ॥

2 तत्त्वार्थ अ. ५ सू. २९, ३७, ४०, ४१. etc.

3 References are given at the end of the section.

selected or attended to by the Manas. This word is used in different senses both in the Upanishads and in the Yogadars'ana. The ambiguity is cleared up in the Nyāya (also Vais'eshika) and the Jain dars'anas where it is used definitely in the sense of an internal organ, roughly corresponding to mind as an internal sense of the old faculty psychology. This manas adds its own specific experiences in the form of feelings of pleasure or of pain along with its workings upon the sense data, and yields the whole content to the Ego, the Ahaṅkāra. The Ahaṅkāra which is regarded as a principle of lower individuation bestows a centre to which all the experiences are referred. The whole content is afterwards delivered over to the Buddhi or the determining Intellect. The word बुद्धि¹ is almost untranslatable inasmuch as within its synthetic unity are to be found intellect as well as will. It is a significant point worth noting that the genesis of the Individual and that of the cosmos run together upto the Ahaṅkāra, the lower principle of individuation. The bifurcation of the individual and the material universe, of manas and matter comes after this, the sāttvika Ahaṅkāra developing into manas and the ten other indriyas, and the tāmasika Ahaṅkāra into the corporeal world. This can only mean that all the material things in the world do possess a sort of individuality, howsoever incipient it might be on account of its tāmasika level. For, such individual objects alone are regarded as objects of perception.²

We have defined Ahaṅkāra as the principle of lower individuation. The higher principle of Individuality is found in the Purusha. It is difficult to comprehend from our point of view how a concept emptied of all its contents can be distinguished from another such empty concept, that is -how the Purushas can be distinguished one from the other.³

The difficulty is not without its counterpart in psychology

1 The point is not made quite clear, but on the cosmological side it is Mahat, on the Individual side it is called Buddhi.

2 Vide यो. १-४३; ३-४४; ४-१३; ४-१६. Also Supra P. 25.

3 The logical outcome of the process can lodge one only into Spiritualistic Monism of the Upanishads.

for it necessarily becomes hard to relate the two absolutely disparate substances, Purusha and Prakṛiti.¹ The difficulty is overcome in Jainism with its doctrine of Soul as a "concrete universal" with unity in diversity, but is hardly solved in the Nyāya even though the attribute of knowledge is allowed to it.

We might define the metaphysical system of the Yogadars'ana as a Spiritualistic pluralism joined to qualitative dualism. Purusha is absolutely static, mind absolutely dynamic. Then the mind or the Buddhi, which is itself material, being the product of Prakṛiti, is said to take on the role of consciousness on account of its nearness to Purusha. The relation between Purusha and Buddhi is taken by Vāchaspati to be an instance of योग्यता संबंध, relation of fitness or harmony, while Bhikshu takes it to be a सत्य संबंध; but this makes no difference in either the form or the final goal, or in the psychological approach to it.

The Buddhi, the Ahankāra and the manas all the three combined are spoken of as अंतःकरण.

Intellectual operations of the Buddhi take place on the conceptual level, and its volitional acts give us external action. In both the functions the Buddhi works through the manas which is the reception house of the afferent sensations as well as the final place for the efferent currents to pass over into bodily actions.²

1 Vide. Psych. Prin. Pp. 12-18 on Dualism and Duality of Experience.

A similar difficulty we find in Aristotle. His dualism between matter and form is only relieved by the insertion of degrees between them. Still the final *hyle* remains unredeemed. So too with Descartes—in his attempt to find a seat of mediation between *res extensae* and *res cogitantes*. If Leibnitz's modern Aristoteleanism made the monads windowless, he had to invoke the Principle of Pre-established Harmony to solve the problem of representation.

2 Manas brings about a co-ordination not merely between different sense organs but between the jñanendriyas and the Karmendriyas too. The functional operations of the inner organ are purely material, but on account of their borrowed light we regard them as psychical. "The combined material inner organ exactly corresponds, as regards its unspiritual nature, to the nervous system." Garbe's art. on Samkhya in

The last concept to be defined is that of चित्त. It is at times identified with the whole working of the mind. It certainly incudes all the three factors of धेतःकरण, as when it is said—योगः चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध. (पा. १. २), at times it is equated with the Buddhi or the Buddhi-Sattva. There is almost a similar ambiguity in the Buddhistic use of the words विज्ञान, चित्त, and मनस्. There विज्ञान is used while discussing the theory of birth death and rebirth¹ the world चित्त being almost reserved to be used in the sense of "the subjective inward looking aspect of consciousness" as in चित्तसंतान or वीथिचित्त. The word मनस् in Buddhism comes up in discussions on intellectual functioning of consciousness.¹ Similarly in the Yogadars'ana the words बुद्धि and चित्त are used in different contexts. That part of the mind which catches, in its purity the reflection of the absolute Purusha is termed Buddhi. It is this संयोजन, coupled with अविद्या, which is responsible for the after fall of the mind from its sãttvika purity, and for the admixture of the attributes of Karma, working through the Adh'sta, leaving in its trail the आशयः or tendencies. The world चित्त is used for such a mind with all its impurities, carrying all the "Seeds" or dispositions accumulated from indefinite past.

The Sãmkhya series has been incorporated in many systems. It figures in the Nyãya, the Vais'eshika, and the Vedãntadars'ana too with their specific modifications. The Pãtañjãli Yoga-sũtras are based upon it. It would be hazardous to build any hypothesis as to why Patañjali chose this system as the basis of

E. R. F. Keith objects against this, saying "everything including psychic states of experience in an unconscious condition, is present in the inner organ waiting to become actual by the addition of the element of consciousness given by spirit." Sam. Sys. P. 95. The material states qua material states cannot include psychic states and A. B. Keith's remark cannot be justified, and we can hold Garbe's opinion, though it must be added, "This comparison may be made in order to indicate the place of the inner organ in the animal organism, although naturally no teacher of the Samkhya had any conception of the nervous system, as it is understood by modern science."

1 Bud. Psych. Pp. 17-25 ff. 6?. cf. बसुबन्धु's definition, चित्तं चेतति, मनस् मन्यते, विज्ञानं विज्ञानादे. Y. Sõgen. P. 152

his exposition of the Yoga-praxis. Probably that was the only school of thought that had any definite system traceable to the Upanishadic times. Whatever it be, the Sāṃkhya point of view gives real existence to every individual, and its qualitative dualism lends itself readily to an easy treatment of the psychological basis of Yoga. The science of Psychology requires at the very start a clear distinction between subject and object, and this need of a naive psychological realism is pre-eminently fulfilled by diluting a little the Sāṃkhya dualism.

Habits of thought in the east and the west differ. The western mind, trained up in the traditions of Aristotelian Logic, cannot but be struck by what H. C. Warren has aptly described as 'the strangeness of the intellectual landscape.' The phrase that was used for Buddhistic habits of thought might as well be applied to the whole field of Indian Philosophy. It is only lately that western Logic has been rescued from the shadow of Aristotle's analytic genius. Still his method of division or of classification into genus and species is applied in all sciences. We might call these analytic classifications *horizontal*. Ancient Indians were acquainted with this system of classification, but they laid it aside and chose a more synthetic method of division when dealing with qualitative entities. The horizontal system is at its best when dealing with things from an externalistic point of view. Thus the system gives us in mathematics clear-cut definitions and divisions which for *some* purposes might be held to be ideal. But as we ascend the ladder of sciences, definitions become more and more incomplete or arbitrary and divisions almost overlap. Accidental qualities or *surds* turn up, and when we reach Psychology we find that the very entity which we want to classify, namely our mind, is too dynamic to be dealt with like this. For at different levels of consciousness there turn up non-subsumable entities that functionally work in the same way as some of those at the lower levels, and which also appear at the higher levels though in a different garb, unless the very structure of the mind be completely changed.

Thus the क्लेश is translated as 'the defiling passions' 'afflictions' -

or 'infections' are divided into—अविद्या, अस्मिता, राग-द्वेष, and अभिनिवेश giving us in a sort of a *vertical* series different contents of consciousness that would otherwise have been put in different chapters like those on Instinct (to begin with अभिनिवेश), Emotions, Sense of self' etc. in any modern treatment of the subject. The purpose of Yogadars'anakāra in putting them all together is to show that the अभिनिवेश—that instinctive clinging to life, resulting in the expression of fear, works at the lowest level of life like that of a worm or a child, much in the same way as the अविद्या or अस्मिता—mundane egoism does, in the economy of the human mind when it has reached a comparatively high level of spiritual development. Our mind is not merely a flat country that might be traversed to and fro and divided into little co-existent counties. It is three dimensional or, to speak in modern scientific terminology, four-dimensional much like the universe around us.

We find the same *vertical* classification when the - Bhāshyakāra says:—मूढं क्षिप्तं विक्षिप्तमेकाग्रं निष्कृद्धमिति चित्तभूमयः for it is about the levels of attention that he is talking. सत्त्व, रजस्, and तमस् too, though very often described as substantive qualities, mean, when applied to the individual mind, only different levels of consciousness.

1. The word अस्मिता seems to be used in two senses, firstly in the sense of—consciousness 'of the phenomenal subject' in which case it might serve as a stepping-stone to higher levels of समाधि. This is given in यो. १. ३६. तथाऽस्मितायां समापन्ते चित्तं...शान्तमनन्तमस्मितामात्रं भवति। Thus अस्मिता has a place in the hierarchy of samapattis. In another sense, it is the false identification of the Purusha with the phenomenal changes in the Buddhi, and taken to be one of the Kles'as. How a Kles'a can have a place in the progression of Samadhi is hard to realise. M. Muller maintains that "Asmita is different from Ahankara." Vide Six. Sys. P. 342. Perhaps in its second sense it is different. But in its purer sense as a prop to a stage of samadhi, we might hold that it does not differ from the Ahankara regarded as the principle of lower individuation. Ahankara is defined in सां. का. २४ and त. कौ. 'मदर्थं एवामी विषयाः"... 'अतोऽहमस्मि' इति॥ And in the Yogadars'ana we have तथा श्रोत्रत्वक्प्राणानि बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि, वाक्...पादूपस्थाः कर्मेन्द्रियाणि, एकादशे मनः ... इत्येतानि अस्मितालक्षणस्य अविशेषस्य विशेषाः ॥ यो. भा. २. १९ ॥ which proves that in its former sense it is the differential quality of, if not identical with, the Ahankara.

The distinction drawn here between the "*horizontal*" and the "*vertical*" systems of classification is not merely indulged in by the writer to justify all old ways of thought.¹ Such a vertical system of classification was used simply because of the pre-eminently ethical point of view of ancient Indians. Even if the existence of evil or the morally bad be explained away metaphysically, the existence of good and bad are not merely extra-psychological ethical quantities but are psychological facts and as such they can have a place in any book on psychology worth its name.²

To satisfy our questioner, we may quote Mrs. Rhys

1 The distinction between the *vertical* and the *horizontal* classification is referred to in the प्रमाणनय० ३. ५-६, mentioned in connection with प्रत्यक्षा—अनुभवसृष्टिहेतुकं तिर्यग्दर्शतासामान्यादिगोचरं सकलमात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षिज्ञानमिति ॥ ३. ५ ॥ तिर्यक् सामान्यञ्च गवादिषु गोत्वादि स्वरूपसदृशपरिणामात्मकम्, ऊर्ध्वतासामान्यञ्च परापर विवर्तव्यापि मृत्नादिद्रव्यम्.....॥ टी ॥ The classification of cows from the view-point of cowhood is *horizontal*, while earth, subsuming under it the jug and the broken pieces, gives us the *vertical* one the former is static and spatial, latter dynamic, and hence unfolding in time. They are defined as.—सामान्यं द्विप्रकारं तिर्यक्सामान्यम् ऊर्ध्वतासामान्यं चेति ॥ ५. ३ ॥ प्रतिव्यक्तिं तुल्या परिणतिरितिर्यक्सामान्यं शबलशाबलेयादिपिण्डेषु गोत्वं यथेति ॥ ५. ४ ॥ पूर्वापरपरिणामसाधारणं द्रव्यम् ऊर्ध्वतासामान्यं कटककणायतुगमिकाञ्चनवदिति ॥ प्रमा० ५. ५ ॥ The ऊर्ध्वता जाति of the Jains is the same as the धर्मी of the Yogādars'ana, where the jug etc. are the धर्मपरिणामs of earth as substance. Vide also Prof. Radhakrishnan's Ind. Phil: II. 211. Fn. 1.

2 The trend of modern psychology leans towards what a few years ago would have been termed an undue ethical bias. Thus Wm. MacDougall says,—“the aim of psychology is to render our knowledge of human nature more exact and more systematic in order that we may control ourselves more wisely and influence our fellow-men more effectively.”—Out. Psych. P. 1

We meet with a less emphatic note in,—“It is not the business of the psychologist to say whether an act is a crime or not. He may give his judgment on the person's mental condition without committing himself further, as the doctor pronounces a man to be dead without thereby asserting him to be murdered. But this formal detachment cannot be maintained absolutely, the definitions of crime and insanity are for practical purposes inseparable”—etc.—His. Psych.—Brett. Vol. III P. 308.

Davids. "For the Buddhist the ethical goodness or badness of a state of consciousness" says she "was a preliminary quality of that state of consciousness no less than, for us, extension and solidity are reckoned as primary qualities of external things. ... These opposed qualities (of good and bad) are integral parts of the content of mental activity, wrought up in its texture. They are therefore not out of place in an analysis of consciousness, and I doubt if even at this time of day, a Buddhist writing on psychology, would judge that such considerations involved trespass outside his legitimate range."¹ What Mrs. Rhys Davids has said of Buddhistic psychology is equally true of all Indian thought

But for the purpose of our treatise we shall sift the purely psychological material from amidst a host of other discussions or descriptions, ethical, religious or purely abnormal. For instance when we read in the Bhāshya on 1-12, *चित्तमसौ नलोभयतोवाहिनी वहति कल्याणाय वहति पापाय च ।* we can see that the Bhāshyakāra compares our mind to a river flowing either towards good or towards bad; but the western bias would ask us to dissociate ourselves from any reference to ethical values. To take another instance, in the sūtra *कायरूपसंयमात्तत्त्वाद्यशक्तिस्तेभ्यश्चक्षुष्यकाशासंप्रयोगेऽन्तर्धानम् ॥ ३ २१ ॥* it is stated how a yogi can become invisible to others. The power to make oneself invisible is one of the siddhis, all of which form the subject matter, if at all, for Abnormal Psychology. But the sūtra also contains the whole theory of visual perception as accepted in the Yogadars'ana, according to which *चक्षुष्यकाशासंप्रयोग* with the outside object is held to give us a perception

We need not give various other illustrations from several dars'anas, showing that to an Indian thinker mind as a whole was the subject matter for investigation. There was not a single expression of mind which was regarded as abnormal. In the west a sort of physical bias was responsible for mistaking our waking consciousness for the whole mind. So they arrived at a "mosaic" view of mind, where sensations and ideas

¹ Bud. Psych. P. 10.

jostled amongst themselves to enter into the focus of consciousness. It was the associationistic school that held the field till lately, when it finally surrendered to modern Psychology expressly positing the subject of experience and taking mind to be a growing unity functionally active at all its levels. As we shall see Indian thought never had any atomistic bias. It only registered certain experiences, and introspectively looked into the mechanism of mind, in order that men might become better. And if any material for a present-day abnormal psychology got into their treatment, we should know that their view-point was truly normal.

Some Sources on the Sāmkhya Series discussed on Page 29, e s.

- (१) इन्द्रियप्रणालिकया चित्तस्य बाह्यवस्तुपरानात तद्विषया ... बुद्धिः प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ यो. भा. १-७ ॥ सान्त.करणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवग्राहते यस्मात् । तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारं, द्वाराणि दोषाणि ॥ का. ३५ ॥
- (२) सोऽयं संकल्पलक्षणो व्यापारो मनसः समानासमानजातीयान्यां व्यवच्छिन्नं मनो लक्षयति ॥ सां. त. कौ. का. २७ ॥
- (३) यथा हि ग्रामाध्यक्षः कौटुंबिकेभ्यः करमादाय विषयाध्यक्षाय प्रयच्छति, विषयाध्यक्षश्च सर्वाध्यक्षाय, स च भूपतये, तथा बाह्येन्द्रियाण्यालोच्य मनसे समर्पयन्ति. मनश्च संकल्प्याहंकाराय, अहंकारश्चाभिमत्य बुद्धौ सर्वाध्यक्षभूतायां, तद्विदमुक्तम्-“पुरुष स्वार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति” इति ॥ सां. त. कौ. का. ३६ ॥
- (४) “उभयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् । का. २७ । पञ्चादश मनः सर्वोऽयम् । यो. भा. २-१९ ।
- (५) “अभिमानोऽहंकारः ... ” । का. २४ । यत् कल्पालोचितं मतं च तत्र ‘अहमधिकृतः’, ‘मदयां पशामी विषयाः’ ... ‘अतोऽहमस्मि’ इति योऽभिमानः ... । तमुपजीव्य हि बुद्धिरध्यवस्यति-‘कर्तव्यमेतन्मया’ इति निश्चयं करोति । सां. त. कौ.
- (६) “अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः ... । ” का. २३ । सर्वो व्यवहर्ताऽऽलोच्य-मत्वाऽहमत्राधिकृत इत्यभिमत्य, कर्तव्यमेतन्मयेत्यध्यवस्यति ततश्च प्रवर्तते इति लोकसिद्धम् । तत्र योऽयं कर्तव्यमिति विनिश्चयः बुद्धेः सोऽध्यवसायः । सां. त. कौ.
- (७) अभिमानोऽहंकारः तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्वः । पञ्चादशकक्ष गणस्तस्मात्तः पञ्चकक्षैव ॥ का. २४ ॥
- (८) स च संस्थानविशेषो भूतसूक्ष्माणां साधारणो धर्म आत्मभूतः फलेन व्यक्तनानुमितः स्वव्यजकाङ्क्षनः प्रादुर्भवति । धर्मांतरस्य कपालादे-रवश्येव तिरोभवति । स एव धर्मोऽवयवोत्पद्यते ॥ यो. भा. १-४३ ॥

Section 2. Perception

(*Mechanism of Perception.*)

Generally a text-book on Psychology would begin with the most abstract or the most " physical " aspect of the mental function met with in sensation and then out of these simpler elements would try to build up the more complex or the more mental. Theories based upon 'atomistic sensations', 'ideas' that get associated by some process in " mental chemistry " try to set aside the active side of human mind, in their zest to simplify and put the science of psychology on par with any other physical science. The same objection may be raised against any treatise that opens the subject with the mechanism of perception. But we may say that theories about perception differ to such an extent that while one school of psychology might see in it a mere passive reception of impressions received from without upon the *tabula rasa* of the mind, another might see in it the promise of the highest purposive working of mind as a whole. Nobody can gainsay the fact that all the mental conative activity is possible because of perception, for it is from the moment of the present that a man

" looks before and after "

though not always to

" pine for what is not."

It is in perception that the spirit first becomes conscious of its own capacity.

In order to understand the position that perception has in psychological thought of the Yoga it is necessary for us first to clear out our ground as regards the mental functions, because ' Mind energy ' has such a pliant form that at times its functions change, while the structure that lies behind such functioning might endure comparatively unchanged; while otherwise even the reverse of this might take place, when by the passing of time the structure itself may undergo drastic changes, the functioning keeping on the same

We can best proceed upon our enquiry by accepting the scheme laid down in the Yogadars'ana. There it is said that mind has several Dharmas,¹ some of them are directly apprehensible, while the existence of others can only be inferred from their effects. The different modes of mind belong to the class of directly perceivable Dharmas, while Nirodha Dharma (in the sense of merit and demerit), Saṃskāra, Guna-Pariṇāma (the unceasing flux of consciousness), Life itself, Act of Attention or Innervation, and Act of Volition are the seven inferable Dharmas. Perception as one of the Modes of Mind falls within the former class along with feelings of pleasure and pain which also are directly apprehensible.

These चित्तवृत्तिस, or modes of mind are infinite in number. (S. 1) They may be divided from different points of views; for instance from an ethical point of view we might divide the modes into क्लिष्ट and अक्लिष्ट—infected or otherwise. These divisions are the same as the Buddhistic ones into कुसल and अकुसल or the सक्कयाय and अक्कयाय of Jainism. From the point of view of different levels of consciousness or of attention the modes are classified into those that lie either on the क्षिप्त, मूढ, विक्षिप्त, एकाग्र, or on the निवृद्ध levels. Thirdly from a non-moral or the psychological point of view, we might differentiate the different Vṛttis under five general heads of प्रमाण, विपर्यय, विकल्प, निद्रा, and स्मृति. (S. 2) This classification gives us a wider range of mental functioning than the comparatively subjective non-moral characteristics of consciousness given in the अभिधम्मत्पसंगहो. The characteristics given there are of consciousness and not of their substrate mind, for the Buddhists did not believe in the category of substance.² In Buddhism this consciousness is taken to be of three kinds showing difference of levels as in कामचित्त, महम्मचित्त in Rūpa and Arūpa lōka and the third ओकुलचित्त—Transcendental consciousness. Consciousness at all these levels is said to be qualified by the seven non-moral mental properties. These are (i) फलसंस्पर्श contact,

1 The word धर्म is untranslatable. We cannot render it by pure function for some of the inferable Dharmas lie in the very structure of our mind.

2 So Buddhism went only a step further than चार्वाक materialism in holding only प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान to be valid, Vide सर्वे० सं० And Pos. Sc. An. Hin. P. 247 c. s.

(ii) वेदना—feeling (iii) संख्या—perception (iv) चेत्ना—will or volition (v) एकत्वता oneness of object, rendered by Aung as—Individuality¹ (vi) जीवितित्तिव which corresponds, in a way, to the Prānas and (vii) मनसिक्कर—attention. (S. 3)

The classification given in the Yogadars'ana is arrived at from the point of view of the enduring mind, while the Buddhistic properties give us only the mental co-efficients of *consciousness*. Even perception which is included here is looked at from a purely subjective point of view. It has, so to say, found a place only in so far as it affects the flow of the अवस्यस्रोत, that subconscious flow of 'being taken in the subjective sense of the word.'

The two classifications can be compared with each other only inasmuch as both are regarded as non-moral. As the Yogadars'ana classification deals only with the directly apprehensible Dharmas of our mind, we can better prosecute our scientific enquiry into mind by attacking its most outward expressions. Taking the Yogadars'ana division, प्रमाण or means to valid knowledge² is subdivided into प्रत्यक्ष—Perception, अनुमान—Inference, आगम Authority. (S. 4) We need not add other pramāṇas like उपमान, अर्थापत्ति, अनाद्य etc. for they can be subsumed under either Inference or Authority. Here in one of the corners of our specious chitta, we find Perception in its immediate contact with outside reality in the concrete present

In the Yoga as well as in the Nyāya it is the सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष which is taken to give us valid knowledge. The mind³ comes in contact with the object of perception through any one of the gateways of senses, as it is attracted by it, just as iron filings are drawn towards a magnet. This relation of contact between mind and its object is variously defined. The Sāṅkhya theory further develops the Upanishadic theory that the senses work under the guidance of the mind. According

1 Individuality (of the object) is rather the product or the result of एकत्वता which is the mental active factor. Vide Intr. Comp. Phil. Pp. 16-17.

2 प्रतीयते अनेन इति प्रमाणम्.

3 The word is used throughout in the sense of चित्त, while मनस् in the sense of the internal organ is kept up without translation.

to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view, the mind assumes the shape or form of an object of perception, going out of the gateway of a sense, as it were. In some places this out-going nature of mental function in perception is toned down and instead we find that the mind is said to be simply "coloured" by its object.

The psychological theory of perception may be divided into different points dealing with—

1. Mechanism of Perception.

§ 1 Number and Nature of Senses.

§ 2 Nature of contact between Sense and its Object.

2. Perception.

§ 1 Sensation-निर्विकल्पप्रत्यक्ष as the lowest level of Perception.

§ 2 Relation between Sensation and Perception or between निर्विकल्प and सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष.

3. Theory of (Auditory) Perception.

§ —Nature of synthetic unity given in Perception and the roll of memory in perception etc. The स्मृति.

The first item is concerned with the *externals* of Perception, and deals with the preliminaries of it like the number of senses etc. We can safely term it the Mechanism of Perception though not in the sense in which Bergson uses it.¹ The next point brings before us the problem variously styled as that of the relation between sensation and perception or that between sensation and thought. It deals with the rise of percepts, as Dr. Ward would put it, from an undifferentiated presentation continuum. In the last item of auditory perception we find that the whole process which was only implicit in the passage from निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष to सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष becomes quite explicit, laying bare before us the active mental functioning in perception.

We shall deal with the mechanism of perception in this section and take up the other two dealing with the nature and theory of perception in the next two sections.

§ (1) Number and Nature of Senses.

The Sanskrit word for sense is इन्द्रिय. इन्द्र and इन्द्रिय both

¹ Vide his *Mind Energy*. P. 97 ff. There it is used in the sense of mental mechanism.

come from the same root *इन्द्र* which means primarily "to be powerful." The Indriyas in this sense are said to lord over the outside world.¹ The selective character of attention no doubt belongs to the mind, but without an indriya it would be helpless. Secondly an indriya may mean that which suggests—In the *सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदी* we read—असाधारणव्यापारयोगिनौ यदा महदहंकारौ नेन्द्रियम्, एवमनो-
प्यसाधारणव्यापारयोगि नेन्द्रियं भवितुमर्हतीति—अत आह "इन्द्रियं च" इति । कुतः ?—
"साधर्म्यात्" इन्द्रियान्तरेः सात्त्विकारंकारोपादानमर्थं च साधर्म्यम् न त्विन्द्रलिङ्गरूपम्, महदहंकार
योरप्यात्मलिङ्गत्वे नेन्द्रियस्त्वप्रसङ्गात्, तस्माद् व्युत्पत्तिमात्रमिन्द्रलिङ्गतन्त्रम् न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ॥
का. २७ ॥ Here the question is whether *manas* should be taken to be one of the indriyas. For us the words *महदहंकार* etc. are important, for it is maintained that inasmuch as they suggest the existence of Soul, they too might be taken to be indriyas. The question is left there saying that the *manas* is to be regarded as an indriya from the point of view of its origin, and not from the point of view of its function. But if we apply the functional definition the indriyas would mean those that suggest, and from our view-point we can hold that they suggest on the one side the outside world, on the other the Subject of experience.

In the *तत्त्वार्थ* we meet with this general definition. The five sensory organs only are mentioned, and an indriya is described as *इन्द्रियं—इन्द्रलिङ्गम्, इन्द्रविष्टम्, इन्द्रदृष्टम्, इन्द्रसृष्टम्, इन्द्रकुट्टमिति वा* । भा. on २. १५ ॥ Here *Indra* stands for the *Jīva* or the soul, and an indriya is regarded as that which is the distinguishing mark of the *Jīva*, or that which is directed by the soul, or is perceived, or created by the soul or that which serves the soul.

Sense organs might particularly be defined as those that grasp their own specific objects. *स्वविषयग्रहणलक्षणानि इन्द्रियाणि* । न्या. भा. १-१-१२. An approach to such a definition is made in a descriptive manner, in *बु०* १. २. with its doctrine of *Grahas* and *Atigrahas*, the indriyas as graspers with their respective stimuli as 'overgraspers'.

According to the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* senses are divided into

¹ *Buddhaghosha's* definition given in the *अ० उ० साहिनी*—shows "Indriya means sovereignty or again Indriya in its characteristic mark of deciding (*अधिभोक्ता*) is that which exercises Lordship" Mrs. R. Davids.

internal and external, and the latter are again sub-divided into Jñānendriyas and Karmendriyas. We shall leave aside the treatment of manas, the internal sense for the time being. (S. 5)

Five Jñānendriyas and five Karmendriyas make up in all the ten external senses. We meet roughly with this classification in १. ३. २. mentioned above, where breath, speech, eye, ear, arms, and skin are laid down along with mind as grasped by their respective stimuli. In १. ३. १. and ५ the ten indriyas are definitely mentioned, greater stress being laid there upon Prajñā as the co-ordinating principle between different sense-experiences. The Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and the Jain dars'anas all of them accept this classification of the external the senses. The Nyāya being a work mainly on logic lays greater stress on the jñānendriyas, and in the Tattvārtha the sensory organs alone are directly mentioned, while some of the Karmendriyas are indirectly spoken of with reference to ascetic restraint. In the Abhidhammatthasangāho we have the eye-door, ear-door, nose-door, tongue-door, body-door, (i. e. skin sensing touch)¹ with their specific objects. The Jñānendriyas are the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue (taste) and the skin; the Karmendriyas being the tongue (speech), the hands (action), the feet (movement), the anus (position) and the generative organ.² (S. 6)

In the Upanishads at times the senses are derived from the outside elements. For instance in ऐत. २-४ the Agni becomes speech, the Vayu becomes the sense of smell (and not touch as we find in later thought), the sun becomes the eye,³ the quarters lodge themselves in the sense of hearing, and the moon becomes the mind. (In this passage along

1 Over and above this we have mind-door too—मनोद्वार, which as we shall see later on corresponds to the " threshold of consciousness." Vide Comp. Phil. P. 85.

2 Here the functions allotted to the motor organs are respectively—speech, act of giving, movement, excretion, and joy.

3 cf. " Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?—By far the most like," Plato's Rep. 508 B.

with other elements hunger, thirst, and death are allowed to enter the human body). The opposite process of linking the senses to the different elements or objects of nature is as old as the R̥gVeda, where after¹ death, the eye is asked to go back to the Sun and the respective senses to their original abodes. The origin given in the ऐत. mentioned above is repeated in a reverse order in ऐत. १-४. where mouth etc. are said to burst forth giving out speech and through it Agni, when the Self (आत्मा) brooded on the Purusha! In ऋ. १-२-१८. too the senses are projected on the vast canvas of Nature and the mind becomes the moon etc.

A different genesis consistent with spiritualistic monism is given in मै. २-६. Prajāpati "feeling even thus that he had not attained his object, (he) thinks from within the interior of heart 'let me enjoy objects' Therefore having thus broken open these five apertures (of the senses), he enjoys the objects by means of (the metaphor here is changed) his reins." The sense organs are here spoken of as reins, and the active organs as horses. A similar passage occurs in कठ. २. १. where the self-existent is said to have pierced the openings (of the senses). Such a conception of the origin of senses directly takes us to the general view of the function of senses as in अत्र भोगसाधनानीन्द्रियाणि । न्या. भा. १. १. ९ । The Sāṃkhya view is the same—एते प्रदीपकस्याः परस्परविलक्षणं गुणविशेषाः । इत्येते पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ का. ३६ ॥ According to the Yogadars'ana too the senses exist for the enjoyment of Purusha; For, just as in the Sāṃkhya, the whole of the Prakṛti with its integrated evolvents are held to exist for the enjoyment (and final liberation of) Purusha. (S. 7)

The outer sense organ, and inner faculty to grasp the outer stimulus were almost differentiated in Upanishadic thought. ऋ. ४-४-१८ reads " life of life, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind" the primeval Brahman being spoken of as *having* (not being) that inner capacity to make use of

1 In the R̥gVeda we find—सूर्यं ते नक्षुर्गच्छता, पृथिवीं ते वरीरमिति । also सूर्यं ते नक्षुः सृणोमि, पृथिवीं ते वरीरं सृणोमि । etc.

all these as its instruments of knowledge. This is quite in keeping with the Upanishadic monism. With a more differentiated evolutionary series like that of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, the distinction was bound to be finer. According to the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, the senses are no doubt derived from the Sūttvika Ahaṅkāra¹, still the different elements are spoken of as residing in the senses enabling them to sense their specific stimuli. The principle accepted is that Like could be known by Like.² Thus ākāś'a is not merely the substratum of sound, but is itself the cause of sensing that sound, for in the ear there is a bit of ākāś'a and it is this that catches the sounds of the air. In case of sensing the sounds of solids as distinguished from those that are conducted in ākāś'a a capacity of resonance is added to the capacity of hearing. (वाचस्पतिमिश्र's टीका on १-४१). (S. 8)

The principle of distinguishing between the outer sense organ, the inner faculty of that organ, and the factor which senses the stimulus is similar to the one involved in any modern physiological theory of sensation. We are not concerned much with whether the older solutions were correct or not. The point of interest to be noted is the existence of such enquiries rather than their results. According to the modern theory, three factors necessary for sensing the outside stimulus are—first the outer sense, then the nerve, and thirdly that specific area of the cortex which can yield the sensation. The first roughly corresponds to the outer sense, the second might be compared with the inner power of the sense. The co-relation of the third factor is hard to strike, for in place of the cortex we have the manas and the Ahaṅkāra. In passing

1 According to the काविका, the 11 senses are derived from the सात्त्विक अहंकार, the moment of रजस् contained in the अहंकार only working as a principle of force. सात्त्विक एकदशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहंकारात् । [भूतादिस्तम्भाः स तामसः] तैजसादुभयम् ॥ का. २५ ॥ In his टीका on यो. २. १९ Vachaspati departs from this, explaining thus—अस्मितालक्षणस्याविशेषस्य सत्त्वप्रधानस्य कुक्षीन्द्रियाणि विशेषाः । राजसस्य कर्मेन्द्रियाणि । This is a minor difference between साह्य and योग. यो. भा. does not state anything definite.

2 Empedocles in Greek Philosophy held this view.

we might mention that there is no qualitative difference between a sensory nerve and the cortex area. Now whether the final term of the series is a merely material portion of the cortex or is a function of the spirit is yet an open question in modern science.¹ The answer to the question seems to lean on the side of the latter alternative, as there is found nothing specific in the nerve-flow or *nurin* to show any trace of the variety we find in mental life.² The fact of a functional replacement of all memory and percepts goes to make the brain a mere instrument of mind energy as shown by Bergson in his *Matter and Memory*. Hereby we do not want to propound a view that the whole modern theory was *en bloc* present to the mind of the ancient Indians, but only this much that in their direct enquiry into the workings of the human mind, they were not very far from right even in the borderlands of psychology.³


That an impairment of the outer sense organ resulted in defective sensation is mentioned by Vāchaspati for we read:—आह्निकारिकमपि प्राणरसनत्वबभूव. श्रोत्रं भूताधिष्ठानमेव भूतोपकारापकाराभ्यां प्राणादीनामुपकारापकारदर्शनादित्युक्तम् । टी. ३. ४१ —that the different senses are lodged in a physical substratum, and when this gets impaired the receptive power of that specific sense becomes faulty. He has taken the instance of hearing only but the same applies to all the remaining four sense organs.

In the तत्त्वार्थ the distinction between the outer and the inner faculty of sense organ is carried a step further.⁴ The outer organ is termed the इन्द्रिय, the inner resulting in specific knowledge to the soul is called भावेन्द्रिय, the two are again subdivided thus—the इन्द्रिय, into निर्वृत्ति and उपकरणइन्द्रिय the one answering to the material structure and the other to the outer and the inner material capacity of the sense to be excited by its stimulus. The two subdivisions of the भावेन्द्रिय into लक्षि and उपयोग are made not from a psychological but from a particular point of view of the Jain philosophy and as such we need not enter into their discussion.

In the history of thought the genetic or the evolutionary

* For footnotes Vide P. 48.

point of view has come up only lately. In Greek philosophy Anaximander came very near the conception of a dynamic relation between different species, when he said that man was evolved from a scaled aquatic creature. But it was a stray reflection that took no root in the soil, and with Aristotle we find the species moving in absolutely closed circles (a circular motion being regarded as more perfect than a linear one) with no way out leading to higher species. In Indian Philosophy too the species do not develop into higher orders of form. So much less should we find any mention of a particular sense organ developing from a crude to a relatively complex form. Still it is of comparative interest to note that in the *तत्त्वार्थ* we find a classification of creatures according to the number of sense organs they possess. To convey the idea better we might give the classification in a tabular form :— (S. 9)



1 The classification given in the *सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह* (Pp. 70-71) differs a bit from the one given here which is from the *तत्त्वार्थ* २, १०-११-१२-१३-१४.

2 In Jainism *संज्ञा* stands for that most incipient awareness of object,

It is of psychological interest to note that the sense of touch is held to be the most primitive of all the five senses. An ekendriya creature¹ has only the sense of touch; then to touch is added taste. Creatures with three senses have touch, taste and the sense of smell. At the fourth stage the faculty of sight-eye-is added to those of touch, taste and smell, while the sense of hearing comes last. We know that the addition of one sense after another in the order given is not scientifically correct, for the sense of hearing comes much earlier.² In spite of this, the positing of touch as the most primitive sense is scientifically correct.

The sense of touch, in a way, has a peculiar place in the economy of an organism's life. Its substratum is the skin, and the skin envelops the organism completely. So it was recognised that all the other senses were modifications of this primitive

meaning consciousness at its lowest level, wrongly identified with "feeling." संप्रधारणसंज्ञा of तत्त्वार्थ-२. २५ means full-fledged mind. For a criticism of such a wrong use of the word "feeling" Vide Psych. Prin P. 45 ff.

1 Ekendriya creatures are mentioned in the Maha-Vagga. Warren's Bud. Trans. § 85 a. Pp. 414-416.

2 Vide Ernst Mach's Scientific Lectures—"Sensations of Orientation" Pp. 300 to 305-306 ff.—There he has explained how originally the motor reactions of an organism were determined through the "autoliths" of the ear.

* 1 "We do not know the last stage of the message in the physical word, before it became a sensation in consciousness."—The Nature of the Physical world: by Prof. Eddington. P. 268.

* 2 The Law of the non-specificity of Nerve is quite established. Vide Nerves by Dr. Harris. P. 78. It was upon its supposed specificity that materialists hoped to explain consciousness as a function of the brain. Vide Mat. Mem. Pp. 49f, 79.

* 3 In the Nikayas (Bud. Psych. 144.) a similar distinction is drawn. There perception is said to arise from a correlation between sense invisible, (not the fleshy organ) and the object too regarded as invisible and yet impinging.

4 4 द्विविधानि ॥ अ. २. १६ ॥ द्विविधानीन्द्रियाणि भवन्ति । इन्द्रियेन्द्रियाणि भावेन्द्रियाणि च ॥ भा ॥ तत्र-निर्वृत्युपकरणे इन्द्रियम् ॥ २-१७ ॥ निर्वृत्तिरंगोपांगनाम निर्वृत्तितानीन्द्रियद्वाराणि कर्मविशेषसंस्कृताः शरीरप्रदेशाः । निर्माणजामांशोपांगप्रत्यया मूलगुणनिर्वृत्तेनेत्यर्थः । उपकरणं बाह्यं, अन्यतरं च ।

sense of touch.¹ We find in the Nyāya पूर्वपक्ष holding that all the other senses are mere modifications of the sense of touch.² One might call this a *Theory of The Non-Specificity of different Senses*. It says—'There is but one sense of Touch, there being no difference between the different senses. For there is not a single sense which is not lodged in skin; and without this skin in the senses, the outside objects would never be grasped. And that which pervades all the senses and which is the *sine qua non* of sensing of objects, is the sense, (therefore) skin (is the only sense)' Reply to this is easy. The upholder of the Nyāya theory maintains—'The objects of other senses are not sensed by (any indifferent part of) skin, even though they come in contact with it. For the blind are not able to see the form. And even if it be maintained that there is no other sense organ except the one that senses through touch, then the form etc. must be sensed by the blind etc., which is not the case. Hence skin is not the only sense.' At this point the पूर्वपक्ष is modified maintaining that 'it is a specific part of skin that catches its specific stimulus thus giving us different senses. For instance a specialized portion of skin in the eye when coming in contact with smoke senses it, not any other part of the skin, and it is on account of an impairment of this specialized part of the skin that the form etc. are not grasped by the blind etc.' The final refutation comes here, 'for the very fact of recognizing specialized parts of skin, that answer to specific stimuli, means the giving up of the original proposition. For then one logically arrives at the conclusion that there are different sense organs for different specific objects.' (S 10)

§(2) Nature of contact between Sense and its Object.

The problem of the relation between a sense and its object remained comparatively in the background in the

1 Cf. "The organ of Touch is diffused over the whole bodily form just as moisture pervades an entire cotton rag. With the exception of this quality of unspecialized organ, the sense ranks with the others. ... In an ultimate sense the organ of touch is both everywhere and not everywhere." भट्टशङ्करिणी (from Mrs. R. Davids.)

Upanishads on account of their monistic tendencies. The fact of contact did not draw their attention so much as the consciousness or the Self that lay behind it. In the Sāṃkhya system and in the Yogadars'ana too we do not find distinct references about the nature of contact. But all the same schools must have differed on the possibility and nature of direct contact between the different senses and their objects. According to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga theory even mind was supposed to go out to its object and assume its shape (चित्तस्य इन्द्रियप्रणालिकया बाह्यवस्तुपरागाद् विषयाकारपरिणामित्वम्) This necessarily bestowed an outgoing nature to the senses too. The objects were regarded as magnets that drew the different senses and through them the mind, whenever they came within their field of attraction. In the Yogadars'ana the question of the relation between sense and its object comes up for discussion only secondarily. In his Tikā on **श्रोत्राकाशयोः संबन्धसंयमाद्विषयं श्रोत्रम् ॥ ३. ४१ ॥** Vāchaspati dwells upon the relation between sound and the sense of hearing. तन्चेदं धीत्रमाहकारिकमयःप्रतिममयस्कान्तमणिकरूपेन वक्त्रवक्त्रसमुत्पन्नेन वक्त्रस्थेन शब्देनाऽऽकृष्टं स्ववृत्तिपरंपरया वक्त्रवक्त्रमागतं शब्दमालोचयति ।—'The sense of hearing is attracted towards its specific stimulus sound, lodged in the mouth of the speaker, just like iron to the loadstone, and by a series of its own वृत्ति's or modifications it reaches the mouth of the speaker and there senses the sound.' This is sufficient to show that the ear was regarded as प्राप्यकारी.

As regards the eye, we have a reference to the nature of its contact in **कायस्पर्शसंयमात्तत्त्वावधारकित्वेन चक्षुःप्राप्यकाशासंयमोऽन्तर्धानम् ॥ ३.२१ ॥** We can take प्राप्यकाश to mean actual light,² in which case the visual theory of the Yogadars'ana would be the same as that of the Nyāya according to which the eye was regarded as प्राप्यकारी, on account of its outgoing visual rays touching the object.

We find a theory parallel to this in Greek philosophy,

¹ वृत्ति may mean vibration or secondarily a course followed. If we lay stress on this sense of the word in चित्तवृत्ति, वृत्ति comes near to Buddhistic वीथि in वीथिविन्न. "वीथि=a line, road, course" Comp. Phil. P. 9.

² We need not follow Vāchaspati in taking प्राप्यकाश to mean ज्ञान,

though in an inverted form. Democritus the materialist reduced both thought and perception to atomic movements in mind, differing only in degree of fineness; and perception was regarded as the outcome of the little *eidola* thrown on all sides by the objects, and caught up by their specific senses. Every thing was expressed by him in quantitative terms but instead of the mind going out to the objects through the senses, the small "*eidola*" were supposed to pass through the senses and reach the mind. He went to the length of explaining the phenomena of dreams with the help of the wandering *eidola* that were not sensed by the mind in the waking state. This proves that he believed in a sort of a physical impact not merely between the *eidola* and the sense but also between the *eidola*¹ and mind.

In the Nyāya dars'ana, in the chapter on an investigation into the nature of the sense organs, (इन्द्रियपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्—अ. ३. आ १. सू ३३-५२) we meet with a long discussion about the प्राप्यकारि nature of the senses. Only the instance of the eye is taken, for it seems, it was taken to be a crucial instance to prove the प्राप्यकारि nature of the indriyas. The discussion is undertaken to prove the material nature of the senses.² Here the whole Nyāya theory of visual perception is dealt with. 'From the eyes shoot forth rays, and it is the contact between the rays and the object that gives the impression of the object to mind.' The simile given is that of a burning lamp and the object which it shows by the light of its rays. The existence of contact is to be inferred from the existence of

1 His. Phil.—Windelband. Pp. 114-115.

2 According to the Nyaya view the senses are physical. A पूर्वपक्ष is considered in 3-1-31, according to which the senses are held to be non-material (अमौलिक), because of their capacity to sense both big and small objects e. g. "a big nyagrodha tree or the biggest mountain, or the smallest seed of that very nyagrodha tree. Now a material object can pervade in space which can be as big as its body only, while an immaterial thing alone can be all pervading. Hence the immaterial nature of the senses." (Vide S. 11) The refutation of this theory is given in terms of the Nyāya theory of visual perception.

an obstructing medium between the object and the visual rays. Just as the light of a lamp cannot pierce a wall and shine on the objects that lie beyond it, so too the visual rays cannot pierce any opaque medium.'

Here the eye itself is not said to go out of its socket to the object, but still it is held to be *प्रेषकरी*, in the sense that something very fine, in the shape of visual rays, is said to shoot forth from the eye and catch the object of visual perception. An objection to such a theory is raised in the form that 'the visual rays are not observed coming out from the eyes, while a burning lamp is seen, with its own rays.' Two replies are given to the objector 'Firstly perception is not in every case a criterion of existence, for even things, which we do not perceive, do exist, as for instance the other side of the moon, or an antipode of the earth. Secondly, the visual rays are seen in case of the beasts that can see even at night in darkness, and hence by inference one can say that the visual rays in case of man also exist.'

The visual rays do not yield any perception in the dark to us for they are weaker than those of a cat, or of a night bird. To do that, they always stand in need of either sun-light or lamp-light. The Nyāya position is quite safe, for it cuts both ways. A man would not be able to see anything in the dark, much less the visual rays of any other human being. If a lamp be brought near in order to perceive the visual rays of some one else, they would be overpowered and remain invisible in its more powerful light, just as a flash of a meteor or the light given out by a red hot iron ball cannot be seen by day.

The nature of the visual rays is held to be the same as that of the sun or a lamp-rays, and as is clear from the above discussion, their existence is to be inferred from an argument by analogy drawn from the case of the beasts that are endowed with a capacity to see by night. Like the very rays of the sun they are said to have the strength to pass through transparent objects, but not through opaque ones. (S. 11)

अग्राप्यग्रहणं काचाग्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धे ॥ ३. १. ४७ ॥ यदि च रश्मिर्दसनिकर्षो
ग्रहणहेतुः स्याद् न व्यवहितस्य सनिकर्ष इत्यग्रहण स्यात् । अस्ति चेद्य काचाग्रपटलस्फटि-
कान्तरितोपलब्धिः, सा ज्ञापयति—अग्राप्यकारीन्द्रियाणि ।—This whole argument
of the पूर्वपक्ष regarding the अग्राप्यकारी nature of the senses is refuted
by asserting that the nature of the transparent media is
such that they do not obstruct the visual rays. Of course,
what is transparent and what is not can be determined only by
an appeal to experience.

The discussion is finally wound up by saying that the
rays of the sun are able to heat up the contents of a quartz
vessel. अदित्यरश्मेः स्फटिकान्तरितेऽपि दाहोऽविधातात् ॥ ३. १. ५० ॥ Here a
confusion is made between heat and light-rays, which not
cleared up in the bhāṣya. (S 12)

We noted above the reason as to why the visual rays of
the eyes cannot be seen by anybody else. Still an alterna-
tive remains, and an objector might maintain that if they
existed, they ought to be seen by the eye itself. Here we
meet with a general theory of the Nyāya, that the senses
cannot see the quality which is lodged in them as a capacity.
In the chapter on the specificity of different senses,
(इन्द्रियनानात्वपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्) it is proved that when all the senses are taken
as specialized differentiations of an original sense of touch, it
can only mean that they have lodged in them different
elements to which they react, and without which they
would be helpless. The instance taken is that of the sense of
smell which is said to lose its faculty of responding to its
stimulus without its associative factor, the elemental *smell*
(taken in the sense of a faculty). This comes very near the
Sāṃkhya-Yoga view that the elements regarded subjectively
are the faculties while objectively they are the specific stimuli
grasped by those faculties. It is the old principle that like is
known by like. Now in order to sense the very quality which
for the sense is the subjective capacity to respond to that
specific objective quality, it would itself have to be without
that quality, and in that case, being bereft of that quality, it
would no longer be in a position to sense the existence of
that subjective "quality" or capacity.¹ (S. 13)

The whole theory about the nature of contact between sense and its object is epitomized in रत्नप्रभाचार्य's—रत्नाकरावतारिका टीका on बाजिदेवसूरी's प्रमाणनवतत्त्वालोकलेखक. We shall not enter into the windy discussions, and hair-splitting distinctions made in the commentary while refuting the divergent views of the different dars'anas for fear of being too lengthly. Much of the discussion is extra-psychological, still there are some reflections that have a psychological value. There we read—'The Vais'eshtikas, the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas and the followers of the Samkhya system regard the senses as प्राप्यकारी, the Buddhists take the eye and the ear to be अप्राप्यकारी, while for those who are purified by स्वाद्वाद (!), all the senses, except that of sight, are प्राप्यकारी.'

In the discussion there are some definitions of a sense organ proposed, and on each of them the doctrine of the adversary is refuted. The first two definitions come up in the form of a question:—Whether the real organ in the eye is the fleshy dark circle or that other finer-eye? The second alternative is again split up into two. The fine (सूक्ष्म) eye may either be अमूर्त immaterial, or of very small dimensions. After proving that according to any one of these three definitions, the eye cannot be regarded as प्राप्यकारी, the hypothesis of the visual rays coming out of the eye and reaching its object is taken up. The theory is refuted in different ways some of which are almost fanciful.

The first three definitions were based upon different possible meanings that might be put upon the word Indriya. Now the possible meanings of the word बहिर् are taken up. For the the proposition laid down in तत्र प्रथमे प्रमाणयन्ति,—चक्षुःप्राप्यमति करोति विषये बाह्येन्द्रियत्वादितो यद्बाह्येन्द्रियतादिना परिगते तत्प्राप्यकारीक्षितं । जिह्वावान् ... । takes the Indriyas as Bahir Indriyas—external indriyas. Firstly the question is put forward as to whether by external we have to understand the sense as (i) produced by some external

1 The sense of hearing is an exception to this, for it is held that it is able to catch its own quality namely a word. We need not enter into the reason for such an exception, as it lies beyond the perview of our thesis. Vide न्या. सू. ३. १. ७४-७६

cause, or (ii) the sense whose primary function is to grasp external objects. A third alternative is put along side of these two—that of *बहिरिन्द्रिय* taken as residing outside the body of the percipient ! We need not go into further nice sub-divisions, which seem to be indulged in only to pervert the opponent's theory and not out of any real motive for investigation into the problem

To prove the *अप्राप्यक* nature of the eye, the opposite theory is examined from various points of views taking different interpretations that can possibly be put upon it. For instance, 'if the contact between the eye and its object be held to be direct, we do not see the eye jumping out of its socket and going to the object. For in that case we should find holes in place of eyes, when a man be engaged in perceiving an object !' As against the theory of visual rays it is held that 'the brightness seen in the eyes of creatures that can see by night is not due to visual rays, but is only a gloss or a shine.' There is another humorous objection put forth against the theory, that 'if the visual rays could pass through a transparent medium, as in the case of a glass bottle and reach the water within, the bottle must show fine holes, and the liquid be spilt through them. And if the rays exist, where do they go when trying to look through muddy water ? In case if it be replied that at that time they calmed down, whence could they come when the water became pure, the deposit going down ?' (S. 14)

We cannot end this section without mentioning a few reflections of psychological interest from Buddhistic philosophy. Among the seven universal properties of consciousness we find that the first is *प्राप्य*-contact. The object that comes in contact may either be an outside object, or one supplied by mind. So the Buddhistic definition of the word "object" is the same as Locke's definition of idea—as anything which is an object of thought, or Ward's "presentation." We are not concerned at present with the object as supplied by the mind, not with the generic but with that specific contact as that between an outside object and a sense organ.

The eye and the ear are taken to be अग्राप्यकारी by the Buddhists.¹ Consciousness is said to be the result of contact between a sense and its object. "If the action of the eye is not cut off, if external visible objects come into focus and if a correlation accordingly is set up, then the corresponding degree of consciousness is set up"² The contact between the eye and the object did not mean any physical impact but only a correlation. "The eye impinges on visible object (रूप) only means eye receiving the mental object (आरम्भण)"³ The sense which cognizes its objects by such coarse physical impact is the skin. In case of contact with smell and taste, the object of sense is likened to a cotton-wool, while in case of touch the object is compared to a hammer. In each case the body is taken to be the anvil, and to explain the relation of contact between the two, another ball of cotton-wool is placed between the object of sense and the body.⁴ The simile of the hammer and the anvil is at times replaced by that of two rams butting or, in case of lighter contact, by that of two cymbals clashing "It is as if, your majesty, two rams were to fight one another. ... or as if the two hands were to be clapped together. ... or as if two cymbals were to be clapped together."⁵

The coarser contact of touch gives us the primary quality of a body, while smell and taste acquaint us with its secondary qualities. As we saw above while considering a सूक्ष्मपक्ष given in the Nyāya that the other senses can be regarded as specialized differentiations of the one original sense of homogeneous diffused touch. In the Maha-Vagga creatures "having but one of the organs of sense" namely that of feeling the outward from have been mentioned. From an

1 Light and sound termed—अक्षय्यरूप, smell, taste regarded only as modifications of touch are held as संपत्तरूप. Vide. Intr. Comp. Phil : P. 3.

2 Bud. Psych. P. 66. also cf. Warren's Bud. Trans 23—Milinda. 23b. Majjhima. Pp. 182-183.

3 अट्टसालिनी quoted in Bud. Psych. P. 184.

4 Vide Comp. Phil : P. 232 ff.

5 Warren's Bud. Trans. 183, also Bud. Psych. P. 166.

evolutionary point of view we might say that from such an undifferentiated primitive *feeling*, the sense of touch was itself differentiated as the other specific senses grew,¹ still however it retained its character of sensing the primary quality of an object namely extension. "What is included under visible object?"—The reply is given—colours and forms of magnitude. On these the commentary remarks,—'Here, inasmuch as we are able to tell—long-short-etc by touch, while we cannot so discern-blue, therefore-long-short and so on are not to be taken as visual objects without explanation. It is only by customary usage that we can speak of anything as *visible* object which appears as long or short, great or small etc. etc., when so placed as to compare with something else."² As Mrs. R. Davids has observed, "this is a definite step in advance towards Berkeley's theory of vision," though, we should say, not near enough to the most modern theory maintaining that every (even visual) sensation has an element of extensity in it.

In the Upanishads the senses, as we saw, have been mentioned as the apertures through which the Soul or the Self or the Brahman is said to enjoy or experience outside objects. The idea is kept up in other systems where the outside world is taken to be fashioned for the sake of enjoyment and ultimate emancipation of the Purusha or the Ātmā. Buddhism had no doctrine of the eternal Soul; so the metaphor of the senses as so many "windows" through which the Soul looks out was chosen only to prove that there was no such soul, for otherwise he must be able to see without the eye or hear without the ear etc.

There is one more instance of such inverted parallelism between the Upanishadic and the Buddhist way of thought. In ऋ. १. १. १. we read—"There is the town with 11 gates belonging to the

1 When a protoplasm comes in touch with some disagreeable object, scientists tell us that it is thrown into convulsions, but we cannot say therefrom that its sense of touch and the accompanying unpleasant feeling are the same as ours.

2 *अमरसंग्रह* quoted by Mrs. R. Davids in *Bud. Psych.* P. 185.

unborn (अमृत), " and again, " the embodied spirit within the town with nine gates, the bird, flutters outwards, the ruler of the whole world, of all that rests and of all that moves ", appearing in वे. ३. १८.¹ This simile was developed by the orthodox systems ultimately in the doctrine according to which the Soul was taken to be entombed in the body, from which prison he could be delivered only after death. (cf. the later Greek doctrine of *Soma sema*=body as the tomb of the Soul). In Buddhism we meet with almost the same theory. " In the Sutta called the Snake', of the Sense-Sphere, Samyutta a man is represented as fleeing from four great snakes (the four elements), five assassins (the five khandhas), with love of pleasure in their midst with drawn sword. He hastens into a village which he finds empty and about to be destroyed by bandits. Rushing away he comes to the perils of the sea, to cross which he has to make a raft, and scull himself over with hands and feet. Here the empty village is identified with the six organs of sense" wherein no ' headman ', no ' I ', nor ' mine ' is found. "² " The village-sacking bandits are the six kinds of " external " objects of sense, for each organ of sense is " hit " by objects that are attractive or the reverse."

1 There is a similar idea in a Gujarati devotional song---
 कान्तारमां दस दरवाजा, एक दरवाजे जाई रे.

2 Including मनस् as the *sensus communis*.

3 अट्टसाहिनी quoted by Mrs. Rhys Davids Bud. Psych. P. 67-68

Section 3. Perception

(*As a Mode of Mind*)

(§1) Preliminary Discussion

On the Nature of Sense-Experience

Till now we have dwelt upon questions, which, from the point of view of pure psychology, would fall at the outskirts of Perception proper. The problem of the number and nature of senses was not approached by Indian thinkers from the side of physics. Even Buddhism that laid so much stress upon the objective factor of experience, approached the 'object,' as its definition shows, not as in physics but purely from the side of consciousness. Psychological view-point was pre-eminently a legacy of the Indian thinker, and whether he talked of the pure elements or of sense objects, he had always in view their possible effects on mind. In spite of all such discussions on the mechanism of perception, the ancient Indians never lost sight of the characteristic unity of an act of perception.

In the Yogadars'ana we find an account of the origin and nature of senses only in Sūtras dealing primarily with some stages of spiritual development. The Sāṃkhya had to deal with it, because even though its main subject was cosmology and not psychology, its ultimate end was the final liberation of Purusha from the clutches of Prakṛiti. The Nyāya enters into its treatment, much in the spirit of Kant, to know the nature of the instruments of knowledge, before going to the objects of knowledge. In Buddhism, though it had neither a static object nor a fixed subject of experience, the enquiry was undertaken to bring about the final disruption of the beginningless correlation between the subject and the object series.

While dealing with perception as the basis of all mental life, the old thinkers directly launched upon the functioning of mind.

We can define प्रत्यक्ष as 'immediate knowledge.' Immediate knowledge can be of two kinds कौक्षिक or अकौक्षिक. In the Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī they are called कौक्षिकप्रमाण and आर्ष विज्ञान respectively which may in turn be defined as immediate knowledge

given by the senses, and immediate supra-sensuous knowledge. The Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya etc. accept this definition of perception as immediate experience, while Jainism takes all sense knowledge to be mediate. The Soul in sense perception can have no direct knowledge of its objects without the mediacy of senses, and we might add without the *frames* imposed upon its content by the categories of sense. Thus we read in the तत्त्वार्थ १. ९-१०-११-१२. मतिश्रुता-वचनमनःपर्यायकेवलानि ज्ञानम् ॥ ९ ॥ तत्प्रमाणे ॥ १० ॥ आद्ये परोक्षम् ॥ ११ ॥ प्रत्यक्ष-मन्यत् ॥ १२ ॥ मति-ordinary knowledge, श्रुत-Authoritative know-ledge, अवधि-covering higher intuitional knowledge, मनःपर्याय-know-ledge of the mental modifications of others, and केवल-Absolute knowledge.—out of these the first two are mediated, and the last three are immediate.¹ Here there is a difference merely in the technical use of words between Jainism and the orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy. Even in Jainism we do find Mati and S'ruta referred to as सांख्यबहिरिकप्रत्यक्ष. Whatever the difference in connotations of terms used be, the original problem of all the Indian dars'anas is to pass from the fleeting relativity of sense experience to that highest intuitional knowledge of the *real* having the same experiential immediacy as that of sense experience. They all believe that Reality has made us a free gift of its qualitative nature in sense experience, if only we could take it to higher levels !

All sense experience is confined to the present. The senses respond to their specific stimuli,—विषयं विषये प्रति वर्तते इति प्रतिविषयम्—इन्द्रियम्—वृत्ति. च संनिकर्षः, अर्धसंनिकृष्टमिन्द्रियम् इत्यर्थः (तां. त. कौ. on का. ५.).² The sense modifications come up when there is any impact with an object. But the impact by itself alone cannot give rise to a perception. In the Upanishads we

1 A direct knowledge of another's mind is held to be possible in यो. प्रत्ययस्य परचित्तज्ञानम् ॥ ३. २२ ॥ We find a greater similarity to the Jain view of immediate knowledge as of अवधि or मनःपर्याय in यो. बहिर-कल्पिता वृत्तिर्महाविदेहा, ततः प्रकाशावरणक्षयः ॥ ३. ४३ ॥ and more so because there is a reference to प्रकाशावरणक्षय corresponding to ज्ञानावरण of Jainism. प्रकाशावरण is also mentioned in यो. २-५२.

2 Cf. अक्षस्याऽक्षस्य प्रतिविषयं वृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षम् । वृत्तिस्तु - संनिकर्षः ज्ञानं वा । न्या., भा. १-१-३ ॥

meet with statements that if the mind be functionally inattentive to any object (even though there be the necessary relation of contact between sense and its object¹) its existence is not cognized. In कौषी ३. ५. instead of the word *Manas*, we have *Prajñā* which is said to attend to percepts. "For without *ब्रह्म*, speech does not make known (to the self) any word, 'My mind was absent' he says 'I did not perceive that word'.....(so on with other senses). Without *Prajñā* no thought succeeds, nothing can be known that is to be known". Just a little further on the objects are compared to the circumference of a wheel, which is placed on the spokes (the senses) which are themselves fixed on the *Prāṇas*, as identified with the self of *Prajñā*. We come across with a similar passage in ५. १. ५. ३—"My mind was elsewhere, I did not see; my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear",—it is clear that a man sees with his mind and hears with his mind." In the Upanishads mind is at times taken to be the sixth internal sense, and *Prāṇas* as the life principle² are put higher up. The question of the relative importance of the different senses is treated at several places (छां ५. १. कौषी. ३. ३. ५. ६. १. ७-१४ and अथ २. ३ cf. also ऋत. ३ ३-४-५) The senses there are represented as wrangling for supremacy, to prove which the most general method of induction is applied and each one of the senses goes out of the body, one after another, and still the body lives on either as deaf, dumb,.....or even as an idiot or a child—without mind, but when the *Prāṇas* try to go out, the senses feel themselves torn from the body. The question of the relative importance of the different senses and the *Prāṇas* does not come up in later psychological thought. With the *Sāṃkhya* series, the *Prāṇas* are relegated to a sphere lower than that of self inasmuch as they are regarded as a generic resultant of the harmonious working of the sensorimotor mechanism of the body.

So it is mind functioning as attention that can perceive

1 This is not explicitly expressed in the Upanishads.

2 We can compare this with the Gr. *Psychē*.

the contact between sense and its object. Inasmuch as such sense experience is said to be confined to the present the time coefficient already enters into it. In कठ. २-१-१, we find a mention of the relation between attention and time. "The existent pierced the openings (of the senses) so that they turn forward, therefore man looks forward not backwards into himself. Some wise man however with his eyes closed and wishing for immortality saw the self behind." This is not enough to give us a complete relation between perception and the time series, but we can add that the Upanishat-kāra in his own language speaks about the preventient character of attention or mind-(mind being one of the senses.)¹

But the question comes up more definitely in the Yogadars'ana and in the Sūṃkhya. According to the former the object of perception is regarded as an organic unity subsuming within itself the differences. Perception of such an object cannot be effected in an atomic present, but must have its own 'psychical time' or the 'specious present.' We shall not here enter into the Yogadars'ana view of time, but shall rest satisfied by quoting only श्री. त. को. - वर्तमान कालं बाह्यमिन्द्रियम् । वर्तमानसमीपमनागतमतीतमपि वर्तमानम् ; अतः बाह्यं वर्तमानकालविषयः भवति । त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरकरणम् (का ३३) 'Time which is just past, and that which is just to come—even these are included within the present.' The perception of meaning of a spoken sentence is par excellence the problem of perception. A comparative absence of written books in olden times helped the ancient thinkers to recognize the cumulative character of consciousness.² The characteristic of the *psychical present* as containing within its two fringes the moment that has just passed and the moment that be coming, finds a place in Buddhism not with reference to the problem of perception but subjectively in the conception of consciousness, where every state of con-

1 In the passage the senses are spoken of as looking forward, but मनस् is included therein.

2 With the wealth of the written word about us, E. Mach and Bergson had originally to take the instance of music in order to show the contracting capacity of our consciousness. Vide. Anal. Sen. P. 245 c. 6.

sciousness in a *वैधित्त* or even in the *अवयवित्त* is said to have उत्पाद, स्थिति and भोग as moments in the present.¹ And the recurrence of the formula—'has seen, sees, will or may see'—'has impinged, impinges, will or may impinge,' repeated in the *अभिधम्मपिटक* in the treatment of different factors entailed in perception, is indulged, in according to Mrs. R. Davids, to show the time-coefficient of sense perception. (Bud. Psych. P. 144.)

We meet with the question of limits and scope of sense experience in सत्. का ७, where it is said that there can be no perception if an object be (i) very far, or (ii) too near, or (iii) if the sense organ be impaired, or (iv) when the mind be not collected (as in the case of a strong emotion) or (v) if the object be very minute, or (vi) if there be an intervening obstruction, or (vii) when the stimulus gets merged in a more intensive one, or lastly (viii) if this object of perception gets mixed up with some other object.² (S. 1)

The distinction between a voluntary and a non-voluntary sensation is drawn in the *Nyāya*. In वृ. २-१-१६, अजातशत्रु by rubbing a sleeping man with his hand wakes him up, and the man rises! There we find an early instance of a non-voluntary

1 Originally Buddhā, intending evidently not to give a handle to substantialism, posited only उत्पाद and भोग moments in a state of consciousness. The *Vaibhashikas* made a change in this by inserting the moment of स्थिति Vide. Bud. Phil. P. 167 also *अभिधम्मसंग्रहो* ४. ८.—उत्पादद्विधितिसंग्रहसेन स्रजस्यै एकचित्तवक्षणे नाम ॥ and Comp. Phil. P. 125.

2 The verse is repeated in सर्व. P. 133. An instance—of (i) is a bird, which when flying far away in the sky, cannot be seen, though it be there: of (ii) is collyrium in the eye. For (iii), the cases of the blind and the deaf are given; and in (iv), the case of a man seized with brute passion, not able to see even the nearest object, is given, while an instance of (v) is of atoms; instances of (vi) being the door of a king's palace intercepted by a wall and of (vii) the case of star-light being invisible by day. The case of (viii) is that of rain drops which cannot be distinguished after their fall in a pond. One can see that the seventh and the eighth cases can be classed as one, and while i, ii and vi, are due to external position. iii, iv, are subjective. The atoms lie beyond *minima sensibilia*. (S. 1)

sensation. According to the Nyāya theory, perception is impossible if the Soul and the manas, be not in relation with each other and manas be not in relation to the senses. —नात्ममनसोः सैनिकर्षाभावे प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः ॥ २-१-२१ ॥ इन्द्रियार्थ-सैनिकर्षाभाववदिति (भा.) The whole chain of necessary relations would be—आत्मा मनसा संबध्यते, मनः इन्द्रियेण, इन्द्रियं सर्वार्थः सैनिकृष्टमिति. (भा. १-१-५६) Soul is characterized by knowledge (ज्ञानमिहात्मादात्मनो नानवरोधः ॥ २-१-२३ ॥ ज्ञानमात्मलिंगं तद्वृणत्वात्—भा) and it directs the manas whenever urged by its own curiosity, the manas in its turn directing the senses. Now in case of a man waking up from sleep on hearing a sharp sound, the sensation is non-voluntary, as the manas is not directed by the Soul wishing to know the object of sense. In case of such sense perception an overwhelming balance lies on the side of the contact between sense and its object. The very cause of sensation is said to be the contact between sense and its object. A non-voluntary sensation is a severe imposition from the objective side, while in case of voluntary perception the inward directing of the manas by the Soul plays a categorical part, the cause of perception lying in the free effort (प्रयत्न) or agency of the soul.

Experience of non-voluntary sensations is not confined to the case of a sleeping man suddenly waking up on hearing a loud sound. One's attention might be functionally engaged in some object, while a stimulus might invade another sense and attention be drawn towards it, because of its sheer intensity. This is the purely objective or *inherent* intensity as distinguished from the *intensity* of a sensation due to attention. In this sense, the manas of the Nyāyadars'ana is identical with attention. The bhāṣhya tells us 'that when the Soul, desirous of knowing some other object, directs the manas towards it by an act of will, it establishes a relation with a sense, and the object is known. Now in case the manas or attention be so functionally engaged somewhere else, when some other object suddenly attacks another sense, we have a non-voluntary sensation. Then the knowledge that comes is not due to soul's desire to know by directing the manas to its object.' (S. 2)

A similar severance of the internal factors in case of a non-voluntary sensation is given to us in Buddhistic thought, where the four moments involved in perception are:—(1) Object as the factor of possible sensation. (cf. Mill's definition of matter as a permanent possibility of sensation.) (2) Actual impact of object. (3) The actual impact of sense, (4) The resultant actual impression and possible results in the four incorporeal aggregates. The classification is from the अभिधम्मपिटक, and it is for scholars to decide whether the fourfold classification of perception—factors into अर्ष, इन्द्रिय, मनस, and आत्मा of the Nyāya did not influence the Buddhistic thinkers ! We are here concerned with “the severance of (2) and (3) explained by the commentary as indicating (2) involuntary sensation e. g. an unexpected seeing of lightning” as distinguished from “voluntary seeing with adjusted movements of attention of ‘one who by his own wish seeking to work at some object, concentrates his vision’”¹

Under the question of limits of sense-experience we noted some subjective, objective and spatial factors on account of which the object could not be perceived. Still the limits of perception on the side of the so-called subliminal sensation remain to be investigated. The existence of subconscious depth within depth is recognized by all the systems of Indian Philosophy in one way or another, but Buddhism had to make special room for it, because of its Anattāvāda, to explain the simulated unity of self.² The theory gets its expression with some slight distinctions in the recognition of भवस्रोत of the Hīnayāna, and the आलम्ब्यविज्ञान of the Mahāyāna School. Oldenberg has described the orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy as based upon substance without causality, and Buddhism as constructed upon causality without substance.³

¹ Bud. Psych. P. 144.

² “The hypothesis of subconsciousness is in the main nothing more than the application, to the facts of presentation, of the law of continuity.” Psych. Prin. Ward. P. 93.

³ The first half of the remark seems to have been made to bring in the effect of a paradox; for the orthodox systems believed in the law of karma.

Still Buddhism had to pay tribute to the category of substance by accepting the above concepts in order to explain the continuity of self which otherwise would have remained purely atomic. The *संज्ञास्रोत*¹ and the *आलम्ब्यविज्ञान* carry the seeds of all past acts in the midst of their flux, and their currents flow on beneath the *संज्ञाद्वार* or the threshold of consciousness. We come across the references to subliminal sensations in the theory of perception given in the *Abhidhammatthagaṅgaho*. There it is stated² that the *संज्ञा* gets disturbed by an idea (in Locke's sense) or a presentation, sensuous or mental, and a *वीथिविहित* is set up. The process ends finally in complete perception leaving sufficiently strong traces behind, making its recall possible. An object begins by disturbing the even flow of the *संज्ञास्रोत*, and the disturbance gathers or accumulates in subliminal consciousness till it comes up to consciousness after crossing the threshold. A complete act of perception is divided into 17 thought-moments out of which the first three thought-moments lie beneath the threshold. The first is the moment of inception, the second and the third with their cumulative effects bring the object to the *संज्ञाद्वार*. In the second and third thought-moments only *चक्षुर्विज्ञान* operates, and after these the moments of apperception and retention come.³

(§2) Relation between निर्विकल्प and सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष

This brings us to the cardinal question in psychology about the relation between निर्विकल्प and सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष. According to the *Yogadars'ana*, mind comes in contact with its object through the path of a sense, as a result of which a particular modification of mind is set up having for its object mainly the individual characteristics of the thing, which in itself is an organic unity of both individual and universal elements. प्रत्यक्ष in the *Nyāya* is defined thus:—"That knowledge which arises from the contact between

1 Prof. Radhakrishnan takes *ज्ञेय* to mean part. Aung has rendered it as 'cause.' Vide *Ind. Phil.* Vol. I P. 408 and *Comp. Phil.* P. 295

2 Vide *अभिधम्मसंख्ये* ४, ८-९. *Comp. of Phil.* Pp. 27-28, 126.

3 *Buddhaghosha* enumerates 14 thought-moments; the first three are not registered by him. (*Bud. Psych.* P. 178).

a sense organ and its object, inexpressible by words (अव्यपदेश्यम्),¹ unerring and well-defined." (न्या. १-१-४).

These definitions, it is maintained, give the palm to the सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष and not to the निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष. The Nyāya definition does take into consideration the unique, non-communicable nature of sense-experience by using the word अव्यपदेश्य. Sense-experience qua sense-experience is always inexpressible. But in order to make it the common property of all, in order to make its content current like any recognized coin, its unity is broken up by a process of thought-analysis. The process, as soon as it begins, tries to draw out of the individual of sense-experience as many generalities as possible predicating them all of the original individual. This operation which essentially breaks up the original unity of concrete experience is called विकल्प. From the point of view of this process the sensation looks formless; while from another point of view, in comparison with the inexhaustible wealth and fluidity of sense-experience, the process of thought-analysis seems pale. Ultimately thought always draws upon the rich content of concrete experience. For a philosophy that holds the original flux as real, the process of analytic thought must be regarded invalid, as one leading us away from the qualitative unity of experience to a quantitative commonwealth of knowledge. Hence the Buddhists maintained that निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष alone yielded true knowledge.

The निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष was taken to be free from differential elements of name, species, genus etc. Vaibhāṣikas defined it as that which is without any element of कल्पना (i. e. विकल्प). In the सां. त. कौ. निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष is described as that bare awareness of an object. It comes as an undifferentiated something. This simple apprehension or bare awareness of an object is compared by Vāchaspati to the simple undifferentiated awareness as that of a child or a dumb man. While treating Kumārila's view of निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष, A. B. Keith says—"Kumarila happily expresses the primitive form of perceptions as bare observation (आलोचना) pertaining to the object

1 Vide Ind. Phil. Vol. II. Pp. 49, 57. A. B. Keith takes अव्यपदेश्यम् to mean that "which does not require definition by name" following the bhāṣya. Vide Kar. Mim. P. 24.

pure and simple, and resembling the cognitions that a new born child has of its environment. (The सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष adding afterwards, or rather breaking up the निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष into substance, class, quality, motion *as distinct from* the thing moving, name etc.)¹ After a quotation from Kerth who is the least minded of all to read modern theories 'into old works, we can say that the निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष in the early years of a child's life would give us the undifferentiated presentation continuum posited by Dr. Ward as the earliest form of experience. Every piece of definite knowledge, in so far as it has an object, must have three moments in it—viz. प्रकारता, विशेष्यता, and ससंग. The निर्विकल्प ज्ञान is bereft of all these. Its nature is regarded as quite unique, being different from the above three moments. In indeterminate perception there is no consciousness of contact between sense and object. Such a consciousness of contact comes only after the differentiation of subject from object. Perception proper is व्यवसायात्मिक well-defined, with a reference to genus, differentiation, name etc. After such determinate perception alone the desire to get at or away from an object rises. The Nyāya by the use of the words अव्यपदेश्यम् and व्यवसायात्मिकम् at once recognizes the immediacy of sense-experience in determinate perception. The Sāṃkhya too takes निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष to be the root of सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष. With the Vedāntins the indeterminate perception is raised to the level of supra-relational intuitive knowledge wherein the individual soul is at one with the Brahman (S 3)

We are here concerned with the psychological process of perception and not with any of the metaphysical bearings of the problem. That the Buddhists regarded indeterminate perception as ultimately valid was, as we have already pointed out, due to their view regarding ultimate reality. In spite of this they allowed psychologically enough room for determinate perception arrived at as a product of a process occupying 17 thought-moments.

It is significant to note that both the camps who fought over the question of the validity or otherwise of सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष

¹ Kar. Mim. P. 25. Italics are ours.

accepted as a common ground the process of विकल्प. Our ordinary perceptions are all on the सविकल्प level, and one can posit the निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष only as an ideal limit. It is a question of theoretical interest only whether at the lowest level we would ever reach a stage where विकल्प was absolutely absent. A follower of the Sāmkhya-Yoga if questioned this day would hold, according to his doctrine of सत्कार्यवाद, the maxim—*Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit prius in sensu*, and would strongly oppose a Buddhist taking down perception to the level of what Prof. Stout has termed *anotic consciousness*.¹ The Buddhists maintained that the मणिप्रभा by itself is a निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष out of which by a process of विकल्प the object itself, the मणि is constructed. We might compare the sensations of मणिप्रभा, to what C D Broad calls 'sensa'.² All our perceptions and objects are in this sense thought-constructions rising out of an original undifferentiated experience, but we cannot claim that this nebulous mass contains no germs of the process that brings us the concretions of thought. All the orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy fought for such a principle of continuity rejected by Buddhism, and as we shall see, psychologically too Buddhism broke down upon this very point. The process from the निर्विकल्प to the सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष is a continuous one, and leads further on through ideation to intellection.

The relation between 'sensa' and the object constructed by a process of विकल्प therefrom, is best exhibited in a proposition held by a पूर्वपक्ष in the Nyāyadars'ana. It says:—Our sense experience catches only fugitive glimpses at an object which as a whole remains out of reach. So our seeing some parts of a tree are really the occasions from which we infer the existence of the tree as such; and this process is essentially the same as our drawing an inference of fire by seeing a part of it namely smoke. (न्या. २. १. ३०.) Indeed in this sense all सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष is a sort of inference; and this was the reason why Helmholtz said that all perception was 'unconscious inference.'

1 Vide Anal. Psych. Vol. I. P. 51 ff.

2 Scientific Thought. Part II.

In our treatment of *vikalpa* we shall see how according to the Yogadars'ana view inference is said to be based on *vikalpa*. But not all perception is inference, for without "bricks" we would be able to build no house, and the *sensa* or the *इन्द्रिय प्रत्यक्ष*, howsoever partial they be, do give us sufficient material to build with. Over and above this it is maintained that in case we do not accept *प्रत्यक्ष*, all possibility of inference, inasmuch as it is built upon it, is automatically destroyed. (S. 4)

The process of perception, distributed in Buddhism under seven stages over a period of 17 thought-moments has its counterpart in the Jain theory of perception, recognizing four stages namely that of *अवग्रह*, *ईहा*, *अवाय*, or *अवाय* and of *धारणा*. Prof. Radhakrishnan has dwelt ably upon these stages in his first volume on Indian Philosophy. In his second volume¹ we read, "The Jains, who hold that in all perception we are conscious of the subject which perceives as well as the object that is perceived, deny the possibility of indeterminate perception." The remark must evidently apply to their epistemological view, and we can hold that psychologically the progress of thought from a relatively indeterminate to a determinate perception is given in the above mentioned four stages.

Out of *मति*, *श्रुत*, *अवधि*, *अनःपराय* and *केवल*, the first *मति* is generated either by the senses or by *nand*. Both these types of *Matī* pass through four stages. We are concerned here with *sense-perception* and shall describe the stages in general terms as given in the *Tattvārtha*.

Operations of thought are progressively brought to bear upon sense data in four stages of *अवग्रह*, *ईहा*, *अवाय* and *धारणा*. A bare apprehension, or awareness of an object which is not yet clear or distinct is called *अवग्रह*. *अवग्रह* is taken to be synonymous with pure grasping, or bare seeing or apprehending. At this first stage the object is grasped only in general its aspects while in the second stage of *ईहा*, urged by the curiosity

1 P. 58.

2 *मति* is the finished product, it is filled with the content which is supplied either by mind, or by sense i. e. by an "object" in the Buddhist sense.

to know its specific characters, the subject resolves to know the object fully in its particular aspects. Here by ईहा is meant जिज्ञासा, परीक्षा, विचारणा—curiosity, examination, enquiry.¹ After the specific properties are fully determined and the object known in all its complexity, a consideration of its moral value comes up at the third stage. Finally in धारणा, one gets acquainted with the object in its true character. The process at this stage is held to be sufficiently intense to leave behind a trace or a संस्कार which makes its recall possible at any future favourable occasion.² (S. 5)

The stages given here are spoken of as if they were different types of perception, simply because the mental operation can stop at any one of these stages. Some objects might simply pass by the fringe of consciousness never to be further attended to, while others might occupy its focus for some time. That they are not different kinds of perceptions is shown by the fact that the last stage is supposed to contain the products of the foregoing three stages, as moments within its organic unity. A similar position is taken up in the Abhidhammatthasangaho. There an object is termed 'very great' if it goes up to the process of "retention" constituting the last two moments (16th and 17th) of an act of perception. An object simply 'great' goes through only 14 moments, the last act being that of apperception (from the 6th to 12th moment) "Slight" objects stop at the 5th thought-moment, going through the process of "determining consciousness determining it," below which a 'very slight' object lies buried in subliminal consciousness.³

The processes described are almost similar in Buddhism and Jainism; and one might safely try to equate them. In

1 उहा and तर्क too are added.

2 We might compare the Jain धारणा with the धारण mentioned in यो. सा. २. १८. along with ग्रहण, उह, अपोह, तरवज्ञान etc. There धारण is defined by वाच. as स्मृतिधारणम्. The Jain धारणा makes स्मृति possible. Definitions of अवग्रह, ईहा, अवाय and धारणा as given in the सन्मतितर्कप्रकरणम् are quoted in S. 5 for comparison.

3 Comp. Phil. Pp. 125-126.

Jainism there is no concept that would answer to the Buddhist doctrine of *सर्वगच्छोत्*, hence the first three moments that lie below the *मनोद्वार* are not recognised by it. But the *अवग्रह* of the Jains covers the second and the third stages, namely those of—"visual consciousness seeing just that visible object" (occupying two thought-moments) and "receptient consciousness receiving it" (enduring for three thought-moments). The stage of *ईहा* is definitely the same as "investigating consciousness investigating it," (taking 4 thought-moments.) Then comes the long-drawn fuller perception of the object in all its relations, the complete *सर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष* answering to the two items of the Buddhistic theory named successively as,—“determining consciousness determining it” (of 5 moments) and “any one of the 29 modes of *कामलंक* apperception.....determined by the conditions evoking it” enduring “normally for seven thought-moments.” After this comes *धारणा* which is the same as “two resultant thought-moments of retention” coming “as immediate consequences of the apperception.”¹

From *अवग्रह* to *धारणा* it is one single process of thought, and the higher stages completely incorporate the results of the lower ones. We come to distinguish between these several stages simply because some objects get to a certain stage and then drop out of consciousness, without reaching fuller perception. If we cannot take *अवग्रह* to be absolutely identical with the pure *निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष* of the level of presentation continuum, it definitely lies at the lowest level of perceptual judgement, where the subject is merely aware of something. The cumulative character of consciousness, as Prof. Stout would call it, is exhibited in the progress of perception from *अवग्रह* or indeterminate perception to *धारणा* including determinate perception and is expressly dwelt upon in the Jain as well as the Buddhistic theories.

In the *प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालंकार*, comparatively a later Jain

¹ Here it is significant to note that in both the *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaho* and the *Tattvartha* the classification is fourfold; e. g. In the latter *mati* is supposed to have four stages of intensity—*तदेतन्मतिज्ञानम् ... चतुर्विधं भवति ।* भा. १. १६ ।

production we find lengthier definitions. For instance, अवग्रह is defined as विषयविषयीसंनिपातात्मन्तरसमुद्भूतसत्तामात्रगोचरदर्शनाज्जातमाद्यभवान्तरसामान्याकारविशिष्टवस्तुग्रहमवग्रह इति ॥ २-७ ॥ When a specific object is grasped in its general aspects that come after the barest apprehension of something existent (सत्तामात्रगोचरदर्शन ¹) following upon the contact between sense and its object, we have अवग्रह. We can say that this अवग्रह though it lies a little higher on the level of thought than the pure निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष, the latter, hinted at in विषयविषयीसंनिपातान्तरसमुद्भूतसत्तामात्रगोचरदर्शन, is not definitely mentioned in Jainism for even analytically we can only approach it asymptotically.

It is of great psychological interest to note that the lower we go in the process of perception, the more general the outlines of its object are said to become. No doubt according to all the systems of Indian thought perception is said to give us the individual as distinguished from the generalities that inhere in it,² and such an individual given in perception might be regarded as further unanalyzable from the point of view of either logic or epistemology. But psychologically the approach to the individual is made through a process that evidently begins with a *vague generality*. We should not mix up this psychological generality with the logical generality or the universal as it is called. Perception while it proceeds from the vague to the distinct gives us the individual; and we might distinguish between the indistinct generality of bare apprehension from the universal aspects that become clear as a result of the operations of विकल्प on the object of determinate perception.

ईहा, अवाय and चारणा are defined in the प्रमाणनव० much in the same way as in other works, but there is a fresh psychological distinction observed between doubt and ईहा. The latter is defined अवग्रहीतार्थविशेषाकांक्षणीहेति ॥ २-८ ॥ — as a desire to know the specific characteristics of an object. In doubt too, the specific

1 सत्तामात्रगोचरदर्शनात् is inserted to emphasize the fact that there must be something positive and not a mere अभाव.

2 अर्थस्य विशेषावधारणप्रधाना इति: प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ बो. भा. १-७ ॥ also वैशिष्ट्यावगाही सविकल्पप्रत्यक्षम् ॥

characteristics are undetermined. The difference between the two is given by putting doubt before ईहा—संशयपूर्वकत्वादीहयाः संशयाद्भेद इति ॥ २

ईहा is that primary act of attention or of will to know the object. The subject when baffled by two opposing specific characteristics claiming the same object begins to doubt his own perception and then determines to know the truth, impelled by the urge of ईहा. This primary act of volition in perception is present even at the अवाय stage where the subject determines the moral qualities of the object. This element of will is recognized explicitly in the अभिधम्मत्त्वसं० where apperception—जवनम्—is a 'free act' "as distinguished from the mental states, which are fixed, determined, resultant acts of mind." It is the active nexus which joins the उपपत्तिभाव to the कम्मभाव, the passive to the active side of life.¹

In the Yogadars'ana the process from निर्विकल्प to सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष is not dwelt upon along with the treatment of प्रत्यक्ष. Instead of the ordinary relation between the two, we come across a discussion where the relation between the two comes up in an inverted order, i. e. the निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष is held to be higher than the सविकल्प one. In the passage from a lower to a higher समापत्ति, the sādhaṅka is required to free his mind from the impositions of विकल्प, resulting in mental association² between the word, the object and the knowledge thereof. This is the process of 'introversion' of mind which we might distinguish from that of senses mentioned in यो. २. ५४. This higher निर्विकल्प ज्ञान is that supra-relational knowledge, which at its highest level corresponds to its Vedāntic definition. The Buddhists could never draw such a distinction between the lower निर्विकल्प and the higher निर्विकल्प ज्ञान because of their अनन्तावाद.

In order to treat the lower निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष we need not re-invert the relation appearing in यो. १. ४२ mentioned above. We have a reference to the sub-relational निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष ending in clear perception, given in the midst of a more general dis-

1 Comp. Phil. P. 43.

2 The word is not साहचर्यं but अभ्यास. इतरेतराभ्यासात् साध्यार्हप्रत्ययानाम् ॥ यो. ३-१७ ॥ also vide भा. भाष्य टी. on १-४२.

cussion on the relation between *वर्ण* and *वर्म*, between substance and attribute or quality. The treatment of the problem given in *सो. ३. १३-१४-१५* might perhaps seem to lose much of its psychological value because of its materialistic point of view. But according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view, the human mind is itself material, its dynamic consciousness being only a reflected (and one might say refracted too) light of the pure static consciousness of Puruṣa. The problem of the relation between *वर्ण* and its *वर्म* crops up because of the dynamicity of Prakṛti. Mind too being the product of Prakṛti ceaselessly flows on and undergoes its own *वर्म-लक्षण* and *अवस्थापरिणाम*s. In the bhāṣya on 3.13 the instance given of *धर्माविस्थापरिणाम* is *तत्र निरोधक्षणे निरोधसंस्कारा बलवन्तो भवन्ति, दुर्बला व्युत्थानसंस्कारा इति । एव धर्माणामवस्थापरिणामः* 1—At the time when the mind be arrested, the *निरोधसंस्कार*s become stronger, while the *व्युत्थानसंस्कार*s become weaker. Here there is a change in the state of qualities. Vāchaspati gives various other illustrations of change wrought in the state of qualities by time.¹ It is a cow or any other creature growing from infancy to old age; it is a jug getting worn out every hour. The third instance is relevant to our discussion. When the eye senses blue and then green etc. it is its *वर्मपरिणाम*. As a particular act of sensing passes out of the present, it is called its *लक्षणपरिणाम*. But when the sense passes *from indistinct to clear perceptions of an object* like a pearl etc, it is held to be its *अवस्थापरिणाम*—*वर्तमान लक्षणस्य रत्नाद्यालोचनस्य स्फुटत्वास्फुटत्वादि अवस्थापरिणामः* । Here we have the whole process from indeterminate to determinate perception. The passage from indistinct to clear perception is said to be a function of the indriyas as expressed in a series of their *अवस्थापरिणाम*s. We know according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view the *manas* is one of the indriyas; and in the *सो. त. कौ.* we are told that the external *jñānendriyas* give us at first indeterminate perception, while determinate perception is a product of *manas*. (S. 3)

1 *अवस्थापरिणाम*—change in the state of a certain quality has for its co-variant the co-efficient of time. It is change in a certain state, not change of a certain state, for the latter would mean *वर्मलक्षणपरिणाम*. Qualitatively the state remains the same, it only becomes weaker or stronger, as it cannot maintain status quo because of the ceaseless flux.

Thus the relation between the jñānendriyas and manas is exhibited in the process of thought from निर्विकल्प to सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष. This relationship is more clearly expressed in the Tarkabhāṣa-वदा निर्विकल्पा प्रमत्त फले तदा इन्द्रियं करणम् । इन्द्रियाणां स्वसंबद्धवस्तुप्रकाशकारित्वम् इति निष्पत्तिः । ततोऽर्थसमिकृष्टेनेन्द्रियेण निर्विकल्पकं नामजात्यादियोजनाहीनं.. ज्ञानं जन्यते । तस्य ज्ञानस्येन्द्रियं करणम् छिदाया इव परबुधः । In the Yogadars'ana we do not meet with this distinction simply because the primary topic for discussion in 3.13 is that of the relation between a quality and its manifestation in the time-series (अवस्थापरिणाम).

It was against the *tabula rasa* view of mind held by Locke, and developed to its logical extremity by Hume in his sensationalism, that Kant posited his primary categories of perception and thought. Mind became the active synthesizer and not a mere on-looker receiving impressions passively.¹ We have seen above how this directing act of attention is recognized in the Jain ईश and the Buddhistic जवन. According to the Nyāya view, too, the आत्मा is endowed with a capacity to make an effort, urged by its own will to know, which effort is absent only in non-voluntary sensations, for then न हि आत्मा जिज्ञासमानः प्रयत्नेन मनस्तदा प्रेरयति ।² Thus the initiative of the Soul or a mere urge residing in the flux of human consciousness (as in Buddhism) is recognized by the Nyāya, Jain and Buddhistic schools. In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga this initiative urge is defined not in its relation to perception, but as the very characteristic of human mind as a whole, which keeps on ceaselessly active, the three guṇas never allowing it any rest.

Our mind finite as it is has to perceive and think of things progressively. The process is there because of the inherent incapacity of the human mind to grasp at a thing catastrophically. The psychological problem of the relation between attention and time must have drawn the thinking minds towards it. For once a process or a series is over, the mind

1 Kant's theory remained to the last epistemological, and bore practically no results in the sphere of psychology. It was Dr. Ward who rescued all the results of Kantian epistemology, by planting them squarely in psychology. Vide Hist. Psych. Brett. Vol. III. Pp. 235-236 ff.

2 व्या. भा. २. १. २६

always begins to reflect as to why it could not reach the end without the intervening steps in the process. Considering the wealth of outside coexistent objects we have to posit the subjective incapacity of attention which can take in only a limited number of things in a single act of attention.

Even for the Indian systems which took mind to be *बिभु* and not *अणु* the problem did exist. So in the *Yogadars'ana* the problem is solved by taking the *वृत्ति* of that original *बिभुचित्त* to be limited in its capacity.¹ As for Jainism, Soul itself was conceived dynamically, and the problem of *कमभाविज्ञान* could not have that degree of urgency for its solution as it had with the *Sāmkhya*-yoga or the *Nyāya*.² For Buddhism the problem did not exist, for it never allowed mind to concretize into something substantial. The question is earnestly taken up in the *Nyāya*, for it had to give a psychological explanation of a problem that seemed to tell on epistemology.³ The *Ātmā* was *बिभु* all-pervading and as such omniscient, and the fact that it was fed on knowledge by crumbs had to be explained. Their conception of *manas* helped them out of this difficulty. The *Nyāya* explained the phenomenon of *incoprescnsibility*⁴ of all sensations by taking *manas* to be *अणु*-as small as an atom. Under the initiative of the *Ātmā* it joins itself with different sense organs one by one, and this is why *युगपज्ज्ञान* is held to be an impossibility. The atomic size of *manas* seems to have been fixed simply to explain the unfolding of experience in the

1 तस्मादाहकारिकत्वाच्चेतसाऽहंकारस्य च.....त्रैलोक्यवापितत्वाद्विभुत्वं मनसः । एष चेदस्यवृत्तिरपि विभ्वति सर्वज्ञतापत्तिरित्यत उक्तं वृत्तिरेवास्य सकोचविकासिनी । बाच. टीका. यो. ४. १० ॥

2 Even though Soul was dynamic, the problem of absolute knowledge does come up in Jainism as a stage to be reached where the Soul is free from the mediacy of the senses and the *manas*.

3 In western philosophy we have a parallel in Kant's categories of sense.

4 Used not in the sense in which Dr. Ward does—"We cannot see an orange as at once yellow and green, though we can feel it at once as both smooth and cool; we cannot open and close the same hand at the same time." *Psych.-Prin.* P. 80. This is due to the patent structure of reality.

time-series. This function of *manas* must have been regarded very important because a *sūtra* has been reserved for it. Over and above "memory, inference, verbal knowledge, doubt, etc," युगपज्ज्ञानानु-
त्पत्तिर्मनसो स्मिन् ॥ १-१-१६ ॥ युगपच्च सत्तु प्राणादीनां गन्धादीनां च सन्निकर्षेषु सत्तु
युगपज्ज्ञानानि नोत्पद्यन्ते - तेनानुमीयते अस्ति तत्तद्भिन्नवसंयोगि सहकारि विमित्तान्तरस्मभ्यापि
यस्यासन्निधेर्नोत्पद्यते ज्ञान संनिधेर्नोत्पद्यत इति । मनःसंयोगानपेक्षस्य हीन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षस्य
ज्ञानोत्पत्ते युगपदुत्पत्त्येन ज्ञानानीति । आ. १-१-१६ ॥—the non-simulta-
neity of knowledge is held to be the differential quality of
manas. The Soul by its nature was outside time, but was
tied to it at one end by *manas* which was its only instru-
ment of knowledge, in its state of bondage, regarding the outside
world. The actual problem about the so-called span of attention,
or its capacity to grasp its several objects at a time did not come
to the fore-front. But in general all knowledge was held to be
consecutive even when it seemed to be simultaneous. The
current example given was that of a block of hundred lotus
leaves pierced by a needle. Now to our slow moving conscious-
ness it would all seem to have been performed simultaneously,
but by using our faculty of reasoning we know that the leaves
were pierced only successively. Another common instance
was that of a burning piece of wood turned round and round
in dark, giving us the perception of a closed circle. अलतचक्रदर्शन-
वत्तदुपलक्षितरात्रुसंचारात् ॥ ३. १. ५९ ॥ आत्रुसंचारादलतस्य भ्रमतो विद्यमानः क्रमो न पृथक्ते
क्रमस्याग्रहणादविच्छेदबुद्ध्या चक्रवर्तुर्निर्भवतीति । Here the slowness of our
Buddhi is definitely laid down as the cause of our seeing a
circle instead of its different positions.¹

(§ 3) Theory of Perception

(Auditory Perception of Meaning)

The passage from निर्विकल्प to सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष is from the

I Bergson tells us "it is conceivable that this consciousness could live so slow and lazy a life as to take in the whole path of the heavenly body in a single perception, just as we do when we perceive the successive positions of a shooting star as one line of fire." Time, F. Will p. 195
In modern philosophy and physics the question of the rate at which time flows and the capacity of our consciousness, the slowness or the speed of it, have come to the foreground.

implicit to the explicit.¹ The investigating consciousness going from one aspect of its object to another, from indistinctness to clearness, from a psychological generality to the knowledge of the concrete individual, registers all its contents and incorporates them into complete perception. A piece of matter, or as the proverb would have it, a stone, if it keeps on rolling may not gather any moss, but the living flow of consciousness would gather its own moss only if it rolled on from content to content, thus becoming richer every moment. The cumulative character of consciousness with its implications of memory, and the unity of perception due to its meaning—all these moments are best exhibited in the perception of meaning of a spoken word. Stout lays stress upon the cumulative character above mentioned, Ward takes perception to be a product of differentiation and concretion from within the original presentational continuum; James, in spite of his atomistic bias, takes perception to be almost a process of subsumption; for Bergson it is pre-eminently an act of contraction, carried out by consciousness, of the different moments spread out in matter—the contraction of material extension being achieved by mind through its higher power of “tension”. In India from olden times the spoken word had drawn the attention of thinkers, and they had analyzed the actual process by which the meaning of a spoken word was grasped by the hearer and built up a theory near enough to the modern theory of perception.

We need not enter into the famous controversy between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas about the eternal nature or otherwise of the word. From the standpoint of psychology the difference between those that believed in the existence of the sphōṭa and those that did not is not very great. We shall take the view about auditory perception given in the *Yogadars'ana*—3. 17. We shall reproduce all the relevant portions, and then try to lay bare the under-lying theory of perception.

¹ The distinction between implicit and explicit, was originally drawn by Prof. Stout,

There we read:—

“ The word, the object, and the knowledge there-of appear as one because of their mutual imposition. ”

“ The power of speech becomes meaningful only in वर्ण-sounds. The ear has for its object only the series of sounds. The word itself is grasped by the Buddhi at the end of the final sound. The sounds, as they do not exist all of them at the same time, cannot do any favour to one-another (i. e. cannot express the word as it is.) They come into being, and go out of it, without touching the word, without establishing it, each one of them being spoken of as not having the form of the word.

“ A (particular) sound taken singly is a part of the word and (by itself) is full of the capacity to express everything inasmuch as it has, as if, gained universal form, being able to enter into combinations with other sounds. It might be placed at times before and at times after the other sounds. Thus there are many sounds which, though limited by convention of meaning on account of their following a certain order, are (still) surrounded by the capacity to express or name everything. For instance the g. au. and h (though in themselves they have a capacity to denote anything by entering into combination with other letters in different sequences, still in this particular order) enlighten an object possessed of a dew-lap etc.

“ The word conventionally expressing a certain object is that very word which is lighted up by a single act of consciousness (बुद्धि) when all the sounds limited by their conventional order have been uttered in their particular order. That word is unitary, it is the object of a single act of consciousness, it is indivisible, having no time sequence, it is not made up of sounds. It is consciousness itself; (बोद्धम्—which might be rendered otherwise according to Samkhya-Yoga terminology—as a specific modification of बुद्धि mind itself.) It is established by the operation of the idea of the last sound. The consciousness of all people is coloured completely or pierced through

with the disposition to linguistic intercourse, which (disposition) has in itself no beginning. The word (spoken of above) is intuited (प्रतीयते) by such a consciousness, along with the conviction of its reality (सिद्धवत् संप्रतिपत्त्या) " (S. 6)

And in Vāchaspati's Tīkā we read:—"The preception of the last letter leaves as its operation its own संस्कार, and the word is established by that संस्कार of the last letter working in unison with the other संस्कारs left by the experience of the preceding sounds" अन्त्यवर्णप्रत्ययस्य व्यापारः संस्कारः पूर्ववर्णानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहित-स्तेनोपस्थापितं विषयीकृतम्। In reply to an objection as to how at all the sounds can cohere as they do not co-exist, he says-असहभाविनामपि च संस्कारद्वारेणास्ति सहभावः इति—"Things which do not happen together can co-exist by way of their संस्कार १."¹ Again "The existence of a saṃskāra is to be inferred from its recollection, and it (i. e. its form) is determined by (the form) of experience which caused it, and such a saṃskāra is unable to bring about the notion of any other object. —स्मृतिफलप्रसवावुमितस्तु संस्कारः स्वकारणानुभवविषय-नियतो न विषयान्तरे प्रत्ययमाधानुमुत्सहते। Such specific saṃskāras combine together in one single act of consciousness and give us a unitary perception of the meaning of a word.

The perception of the meaning of a spoken word is said to differ from the determinate perceptions given by other senses. For instance "it is seen that the past indistinct experiences bring forth or support the present distinct experiences by means of the saṃskāras stored up successively. Thus our knowledge of a distant tree is at first vague, and then becomes clear—literally speaking (the tree is the same but) our indistinct knowledge or apprehension regarding the existence of a tree in the distance becomes the cause of our future distinct knowledge of it. This cannot be said to happen in case of sounds giving us the knowledge of their meaning." (S. 7) The argument put concisely comes to this:—"The spoken letters taken singly do not bring out any

1 "Items successively apprehended by the 'movements' of attention, (or even those that happen in succession) come, through primary retention, to be co-present to the mind." Art. on Psych. by G. F. Stout and C. A. Mace in Encycl. Brit. 14th En. Bracketed phrase is ours.

indistinct perception, for if at all they bring out any perceptions, one might say that they are distinct (inasmuch as each letter yields its own perception). The meaning (अर्थप्रत्यय) though supported by letters is not directly given in perception, of those letters. That meaning can be given either distinct as the letters come and go, or not at all, but we cannot say that it is given at first indistinctly, (and that it becomes distinct afterwards. For the relation between indistinct apprehension and distinct perception holds only in case of visual perception.) The moments of distinctness and indistinctness are posited, only by a process of विकल्प, in auditory perception of the Sphota after it is grasped (by a single act of consciousness) suggested as it is by the sounds." "The meaning of a spoken word is arrived at by a specific effort of consciousness." "For when, through the ear mind knows that all the sounds have been spoken, the *residua* left by the experiences of individual sounds come together, get *compressed* and thus assume the form of a Sphota, i. e. the meaning of that word." "The sounds and the *saṃskāras* left by them have not different objects (of reference) because they have for their object one and the same word." (S. 7)

From the above quotations the following theory about the process of perception of meaning of a spoken word can be clearly marked out. The distinction between सविकल्प and निर्विकल्प प्रत्यय can be drawn only in case of those perceptions whose objects continue to endure in time and space while attention is being paid to them. But in case of a spoken word, the different letters die out as they are spoken one after another. In auditory perception we are dealing with a pure time-series. One by one the letters as they are spoken leave their characteristic traces, *saṃskāras* which endure in the mind. These specific *saṃskāras* of different sounds differ from one another as the sounds themselves do. The *saṃskāra* of each and every pronounced letter is quite distinct, and we can say that just like the letter, it too has got the capacity to enter into an infinite number of relations of sequence with those of other letters. The letters or sounds are surrounded

with a halo of this capacity of naming things, which is determined in a specific way only by their combining in a certain number and a particular permutation. This comes to the same thing as that the saṃskāra of each and every letter is modified, at the same time that it modifies others when it enters into a particular combination. The fleeting sensations of different letters are registered in our memory, they co-exist there in the form of saṃskāras and the linear time sensations are as if "contracted". When the final letter is spoken, its saṃskāra modifies all others, and is modified in turn by them and the meaning *breaks* upon the mind. In such a process of organic modification, the different letters do not fly at a tangent, but are welded into the unity of a single meaning grasped by a single act of attention or mind.

The objects of all other senses are in a way spatially spread-out, but there too the cumulative effects of all the various acts of attention consisting of a series which primarily begins at the lowest level of अस्फुटानुभव-indistinct apprehension, brings one ultimately to the level of clear determinate perception. The indeterminate perceptions are all of them woven organically into the fabric of the ensuing determinate perception. In view of the whole discussion we can now say that in निश्चित्य प्रत्यक्ष-and especially in visual indeterminate perception what one begins with is the barest outline which afterwards gets filled by details as perception gets more and more definite. Thus accepting Dr. Ward's symbolism we can say that if the determinate perception of a flower be represented by "[p' (ab) s' (cd) o' (fg)]", we first apprehend [p'...s'...o'], or [p' (a—) s' (c...) o' (f...)] and so forth." And his further remark that "It is because the traits first attended to persist that those noticed later form an addition to them so that the complex at length may be complete.",¹ is definitely stated in the Yogadars'ana theory of perception discussed here.

But the question remains—why was it that the perception of

¹ Psych. Prin. P. 81.

the meaning of a spoken word was singled out from those of other ordinary perceptions ? Memory as a function of mind plays its part in both, so we must look for the difference not in mental functioning. And the cardinal difference between the two is this:—In case of other perceptions the indeterminate level is characterized by the same generic aspect as that of the determinate perception. The clear perception is only a greater specification of the original generic mass of its निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष. But in case of auditory perception the different saṃskāras of the various letters seem characterized by their own nature which ultimately get their generic and specific meaning only after the meaning is perceived as a whole.¹

With this we come to the question of the relation between perception and the kinds of "wholes". We have already mentioned that the object of perception according to the Yoga view is an organic whole यद्यप्युपलभ्यते तत्तदवयवविवेकेन आम्मानम् (भा १. ४३)—whatever is perceived is considered as organic, a whole with parts. But there can be different degrees of organic unity; and this we find best exhibited in the letters uniting organically in a word, and the words uniting organically in sentences. Just as a letter by itself is only nebulous in its character, a fact perceived by the ancients in their own way when they described it as सर्वोभिधानशक्तिप्रचित, so too every word is surrounded by an indefinite halo of meaning which is only determined by its organic relation with other words in a sentence. The word perceived by mind is called

1 "At this moment that I am conversing with you I pronounce the word "conversation." Clearly my consciousness presents the word all at once, otherwise it would not be a whole word, and would not convey a single meaning. Yet, when I pronounce the last syllable of the word, the first three have already been pronounced: they are past with regard to the last one, which must then be called the present." (Mind Energy p. 55.) Prof. Bergson when he spoke these words could hardly have dreamt that in India 12 or 14 centuries back another sister mind laid down:—
 वर्णा एकसमयासंभवित्वान् आविर्भूतास्तिरोभूताः.....उच्यन्ते । तेषां य एको बुद्धिनिर्मास-
 स्तत्पदं.....एकबुद्धिविषयः, एकप्रयत्नाक्षितम्, अभागम्, अकमम्, बौद्धम्, अम्यवर्णप्रत्ययव्यापारो-
 पस्थापितम् ॥ व्यास भाष्य on पा. ३. १७. ॥

a Sphota; or a Pada-Sphota, while the meaning of a sentence grasped by a single act of consciousness is called a Vākyasphota."

"Words have the capacity to form themselves into sentences. They are arranged in a certain order to express the meaning of a sentence. (In a sentence) the words, the object to which the meaning of the sentence is referred to, and the meaning it conveys—all three are different." (सर्वपदेषु चास्तिवाक्य-शक्तिः—। एष्टं च वाक्यायै पदरचन । तेषां शब्द, वस्तुत्यानां प्रविभागः ॥ आ. ibid) "But

it is (only) in a sentence that the words and their object are expressed i. e. get their meaning" तत्र वाक्ये पदार्थाभिव्यक्तिः आ. ibid)

And Vāchaspati says—"After having defined the word as indivisible, unitary and consisting of letters (or sounds) only from the point of view of abstraction in thought—the Bhāṣhyakāra goes on to explain the nature of a sentence as a whole single unit, without parts, which too can be said to be made up of parts in the form of words from an abstract point of view."

One might naturally object that words do have a meaning of their own and there is no necessity of taking the sentence as a unit. Referring to such an objection Vāchaspati replies—"It has already been said that the meaning intended to be conveyed by a word is not conveyed by a word alone until it is joined to another word understood. वृक्ष इत्युक्तं अस्तीति गम्यते । Even where a single word is used its meaning is grasped with the help of some additional word, not by itself alone, for it is a sentence which expresses the meaning and not the (atomic) words." (तदेव विकल्पितवर्णमागम्य एकम् अनवयम् पद व्युत्पाद्य, कल्पितपदविभागं वाक्यम् एकम् अनवयम् व्युत्पादयितुम् आह—स्यादेतत्पदानामेव चेद्वाक्यशक्तिः कृतं तर्हि वाक्येन, तेनैव एव तदर्थान्वयादित्यत आहः—“ तत्र वाक्य इति । उक्तमेतन्न केवलपदवाच्यार्थः प्रतिपिस्तितः प्रतीयते न यावदेतत्पदान्तरेण अभिसमस्यत इति । यत्रापि केवलस्य पदस्य प्रयोगः तत्रापि पदान्तरेण सहैकीकृत्य ततोऽर्थो गम्यते, न तु केवलतः.....वाक्यमेव तत्र तत्र वाचकं न तु पदानि ।)

A word too is surrounded by a nebulous mass of meaning which is determined specifically only in its relation to other words in an organic sentence. For example the meaning of

2 There are 8 kinds of sphotas—१ वर्णस्फोट, २ पदस्फोट, ३ वाक्यस्फोट, ४ अलङ्कारपदस्फोट, ५ अलङ्कारवाक्यस्फोट, ६ वर्णजातिस्फोट, ७ पदजातिस्फोट, and ८ वाक्यजातिस्फोट,—तत्र वाक्यस्फोट एव वास्तवः अन्येषां त्ववास्तवत्वम् इति वैयाकरणानां सिद्धान्तः ।

भवति in the sentence—चटो भवति, भवति मित्रां देहि, and भवति तिष्ठति can be determined only in its relation to other words. We might carry further the analysis applied to the relation between the sounds and the meaning of the word perceived. In a sentence the vague meanings of all the words are modified in their interrelations, and a single meaning without parts is grasped by consciousness, with the help of the *samskāras* left behind by the different words.¹

The view propounded in the *Yogadars'ana* thus amounts to *अन्विताभिधानवाद* as distinguished from *अभिहितान्वयवाद*. The former takes the sentence to be a unit of meaning apprehended by consciousness directly, the words and the letters being afterwards arrived at by a process of abstraction in thought—(*विकल्प*). The latter view is the atomistic view, according to which separate words have meanings irrespective of their being in a sentence.

The theory of the *sphota* is dwelt upon at some length in the *पाणिनिदर्शन* (सर्व)². The objections against the *sphota* theory are advanced by the oppositionists, who hold that the letters or the sounds themselves have the power to light up the meaning, and that there is no need of positing an intermediate hypothesized existence in the form of a *sphota*, between our sensing the sounds and perceiving the meaning. The controversy would lead us to the consideration as to whether the word is eternal or no. The camps are divided, the *Nyāya Vais'eshika* against the eternalists. The reasons advanced by the latter are extra psychological, and we need not enter into them. But from

1 And in *Mind Energy* we read—"When we read a book or glance through the newspaper, do we actually perceive each letter of each word or even each word of each sentence? Were it so, we should not read many pages. The fact is that we only actually see in a word and in a sentence, a few letters, or even a few characteristic strokes, just what is needed in order that we can guess all the remainder: as for the remainder, we fancy we are seeing it, but we are actually producing in ourselves the hallucination of it". p. 97. Further on he says—"In short, rapid reading is a work of divination, but not of abstract divination." p. 98. It is this fact which lends truth to the *Nyāya पूर्वपक्ष* mentioned above that all perception is but "unconscious inference."

2 सर्व Pp. 299 to 303, 302 ff.

the above quotation from the Vyāsabhāṣya on 3. 17, one can go to the length of identifying the sphota with the meaning of the word. The controversy would cease then, and the theory of the sphota would only get a psychological significance in being a true theory of the process of auditory perception. In the Nyāya which does not accept the sphota theory, we read.— सर्वविषयं च शास्त्रं प्रतिपद्यते, अर्थमविषयभूतं श्रोत्रस्य कर्मभाविनो वर्णान् धृत्वा पदवाक्यभावेन प्रति-
सन्धानं सच्चार्थव्यवस्थां च बुद्धयमानोऽनेकविषयमर्थजातमप्रहणीयमेककेन इन्द्रियेण गृह्णाति ।
तदेवमनियतपर्यायं सर्वविषयप्रहणमेकचेतनाधिकरणमनन्वकर्तृकं प्रतिपद्यते ॥ न्या भा. ३. १.
३. ॥ In the Nyāya the Soul is posited as a principle synthesizing all the sense-experience which would otherwise remain loose like grains of sands. In this sense the Nyāya epistemology comes very near the Kantian epistemology. Full-fledged perception too is regarded as a product built up actively by the Soul. The प्रतिबंधन is that act of synthesis, which includes the grafting of a new perception on to memory (Vide Nyāyadars'ana 3-1-14 and 15). And if the Nyāyadars'ana does not posit a sphota, it is at one with the Vaiyākaraṇas in holding that the meaning of a word is not given by the ear, but is the active work of a synthesizing principle.¹

Compared with this the sphota theory at its worst is only a hypostatization of the psychological process of perception. Divested of this hypostatization theory becomes the same as that of its opponents both of which come nearest the most modern theory of perception.²

(§4-a) Recognition

In the perception of meaning of a spoken word or a sentence, we for the first time have to recognise explicitly the nature of our mind storing up everything that comes

1 For the Yogadarś'ana it is the Buddhi, according to the Nyāya it is the Soul.

2 " They (the grammarians) recognized the sphota, a mysterious entity, a sort of hypostatization of sound, of which action sounds were manifestations." His. San. Lit. P. 387. " It will be seen that a true thought is here presented though obscurely expressed. That ' supersensible word ' is of course no other than the idea which is expressed by the combination of the letters." R. Garbe's art. on Yoga in E. R. E.

across its current. Each and every mode of mind leaves its trace, and by a process of "contraction", as Bergson would put it, we are able to give the content of any impression a meaning. In the process of passing from निर्विकल्प to सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष of any spatial object, this cumulative nature of consciousness remains implicit, but when dealing with a pure time series of sounds, the saṃskāras come to play a prominent part.¹

An indriya-pratyaksha while passing out of mind leaves its impression on it, and when it recurs it is recognized as having been experienced before. Thus recognition entails memory, and memory presupposes mind. But recognition is neither pure memory nor pure perception, but an organic unity of the two, blended in a single complex. The perception of the meaning of a word differs from recognition in that its different syllables are different and contiguous in time, while the memory of an object and its present percept—which are only two moments in the single act of recognition—are separated by some appreciable time interval. Mrs. Rhys Davids thinks that the problem of the continuity of the experiencing subject as implied in the fact of memory could suggest itself to Mr. Aung because of his "contact with western thought and criticism!"² We might assure her that the Indian philosophical systems deal full well with all the implications of memory; and even Buddhism had to accommodate itself to the cardinal fact of memory. The query: "How is memory possible, if the subject be not the same for any two consecutive moments in life?" has not, as she thinks, come from the west. In the Yogadars'ana we read:—"यदहमब्रूवं तत्स्मृत्वामि," "यच्चास्मिन् तत्पश्चाद्गमि—" त्यहमिति प्रत्ययः सर्वस्य प्रत्ययस्य भेदे सति, प्रत्ययिन्यभेदेन उपस्थितः ॥ भा. १. ३२ ॥ "I touch what I saw", "I see what I touched"—this experience of the "I", in the midst of all different fragmentary pieces of experience gets established as the one subject of experience." Again—वस्तुप्रत्यभिज्ञानाच्च स्थितोऽन्वयी धर्मो यो धर्मान्यथात्वम् अभ्युपगतः प्रत्यभिज्ञायते ॥ भा. ३. १४ ॥ The existence of a unitary mind is proved

¹ This is why, while discussing the nature of consciousness, Bergson takes the instance of music.

² Bud. Psych. P. 194.

by the fact of recognition. It as a substrate runs like a thread and recognizes an object in spite of its changing qualities. In the first quotation the enduring subject is directly posited, while the second quotation applies to the object too; and the psychological interest in postulating objective substance lies in the fact that it has been arrived at from the conviction of the mind as an enduring subject. This point of view is diametrically opposed to that of Buddhism. Still Buddhism had to make room for such an identity of the object, though it did so only negatively, by maintaining that a thing looks identical on account of its exclusion of the nature of any other object.

-अनुवृत्तप्रत्ययः किमालम्बन इति चेत्-अग, अन्यापोहालम्बन एवेति संतोष्यम् ॥ (सर्ग F. 28.)

In the Nyāyadars'ana-चक्षुरद्वैतप्रकरणम्—we come across the problem of recognition. The question is—how is it that we have a perception of a single object though the eyes are two? The reply is given—सन्ध्येन चक्षुषा दृष्टस्य इतरेणापि चक्षुषा प्रत्यभिज्ञानाद् यमद्राक्ष्यते तमेव इति हि पश्यामीति ॥ ३. १. ७ ॥ The object seen by the left eye is recognized by the right eye in the form—‘that which I saw, I see now.’ प्रत्यभिज्ञा is defined as पूर्वपरयोर्विज्ञानयोरेकविषये प्रतिसंनिधानम्—प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् । Recognition is a linking together of a former perception with a later one, referring both to one and the same object. Strictly speaking this is the process of co-ordination between two senses. The pure act of recognition is defined in—पूर्वमज्ञासिधमर्थं तस्मिन् जानामीति ज्ञानयोः समानेऽर्थे प्रतिसंनिधानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ॥ भा ३-२-२ ॥ The function of recognizing belongs to the Soul and not to the Buddhi as held by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga. (न्या. भा. ३. २. ३.) A non-acceptance of the act of recognition would lodge one directly into a disbelief of the subject who recognizes. (अप्रत्यभिज्ञाने च विनाशप्रसंगः । न्या. सू. ३. २. ५.)

Recognition as an act *sui-generis* attracted the attention of some of the old thinkers to such an extent that they raised on its foundation a philosophical system called the प्रत्यभिज्ञाशास्त्र. We already know that immediate experience was taken to be of two types—लौकिक and अलौकिक, sense-experience and transcendental perception. We have not touched the transcendental perception, but we might mention that transcendental recognition corresponds to that level. तस्य

महेश्वरस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रति अभिमुख्येन ज्ञानम् । कोके हि-स एवाय चेन्न इति प्रतिलिख्येन अभिमुखीभूते वस्तुनि ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञा इति व्यवहियते । इहापि (अलौकिकप्रत्यभिज्ञायासपि) प्रसिद्धपुराणवर्तिप्रमाणानुमानादिज्ञातपरिपूर्णशक्तिके परमेश्वरे सति स्वात्मन्यभिमुखीभूते तच्छास्त्रप्रति-संश्रानेन-ज्ञानमुदेति-नूनं स एव ईश्वरोऽहम् इति ।-In transcendental recognition there is no memory of an original perception to be fused with a present perception. In stead of the memory of a former experience we have the knowledge of God received from आगम Authority and अनुमान-Inference; and in place of the enduring subject linking together memory and perception, on the transcendental level it is the power of God which makes the fusion giving the devotee ultimately a higher recognition-" I am that God ".

(4-b) Interpretation

We have already mentioned that manas or प्रज्ञा was regarded as the seat of co-ordination between different sense-experiences in the Upanishads. In the orthodox philosophical systems it is referred ultimately either to the Soul; or to the reflection thereof. In a way all co-ordination involves interpretation of the present perception in the light of past experience and as such it is involved in recognition. It is one continuous process in consciousness from निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष through सविकल्प ज्ञान to प्रत्यभिज्ञा and interpretation. Fusion of all sense-impressions of one and the same object through the door of the saṃskāras brings one to सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष. Fusion of different experiences by way of two or more senses gives us co-ordinated experience; while a percept joined organically with its memory is recognition.

All these processes involve interpretation. The act of interpreting is a mental functioning and is made possible only by mind preserving all its past experiences. The finished product of the act viz- meaning depends upon the structure of the mind. Thus we are informed that Newton only interpreted his perception of the falling apple in the light of the knowledge which was embedded in the structure of his mind. Similarly the Indian thinkers said—

परिभाद् कामुककुलामेकस्यां प्रमदातनौ ।

कुणपः कामिनी मस्य इति तिष्ठो विकल्पना ॥ सर्व० पृ. ३०. ॥

On seeing a woman, a wandering recluse takes her to be

a corpse (meaning a thing to be avoided), a man seized with brutal passion takes her to be an object of his lust, while a dog looks at her as his morsel. " And the Buddhists maintained " that the view depends upon the point of view."

The act of interpretation was not taken to be purely cognitive. It had its own conative sides too. यथा मनोस्तर्क इत्युक्तं जातबोधाद्वादयः स्वैद्यनुसारेण अभिसरणपरस्परहरणसदाचारणादि समयं बुध्यन्ते । तथा यदीयं मग्नान् बुद्ध एक एव बोधयिता तथापि बोद्धव्यानां बुद्धिभेदाच्चातुर्विध्यम् । सर्वं P. 19—For instance, if some one were to say—"the sun has set" the sentence would bring different thoughts to the minds of differently constituted people according to their cognitive-conative systems of dispositions: a lover thinks of meeting his love, a thief takes it to be the time to start on his thieving expeditions, while for a pious man it is time to worship or do good acts. So, too, on account of the differences in the Buddhis of those whom Lord Buddha instructed, the doctrine was differently interpreted by the four schools.

In the older psychological material no hard and fast lines are drawn between the processes of cognition, interpretation, and conation. A cognition based upon an interpretation which in its turn was an outcome of the structure of the mind working functionally upon the present, was, from the point of view of the ultimate goal no way different from a line of action chalked out by the subject under the same mental structure and its functioning. That is how in Buddhi we find a complete blending of intellect and will otherwise classed separately in our modern tripartite division of mind.

(4-c) Perception of Similarity

We can now see how near to each other interpretation and association can come, both being dependent on the structure of the mind. As regards association interpreted in an atomic sense, we find no treatment of it in Indian philosophy.

1 In the Visuddhi-Magga we have a passage telling us that the Elder Mahatissa when questioned as to whether he saw a woman pass by, replied: "Was it a woman or a man...I cannot tell: but a set of bones is travelling on upon this road." Bud. Trans. P. 298.

For not a single school took mind to be merely passive. In the act of recognition we might find a faint trace of association by similarity. But there it is between a memory and a percept of one and the same object. Moreover the fusion there is quite complete and instead of two similar objects we have a concrete object recognized as one in his different phases. In the act of comparison both the objects are present to the senses, though one should say that here too memory plays an important roll, for with attention passing from the one to the other, mind can compare the two things only by means of the accumulated *samskāras*, and form a perceptual judgment of similarity in a single act of consciousness.

We do not find much material on the question of perception of similarity. The perception of जाति, one pervading genus in the midst of different individuals, psychologically comes near the perceptual judgment of similarity. According to Buddhism only the flux was real, and even our concept of Mr X, as being one and the same individual, was regarded by it only as a convenient manner of linguistic short-hand lable without any objective counterpart.¹ much more so the concept of genus. As for the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, the conceptions of genus, species and individual were only relative, the ultimate genus being प्रकृति.² The Nyāya posited जाति over and above व्यक्ति and आकृति,—an individual and its form. A thing may have the form of an individual of a certain species, though it may not have its जाति in reality—e. g. a cow made of clay. (न्या सू. भा. २. २. ६३.) Through such reasoning the Nyāya posited the substantive existence of the जाति, and still आकृति was held to be the *ratio cognoscendi* (लिङ्ग) of the जाति. The जाति was to be inferred from the sameness of आकृति amongst different individuals. यथा मित्रान्येकानि वस्तूनि इतरेतरतोऽनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययहेतुत्वेन व्यवतिष्ठन्ते सा जातिः । यथेमानि कुंडलानि अनुवर्तन्ते नेमानि कुंडलानि इति व्यावर्तन्ते तदेकं सनिमित्तम् अनुवृत्तिकारण जातिरिति । न्या वा. on २. २. ६८. ।

1 Vide. Warren's Bud. Trans. P. 129 e. s. also Com Phil. P. 200 ff.

2 Though जाति is not directly treated in the Yogadars'ana, धर्मी and द्रव्य are defined. These give us ऊर्ध्वताजाति. Vide Supra P. 35 N. 1. From this point of view Jainism, as it believes in both the types of genus, stands midway between the Nyaya and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga.

The perceptual judgment based upon resemblances found in certain objects, excludes them from those that differ from them. The rule for classing certain objects in a particular genus is that the differentia should not be found in the instances of any other genus. Higher genera are also posited. Objects belonging to different species might be regarded as falling within a wider genus. For instance one might put several things under the head of पदार्थ—things in general जातिमन्तरेणापि समानप्रत्ययो दृष्टः । यथा पाचकादिषु तस्मादव्यस्तितं व्यक्ताकृतिजातयः पदार्थ इति । That which generates in us a perception of similarity is called जाति. "समान्यव्यस्तितिका जाति"—या समानां बुद्धिं प्रसूते.... तत्सामान्यम् । यच्च केषाञ्चिद्-भेदे कुतश्चिन्नेरं करोति तत्सामान्यविशेषो जातिरिति ॥ ३ २ ॥ If the Naiyayikas were pressed further they would reply that in the perception of dissimilarity, the same process is involved, though in a more explicit form, as in the perception of similarity. Mentally there is the same प्रतिसिद्धान fusion in consciousness. For every judgment about dissimilarity is based upon a perception of similarity existing somewhere between a set of things.

But apart from such logical implications, the direct perception of dissimilarity must have appeared unique inasmuch as the perception of भेद plays an important part in the पूर्णप्रज्ञदर्शन. The arguments put forth in the Sarvādars'anaśāṅgraha by the अभेदवादी are more or less metaphysical in their nature, and almost come on par with those forwarded by Nāgārjuna in favour of his शून्य, or of Bradley in western philosophy against the ultimate unreality of relations, both positing in their own way the non-relational character of the real. As against this the perception of भेद is asserted to be directly perceived, but no psychological description of the process is given.

Section 4 प्रत्यक्ष and other Pramānas

अनुमान and आगम

The position of प्रत्यक्ष in relation to the whole structure of knowledge is unique. It is from sense-experience that all knowledge starts, helped by the processes of differentiation and integration, and all the forms of knowledge when challenged have to prove their validity by an appeal to प्रत्यक्ष—or immediate experience. All knowledge is taken to be प्रत्यक्षमिमुख—facing experience. This is why an enquiry into the instruments and structure of knowledge begins by an exposition of immediate sense-experience. Vāchaspati says—संप्रति प्रमाणविशेषलक्षणानुसारे प्रत्यक्षस्य सर्वप्रमाणेषु ज्येष्ठत्वात्, नन्वीनत्वाच्चानुमानादीनाम्—तदेव तावदक्षयति- (सां. त. कौ.) Immediate sense-experience is here regarded as an “elder” to inference etc. inasmuch as they all depend on it; and hence it is treated prior to any other pramāṇa. In his Tīkā on the Yogadars'ana too Vāchaspati explains—तत्र सकलप्रमाणमूलत्वात्प्रथमतः प्रत्यक्षं लक्षयति । या. टी. १ ६ ।

The position is similar to the one taken up in the Nyāya. ‘No one can rest satisfied with any mediate form of knowledge, and our mind is so characterized that it pushes forward to know by inference what has been known by acceptance of an authority. By the process of inference a piece of āgama knowledge is assimilated into the structure of our knowledge, for howsoever great an authority be its acceptance remains like a foreign appendix to us. But even inference is mediate knowledge, and the nature of our life always demands immediacy of experience after which one either tries to get at the object or avoid it.’ The Vātsyāyana bhāṣhya says—सा चेयं प्रमितिः प्रत्यक्षपरा । जिज्ञासितमर्थमाप्तोपदेशात्प्रतिपद्यमानो लिङ्गदर्शनेनापि बुभुक्षते, लिङ्गदर्शनावुमितं च प्रत्यक्षतो दिदृक्षते, उपलब्धेऽर्थे, जिज्ञासा निवर्तते—All curiosity ceases after the mediate knowledge is immediately experienced.¹

If sense-experience be given such a place in any system

1 cf. also विशेषदक्षिण आत्मभावभावनानिवृत्ति. पा. ४-२५. where after true knowledge, curiosity about the nature of Puruṣa is said to cease.

of thought, one would think that it would result only in sensationalism or solipsism. It does not fall within the domain of psychology to discuss the criterion of reality. We have slightly touched upon the problem in the question of the invisibility of visual rays. All the orthodox schools posit different levels of immediate experience corresponding to levels of attention from which it follows that by holding प्रत्यक्ष to be the ultimate criterion of truth or reality, the doctrine did not narrow down to mere sensationalism. Reality was held not to be so poor as could be known entirely through the senses न च इन्द्रियाणामस्मिन्नस्ति योग्यता इत्यर्थः । यो भा. ३. २७ । Sense-experience is not the final judge on the existence or non-existence of a thing. There is another principle that of योग्यता-fitness which informs us whether a certain object posited by the necessity of reasoning can be as well an object for the senses or not. The measure of योग्यता is wider than that of mere sense-experience, but it can only work negatively inasmuch as it has drawbacks similar to those found in Spencer's principle of *Inconceivability of the Opposite* as a criterion of truth. However all science is built upon such a principle. योग्यता is to be applied not to any wayward fancy, but to an hypothesis arrived at constructively by close inductive reasoning. The highest postulates of any science are posited only according to this principle. The principle is applied to the hypothesis of visual rays—रश्मेर्या प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिर्नासावभाव प्रतिपादयति, यथा चन्द्रमसः परमाण्वस्य पृथिव्यान्वाधोभागस्य ॥ न्या. भा. ३. १. ३७. ॥ In the सां. त. कौ. We read न प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिमात्राद्वस्त्वभावो भवति, अनिप्रसंगात् । तथा हि गृह्णाद्विनिर्गतो गृहजनमपश्यन्तदभावं विनिश्चनुयात्, न त्वेवम् । अपि तु योग्यप्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तेरयमभाव विनिश्चिनोति ॥ का. ७ ॥ and again दृष्टतरप्रमाणवधारिते हि प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्तमानमयोभ्यस्तान्न प्रवर्तते इति कल्प्यते । सप्तमस्य रक्षो न प्रमाणेनाऽवधारित इति न तत्र प्रत्यक्षस्य योग्यता शक्याऽभ्यवसितुमित्यभिप्रायः ॥ का. ८ ॥ Here both the sides of the question are put in. Not seeing an object does not mean its non-existence, e. g. a man going out from his house does not see his people at home, but he does not conclude therefrom that they are not, nor can such not sensing an object mean its definite existence, e. g. our not having an experience of a seventh taste over and above the six ones cannot mean that it exists, for it is posited by no other pramāṇa. We need not enter into

any further discussion of the topic leading on to a criticism of subjective idealism or solipsism that we meet with in यो. ४, १४-१५-१६.

In spite of the fact that sense-experience cannot be regarded as a criterion of actuality of a thing posited otherwise, it is still the only foundation on which the construction of an individual's world is based.¹ Inference is one degree removed while knowledge accepted on authority is two degrees removed from concrete experience. Inference is primarily based upon the products of दिक्स्थ. विकल्प as we have already noted, tries to draw out of the concrete individual as many universals as possible, and we can say that the process of inference is based upon the interconnections between a set of universals giving us a certain scheme upon which alone we dwell when applying it to individuals. So instead of looking at the concrete individual just as we do in experience, in inference we take him only as an instance of a universal which in its trail brings us to a knowledge of another universal which is proved of some other individual. If X and Y be two individuals and 'a' be a universal found to exist in both, then if there be another universal 'b' found to cohere in X essentially on account of 'a', then it is inferred that 'b' ought to be present in Y too. 'A' is evidently the middle term of the syllogism, called in Indian Logic व्याप्ति. All the fallacies of the middle term were known to Indian thinkers. As regards inference proper, it was held to be of two kinds viz. स्वार्थानुमान and परार्थानुमान तन्वानुमानं द्विविधम् । स्वार्थं परार्थं चेति । स्वार्थं स्वप्रतिपत्तिहेतुः । तथा हि स्वयमेव महानसादौ विक्षिप्येन प्रत्यक्षेण धूमाग्न्याव्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा पर्वतसमीपं गतः तत्र ते चाग्नौ मन्दिहानः पर्वतवर्तिनीमविक्षिप्यमूलमवलिङ्ग्य धूमलेखां पश्यन् धूमदर्शनाच्चोद्बुद्धास्कारौ व्याप्तिं स्मारति यत्रधूमस्तत्राग्निरिति । ततोऽत्रागि धूमोऽस्तीति प्रतिपद्यते तस्मादत्र पर्वतेऽग्निरप्यस्तीति स्वयमेव प्रतिपद्यते तत् स्वार्थानुमानम् । यत्तु कश्चिन् स्वयं धूमादग्निरनुमाय परं बाधयितुं पचावयवमनुमानवाक्यं प्रयुक्ते तत् परार्थानुमानम् (त. भा.) The distinction between स्वार्थं and परार्थानुमान is drawn from a

1 "The certainty of sense is fundamental, whilst the certainty of thought as concerned with objects of a higher order, presupposes sensory *fundamenta* " Psych. Prin. P. 349 and व्यासभाष्य reads: न च प्रत्यक्षस्य माहात्म्यं प्रमाणान्तरेणाभिभूयते । प्रमाणान्तरं च प्रत्यक्षबलमेव व्यवहारं लभते ।

psychological point of view. Originally all inference is स्वार्थानुमान. Before one can convey syllogistically a piece of reasoning to any body else, he must himself have arrived at it. परार्थानुमान is the syllogism built up to convey the inner necessity of reasoning or thought leading to a certain conclusion from the premises. According to Indian Logic it consisted of five members and included in it an instance exemplifying the universal connection put down in the व्याप्ति. Much criticism has been wasted in showing that the form of the Indian syllogism is extra-logical. But if we look at it apart from logical *formalism*, it comes nearer to our actual mental process than the purely formal Aristotelian syllogism. So far as स्वार्थानुमान is concerned, the general premise almost always keeps in the background, for it is never explicitly mentioned, unless the subject himself were doubtful of the truth of his own conclusion. The above instance from the Tarkabhāṣhā shows explicitly the inner nerve of reasoning from a particular instance viewed in the light of a universal relation to another particular instance in which the subject happens to be interested for the moment. Inference is always primarily pressed into the service of needs and their fulfilment, and as such it always engages itself with particulars, "In the simpler forms of reasoning we first appreciate the difficulty, then we look for means of obviating it." Psychologically we always assert the conclusion at the beginning, and the Indian syllogism opens with it. So too in inventing a machine, the problem is firstly taken as solved, and the parts arrived at deductively. If we look at it psychologically the Indian syllogism with its five members shows exactly the inner nerve of our mental process in inferring.¹ For want of space we shall not enter into a detailed justification

1 Vide Pillsbury's Attention. P. 177 e. s. where he has dwelt almost upon the process of स्वार्थानुमान. "If we study the actual thinking process it seems that we rarely have anything but the conclusion, when the decision is made. The only occasions when the major and minor premises come into play are when we would test some conclusion that has already been attained, or when we want to show its validity to some one else." P. 179. Italics are ours.

of the Indian syllogism, but shall rest satisfied by noting that it contains within its synthetic unity induction and deduction, and if in western logic we meet with the Deductive Method of Induction, we can posit, analogous to that, the Inductive Method of Deduction borne out in the five-membered Indian syllogism.¹

सागम्य is defined as an instrument of knowledge.² The subject accepts a piece of knowledge given to him by an authority. Thus it involves a definite belief in the authority accepted, but we do not meet with any psychological discussion on the nature of belief.

Language is the primary medium of getting authoritative knowledge, but by its very nature it is incapable of giving us any direct acquaintance with its object. All words deal with only general concepts, and as such direct knowledge of an object can be gained only through concrete experience. श्रुतमागम-
विज्ञानं तत्सामान्यविषयम् । न सागम्येन शब्दो विशेषोऽभिप्राद्युः, कस्मात् ? न हि विशेषेण कृत-
कमेतः शब्द इति । यो. भा. १. ४९ । The relation between a word and the object denoted by it is conventional, and leaves the individual in the object untouched or unapproached. A word is able to pierce the sheath of the generic attributes of an individual and go no deeper.³ प्रत्यक्षानुमानपूर्वं हि शास्त्रम् (यो. टी. १. २४.) All authoritative knowledge is based upon either experience of or inference drawn by the man who gives it. आप्तेन दृष्टोऽनुमितो वाऽर्थः परत्र स्वबोधसंक्रान्तये शब्देनोपदिश्यते, शब्दसत्तदर्थविषया वृत्तिः श्रोतुरागमः । यस्माच्छब्देनार्थो वक्ता न दृष्टानुमितार्थः स आगमः श्रवते । मूलवक्तुः तु दृष्टानुमितार्थं विदित्वः स्यात् ॥ यो. भा. १. ७ ॥ It is not any poser whose word is to be believed in. Only one who has either experienced or known through inference (based upon experience) an object has a right to say anything authoritatively. Any other statement

1 If there had been a five-membered syllogism in western logic, logicians like Keynes would have rebelled the less against "Formal Logic."

2 The प्रमाण is instruments of knowledge. They are also identified with the product of it knowledge gained by that instrument.

3 अनुमान too shares the same characteristic. तथाऽनुमानं सामान्यविषयमेव । अत्र प्राप्तस्तत्र गतिर्यत्राप्रतिस्तत्र न भवति गतिरित्युक्तम् । अनुमानेन च सामान्येनोपलब्धः । तस्माच्छ्रुतानुमानविषयो न विशेषः कश्चिदस्तीति ।

based upon neither experience nor inference is to be thrown overboard.

The definition given in the Nyāya-bhāṣya is more strict. आप्तः खलु साक्षात्कृतधर्मा यथादृष्टस्याऽर्थस्य विज्ञापयितव्यः प्रयुक्त उपपेक्ष ॥ न्या. भा. १. १. ७. ॥ One more qualification is added here in the form of willingness to convey the truth of one's own experience to some other person before one could be taken as a proper authority.

The whole discussion implies that a revelation of one man when conveyed to another is no longer a revelation to the other, for unless the man who receives it experiences it himself, it only remains at best in the form of blind belief. तस्माच्छास्त्रानुमानाचार्योपदेशोद्बलनार्थमेवावश्यं कश्चिदर्थविशेषः प्रत्यक्षीकर्तव्यः ।

A Note on विपर्यय

Knowledge may be either true or false. True knowledge is defined as having the form of a thing as it really exists. False knowledge has a form not its own, that is, it has a form different from that of the object. This comes to the "Correspondence Theory of Truth" with a metaphysical realism at its back. But a further implication of false knowledge seems to lie towards the "Coherence Theory of Truth." False knowledge is proved to be false because of its inconsistency with true knowledge. स कस्मान् प्रमाणम् । यतः प्रमाणेन बाध्यते । ... तत्र प्रमाणेन बाधकप्रमाणस्य दृष्टम् ॥ बो. भा. १. ८. ॥ Why is not false knowledge true knowledge ? Because it is in consistent with truth. For truth is a consistent whole.

Several instances of false knowledge are given. False knowledge may exist at different levels of consciousness. The lowest level of it is represented in the perception of two moons instead of one. Here it is a mere question of the lack of co-ordination between two senses—the two eyes. According to the Nyāya view as we saw above the right eye recognized the object which the left eye had seen. There we do not know whether the visual rays reach the object simultaneously or not; though to make recognition possible they must do so consecutively, and द्विचन्द्रदर्शन would be the result of some derangement in the recognitional function. Prabhākara's explanation of the illusion is quite patent. He

accepts the Nyāya view that the eyes are *ब्रह्मचरि*. Visual rays emanate from the two eyes, and ordinarily settle on the object of vision simultaneously thus yielding a single perception. A derangement of this mechanism results in the rays not reaching the object simultaneously, which is said to result in a double image of the object.

There is another classical instance of false visual perception. It is the case of a rope which is taken for a snake. We have seen what part memory plays in perception. But over and above the cumulative effect due to 'primary retention' of different acts of attention directed toward the object, there are large masses of so-called apperception that go to complete the perception, by making it meaningful. It is in such organic superimposition of the elements supplied by memory upon sense-impression that false knowledge has its genesis. Prabhākara takes the instance of a piece of pearl-shell taken for silver. He rightly says that in the judgment—"This is silver," the bare apprehension of "this" is not mistaken, but the interpretation added by memory in the predicate is false.¹

The mental coefficient of error sinks deeper into ourselves as we go higher up. As an instance of the vertical system of classification we have already given the five kinds of *kles'as*—or 'infections'. From amidst *अविद्या*, *अस्मिता*, *राग*, *द्वेष*, and *अभिनिवेश*, we can compare *अविद्या* alone to false knowledge. *अविद्या* is positive false knowledge not mere ignorance and is supposed to lie at the very foundation of all our particular wrong notions seen in the false modifications of our mind. It is false identification of Purusha with the phenomenal self, false attachment, false prepossessions. The whole problem of Yoga is to get free from this generic *अविद्या*—false knowledge. The doctrine has its source in the metaphysical and the practical aspects of

1 Prabhakara has two more instances. (i) the case of the man with jaundice seeing everything yellow, and (ii) Apprehension in dreams, when actual things are absent. Vide. Prabhakara's Theory of Error in Bhan. Com. Vol. F. 167. His view of judgment comes near to that of Bradley or Bosanquet according to whom the "th.s," the given, is the subject; while the ascription of the meaning comes up in the predicate supplied by mind.

Yoga, and as such they do not exactly fit in with the psychological question of error and its origin.

A Note on निद्रा

According to the modern point of view sleep is taken to be a function of the body, and if at all of the mind, an abnormal aspect of it. Indian thinkers have always been drawn towards the problem of sleep. In the Upanishads we come across the "fatigue and the Puritat theories" and "the Prāṇa and the Brahman theories."¹ We shall here deal with the psychological theory of sleep as we find it in the Yogadars'ana. There sleep is taken to be one of the modes of mind, and not a function of the body.² Differences of opinion must have existed as to whether sleep should be regarded as a mode of mind or not, for Vāchaspati in his Tīkā informs us that the word वृत्ति is put down in the sūtra principally to assert it—अधिकृतं हि वृत्तिपदमनुवादकम् । प्रमाणविषयविकल्पस्थतीनां वृत्तित्वं प्रति परीक्षकाणामविप्रतिपत्तेः ।..... निद्रायास्तु वृत्तित्वे परीक्षकाणामस्ति विप्रतिपत्तिरिति वृत्तित्वं विधेयम् । टीका on १.१०.१

Upto now we have not mentioned the three guṇas that ceaselessly fight amongst themselves for supremacy, in the arena of our mind. But in the treatment of sleep we cannot do without referring to them.

The doctrine of the guṇas is pre-eminently a Sāṃkhya doctrine, so much so that as Keith has observed, there is no Sāṃkhya without the three guṇas. He further informs us that the names सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् together appear for the first time in the Maitrāyaṇī. (25, 5.2) They are treated often as substantive qualities, but with the Yogadars'ana view of the ultimate identity of substance and attribute, we can only maintain that they are tendencies found to co-exist in our mind, each one trying to get the upper hand over the other two. In the conception of the guṇas we find the patent characteristic of Indian thought to view things dynamically, rather than statically, *vertically* rather than *horizon-*

1 For their exposition Vide. Con Sur Up. Phil: Pp. 122-126.

2 The nearest approach to this would be the western view which takes sleep to be a form of instinct.

tally.¹ For we do not find any co-planer tripartite division of mind into knowing, feeling and willing which can best be restricted only to "the subjective modes of experience"; but instead we have the tendencies of mind which show at different heights in the shape of सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस्. The *gunas* are not separable entities but only distinguishable moments, and their working too is not directly apprehended but only indirectly inferred through its results. परिणाम in the sense of गुणपरिणाम is one of the seven inferable Dharmas of our mind. एव त्रिगुणत्वाच्चित्तस्य चलं च गुणवृत्तमिति प्रतिक्षणं परिणामोऽनुमीयत ॥ बौ. टी. ३ १५ ॥ or "गुणानां परमं रूपं न हृदियथमुच्छति ॥ भा. ८. १३ ॥

Sleep is defined as a mode of mind that has for its object the cause of non-existence. The words—cause of non-existence—have a particular meaning in the concrete setting of the *Yoga-dars'ana*. We know that according to the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* view the mind takes up the form of an object with which it comes in contact through the doors of the senses. In waking life the objects compete amongst themselves to catch our mind, they work like magnets drawing our mind towards them. There is just another kind of competition going on in our mind too, between the three *gunas* fighting for supremacy. The relation between mind and the *gunas* is that of between धर्म and धर्म, the substratum and its attributes.² At some intervals the तमस् gets the upper hand and the सत्त्व and रजस् are vanquished. It is the nature of तमस् never to respond to any stimuli, it is the darkness overwhelming the primeval universe. So in the case of an individual, just like the dirty surface of a mirror, his mind reflects nothing from the outside world, when तमस् seizes it.

1 Cf. "Wundt sees will in the effort of full attention. The Buddhist sees चेतना in the action of जवन or कर्म. As elsewhere, it is the *afferent* stage that interests the European, the *efferent* mystery that interests the East" Mrs. Rhys Davids in *Comp. Phil.* I. 249. Ftn.

2 In मूलप्रकृति there is गुणसाम्यावस्था. It is the original धर्म. As a result of its परिणाम we get महत् बुद्धि or चित्त with the *gunas* working heterogeneously in them, so that महत् बुद्धि or चित्त in turn become the धर्म's Vide बो. भा. and टी. on. 3.15.

Even in such a state when mind does not respond to any outside stimulus its functioning remains the same. According to the Sāṅkhya-yoga view, experience is the result of the final reflection of a particular mode in the बुद्धिसत्त्व that has become conscious on account of its nearness to Puruṣa. In sleep the mind refuses to respond to any stimulus that may come through the senses on account of the preponderating तमस्, but the purer part of the mind still goes on reflecting that तमस् and gets coloured by its darkness. That is how Sāṅkhya-Yoga would explain the phenomenon of (relative)¹ unconsciousness in sleep. A mirror in the dark does not lose its reflecting capacity, but as it has then nothing else to reflect, we can say that it does reflect darkness at the time. So even in sleep the mind—बुद्धिसत्त्व goes on reflecting its तमस् thus receiving the Saṃskāras of sleep, which it is able to recollect, on waking. Sleep is regarded thus to be a positive experience leaving its *resedua* in our mind. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga theory of सत्त्वसंयोगाद् posits a continuity of consciousness, culminating on the one side in the transcendental Puruṣa, and ebbing on the other side in sleep, the identical functioning of mind storing up saṃskāras whether at the lowest level of sleep or at the highest of निर्बीजसमाधि. The bhāṣya (1.10) tells us that when the तमस् of sleep gets mixed up with the सत्त्व, the recollection that comes on waking is 'I have slept well, my mind is clear etc. '; when it gets mixed up with रजस्, the memory of it is—'I have slept badly, my mind is listless, it wanders and is unsteady.' With तमस् on तमस, heaped upon both the सत्त्व and the रजस्, the subject on waking finds—गार्ह मूढोऽहमस्वाप्तम् । शुरुणि मे गात्राणि । क्लान्त मे चित्तम् । आलस्यं बुधितमिष तिष्ठति ।—"I have slept as if in a swoon, or torpor, (lit. slept deeply as if stupid or infatuated.) my limbs are heavy, my mind is tired, and stands lazy and absent (stolen)." The effect of तमस् is inability to attend to anything.

Sleep looks like एकामृता, and a man in deep समाधि may appear to be sleeping. It is as if positive infinity appearing like

¹ Relative because consciousness by itself can never be unconscious. Unconscious consciousness is a self contradiction.

negative infinity. In abstract mathematics, positive and negative infinities may meet but in actual experience it can never do so, and sleep though it might look like समाधि, can never be that. It was definitely known to the old thinkers that in sleep attention is functionally absent from mind, there being no conscious knowledge in sleep. In waking life attention is either at the क्षिप्त, विक्षिप्त or एकाग्र level, on the मूढ level the mind becomes stupidly stolid or goes off into sleep. If attention means taking interest in life, in sleep one gets absolutely "disinterested."¹ Under the pressure of wakeful interest, our mind wanders here and there, hence प्रमाण, निषर्षव, विकल्प—any one of these vrittis might appear more distracted than sleep. From an objective point of view also mind might be regarded as ekāgra in sleep, for then it has for its object only the all pervading तमस्. We know that each of the pramāṇas is used both for the instrument of, as well as the product of knowledge obtained by that instrument, so here the तमस् is, from one point of view, the lowest level of mind, and from another a guṇa which the mind turns it into its own object when sleeping. Such तामसिक एकाग्रता is full of Kles'as, for mind in a state of torpor has no power to shake off its impurities and hence the seeming ekāgratā of sleep is distinguished from the real ekāgratā of Yoga. मूढे तु तमःसमुद्भेकाभिद्रावृत्तिमत् ।..... निद्रावृत्तिरपि स्वावलम्ब्ये तमसि भूते भवत्येकाग्रः . . . । शोभनं नितान्ताविर्भूतं सत्त्वं तमःसमुद्भेकः तु अशोभनः तस्य क्लेशहेतुत्वादिति ।...टी. १. १. । ननु प्रमाणादयो व्युत्थानचित्ताधिकरणानि ह्यन्यन्ता समाधिप्रतिपक्षत्वाभिद्रावाः तु एकाग्रवृत्तितुल्यायाः कथं समाधिप्रतिपक्षता इति अत आह-एकाग्रतुल्याऽपि तामसत्वेन निद्रा सधीजनिर्बीजसमाधिप्रतिपक्षा इति साऽपि निरोद्धव्या इत्यर्थः । टी. १. १० ।

According to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga view the mind is not annihilated in the state of sleep. The doctrine of सत्कार्यवाद posits the principle—*ex nihilo nihil*. If the mind were once taken to be non-existent in sleep, it would be impossible to get back to its organic unity and continuity ever after waking,

1 "But suppose that at a given moment, I become "disinterested" in the present situation, in the pressing action, in both of the forces which concentrate on one single point all the activities of memory; suppose in other words; I fall asleep." Mind Energy P. 94. Bergson could not think that "disinterestedness" could be there in spite of "tension" of Attention. As we shall see the discipline of Yoga combines both. . .

if at all one could wake up from such a sleep. At times in Upanishadic thought the soul of a man is said to be free from the fetters of his mind as the latter is held to be destroyed (in sleep). We find this view popularly expressed in सुषुप्तिकाले सकले विलीने ततोऽभिभूतः सुखरूपमेति or in ज्ञानानामुपसंहारे बुद्धेः कारणता स्थितिः, बटबीजे बटस्यैव सुषुप्तिरभिधीयते. Here mind is said to be drowned in the original प्रकृति, leaving the individual soul free to meet the Universal ब्रह्म.¹ Sometimes along with the mind, even the senses are described as having gone into the original Nescience. एहीते वाक् चक्षुः एहीते श्रोत्रं एहीते मनः (१-४). At the root of different views about continuity or annihilation of mind in sleep lie the different metaphysical doctrines about the nature of the world and causality. It is easy to see that according to the latter view, we are left with no differentia to demarcate sleep from समाधि. The difficulty must have been observed early, for in छं. ८. ११. १-२. we find that Indra is not satisfied with Prajāpati's reply when he identifies the true self with the self in sleep. "When a man being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest (so that he is not aware that he is asleep) sees no dreams, that is the self, this is the immortal..." But Indra objects, "Sir, in that way-he does not know himself, that he is I, nor does he know anything that exists. He is gone to utter annihilation. I see no good in this." After such a rejection of the sleep-self comes the true higher self. And the difference lies in the level of attention. Ekāgratā literally means one-pointedness, but it may be defined from the side of the object, as a state of mind in which it has one and the same thing as its object. The subjective co-efficient of ekāgratā is one-pointedness and it is this that is lacking in sleep, though it may have one and the same तमस as its object. The seemingly ekāgra nature of sleep is due to this oneness of object but from the point of *synergetic* ekāgratā, it is diametrically opposed to the state of Samadhi.

1 cf. also समाधिसुषुप्तिभेदेषु ब्रह्मरूपता ॥ वाक्यसूत्र ६. ११६ ।

Section 5 विकल्प

The operations of the विकल्पवृत्ति are to a great extent presupposed in sense-perception. We had to deal with this function of mind in its onward path from निर्विकल्प to सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष. The English rendering of the word विकल्प is given by "Imagination."¹ But विकल्प is not कल्पना² as commonly understood. Even if the word कल्पना were used in the sense of विकल्प, one can only render its true meaning in the light of the whole discussion. In the field of Indian Philosophy we often find it difficult to light upon the true meaning of a term used. Thus संज्ञा in Buddhism would mean perception, a process carrying one to the length of सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष, while in Jainism it means the barest awareness, the most incipient consciousness. To take another instance स्मृति may mean an act of memory, and sometimes that keen watchfulness of the mind, which guards one against evil thoughts. So too the word कल्पना is very often used instead of विकल्प, but the process there is not that of imagination. Under such circumstance we can profit more by closely following the discussion and the instances given of the process of विकल्प, than by merely dogmatizing about it.

We read in the Yogadars'ana:—

"विकल्प is devoid of object" and follows the knowledge of words."

"It does not come up to real knowledge, nor can it come to mean false knowledge. Even though devoid of object, there is a general tendency towards it"⁴ supported as it is by the

1 Almost all the authorities render it as "Imagination." Swami Vivekanand renders it as "verbal delusion" which comes nearer its yogic value but it tells us nothing about विकल्प as a psychological process.

2 Unfortunately the word कल्पना too is at times used in the sense of विकल्प as in कल्पनापोढमभ्रातृत्वं ।

3 Object not in the psychological sense but object considered as something real outside.

4 The word व्यवहार is rendered by a general tendency towards it. Conception of व्यवहार comes very near the pragmatic view of truth, according to which one may act up to a truth because it helps one in the economy of life.

strength of verbal knowledge. For instance the very nature of Purusha is consciousness. If consciousness itself is Purusha, what is predicated of what (in this judgement)? However a certain mode of mind manifests itself in the act of predicating. For instance—'Chaitra's cow;' so too—'the Purusha is inactive, and such-that-the-qualities-of-an-object-are-denied-to-it. (प्रतिषिद्धस्तुष्ये)' 'Bāṇa stands, will stand, has stood.' Here the meaning of the root alone is understood in the cessation of motion. In the same way the Purusha has 'the-attribute-of-not-being-born. By such a phrase one can understand only the absence of the quality of being born and not any (positive) quality (residing) in Purusha taken as a substratum (भण्यवी) (underlying his different attributes). Therefore there is a tendency in all men to express themselves by means of a quality arrived at by the process of विकल्प" (सं. गृ. and भा. १. १ Vide S. 1.)

And Vāchaspati explains it thus:-

"Predication or an act of judgment consists of a relation between the predicated and the predicate. It might also be put thus—It is a relation between the quality and the thing qualified. Such a specific mode of mind is exhibited in the sentence 'Chaitra's Cow'—To give an ordinary instance,—'An arrow stands.' Just as in "he cooks" or "he breaks", a complete series of moments of action in which some precede while others (other moments) follow, is spoken of as limited by a certain result, so here too in—'(An arrow) stands.' It is the same relation of antecedence and subsequence when it is said—will stand—has stood. We'll suppose that just like the action of cooking, the act of standing (or of cessation of motion) is different from the arrow and that it is predicated of it. In reply to this the Bhashyakāra says that only the meaning of the root is understood in the cessation of motion. The cessation from motion is कल्पित, again it is regarded as a form of existence and therein too the order of before and after is imposed upon,—such is the process of progressive कल्पना! Non-existence is posited as existence and as subsequent (to something)—which afterwards is attributed of all the Purushas! But it is not however an attribute which can be separated from the Purusha. Another instance is given—e. g.

तथाऽनुपपत्तिर्भवति । It has been maintained by many that apart from प्रमाण and विपर्यय there is no other mode of mind like that of विकल्प. It is for their enlightenment that all the amplification of instances is given."

Over and above this it is maintained that:—"The process of विकल्प projects or imposes differences in unity, or again imposes unity among differences. There the difference as well as unity do not really exist. Even then the विकल्प is neither प्रमाण nor विपर्यय because its operation is without any inner contradiction. Taking the well-known instance-of the Purusha's relation to चैतन्य, what is the thing (subject) and what is the predicate. In pure unity there can be no differentiation between a thing and its quality. A cow is not predicated of a cow! (टीका १-१. S. 2.)

Again further on we read:—"The सवितर्कसमापत्ति is one in which are mixed up the विकल्पs of the word, the object and the knowledge thereof. What sort of सवितर्क समापत्ति is this, ?- It is full of the word, the object, and its knowledge and their विकल्पs. They are by their nature different, but on account of their (mutual) interrelation (अव्यास), विकल्प works in them-for it is its function to show difference in unity and unity in difference. The meaning is that the सवितर्क समापत्ति is mixed up with विकल्पs of the word, the object and the knowledge thereof. For instance the word "cow"—In this instance the (process of) विकल्प shows unity between object and its knowledge on one side and the word on the other.'... Thus it is seen that men grasp the word, the object and the knowledge thereof together and not keep them apart, even though they are different. But since you say that they are not grasped apart, whence does the difference come ?" (यो. टी. १. ४२ S. 3)

After this we come to the next Sūtra. The difference drawn between the सवितर्क and निर्वितर्क समापत्ति is that in

1 Here the टीका goes on with the विकल्प showing (a) unity between (i) the object and (ii) the word and knowledge and (b) between (i) knowledge and (ii) word and object on the other.

2 The reply is given that learned seers have the power to see them as different. The quotation is given in S. 3.

the latter there is no superimposition (अध्यास) of any one of the three (शब्द, अर्थ and ज्ञान) on the other, it being free from the process of विकल्प. The object of that समापत्ति is the pure object—the individual, free from the basic root of the process of विकल्प involved in knowledge gained by श्रुत and अनुमान.—“The object stands by itself in its own pure form, cut off or limited, by its own form (and not by any other form which is arrived at by the process of विकल्प. The word is विकल्पित). This is the higher प्रत्यक्ष—immediate experience of the Yogi. It is the root or the seed of both श्रुत and अनुमान; because they originate from it. But the immediate experience of that higher प्रत्यक्ष is not accompanied by श्रुत or अनुमान. Therefore the immediate higher experience born of निर्विकल्पसमाधि is not mixed with any other pramāṇa.” And Vāchaspati explains it thus :—“It is the higher प्रत्यक्ष of the Yogis because it has not the least taint of any असद्—non-existence imposed upon it. (But the opponent objects) ‘Let us grant that the yogis grasp the reality of an object in such higher immediate experience, and then instruct and prove it to others. But how can such an object be either taught or proved by आगम or पराश्रुतमान (verbal knowledge or inference drawn to instruct others), for the object of either is not that परप्रत्यक्ष. But if आगम and अनुमान have for their object that higher perception, they being themselves mere processes of विकल्प the higher perception too becomes only a form of विकल्प.’ It is in reply to this that the Bhāṣyakāra says—‘It is the source of all श्रुत and अनुमान.’ If the higher perception had been alloyed with श्रुतानुमान just as the सवितर्कप्रत्यक्ष is, this would have been the case, but the higher perception is their source; it is from higher perception that श्रुतानुमान are born. That which is the cause of something cannot itself be its object. ... Therefore the Yogis first know an object by the अविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष, and then lay it down before others and teach it to them.” (टीका १. ४३.) “Convention (e. g. to call a certain object a cow) is the soul of that interrelation of अध्यास between the word, the thing and its knowledge. And the विकल्प of the knowledge we have in āgama and inference comes out of that.” (S. 4) But in the निर्विकल्पा समापत्ति, the object shakes off all the associated memories of such knowledge.

We find a similar process of विकल्प when the unity found in the meaning of a complete sentence is broken up into words which by a second act of विकल्प are broken up into a series of letters or sounds. (टी. ३. १५. S. 5)

Another reference to विकल्प comes up in यो. भा. ४. १४. There in the भाष्य the doctrine of the वैशेषिक's *i. e.* of subjective idealism is referred to. As against that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga realism is posited, showing that the argument put forth by the subjectivists regarding the independent non-existence of the outside world is based upon a mere विकल्प. For it is only by accentuating on a mere aspect of reality and taking that to be the whole of it that one can rob the objective world of its independent reality. That aspect on which the subjectivists build their whole metaphysics is the invariable nature of the real to be a part of some one's consciousness. We are not here concerned with the metaphysical side of the discussion. But we must mention that the mere fact of being presented to us can be distinguished from within a complete subject-object relation, by the help विकल्प-process and that the identification of thought with reality is an unwarranted step taken by metaphysics from insufficient psychological data. अद्युपस्थितमिदं स्वभावात्मानं वस्तु कथमग्रामाणात्मकेन विकल्पज्ञानबलेन वस्तुस्वरूपमुत्पद्यते तदेवापलपन्तः भूद्वयवचना स्युः ॥ भा. ४. १४. ॥ In the Tīkā the sphere of विकल्प-process is differentiated from that of पमाण. The objects of the outside world are स्थूल or जड़ material; and matter is not taken to be the field of the विकल्प-process. विकल्प does not illuminate the real form of the object, like the process of knowledge which is not विकल्प.¹

Our primary sense experience is a series of निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष *i. e.* as we have already mentioned, it consists of a presentation continuum. This fact is not laid down by the old thinkers in so many words as thesc. But the act of analysis by the help of which that original unity is

1 न चाविकल्पवद्विकल्पोऽपि स्वाकारमात्रगोचरः—but the next phrase rather complicates the matter—तस्य चास्थूलत्वात् स्थूलगोचरो भवितुमर्हति । विकल्प not being gross has not for its object the gross. But the अविकल्पवृत्ति is not itself gross even though capable of experiencing the gross. In his com. on १. ४३ वाच० holds that grossness is grasped by प्रत्यक्ष.

broken up is itself introspectively analysed with a keenness equal to that exhibited by any one in the range of philosophic thought. From the above quotations we can describe the process of विकल्प and lay down the following points.

Our Intellect is so structurally framed that it can grasp a thing in its unity only by breaking it up into differences. Intellectual thought is always accompanied by language, and it is hard to say whether the analytical bias belongs originally to thought or is the mere outcome of the use of language. The former alternative seems to be more plausible, for if it were wholly absent in thought it could surely have found out a better instrument through which to express itself. Such a thought process is one of the two aspects of विकल्प. Man never likes to remain within the narrow though intense boundaries of pure sense-experience. The disposition to self-expression in the midst of similar selves is an urge which has no beginning. (परत्र प्रतिपिपादयिषया वर्णैरिवामिचीयमानः श्रूयमाणैश्च भ्रातृभिः अनदिवाभ्यवहारवासनानुविद्धया लोकबुद्ध्या सिद्धवत् संप्रतिपत्त्या प्रतीयते ।) In a way man's universe becomes wider by social intercourse, but this expansion costs him his intensity, inasmuch as it takes him further away from the direct touch of reality.

We cannot know the pure निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष; we cannot reduce ourselves to the level of the sensation. We travel a long way off on the path of thought-abstraction, before we realise where we are.¹ Even our perceptual judgment e. g. this is a jug—अथैषटः—already bears the stamp of विकल्प showing us a subject and a predicate, both different in a way from each other and still brought together in a single act of consciousness. Judgments at the lowest level already have the form A is B, for no judgment is possible in the tautological form A is A. न हि गवा गौर्विशेष्यते, किन्तु मित्रेनैव चैत्रेण.

How the original unity of concrete experience is broken up we do not know. We can only say that psychologically the concepts of subject and object are arrived at by a process

¹ This is the reason why in the योगदर्शन the lower निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष is not mentioned except as a process or अवस्थापरिणाम of the indryas.

of differentiation carried into the original unity of experience implying a duality but not dualism. There is no mention as to *how* the psychological process of विकल्प actually works in breaking up the original experience, giving us both the subject and the object; Perhaps a Buddhist in any such explanation, if he tried it, would give greater prominence to the object, than to the subject. A Vedāntin might hold that the products of विकल्प constitute the Māyā which is eternal but his belief is metaphysical and not psychological. Other schools of philosophy had no necessity to posit any specific vṛtti of विकल्प, for they believed in the objective existence of substance and quality, person and attribute the individual and his genus. For the Nyāya and the Jain schools of thought both relations and *relata* were real. According to the Yogādars'ana they are one indivisible, and only distinguishable with the help of विकल्प. Other schools did accept विकल्प but only to the extent that it gave us determinate perception. Patañjali alone had to extend its operations beyond the सविकल्प अवस्था and posit its existence integrally on account of an extra-psychological doctrine of his system. Thus we can understand full well the real import of the विकल्पवृत्ति, only by taking it along with the earliest beginnings of the process seen in the सविकल्प अवस्था.

Psychology as a science can do nothing but posit the principle of continuity, and hand over the ultimate problem of the relation between निर्विकल्प and सविकल्प ज्ञान to metaphysics. It does not try to probe beyond the differentiation between subject and object which for it are final. It takes them for granted and starts from an apparent duality. But the whole praxis of yoga lies in the direction of a return to the original unity of experience. It is a question whether our consciousness can ever return to the point whence it started. The writer believes that a definite theory of the different levels of attention or of consciousness goes to assert the impossibility of traversing the same path once gone over by mind, at the same time that it makes enough room for the attainment of higher निर्विकल्प ज्ञान. Hence a process from सवितर्क to निर्वितर्कमवाप्ति i. e. from सविकल्प to निर्विकल्प stage does not bring one to the original निर्विकल्प sensation, but to a higher अविकल्प अवस्था.

We shall deal with the question of the Levels of Attention and समापत्ति or ध्यान later on; what concerns us here is the nature of the विकल्प process. *The process taken as a whole includes within itself two apparently contradictory but in truth complimentary operations namely those of finding differences within a unity, and secondly of imposing unity on differences* Its first half is a process of abstraction in thought wherein the single composite organic oneness of an object is broken up into several elements. The other half of the process consists of the relationing function of mind bringing absolutely unconnected objects into a related whole, simply because such a relation serves some one of its purposes.

The traditional instance taken is that of the relation between Purusha and his attributes. When a thing simply is the attribute, (though we cannot say even this much) we can make no judgment about it. Still however men indulge in such judgments and base their social intercourse on them. There is another instance taken from ordinary life. A man says—'the arrow¹ is, will be, and has become stationary ! And he might try to divide motion, or take *rest to be a state which is derived from motion*. But in no instance do we find mere motion apart from something moving. As a Buddhist would say, there is no motion outside the moving object. This has its own application in Yoga where one is required to be free from the impositions of विकल्प. Freedom from its first operation namely that of breaking up a unity into differences means freedom from abstract names. This is very essential so far as reaching the underlying truth even in any science is concerned, for very often, when an abstract term is used instead of a concrete one, one is tempted to think that one has *explained* a phenomenon. For instance in Psychology, it was this enslavement to विकल्प-products that took it in a wrong direction. Very often a psychologist thought that when he had used terms like 'sensations', 'percepts', 'ideas', 'volitions', and what not, he had explained the entity called mind to an extent that he had no need of recognizing it. But as McDougall has put it, "a percept, a concept,.....are never found lying about loose in the world, as he may find a pebble, or a star, or a bone,

or any other physical thing. He might as well expect to find "a falling" or "a movement" without something that falls or moves or "a perceiving" or "a remembrance" detached and isolated from the subject who perceives or remembers."

This does not mean that motion itself is impossible, for the world is not a plenum, but a process and that, as Vācaspati lays it down, each and every process is supposed to terminate in a certain result. Does he mean that we only think the process comes to an end, simply because we are interested in a certain result or, as we might put it, simply because we cut across and put a stop to a process in itself indivisible, by means of our artificial purposes? Can we link this assertion with बले च गुणवृत्तं—the Gūṇas work ceaselessly, only we impose our purposes on them? Can we above all find in this the Bergsonian solution of the paradox of Zeno's flying arrow¹ that motion by itself is indivisible, and that one can divide it only by the process of विच्छेद, i. e. by the process of abstraction?

That the object and its motion cannot be separated is consistent with and comes near the view that the धर्म, its धर्म and its परिणामs—all form an indivisible single process, and that what might be regarded as a धर्म from one point of view might as well turn out to be a धर्म from a higher point of view. Hierarchy of धर्मों is definitely posited in बो. ३. १३-१४-१५, the different धर्मों answering to different points of views, i. e. to our different purposes. परमार्थतत्त्वेन एव परिणामः ।.....धर्मिणोऽपि धर्मान्तरमवस्था, धर्मस्यापि लक्षणान्तरमवस्था इति एक एव द्वयपरिणामो भेदेन उपदर्शित इति ।..... त एतं धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा धर्मस्वरूपमनतिक्रान्ता, इति एक एव परिणामः सर्वानुभूतिबोधोपानमिश्रते भा. ३. १३. धर्मोऽपि धर्मो भवति अन्यधर्मस्वरूपापेक्षया इति । भा. ३. १४. And Vācaspati comments—यदा परमार्थधर्मिण्यल्लिङ्गेऽभेदोपचारप्रयोगस्तद्वद्वारेण समानाधिकरन्ध्रद्वारेण धर्मोऽव धर्म इति यावत् । तदेक एव परिणामो धर्मपरिणाम एवेत्यर्थः ।

The process of analysis and abstraction in thought is responsible for all the problems of relation like those of—substance and quality, Person and his attributes, the subject and the predicate. Spatial relations are held to be given. Though space

¹ Whether बाल mentioned in the bhashya be a man or an arrow it is immaterial to us so far as our discussion goes.

means extension, and mind has no spatial coefficient (तथाहि—
ज्ञानाकारस्य भूतभौतिकदेः जदेतद् बाह्यत्वं स्थूलत्वं च भाषेते न ते ज्ञाने संभवतः ।.....
न च एकविज्ञानस्य ज्ञानादेशाभ्यापिता विच्छिन्नदेयता चोपपद्यते । भाव० ४. १४. ॥), still
it is held that spatial relations are directly apprehended by प्रत्यक्ष
The temporal relations of the outside world are given along with
these in a certain order of limitation and so too motion. But the
processes of thought—the categories of thought as we might
say—work upon the unity of experience by breaking it up. We
do not find any metaphysical treatment of the problem of
relations as such. For the Yogadars'ana is concerned not
with the metaphysics of relations and their reality, but with
their psychological side, and the way out of them leading one
nearer to the underlying spiritual Reality.

But the विकल्प process does not merely mean abstraction
and analysis. It covers the whole ground of relations, which
may be classified broadly into those that are brought about
by artificially breaking up a unity and those which are the
outcome of conventionally linking two objects together.
We have dealt with the former class of relations. An
instance of the latter type is:—चैत्रस्य गौः—This is Chaitra's cow.
Evidently the relation is a purely got-up relation. Chaitra and
the cow are different objects, and they are brought together, by
the विकल्प process, establishing a semblance of unity between
the two in a single judgment

Thus at a stroke the whole fabric underlying social
relations and convention is cut up. Relations can be either the
work of individual thought or of social convention. All verbal
knowledge is either a unity broken up into differences, or an
artificial unity set up between differences. Even the social law
of property goes, for चैत्रस्य गौ is only a विकल्प! The sādha
has to free himself not merely from judgments that seem to
deal with unity, but from projecting relations where they do
not really exist between things.

The correlation of विकल्प on the objective side is the
relation of अभ्यास between the objects related. In the relation-
ship of अभ्यास we have false imposition or false identification.

The relation between body and Soul is often said to be that of *अध्यास*. So too even outside objects do impose themselves upon one another and even upon us, some how or other. The *विकल्प* process is the subjective faculty which corresponds to the objective *अध्यास*. Thus Patañjali says:—*शब्दार्थ प्रत्ययानामितरेतराध्यासात् संकरः ॥ ३-१७ ॥* Viewed objectively the relation between *शब्द*, *अर्थ* and *प्रत्यय* is that of *अध्यास*, while subjectively it is the *विकल्पवृत्ति* that is able to apprehend this relationship. Inasmuch as the *अध्यास* includes the relation between knowledge and its object *अर्थ* and *ज्ञान* or *प्रत्यय*, it comes a bit near the Nyāya conception of *संसर्गता*—that peculiar relation between mind and its object the like of which we never find in experience.

Ramifications of the *विकल्पवृत्ति* are wider than those of any other. Verbal knowledge, and inference both are cast into the mould, at the base of which *विकल्प* works supreme. So there is overlapping in the classification of the modes of mind (*चित्तवृत्ति*s). The division given is *प्रमाण*, *निर्णय*, *विकल्प*, *निदा* and *स्मृति*. But out of the three kinds of *pramāṇas*, two are based upon *विकल्प*. Even *प्रत्यक्ष* is not wholly free from its taint for its further subdivisions are the *निर्विकल्प* and *सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष*. Hence only one—the *निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष* can be regarded as a pure *प्रमाण*, while the *सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष*, *अनुमान* and *आगम* try to deal with things only through the refracting medium of "words, words, words" and they by themselves do not give us the *individual* in the object, but only the generalities that inhere in it *न हि विशेषेण कृतसंकेतः शब्द इति*. In the *Yogadarsana* it is not definitely laid down that the concept of the *genus* is arrived at by the process of *विकल्प*. The object of *प्रत्यक्ष* is held to be on the contrary an organic unity containing within its womb both the *विशेष* and the *सामान्य*. A consideration of the relation between the *विशेष* and the *सामान्य* would lead us to a discussion of *युतसिद्ध* and *अयुतसिद्ध wholes*, into which we need not go for the present. How the *सामान्य* is picked out from amidst the concrete individual is not made quite clear; but from the fact that the *अनुमान* process is held to be based upon *विकल्प*, we might conclude that the *सामान्य* is picked up by that very process. Thus to avoid overlapping we would be required to classify the *चित्तवृत्ति*s

under the following heads:—निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष, विकल्प, निद्रा, and स्थिति, subdividing विकल्प into सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and आगम

विकल्प is distinguished from both प्रमाण and विपर्यय. विकल्प is neither true knowledge nor false knowledge¹ That which can be neither true nor false is classified in modern text books on psychology either under doubt or "suppositions". We evidently cannot put विकल्प under संशय—doubt, because the state of doubt affects the subject alone and as such the element of personal equation enters more in doubt. Hence social intercourse cannot be based upon such a precarious mode of mind. True or false belief or disbelief is categorical in its nature and is opposed to doubt psychologically, but the products of विकल्प are distinguished from प्रमाण and विपर्यय. It was Meinong who posited the existence of a certain class of judgments that were neither true nor false, but were mere *Suppositions*.¹ We might favourably compare विकल्प with suppositions; but like all comparisons, this too is to be taken with some reservation विकल्प is wider than an act of supposition inasmuch as its operation is seen at the root of judgments that would be regarded as falling within the category of true or false by western thinkers. Thus the judgment—This is Carra's cow—would be regarded a valid judgment and not a mere supposition, while according to the Yogadars'ana view all judgments of relation are merely products of the विकल्प -functioning.

From the above discussion it must be clear that विकल्प is not the process of imagination in the sense of the word in which it is generally used. It is on one side the process of abstraction in thought. It is thought brought to bear with all its analytical functioning upon the unity of experience. At the same time it is a sort of a relationing process between different objects. Taking both the moments contained in the operations of विकल्प, we might say it is a relationing faculty somehow imposed upon reality and accepted by both reality as well as humanity. Though reality be apprehended by us through judgments, it is not made up of judgments. The content of any proposition is given to us in a निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष, while the form of it is

¹ Vide Problem of Truth. P. 84. e. s.

given by the the categories of *विकल्प*. This comes near the Kantian epistemology.¹ The thing-in-itself, the *Ding-an-sich* was taken to be inapproachable by Kant. The Indian view point parts company here, for in the Upanishads we find a sufficient number of references to show that the *real* was not held to be out of reach, though only an inner approach to it was held to be possible. And in spite of such a characteristic of the *real*, all social intercourse regarding it is based upon *विकल्प* and somehow or other it goes on even though the *विकल्पज्ञान* follows only words and has no real objective substratum to correspond to the relations² (*वस्तुधन्य*) set up by it. To seek the reason for such a harmony, amounting almost to a pre-established harmony, is to leave the sphere of psychology proper, and go over to metaphysics. But inasmuch as the Yoga doctrine is based upon it we may mention in passing that the process of *सद्दहानानुपाती वस्तुधन्यविकल्प* is possible primarily because all are in possession of the same reality, and secondarily because the *विकल्प* process functions in the same way in all human beings.

1 Keith says, "Dharmakīrti developed a perfectly definite theory in which a clear distinction was drawn between the element of sense in perception and the function of imagination. In the narrowest sense, perception is without imagination and unerring (*कल्पनापौडम् अश्रान्तम्*) but this merely gives us a momentary contact with something real, but utterly inexpressible. All our knowledge is based upon this contact, but its content (?) is supplied by the imagination (*विकल्प*), acting by rules which it itself imposes, a conception which has obvious analogues with the Kantian doctrine of perception." *Kar. Mim.* P. 25. The writer has not looked into Dharmakīrti's theory of perception, but how even the content can be supplied by *विकल्प* is something which evidently one cannot follow. It certainly can not be upon bare contact that the rules of *विकल्प* are imposed. The *निर्विकल्प* *प्रत्यक्ष* has in it, in a seed-state all the moments of knowledge, distinguished later on. The Yogi has to take recourse to *विकल्प* only to convey it to others. *तस्माद् अविकल्पेन प्रत्यक्षेण गृहीत्वा विकल्प उपदिशन्ति बोधपादयन्ति च*. What Vachaspati has said of the highest *अविकल्प* *प्रत्यक्ष* can as well be applied to the lower *निर्विकल्प* *प्रत्यक्ष*.

2 We have already mentioned that the objective counterpart is *अव्यास*, but *अव्यास* is not regarded as real.

We almost come upon this view of विकल्प in The Study of Patañjali¹—"When we say Chaitra's cow, it is only an imaginary (?) relation, for actually speaking no such thing exists as the cow of Chaitra. Chaitra has no connection in reality with the cow. When we say Purusha is of the nature of consciousness, there is the same illusory relation.....Thus it sometimes breaks a concept into two parts and predicates one of the other, and sometimes predicates unity of two concepts which are different.Thus its sphere has a wide latitude in all thought process conducted through language and involves an element of abstraction and construction and is called विकल्प. This represents the faculty by which our concepts are arranged in analytical or synthetical proposition." Here we come very near a true description of the विकल्प functioning, but the rendering is done by the same ill-fated word 'Imagination'!

Section 6 संस्कार पिंड Dispositional Masses

Bosanquet has said-Truth is the whole; we might say with equal meaning that Mind is the whole. Even though we might pick up certain modes or some functions, it is the total mind that manifests itself in all its workings. In spite of the scholastic differences about the nature of the senses, and the outside world, Indian thought always agreed to view mind as a whole for it never broke up its unity into compartmental faculties. The surest assurance of this fact comes to us from the definite recognition of dispositional masses, cognitive, affective as well as conative. At the very first question regarding the modes of the mind, the interdependence of the present and the past is recognized, वृत्तयः.....क्रियाक्रियाः । यो. १-६. । तथा-जातीयकाः संस्काराः वृत्तिनिरेव कियन्ते । संस्कारेव वृत्तय इति । एतं वृत्तिसंस्कारचक्रम् अनिशम् आवर्तते ।—"The modes of the mind are either afflicted or pure. These modes create or leave behind them their saṃskāras which are akin to them. From the saṃskāras (in turn) originate the various modes and again from the modes the saṃskāras. Thus the wheel of the modes and the saṃskāras turns round and round ceaselessly." This is not a one-sided dependence of the present on the past which might result in automatism, but it is mutual modification of both, giving us a continuity actively constructed by the inner Self.

The Sanskrit word Saṃskāra is almost untranslatable. It is wider than the masses of so-called apperception, in that the functioning of the संस्कारपिंड is not confined to the cognitive side of consciousness alone. It includes within itself the cognitive, affective and conative dispositions. When the Bhashya-kāra speaks of the वृत्तिसंस्कारचक्रम्, he means it as a fundamental law of the mental function, which when specified gives us the three types of dispositions laid down in modern psychology.¹ The five principal modes of mind mentioned seem to have

1 E. g. the same law is implied when the bhashya quotes—"स्वाध्यायाद्योगमासीत् योगात्स्वाध्यायमामनेत्" ॥ १-२८ ॥ We can roughly compare it with Arist's conceptions of *energeia* and *dynamis* and their relation.

nothing to do with the conative aspect of consciousness. One would think that with only these modes, a complete psychology of the structure and the function of mind could not be constructed. The eternal wheel, or the vicious circle in which our mind keeps on moving is only the barest diagram with which the Bhāshyakāra acquaints us firstly. Our mind does move in a circle, but the circle as we shall see later on gets wider, so as to include within itself all the stages from perception to the accomplishment of an act through the intermediate links of desire, aversion etc. And the saṃskāras play an important roll in all this economy of an individual's life.

The word saṃskāra has even a wider field of application than that of the mental dispositions. Even material things are said to be capable of receiving the saṃskāras, which on their level are not of the finer acts of consciousness, but of mere physical impact and motion. We have already mentioned the Potter's wheel catching the गतिसंस्कार or momentum. As distinguished from गतिसंस्कार there is another termed स्थितिस्थापकसंस्कार. In the Yoga-dars'ana we read:—जातमात्रस्य बालस्य स्मृतिः पूर्वानुभवनिबन्धना स्मृतिस्वाद् अस्मदादिस्मृतिवदिति । न च पद्मसकोचविकासवापि स्वाभाविकौ ।.....तस्मादागन्तुकम् अरणकरसंपर्कमात्रमेव कमलिनीविकासकारणम् । सकोचकारणं च संस्कारः स्थितिस्थापक इति ॥ टी ४. १० ॥

Here while treating the subject matter of अग्निनिवेश resulting in an instinctive fear of death, Vāchaspati says that an attempt to explain it by the help of such broad and vague conceptions like those of Nature or स्वभाव would fail, for even in such a physical event like that of the opening of a lotus by day and its closing down by night, we cannot invoke their aid. For the cause of its opening is the touch of the sun's rays, while the closing of its petals is due to its स्थितिस्थापकसंस्कार. The conception of the स्थितिस्थापकसंस्कार comes to mean more than inertia, for the former not merely resists any outside force, but over and above that it tries to bring back its original position when the force has spent itself. In this sense it does come after all near the conception of प्रकृति or स्वभाव. Though it is not mentioned by Vāchaspati, we might say that in us too there is an element of स्थितिस्थापकसंस्कार, on account of which our body constantly refuses to respond rightly, to obey or to come up to the level of our higher thoughts and purposes.

The परोक्ष and the अपरोक्ष, the inferable and the directly perceivable वितर्क्य are already mentioned. संस्कार is a वितर्क्य of the former type, inapproachable by its very nature.¹ It was said "By its fruits ye shall know them". So with the uncanny depths of our mind. We infer the existence of the saṃskāras from the individual acts of recollection or memory. The saṃskāras (particularly the ज्ञानजाः संस्काराः) form the fund of memory, while स्मृति gives us the individual recollections, a distinction drawn by Bergson in his Matter and Memory. References are met with at various places, about the relation between saṃskāra and smṛiti. संस्कारस्तु स्मृतेरनुमीयते । वाच० टी. ३. १५ ॥ ये संस्कारा स्मृतिहेतवः ता वासनाः ताः च अनादिकालीना इति । etc.

According to Indian thought, the life of the individual extends in the past upto infinity, but may have a terminus in moksha in future. The Soul is eternal and its relation with life or the world is beginningless in the past with a possibility of a divorce depending upon his own effort. It is, in a way, the reverse of the Christian conception of the human soul with a definite beginning in time and an infinite future. Mind in its passage through eternal time past, gathers the debris of the saṃskāras of all experiences in different lives; and the infinite burden of accumulation would in itself be unbearable except for the Law of Karma. संस्कार and वासना mean the same thing, though generally वासना is reserved for that संस्कार which has a determining value on our present or the future life. The saṃskāras of all the acts are stored up in our mind as so many latent forces, which assume the form of a वासना or an active *tendency* when, according to the law of Karma, the time for their fruition comes.

The saṃskāras are taken to be the causes of recollections. The संस्कारपिण्ड is the original fund of memory from which different recollections spring up at opportune moments. The relation between संस्कार and स्मृति is that between the unmanifest *substratum* and its *manifestation*. The region of the saṃskāras lie in the depths of subconsciousness. The अनादिकालीनाः संस्काराः form the

1 cf. फलानुमेयाः प्रारंभाः संस्काराः प्राक्कना इव ॥ काशिका—रघुवैद्य, ॥

structure of our mind in its totality. Taken in its full psychological connotation, the संस्कारपिंड includes within itself the cognitive, conative, affective and instinctive dispositions as well,¹

After a certain spiritual advancement, it is held that a Yogi is able to know all the saṃskāras of his whole past. In our next section we shall see that such a direct knowledge of the saṃskāras cannot mean an actual memory, because only in a narrower sense an objectification of a saṃskāra would result in स्मृति, recollection; In the bhāṣya on 3.18 the different kinds of संस्कारs are given as under—द्वये काल्पनी संस्काराः, स्मृतिवत्काल्पितवो वासनारूपाः, विपाकहेतवो धर्माधर्मरूपाः । ते पूर्वभवासि संस्कृताः परिणामचेष्टानिरोधवृत्तिजीवनधर्मवद् अपरिदृष्टाः चित्तधर्माः । Here saṃskāras are broadly divided into two classes:—

(i) The वासनारूप

and (ii) the धर्माधर्मरूप—Saṃskāras

The former group is taken to be the *sine qua non* of particular recollections and infections of the mind, the latter class contain within it the धर्माधर्मरूपसंस्कारs which are left behind by different acts, good and bad and form the conative dispositions with their mysterious (अदृष्ट) working woven with the law of karma. The former group gives us the cognitive dispositional or apperceptive masses on the one hand,

1 It is only in modern psychology that we find the fact of the mind storing all its experiences in the form of saṃskaras fully annunciated. E. g. " They (subconscious ideas) are not really and in fact present to the mind, but only in *power*. nor do we draw them all out distinctly in imagination ". P. 96. " Habit itself implies retention and is practically synonymous with disposition. It must therefore pre-suppose *disposita* ". -Ward's Psych. Prin. P. 98. ' And we prefer to call that which endures in the mind (not idea because it confuses the act of thinking of an object with the enduring conditions which render possible the thinking of that object)—as the conditions of our thinking of any object, not an " idea " but cognitive dispositions ". - Out. Psych. P. 259. The principle is quite commonly accepted, but the psychologists in the west posit the dynamic *residua* analytically, i. e. cognitive *residua*, conative *residua* etc. The Indian thinkers on the contrary grasped the depositing of saṃskaras firstly synthetically, for it was one and the same, trait of the mind which preserved cognitive, affective or conative acts,

and the affective dispositions which supply the mind with the necessary motive power for action. That part of the total fund of saṃskāras which is known in the shape of definite acts of memory is defined by Vāchaspati in his Tīkā, where he says **ज्ञानजा हि संस्काराः स्मृतेर्हेतवः**, while the others are-- **अविद्यासंस्काराः अविद्याधीना क्लेशानां हेतवः**. It is only the saṃskāras left by our cognitive acts which can be recalled in the shape of recollections. The sūtra itself—**संस्कारसाक्षात्कारणतत्त्वज्ञातिज्ञानम् ॥ यो. ३. १८ ॥** deals with a phenomenon that would fall within the perview of abnormal psychology, and we need not enter into it. But Vāchaspati's Tīka shows us clearly the several kinds of dispositional masses that form the structure of our mind.

We shall for the present deal with the cognitive dispositional masses which result not merely in memory, but affect the incoming sensations, by ushering some and excluding others. We might compare these **ज्ञानजाः संस्काराः** with the so-called apperceptional¹ masses, termed by Dr. Ward "Intellective systems" which assimilate any new sensation and give it its meaning.

According to western psychology apperception of any new element of consciousness is carried out under the guidance of the mood present, or the purpose or the particular "question" in mind, and more or less the character of any new element or its meaning depends upon the particular system of the saṃskāras with which it gets unified. We have already referred to this in our treatment of perception and interpretation. The moods or the purposes of western psychology, on account of their strictly non-moral scientific attitude, all seem to live upon the same level of consciousness. Thus Pillsbury says—"The subconscious is nothing mysterious, no new and detached realm of mind, but merely a mass of experiences of the same general character as those that we have been considering." This much is in perfect harmony with the Indian doctrine of the **संस्कारपिण्ड**. Further on he says that "we

¹ "Apperception" the word was originally used by Leibnitz, to demarcate clear ideas from the vague. It was developed by Kant, for whom "transcendental apperception" was the work of the categories of understanding. Herbert brought the word down from general Philosophy to psychology proper.

cannot mean by the subconscious a new level of mind, we can at the most mean an organisation of the old experiences in a slightly new way " He has maintained this as against the theory of Freud which turns subconsciousness into almost another individual mind as opposed to the conscious mind. But in the Yogadars'ana, the mention of the subconscious intellective masses always goes with the acceptance of different levels of subconscious mind. That a certain level of apperceptional masses always gravitate towards bondage in life, while others take a man higher up in spiritual advancement is shown in—

समाधिप्रज्ञाप्रभवः संस्कारो व्युत्थानसंस्काराक्षयं बाधते । व्युत्थानसंस्काराभिभवात् तत्प्रभवाः प्रत्यया न भवेति । भा. १-५० । व्युत्थानसंस्काराक्षितधर्मा न ते प्रत्ययात्मका, इति प्रत्यय- निराधे न निरुद्धा, निरोधसंस्कारा अपि क्षितधर्मा ॥ भा ३-९ ॥ व्युत्थानप्रत्ययमूलः संस्कारा व्युत्थानप्रत्ययनिवृत्तौ एव न निवर्तन्ते इति, तन्निवृत्तौ न निरोधसंस्कारोऽपेक्षितश्च इति न कारणमात्रनिवृत्तिः कार्यनिवृत्तिहेतुः ॥—टीका ३-९ ॥ We have so often mentioned that the whole problem of Yoga, is to rise on higher levels of our mind. Corresponding to the levels of consciousness there are different levels in subconsciousness too. The samskāras cannot be worked upon directly. A lower samskāra i. e. a samskāra left by a lower vṛtti, can only be driven out or uprooted, or suppressed by a higher samskāra, which we can deposit in our subconscious mind only by inducing a higher mode of mind through an effort of attention. In the passage above quoted, it is definitely laid down that the व्युत्थानसंस्कारs which are originally deposited in the mind by similar modes, are themselves the causes of further वृत्तिस or modes on the same level. These are so to say the cognitive dispositional masses, which condition 'the acts of our attention. The structure of the samskāras is of our own making. The functional working of mind when left to itself, undisturbed by individual effort, expresses what we can call *the Law of circular causality*,¹ according to which the causes (प्रत्ययs) leave their effects (संस्कार) which in turn cause fresh causes (प्रत्ययs)

1. In Physics eternal motion is impossible but in Psychology, with the entity of mind it seems to be a statement, the truth of which is easily granted. Psychology never posits *entropy*.

In our section on the auditory perception of meaning we have quoted Vāchaspati's sentence—स्मृतिफलप्रसवानुमितस्तु संस्कारः स्वकारणानुभवविषयनियतो न विषयान्तरे प्रत्ययमाघातमुत्सहते ॥ टी. ३. १७. ॥ We can call this the *Law of the Specificity of the Samskāras*. For what Vāchaspati has said here with regard to the specific recollections of different letter sounds might as well be applied to an act of assimilation or apperception. He means that a particular samskāra can bring to memory only the very object which had caused it. Taking a wider meaning of the word प्रत्यय we might go beyond this and say that a particular system of samskāras can bring forth a fresh object belonging to that class only. This widening of the sphere of the functioning of samskāras is not unwarranted in the light of our earlier quotation. We find its corroboration even further on:—

यथा प्रावृषि तृणाङ्कुरस्थोद्भवेन तद्वीजसत्ताऽनुमीयते तथा मोक्षमार्गध्वणेन यस्य रोम-
हर्षाश्रुपातो दृश्यते, तत्राप्यास्ति विशेषदर्शनबीजम् ॥ भा. ४. २६ ॥ तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्त-
राणि संस्कारेभ्यः ॥ ४. २७ ॥ प्रत्ययविवेकनिम्नस्य.....चित्तस्य, तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराण्य-
स्सीति etc । कुतः ? क्षीयमाणबीजेभ्यः पूर्वसंस्कारेभ्यः इति ॥ भा. ४. २७
यथा क्लेशा दग्धबीजभावा न प्ररोहसमर्था भवन्ति, तथा ज्ञानाग्निना दग्धबीजभाव
पूर्वसंस्कारो न प्रत्ययप्रसूयेवति ॥ भा. ४. २८ ॥ तत्रापि विग्तस्य सर्वथा
विवेकस्यातिरेक भवतीति, संस्कारबीजक्षयाग्नास्य प्रत्ययान्तराण्युत्पद्यन्ते । भा
६. २९ ॥ and मनस्तु साधिकारमाश्रयो वासनानाम् । यदमिमुखीभूत वस्तु या
वासना व्यनक्ति तस्याः तदालम्बनम् ॥ भा. ४. ११ ॥ "Just as the existance of
seeds is inferred from the blades of grass shooting forth in
the monsoon, so too when tears flow down, and the hair
stand on their ends on hearing of the path of liberation, we
infer that such a man has in him the seed of विशेषदर्शन—true
knowledge of the nature of the absolutely individual Purusha
In between the breaks arise other thoughts (leaning towards
bondage) due to the still surviving samskāras (of the same
type, lurking in subconscious depths.) Even in mind
otherwise bent towards true discrimination, other thoughts like
" I am " crop up at intervals And whence ? From previous
samskāras (even though their) seeds be almost weak.¹ Just as

1 And this reflection is as old as मं. ६. ३४. wherein we read, " Even in a mind which loves the truth and has gone to rest in

the infections (of the mind) cannot again sprout forth after their seeds have once been burnt up, (this is said with regard to affective dispositional masses), in the same way the former *samskāra* (पूर्वसंस्कार representing the whole mass of cognitive dispositions tending to bondage) cannot give birth to (lower) knowledge or experience or mode, after it has once been burnt up in the fire of knowledge." In the quotation given from 4. 29 the same fact is retold. In the last quotation the repository of the total fund of *samskāras* is said to be the mind. Here *मनस्* is used in the sense of चित्त. Though the mind is the reservoir of all our *वासना*s, any particular *वासना* cannot gather strength by merely having a place in the store house of the mind. Here we must distinguish between आश्रय and आलंबन.¹ The *वासना* finds refuge in the mind, but it leans on to the object which calls it forth; so that it at once conditions the object, and receives strength from it. So instead of the वृत्तिसंस्कारचक्र we might speak of the वृत्तिसंस्कारवासनाचक्र, *वासना* bringing one again to [the specific *vṛtti* which was the cause of it.

We began with the division of the संस्कारपिण्ड into cognitive, affective² and conative ones—ज्ञानमूल, क्लेशमूल, धर्माधर्ममूल, but they are only distinguishable and not separable. They all work together almost interdependent like the three *guṇas* working ceaselessly in the mind. धर्मापेक्षं चित्तस्य वस्तुसाम्येऽपि सुखज्ञानं भवति, अधर्मापेक्षं तत एव दुःखज्ञानम्, अविद्यापेक्षं तत एव मूढज्ञानम्, सम्यग्दर्शनापेक्षं तत एव माध्यस्थ्यज्ञानमिति ।

itself, there arise when it is deluded by the object of sense, wrongs resulting from former acts."

1 The Bhashyakara does make a distinction between हेतु, फल, आश्रय and आलंबन of the *वासना*s. संस्कार is used for both good and bad ones—e. g. शुभकामसंस्कार as well as निरोधसंस्कार. The word *वासना* though at times identified with संस्कार is reservedly used for lower संस्कारs when in their dynamic state.

2 Out of the five क्लेशs, राग द्वेष are definitely affective in their character, अग्निनिवेष्टा is instinctive fear and taking fear to be an emotion we might class it with रागद्वेष. अविद्या is too generic in its nature, and अस्मिता as a क्लेश is the feeling of Egoism. All these are affective in an evil sense. Still however we might use affective for "infective." (Vide Supra. P. 34 Ftn. 1.)

To the virtuous is pleasant what to the vicious is painful, while from अविद्या—Nescience springs infatuation. It is only in true knowledge that the mind is able to keep to the golden mean. And in all such acts of knowledge, mind as a whole works through its total mass of dispositions which form its structure.

Note:—

The dispositional masses form the structure of our mind, which structure is of its own making. Mind functions through its past experiences in the present, but we cannot, as Pillsbury does it,¹ prove the continuity of self merely through this characteristic of mind to preserve all its experiences. The mental structure is nothing material, but like any other material structure it has an inertia of its own which might stubbornly refuse to rise superior to itself. The Yogic praxis consists in going from lower to higher levels of attention; and the structure of mind is automatically recast in doing this. Thus Yoga stands for freedom of the mind as against its automatism which comes as a result of *the Law of Circular Causality* at lower levels of mind. It is to develop *plasticity* of mind as against the rigidity of its structure. To do this Yoga asks a subject to catch the mind in the moment of its functioning through its structure in the present and thus try to transform it. In the active functioning of mind, those *vrittis* which rise *automatically* from the bed of past structure and tend towards bondage have to be suppressed. Biology tells us that when a structure ceases to function, it gets atrophied. The same happens with mental structure too. If those *vrittis* which are to a more or less extent the expressions of a certain structure be suppressed, the structure would sooner or later *get atrophied* and die out. The meaning of suppression here is not "*repression*". Due to the Freudian school, there has been no dearth of pseudo-psychological literature preaching against "*repression*", and asking men to run out their nature. Now repression can

¹ Vide his Attention. P. 199 s. s. We shall have to deal with this in our section on The Nature of Mind.

be harmful only because an evil tendency is fought against on the same mental plane. Psychologists and physiologists too are ready enough to posit a hierarchy of neurones in our nervous system. Such neurones lying in successive superior gradations regulate those on the lower level, so that the physiology of our whole body resembles a government with its own head in the cortex.¹ But in psychology proper it was Swami Vivekananda who firstly gave the principle of levels of consciousness by positing 'super-consciousness'² What the physiologists claim for the body, Indian thinkers asserted long ago of mind. Now निरोध or suppression consists of nipping in bud the expressions of a certain structural tendency, when they appear above the threshold by reaching a higher level of attention, and this primarily means a complete structural transformation of mind. This can only be done by *burning out* the unwanted saṃskāras deeper in our subconscious mind. It was a direct knowledge of the truth contained in this that made the Indian thinkers posit levels of subconsciousness corresponding to levels of attention. We can find a modern analogue to this in Bergson's principle of the levels of "tension" above the threshold,³ while below it lie depths within depths of subconscious mind, traversed, though not consciously, by the effort of memory, in trying to recall a particular saṃskāra.⁴

1 "We cannot mean by the subconscious a new level of mind" P. 212 and "Again we must assume that there are not only different systems, but different levels of systems in the organism of the nervous mechanism. Systems upon one level would control directly the systems at the lower level, just as the lower systems control the activity of the single cells." P. 255. What can Pillsbury's two remarks put together mean? Even a strictly scientific psycho-neural (if not psycho-physical) parallelism would require one to posit such a structure in our mind too.

2 Const. Sur. Up. Phil. P. 139.

3 Mind Energy —Nature of Intellectual Effort P. 152 e. s.

4 Matter and Memory. P. 211 and 220 e. s. Also False Recognition —in Mind Energy. P. 120 e. s. also P. 154.

Section 7 स्मृति—Memory

When a संस्कार comes up to consciousness in its original form it is called memory. The saṃskāra is the cause, the *sine qua non*, of an act of memory. स्मृति though treated last of all is presupposed from the very beginning in the ascription of meaning, due to *contraction* in perception. Even determinate perception would be impossible without initial memory which at its implicit level we call 'primary retention'. This implicit memory becomes explicit at the ideational level when the subject recalls definite portions of his past. स्मृति has for its object the greater portion of mental structure. Because mind functions as a whole, any individual mode is depicted against its complete background, and even in its functioning the different modes imply one another. Thus सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, आगम—all imply विकल्प. So too we have to definitely recognize memory in the grasping of the meaning of a spoken word, but its field is wider than that of विकल्प even. Without memory mental functioning would be impossible, for a mere fund of saṃskāras would give no meaning to the outside world. Memory gives us the living link between the past and the present. As the differentiation of the निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष takes on more complex forms from those of determinate perception or recognition to those of interpretation and association, the mental coefficient of memory gets extricated from other modes, and memory of some past experience becomes possible.

Before going any further, we must distinguish this स्मृति from the other use of the word where it means wakefulness or watchfulness. The use seems to be as old as the Upanishadic times—for सनत्कुमार says in the छांदोग्य ७. २६ २-सत्त्वशुद्धौ धृत्वा स्मृतिः स्मृतिरन्मे सर्वप्रधाना विप्रमोक्षः।¹ The word is more often met with in Buddhism, and in this sense of watchfulness it means keeping the particular ध्येय always in mind implying complete subjection of all the विक्षेप. There is a verse by S'antidevāchārya—

¹ We had no such doctrine of an original state of Soul from which it fell down into the world of sense, because the relation between पुरुष and प्रकृति is beginningless. So we cannot compare this स्मृति with Plato's theory of 'Anamnesis'.

संप्रजन्त्य तदा याति न च वात्स्यागर्तं पुनः ।

स्मृतिर्यदा मनोद्वारे रक्षार्थमवलिष्ठते ॥¹

“ When स्मृति stands keeping a watch at the mind-door the संप्रजन्त्य comes, and having come, it never departs.” Even in the Yogadars'ana we have—अद्वावीर्यस्मृतिसमाधिप्रज्ञापूर्वक इतरेषाम् ॥ १. २.१ ॥ Here the word स्मृति cannot be taken in the sense of mere memory. Vāchaspati takes it in the sense of ध्यान or fixed voluntary attention preliminary to समाधि—स्मृतिर्ध्यानम् अनाकुलम् अविक्षिप्तम् । But the positive definition of ध्यान given in यो. ३. २. is—तत्र प्रत्ययेक-तानताध्यानम् ॥ and we can only take स्मृति to be the negative side of it. And in this case as it comes after अद्वा and वीर्य, the meaning of such a negative sense can be that keen watchfulness of mind. We can do nothing but guess how स्मृति from its original meaning of memory could come to mean such watchfulness. In an effort of recollection we always go up and down the depths of different levels of subconsciousness, and pick up the right thing from amidst a total background of irrelevant matter. A sādḥaka has to suppress all other memories except those that would help him in his spiritual advancement. Originally स्मृति might have meant the product of recollection, but in the Yogic practices attention must have been drawn to the process or act of recollecting. Just as a प्रत्यय or a piece of knowledge contains within itself both the object of knowledge as well as the act of it, so too in a recollection we might distinguish between the object remembered and the act of remembering which is an effort *sui generis*. In Yoga greater value must have been attached to this native effort which brings to mind the right thing at the right moment suppressing all others. The word mind-door-मनोद्वार too occurring in the verse quoted above is significant, in that the स्मृति stands at the “ threshold of consciousness ” as a censor allowing only relevant memories to pass by.

1 Quoted in धम्मपद P. 145.

2 अद्वावीर्यस्मृतिसमाधिप्रज्ञा all these are repeated *en bloc* in Buddhism too. Vide अभिधम्मत्थसंग्रहो ७. २९—पञ्चबलानि । सद्भाषलं, विरिजबलं, सतिबलं, समाधिबलं, पञ्चाबलं ॥

Memory is defined as not stealing away with the object experienced." अनुभूतविषयासंप्रमोषः स्मृतिः ॥ यो. १. ११ ॥ By merely taking the sūtra, as it is, one might define memory as that capacity of mind which stores up (असंप्रमोष) its past experiences. But the word असंप्रमोष has a specific meaning as explained by Vāchaspati. By " not stealing away with the objects of experience " is meant reproducing the object just as it was experienced, *without adding anything to it*. In this sense smṛti would stand for different recollections as distinguished from that capacity of mind to store up its past memories as differentiated from the fund of memory.

Memory differs from the other modes of mind. It springs from the traces (संस्कारs) left by all the वृत्तिस including स्मृति, सर्वाः स्मृतयः प्रमाणविषयविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतीनामनुभवान् प्रभवन्ति । भा. १-११ । (cf. यथा च वासनास्तथा स्मृति । स्मृतेश्च पुनः संस्कारा इत्येवमेते स्मृतिसंस्कारा.... यो. भा. ४. ९.) All the saṃskāras co-exist in the mind. असह्यधिनामपि च संस्काराद्वारेणास्ति सहभाव इति । टीका ३. १७ ॥ But an act of memory lies in the present, and as such it has a temporal coefficient like that of any other mode, and hence a memory of a memory is possible. स्मृति too is an अनुभव and as such it can be reproduced. Thus our consciousness is capable of reduplicating itself infinitely. So we can say that " the successive experiences of *n* identical occurrences does not then result in an accumulation of *n* identical *residua*." There is nothing in this critical interpretation of ours that is contradictory to any principle accepted in the Yogadars'an. On the contrary it is implied in the bhāṣhya quoted above as well as in प्राप्तिपूर्वा वृत्तिः स्मृति ततः स्मृतीनामुपजन इत्यर्थः । टीका ।

All the other modes of mind have a reference to something objective in a realistic sense of the word. Even the वस्तुसंज्ञाविकल्प works upon the unity or the differences met with in concrete experience, while sleep has the all-pervading *tamas* as its object. In memory the mind dwells only upon its

1 We do not find any mention of the modern distinction that Bergson has drawn between ordinary recollection and personal memory with its specific coefficient of experience: nor do we find any discussion of the dropping out of the individual characteristics out of each memory-image of a familiar object.

past experiences. It is no new knowledge that we get through memory. As Vāchaspati has said, all the other modes do make some addition to our knowledge in general or in particular. This addition of new elements is called "stealing" and the specific meaning of असंप्रमोष is that in every fresh piece of knowledge, we appropriate reality while in memory there is no fresh acquisition made. संस्कारमात्रजस्य हि ज्ञानस्य संस्कारकारणानुभवावभासितो विषयः आत्मीयः तदधिकविषयपरिग्रहस्तु संप्रमोषः । Memory springs from the saṃskāras and as such it has for its object the specific experience which left that particular saṃskāra behind. In short memory never transgresses the limits of former experience. सर्वप्रमाणादयोऽनधिगतमर्थं सामान्यतः प्रकारतो वाऽधिगमयन्ति । स्मृतिः पुनरैवापूर्वानुभवमयादात्मतिष्ठामति । Other modes of mind extend our field, but memory may at the most come up to a complete recall, though very often it might fall short of it. तद्विषया तद्वनविषया वा, न तु तदधिकविषया । (वाच०)

There is an interesting question put by the Bhāṣhyakāra about the form or mould of recollection, which can inform us of the introspective analysis brought to bear by the ancient thinkers upon the act of memory. He puts the question—'Does mind remember a प्रत्यय—particular piece of knowledge or the object thereof?' And the reply is given, "The particular प्रत्यय (the piece of knowledge) is coloured by the object (of knowledge)—and it shows both the object as well as the act of knowledge, and thus begins the formation of a saṃskāra of the same kind. Such a saṃskāra manifests its own cause (that original प्रत्यय) and thus generates a memory having the same form and consisting of both the object and the act of knowledge." किं प्रत्ययस्य चित्तं स्मरति, आहोस्विद्विषयस्येति । ग्राह्योपरकः प्रत्ययो ग्राह्यग्रहणोभयाकारनिर्भासः तच्चात्मीयकं संस्कारं आरभते । स संस्कारः स्वव्यवकाजिनः तदाकारमेव ग्राह्यग्रहणोभयात्मिका स्मृतिं जयति । यो भा. १. ११. । Here the word आरभते is the most meaningful and important. The passage tells us that the depositing of the traces or the saṃskāras is done at the very time that the mind is experiencing something. The memory of the present sinks into the mind in the present.¹ This would mean that there is

1 Cf. Bergson on formation of memory in the present. *Mind Energy*,

no gap between the present and the past. No moments of retention are allowed here as they are in Buddhism or Jainism. Of course the thought moments according to Buddhism are the shortest possible, there being about a billion such moments in the time occupied by the shortest flash of lightning.¹

A second point put down in the Yogadars'ana is about the common mould of perception (in the most general sense) and memory. Both contain within themselves two moments namely of an object known and the act of knowledge. The object and the act of knowledge though distinguishable only by the process of *vikalpa* are in themselves inseparable. The mind perceives them both under a single unity, and still, as Vācaspati says — विकल्पतत्त्वाद्यमभेदेऽपि गुणप्रधानभाव इति ।—in such an act of knowledge one of its two moments might be primary, the other remaining only secondary.

The question would naturally arise— where then lies the difference between a fresh act of mind (बुद्धि) and an act of memory, when both have the same form. The reply is already contained in the nature of memory which never leaps beyond past experience, but it is worded differently. तत्र ग्रहणाकारपूर्वा बुद्धिः । प्राज्ञाकारपूर्वा स्मृतिः । When the mind appropriates a portion of the real in perception (अधिकविषयपरिग्रहस्तु संप्रमोषः), greater stress is laid upon the act of knowledge; while in memory the original act of knowledge falls into the background and the object comes pre-dominantly before the mind. (तदनेन अनविगतबोधन बुद्धिरित्युक्तम् । वाच०)

P. 129 c. s.—Buddhistic moments of retention and the Jain धारणा as the last stages of perception were inserted, it seems, simply from an educative point of view. The धारणा stage cannot be said to amount to a gap between the present experience and the formation of its *Saṃskāra*. It is only a strengthening of the *samskara*, just sufficient to enable a voluntary recall. We can compare the moments of retention or धारणा with the Stoic view of judgment, the essential characteristic of which was "the peculiar act of *assent*, of approval, and of being convinced with which the mind makes the content of the idea its own, grasps it and in a certain way takes possession of it." Hist. Phil. Windelband P. 207. In धारणा too mind takes possession of its perceptions or judgments.

There is a modern discussion on the question as to whether memory comes up to mind with or without its temporal sign. The problem has its counterpart in Indian thought too. There is one type of memory without its local sign in the past which Vijñānabhikṣu calls a sort of recognition. It comes up in the form—Oh! my mother. This is a प्रसुष्ट-तत्तात्पर्य. We cannot call it a recognition in that it has not the necessary form of it, namely—*This is my mother*. The indefinite subject "This" of the perceptual level is lacking. It is an interjectional exclamation and hence it is an act of recollection, not definitely localized in the past.

But the general tone of the Yogadarśana seems to lie in the direction that a recollection always comes along with its concrete setting in the past. We meet with this principle in the संस्कारसाक्षात्करणार्थवृत्तिज्ञानम्¹ ॥ ३. १८ ॥ we have already said that a direct experience of all kinds of saṃskāras is not memory but that it corresponds to a plunge in the subconscious depths of one's mind, and as such it is rather the subject matter for abnormal psychology. The question can only be determined by an appeal to the concrete experiences of the Yogis. It is held by all Indian schools that the knowledge of all the lives past can come to a Yogi, in his highest "disinterestedness" and acuteness of attention. "Many facts seem to indicate that the past is preserved even down to its slightest details and that there is no real forgetting." What Bergson says with regard to the short span of our present life, Indian thinkers hold for all the memories of past lives. Bergson goes on to say that if ever on account of a "sudden" or, as we should say, supreme disinterestedness in life, a man were to lose the primary "racial attention", which one might compare with instinctive mental adaptation, "the panoramic vision of the (whole) past" can come up to the surface of his conscious mind. But he further thinks that it can be due only to a complete loss of

1 पुष्पेनिवासानुस्मृति—पूर्वजातिज्ञान held in Buddhism to be one of the Siddhis. Jain सर्वज्ञता includes this. We can favourably compare Plato's *Anamnesis* with this,

"the attention to life"—not voluntary or individual attention, but that "racial attention" growing weak. But the Dhyāna-praxis means just the reverse of a general lack of attention. To what Bergson holds about the memory of a single life flashing upon the mind in all its details at the time of death, Indian thinkers add the memories of all the lives past. But we shall give up this question which primarily belongs to abnormal psychology, and merely dwell upon the positive aspect of it. The Bhāṣyakāra says—न च देशकालनिमित्तानुसर्गैर्विना तेषामस्ति साक्षात्करणम् । This tells us that the direct experience of the saṃskāras comes up with the co-efficients of space, time and causality. Over and above the knowledge of his own past, it is held that a Yogi is able to see the past lives of other people too. परब्राह्मणेनैव संस्कारसाक्षात्करणत्वरजातिसंवेदनम् । And if we accept the original proposition of the Yogadars'ana about the संस्कारसाक्षात्करण, and with Bergson hold it as a possibility that "between different minds there may be continuously taking place changes analogous to the phenomena of *endosmosis*,"¹ we cannot *absolutely positively* deny the possibility of such a phenomenon too, for it is space alone which creates sharp divisions, and mind is non-spatial by its nature.

Such an acceptance which is implied in the Yogadars'ana would bring us to the theory of Levels of Memory. The principle is not imposed by us on the Yogadars'ana, for just as there are different levels of attention, and corresponding to them different levels of immediate experiences, so too we might distinguish between different efforts at recollection, one on the level of ordinary perception which gives us स्मृति—memory, and the other the higher स्मृति or the संस्कारसाक्षात्करण of the Yogi, which comes from his capacity to make a superior effort. Whether the former ordinary recollection comes along with its space-time setting, we can only judge by an analogy with the latter. On the lowest level is the प्रमुह्यतत्तात्पर्य, on the highest is the संस्कारसाक्षात्करण, in between the two our poor acts of recollection lie, at times floating and at times with their concrete setting of space, time and causality.

¹ Mind Energy. P. 76. e. s.

(§2) Causes of Mental Recall

We have seen how the functioning of mind in the present leaves its traces to be stored up in its depths, and from which by an effort of recollecting one can bring up in the present the original experience. But the sense of effort is not always wakeful. We might say that just as in perception we have different shades of mental effort, ranging from the non-voluntary sensation where it is nil to the perception of an object held before the mind at the exclusion of others by *ekāgratā*, so in the act of recollection too we might have the lowest level of recall with its associative automatism, to the highest स्मृति standing at the mind-door always watchful to pick up the relevant object. In the *Yogadars'ana* we do not find any rules laid down for the objective conditions of associational recall, but in the *Nyāyadars'ana*¹ there is a whole sūtra giving about 25 relations which form the basis of mental association and recall. They are स्मृतिहेतुs or causes of recollection.

The most general subjective condition or the *sine qua non* of memory is the connection of the Soul with its *manas*. In the fund of memory all *saṃskāras* coexist, but in a single effort of mind all do not come up to consciousness, and the reason given is that over and above the general conditions of memory namely the contact between the Soul and the *manas* and the existence of a specific *saṃskāra*, there are other exciting causes (उद्बोधकs) of memory which help the recall. These उद्बोधकs turn up one by one, and hence memories do not come in crowds. प्रणिधानलिङ्गादिज्ञानानामयुगपद्भावाद् अयुगपत्स्मरणम् ॥ न्या. सू. ३. २. ३३. ॥ यथा कञ्च आत्ममनसोः संनिर्गन्धः सस्वरश्च स्मृतिहेतुरेव प्रणिधानं लिङ्गादिज्ञानानि, तानि च न युगपद् भवन्ति, तत्कृता स्मृतीनां युगपदनुत्पत्तिरिति ॥ भा. ३३ ॥ The contact between the Soul and the *manas*, and the existence of a particular *saṃskāra* are the generic conditions of an act of memory, while the will to remember and the presence of an associative link are the immediate

1 According to the Nyaya view memory is a function of the Soul. It links the past to the present giving meaning to perception etc. For प्रतिसम्बन्ध as a function of the Soul vide न्या. ३.१.३-१४-१५; ३.२.४१ etc.

subjective and objective factors which result in a recollection. It is to the examination of these factors giving us the so-called association of ideas, that we turn our attention now.

(भा.) स्मृतिहेतूनाम् अवयवपथात् अयुगपद् स्मरणमित्युक्तम् । अथ केभ्यः स्मृतिरूपयत इति ? स्मृतिः कालः—

प्रणिधाननिर्वाहान्यासलिंगलक्षणसादृश्यपरिग्रहाश्रयाश्रितसम्बन्धानन्तर्यवियोगकार्यविरोधाति-
शयप्राप्तिव्यवधानसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषमवाचित्वक्रियाप्रागपमार्गमनिमित्तेभ्यः॥ न्या. सू. ३. २. ४२ ॥

“Memories come up one by one, because the immediate associative determinants come up one by one. Now what are those determinants which bring up a recall? An associated recall comes through any one of these:—

(1) प्रणिधान—The one-pointed effort of mind to re-collect something—this gives the general attitude of mind, the necessary subjective condition of memory.

(2) निबन्ध—Thoughts contained in the same book help to recall one another. The recall might come in the same order or it may follow a reverse course too. The former type of recall would give us an instance of *The Law of Forward Conduction*. There is another technical sense in which the word निबन्ध is used. In Yoga, the spiritual object of Dhyāna is supposed to be located in a particular part of one's own body. This is called निबन्ध. The meaning is the same as in—देशबन्धः चित्तस्य धारणा ॥ यो. ३. १. ॥ wherein mind is to be fixed in a certain part of the body or outside it.

(3) अभ्यास—repetition regarded as having a strengthening effect on the possibility of a recall. Importance of repetition is recognized in the Yogadars'ana—अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्याम् तन्निरोधः ॥ यो. १-१२ ॥ Technically अभ्यास is defined as इतिरहितस्य चित्तस्य...स्थितिः । तं निमित्तीकृत्य यत्नः पुनः पुनः तथात्वेन चेतसि निवेशनम् अभ्यासः । (सर्व. पृ. ३६६) The unruffled condition of mind is the goal, and repeated effort in that direction is called अभ्यास

(4) लिङ्ग—This is a logical relation between two objects. It might either be a relation of the type of fire and smoke, or an inseparable connection always found to exist between certain objects as in—A cow and her horns. The former we might call a universal, the latter an empirically established relation. Under

this is mentioned the case of an inseparable relation between two things which are always found together in some third thing, like hands and feet in the human body. i. e. a relation between parts of a single organism. Lastly even a relation of antagonism would serve to recall a thing at the instance of the thing antagonistic to it. Here antagonism is the same as dissimilarity.

(5) लक्षण—Recall comes here through a characteristic mark e. g. One is reminded of Arjuna on seeing his banner.

(6) सादृश्य—Similarity,—e. g. seeing the picture of Devadatta, we are reminded of him.¹

(7) परिग्रह—When one is reminded of the owner on seeing the thing owned, or *vice versa*.

(8) { आश्रय—आश्रित—When a thing dependent upon another

(9) { brings that other to our mind or *vice versa*.

(10) संबन्ध—closely related objects—e. g. a student and his teacher.

(11) आनन्तर्य—Relation of immediate succession (either in time or space).

(12) वियोग—Objects ordinarily connected together when separated remind each one of the other.

(13) एककार्य—On seeing one engaged in a task, one is reminded of another devoted to the same task.

(14) विरोध—Antagonism like the one between a serpent and a weasel. This is positive antagonism between two objects—going beyond the range of mere dissimilarity

(15) अतिशय—That which is the cause of an increase in a thing reminding one of that thing or *vice versa*.

(16) प्राप्ति—The relation between the giver and the thing obtained—as between a charitable man and money.

(17) व्यवधान—Relation of obstruction—as between a treasure and the men guarding it with swords.

(18) सुखदुःख—Happiness and Misery.

(19) इच्छाद्वेष—Desire and Aversion.

(20) भय—Fear when it reminds one of the object of fear.

1 चित्रगतं प्रतिरूपकं देवदत्तस्य इत्येवमादि । This form 'देवदत्तस्य' इति is not a judgment of recognition but of similarity based upon association.

(21) अर्चित—Need of an object reminding one of it.

(22) क्रिया—Action e. g. movement of branches reminding us of its cause the wind. This is the relation between a doer and his act.

(23) राग—Affection reminding one of its own object.

(24) धर्म— It is held that Dharma reminds one of past lives, and also enables one to keep in mind the object of study.

(25) अधर्म—Through Adharma one is reminded of the cause or the object of past miseries.

We might compare with these the determinants of memory given in the Milindapañhā¹. They are (1) Subjective Effort giving एवंजातिज्ञान corresponding to संस्कारसाक्षात्करण of the Yogadars'ana; (2) giving us objective determinants which also are included in the above list, (3) and (4) Pleasure and Pain, (cf. सुखदुःख-18-given above) which give importance to any objective connection, (5) Similarity is सादृश्य; (6) Difference (cf. instances given above under लिंग and विरोध); (7) Speech, (8) A sign -this is equivalent to लक्षण given above; (9) An effort at a recall coming near प्रणिधान of the Nyāyadars'ana; (10) Expectation e.g. in writing when we know that such and such a letter follows such other letter; (11) Arithmetic; (12) Learning by rote which can be compared with the mechanical automatic memory explained by Bergson on the basis of cerebral habit; (13) Recall due to meditation which would come near the personal recollections as different from automatic memory; (14) Reference to a book—we can compare this with the relation between the container and the contained, or with parts of a whole recalling each other, (15) A pledge and (16) is the recall of actual experience meaning almost the same thing as a recall through meditation giving us what Bergson calls personal memory. Keith passes over these in his characteristic manner saying, "There is, it is clear, practically no appreciation whatever of the nature of the problem."²

After giving so many determinants of recall, the Nyāya-Bhāṣyakāra adds—'These immediate excitant causes of recall do not

¹ P. 78 c. s.

² Bud. Phil. P. 194.

come to mind simultaneously and hence memories too come one by one. These do not exhaust enumeratively all the determinants of recall, but are mere instances. (निर्द्वैतं चेदं स्मृतिहेतूनां न परिसंख्यानमिति ।) ' We might apply this remark to all the determinants of associative recall. The Bhāṣhyakāra means that there are an infinite number and kinds of relations that subsist between things, and that any one term of a relation may serve to recall the other term.

We find in the relations given above almost all the types of associational recall mentioned in western Psychology. First and foremost of course is the प्रणिधान—the will to remember a certain object. Other causes give us relations between objects themselves, except numbers 3, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 23. अभ्यास (3) is repetition by which the saṃskāras of a certain object or objects are fixed more firmly in the mind. Numbers 18, 19, 20, 21, and 23, furnish us a specific subjective attitude of mind helping us to recall older experience because of a connection established by mind. Thus दुःख and दुःख (18), इच्छा (taking इच्छा to be equivalent to राग) and द्वेष (19) tell up that a feeling or an emotion very often strikes us a subjective connection between separate objects that would otherwise remain wholly apart. The relation between fear (20) and the object of fear is more subjective and enduring while that between a need (21) and its object though in some way similar to it is less permanent in its character, as it no longer holds after the need is satisfied. The relation between affection and its object is almost on par with the relation between fear and its object.

In western Psychology, Aristotle posited three types of Association—Resemblance, Contrast and Contiguity (of space or time). We find all the three mentioned here. Resemblance is सादृश्य, Contrast comes near विरोध, while Contiguity is laid down in the relation of आनन्तर्य, or even in निबन्ध (as एकप्रत्ययपरनिबन्धनम्). Hume banishes contrast from the list and adds the relation of Cause and Effect, either term of which might remind one of the other. This we definitely find in क्रिया—and it is shadowed in अतिशय, प्राप्त, and एककार्य. According to J. Mill contiguity was the fundamental form of association. Wm. Hamilton reduced all the laws to the process of " Redintegration." According to

this the parts of an original (as we should say a psychological) whole tend to reproduce one another. This is implied in स्मि as one of the causes of recall. स्मिन् व्याप्यम् व्यापकस्य स्मारकम् This is the logical relation between the container and the contained. But as given in the bhāṣhya, cases of parts within a whole recalling each other are put under this. In the bhāṣhya we read स्मि पुनः.....एकार्षेयसमवायि.....! i. e. parts dependent on the same thing help each other's recall. Modern writers on psychology generally recognize Association by Similarity and Contiguity as the principle modes of association but greater stress is laid on the functioning of attention rather than on the passive side of associative relationing. The present day tendency is represented by those who reduce everything to contiguity, the movement of attention being the original factor linking objects together. There is nothing in Indian thought which can be construed into an automatic relationing between objects of experience, the mind remaining passive all the while. All the determinants of recall given above show the relations which can have meaning only with regard to an active consciousness; and attention is no less an integral factor in recollection than in perception.

The last two causes of recall as given in the Nyāyabhāṣhya namely—Dharma and Adharma—are almost similar to a direct experience of the saṃskāras mentioned in the Yogadars'ana. Dharma and Adharma either as causes or as the attributes or qualities of mind are always held to be invisible (अदृष्ट) and hence only inferable from their effects.

The doctrine of Associationism has its counterpart in physiological psychology, where along with its drain and inhibition theories, a law of "neural association" is based upon another "law of neural habit" according to which—'the passage of an impulse along a certain chain of neurones leaves it permanently altered in a way that the successive passages of same or similar impulses become easier over the same beaten path.' The medical theory of infection and consequent immunity does not hold at least in case of matter which is in immediate contact with mind! It is for learned doctors to

find out reasons for this; but the fact of canalization was recognized in some form by ancient Indian thinkers. The refusal of the body and even the lower mind to live up to the higher life of the spirit was regarded the greatest impediment to a sādḥaka. Prof. Radhakrishnan has said "Buddhistic psychology may be described as associationist."¹ We may add that Buddhistic Associationism is a bit different from the western theory which goes by that name. The former is truly dynamic, while the latter is mechanically atomistic. The conditions of our present experience lie no doubt in the structure of our mind based upon past experiences, but the present contains at the same time that element of *अवलम्बन*-apperception which is free. It is to these conditions of experience to which Nāgasena refers when he says—"Because of their being an incline, and because of their being a door, and because of their being a habit, and because of their being an association," we have particular ideas, when particular impressions occur. Mrs. Rhys Davids explains the conditions as (1) 'inclination' or natural tendency² (2) existing structure, (3) habitual process and (4) practice. Prof. Radhakrishnan observes, "The incline is explained in terms which remind us of modern physiological psychology and its law of neural habit. "'When it rains, where will the water go to?' 'It will follow the slope of the ground' 'And if it were to rain again, where would the water go to?' 'It would go the same way as the first water has gone.'"

Still the whole of Indian thought is so alive to the sense of moral responsibility, and the individual's final emancipation as not to construct its whole psychology upon the Psychological Atomism of the Associationist.

A Note on Dreams

Now that we have finished the treatment of the disposi-

1 Ind. Phil: Vol. I. P. 406.

2 Bud. Psych. P. 165. Instance of (1) is water flowing down the slope; of (2) is a single entrance in a walled city; of (3) is a particular order followed in a caravan; of (4) is the skill obtained in writing through habit.

tional masses and memory, we can safely touch the problem of dreams. Even savages are known to be more disturbed by the phenomena of dreams than by broad waking consciousness or even sleep. Both these latter modes of mind can be accepted in a matter of fact way. But in dreams one finds novel constructions, clothed in a new space and a new time. It is from the dream state that the early man comes to have a notion of himself as different from the body. The doctrine of a body within a body, a sheath within a sheath might be the outcome to a certain extent of reflection on dreams.¹ It would be an interesting problem to show how far the conception of the true self was arrived at in the Upanishads in this way. In an early stage of civilization man thinks that during sleep his soul goes out of his body to enjoy things elsewhere. And in *बृ०* ४. ३. १४, it is said—तं नाऽऽयतं बोधयेदित्याहुः । दुर्मिषज्य ५ ह्यस्मै भवति यमेव न प्रतिपद्यते । “ They say—let no one wake a man suddenly; for it is not easy to remedy if he does not get back.” It would be an interesting task to sift the truly philosophical portions from such passages that show comparatively a primitive level of thought.

Whatever it be, memory and dreams are closely allied in their stuff. सा (स्मृतिः) च द्वयी—भावितस्मर्तव्या चाभावितस्मर्तव्या च । स्वप्ने भावितस्मर्तव्या । जाग्रत्समये तु अभावितस्मर्तव्या इति । यो. भा. १. ११ । In a dream memories come floating, and they are imagined not true memories. Vāchaspati says:—ननु अस्ति स्मृतेरपि शंभ्रमोषः दर्शयति हि पित्रादेरतीतस्व देशकालान्तरानुभूतस्य अनुभूतचरदेशकालान्तरसंबन्ध. स्वप्न इति । Appropriation of new elements is found even in memory. For in dreams we do meet with our dead forefathers etc. not as they would come to memory in waking life with all the setting of space and time when we lived with them, but as connected with space and time of which we never had any experience formerly. The constructive functioning of memory in dreams is recognized even in *बृ०* ४. ३. १०—न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पथानो भवन्त्यथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथः सृजन्ते न तत्राऽऽनन्दा मुदः प्रमुदो भवन्त्यथाऽऽनन्दान्मुदः प्रमुदः सृजन्ते न तत्र वेदान्ताः पुष्करिण्यः

¹ We can say that psychologically the doctrine of sheaths drew the attention of thinkers from the phenomenon of dreams which in the end as Prof. Ranade has observed became at bottom identical with the problem of substance. Vide Const. Sur. Up. Phil : p. 141. e. a.

सबन्धो भवन्त्यय वेदान्तानुष्करिणीः स्वप्नोः सृजते स हि कर्ता। Here no doubt greater stress is laid upon the agent who creates for himself the objects of dreams, than upon the process of construction. About the stuff of which dreams are made we read in the bhāṣhya on the ३. passage अथ वेदान्तारीन्द्रजते वासनामात्ररूपान्। The chariots, the joys, the lakes and the rivers are all made of the stuff of वासना. We have already made a distinction between a pure saṃskāra and a vāsanā in that the former lies in our subconsciousness rather in a dormant state, while the latter is a saṃskāra in its active eruptive stage. The whole of Indian thought practically takes a dream to be an embodiment of a वासना. स्वप्नावस्थायाम् वासनाबलात् दर्शनस्य देशकालाकारनियमो दृष्टः। (सन्मसितर्कप्रकरणम्—Vol. I. P. 82.) In a dream under the force of a suppressed wish, the law of perception works, namely the law of time-space-configuration. In such references we find the earliest anticipation of Freud's theory of dreams according to which a repressed tendency gets free when the censorship of mind is lacking in sleep. For Freud the only वासना that exhibits itself in dreams is that of sex. The Indian conception of वासना is not necessarily that of a repressed tendency though it can be that too, for even a tendency not repressed, i. e. a saṃskāra left by a free expression, might get into an active form and find its way out in a dream. Moreover as we shall see in our treatment of emotions, sex is only one of the vāsanās of the human mind. Nāgasena too in Milindapañhā defines a dream thus :—"It is a suggestion, O king, coming across the path of the mind which is what is called a dream."

The different kinds of sleep, तामसिक, राजसिक and सात्त्विक, have already been mentioned as appearing in the Yogadars'ana. But therein we do not come across any discussion on the relation between dreamless sleep and the dreaming and the waking state. The kinds of sleep mentioned in the Yogadars'ana do not correspond to a gradual falling off from broad wakefulness through a comparatively halting state of consciousness, when the mind may dream on for a few minutes, into dreamless sleep. There is no recognition of the existence of a twilight of consciousness between waking and sleep.¹* Nāgasena

is definite on the point. According to him dreams occur neither in broad wakefulness nor in deep sleep. 'The dreamy state he says, is preceded by fatigue and ended by sleep. Thus he does not take into account, the transitional stage from sleep to waking.'¹ According to Buddhaghosha, dreams occur during what he called "monkey sleep." In Buddhism mind is very often compared to an ape, catching and leaving branches after branches. *i. e.* jumping from object to object, and never remaining at rest. Corresponding to this characteristic of consciousness there is a level in sleep, when the mind works upon its own fund of memory without the guidance of waking logicity.

The problem of dreams falls within abnormal psychology, and is a subject for psychical research. Dreams might differ in their nature, and to exhaust all reflections about prophetic, or clairvoyant dreams would require greater space than can be allowed in a thesis like this. As regards the moral responsibility in dreams, the Buddhists believed that a Bhikkhu was not responsible for sins committed in dreams.

Dreams are not taken as representing reality. They are contradicted by waking experiences, and hence they do not fit in with the actual scheme of things.² The definition of false knowledge is wide enough to cover dreams. स कस्मान्न प्रमाणम् । यतः प्रमाणेन बाध्यते । यो. भा. १. ८ ॥ From the point of view of psychology a dream is a real experience while from the point of view of validity it is false knowledge. The dream-stuff is made out of memory, but it is false because it poses to be more than a mere memory of a past experience. It is from this point of view that Vāchaspati says—नेवं सृष्टिरपि तु विपर्ययः, तल्लक्षणोपपन्नत्वात्सम्यग्भासतया

1* In B. ४. ३-१७. We find a recognition of different states between waking consciousness and sleep. तस्यैवा मद्भ्रमत्स्व उमे कृते अनुसंचरति पूर्व चापरं वैद्यमेवाचं पुरुष एतादृशोऽवन्तावतु संचरति स्वप्नान्तं च बुद्धान्तं च ॥ As a large fish moves along the two banks or a river—so does the Person move between the two states.

1 Aung's Intr. to his Comp. of Phil. : 51.

2 Dream as a positive experience leaves its specific samskara on the mind. Though not mentioned in the *माध्य* in वाच's टीका we read—इष्टा हि प्राप्नोतीति स्वप्नरश्मिः सृष्टिः इति. (१. ५१.)

दु स्मृतिरुक्ता । A dream is false knowledge, but on account of its similarity with memory it is spoken of as memory. Here Vāchaspati goes beyond the Bhāṣhyakāra for according to the latter a dream is a “ भावितस्मृत्यैव ”—स्मृतिः—a memory the object of which is (partially) imagined.

The same position as regards the validity of a dream is held in the Nyāyadars'ana. An objection is first raised that all the tall talk about प्रमाण and प्रमेय, instruments and objects of knowledge, is as false as the conviction which one has in a dream. स्वप्रविषयामिमानवदर्थं प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानः ॥ ४ २. ३१. ॥ and that यथा स्वप्ने न विषयाः सन्त्यथ चाभिमानो भवति, एवं न प्रमाणानि प्रमेयानि च सन्ति, अथ च प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानो भवति । The objection is more clearly brought out in the न्यायवृत्ति, where the object and the instrument of knowledge are both held to be mere resultants of the fruition of some time-old वासना, just as a dream is.¹ Looking purely to the subjective conditions, perhaps both (स्वप्न and प्रमाण etc.) might be regarded as that, but the laws which govern a dream, imagination, a free train of ideas, and cogent reasoning are not the same. As we might put it, the cause or the stuff (निमित्त and उपादान कारण) of two mental processes might be the same, but their references differ.² An enquiry into the references that constitute validity is the subject matter of Logic. Here we shall pass by it by merely referring to the न्या. भा. ४. २. ३३,—यः सुप्तः स्वप्नं पश्यति स एव जाग्रत् स्वप्नदर्शनानि प्रतिसन्धत्ते इदमव्यासमिति । तत्र जाग्रद् बुद्धिवृत्तिवशात् स्वप्रविषयामिमानो मिथ्येति व्यवसायः ॥ He that has seen a dream while sleeping is able to call it back while awake saying—I saw this. But he begins to think under the influence of the waking state of intellect that the dream is false. This of course implies that even a dream posits its own saṃskāras in our mind, and can be recalled just like those of any other mode of mind.

1 ननु प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारो न पारमार्थिकः, परन्तु विज्ञानानि तत्तदाकाराणि वास्तव-परिपाकवशादेव स्वप्नप्रत्ययवद्... आविर्भवन्ति ... ।

2 Because the process of perception is not centripetal, but mainly *centrifugal* for in making a sensation our own, we as if throw out from ourselves its meaning, and meet it halfway. In this sense we can accept the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view and say that it is the mind which goes out and meets its object.

Section 8 Levels of Attention

The problem of the Yoga praxis is to go from lower to the higher levels of attention. In Bergson's terminology we might say that the passage lies from the comparatively "*detended*" levels to the more "*tense*" levels of attention. Sleep from the point of view of *ekāgratā* might be regarded the lowest level of attention where it lies so to say in an *extended* form.¹ Bergson compares the levels diagrammatically to a pyramid at the apex of which we have *ekāgratā* with sleep at its base. The main difference between Bergson's and the Yoga view lies in that for Bergson "*tension*" of attention or consciousness is always a servant of action and needs, while in Yoga, the *ekāgratā* or *samādhi* is developed irrespective of its connection with the immediate needs of action or life for the sake of purely Spiritual gains. It is Bergson's "disinterestedness" coupled with highest *tension*. The difference is due to the cardinal difference between the west and the east. Yogic practices are based upon moral values while for Bergson *ekāgratā* is a mere mental (or psychological) phenomenon subservient to the needs of the present but with no moral coefficient. Hence it is that whenever he talks of disinterestedness, his subject *relaxes* into sleep.²

1 Prof. Ranade's Const. Sur. Up. Phil P. 125. "There is in fact as much likeness, or as little, between sleep and ecstasy, as there is, as Spinoza would have said, between God and Dog, the same letters but what an important difference!" Vide also supra P. 103 e. s.

2 Vide Matter and Memory. Pp. 97 and 199-200 also Mind Energy Pp. 94-95 ff. To explain pure *duration*, he takes the example of music-experience, and explains that "our ordinary conception of duration depends on a gradual incursion of space into the domain of pure consciousness." To prove which, one has only "to deprive the ego of the faculty of perceiving homogeneous time," by taking away from it "this outside circle of psychic states which it uses as a balance wheel." Time and F. Will P. 126. Reading this one would feel that Bergson would next treat of our *चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध* but no, he cannot think of *tension* apart from the fly-wheel, and his next sentence is—"These conditions are realized when we dream." (1)

In the Upanishads we meet with many references to Yoga praxis. Connection between attention and suspension of breath was noticed early. (Prof. Ranade's: Const. Sur. Up. Phil: P. 114) A progressive introversion or *प्रत्याहार* was regarded an absolute necessity before one could attain higher levels of consciousness. As early as ऋ. we read, " when the five instruments of knowledge stand still together with the mind and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state. " " This the firm holding back of the senses (here *प्रत्याहार* is not mentioned, but the process is the same—तां योगमिति मन्यन्ते स्थिरामिन्द्रियधारणाम्) is what is called yoga. " (ऋ. २. ३. १०-११). In मै. ६. ३१, we read, " Some one asks ' of what nature are those organs of sense, that go forth (towards their objects)? who sends them out here, or *who holds them back* ? " And again—" The mind must be restrained in the heart, till it comes to an end;-that is knowledge, that is liberty, all the rest are extensions of the ties. " (मै. ६. ३४¹) We also meet with the beautiful simile given in the bhāṣya on the *प्रत्याहारसूत्र*. यो. २. ५४, namely—यथा मधुकरराजं मक्षिका उत्पतन्तमूषतन्ति निविशमानमनु निविशन्ते तथेन्द्रियाणि etc. in the प्रथ. २. ४. in a more elaborate form—तद्यथा मक्षिका मधुकरराजानमुत्क्रामन्तं सर्वा एवोत्क्रामन्ते तस्मि २ व प्रतिष्ठमाने सर्वा एव प्रतिष्ठन्ते एवं बाह्यमनश्चक्षुःश्रोत्र च तै प्रीताः प्राणं स्तुन्वन्ति ॥ We can guess that it must be after reading such passages as these that Max Müller must have written—" This concentration of thought, *ekāgratā* or one-pointedness, as the Hindus called it, is something to us almost un-known." He compares human mind as James does² to " Kaleidoscopes of thoughts in constant motion " and holds it quite impossible, in our days full of " telegrams-newspapers " etc. " breaking in upon us " " even to arrive at that intensity of thought which the Hindus meant by *ekāgratā* ! " Bergon's view of the mental flux (with nothing but change in it) is the extreme length that the western point of view could go. But in spite of such a view

1 The sixfold Yoga is given in मै. ६. १८. " This is the rule for achieving it viz. concentration of the mind on the subject of meditation, restraint of breath,—*आणायाम*, restraint of senses—*प्रत्याहार*, meditation fixed attention, investigation, absorption. "

2 E. g. Vol. I. P. 246.

that we meet with in Buddhism, where the ever-changing flux is carried to the height of pure dynamicity, we find *ekāgratā* posited as the goal to be reached.

In waking hours our attention is never steady. It is no doubt continuous, like the foot of a snail that never leaves the ground—as Pillsbury would describe it, but even then it jumps from object to object. It is either *क्षिप्त*—extremely *detended*, or *scattering* as Swami Vivekanand has said, or secondly *विक्षिप्त*—distracted—which shows positively that it is “wakening,”¹ for distraction would only be felt in the presence of a positive effort at fixed attention. *क्षिप्त*.....*विक्षिप्तमेकामम्* इति चित्तभूमयः । मूढ, क्षिप्त, and the *विक्षिप्त* levels are already implied in मे. ६. ३४ “When a man having freed his mind from *sloth*, *distraction*, and *vacillation*, becomes as it were delivered from his mind, that is the highest point.” We might say here that *sloth* and *distraction* are the causes (तामसिक and राजसिक) of the मूढ, क्षिप्त and *विक्षिप्त* levels.

There can indeed be infinite levels of attention from the highly pointed to the most flattened. We can say—बहुदे सति चित्तस्य—भूमयः पञ्चतप्यः। following यो. १. ५. The passage—योगः समाधिः । स च सार्वभौमचित्तस्य धर्मः² । क्षिप्तं मूढं विक्षिप्तमेकामनिरुद्धमिति चित्तभूमयः—*is a problem for interpretation. Yoga here is identified with samādhi, and samādhi is asserted to be a quality of mind (चित्तस्य धर्मः) pervading all the levels of (conscious) mind. Now samādhi does not appear as one of the चित्तधर्मस (perceivable or inferable) in the Bhāṣya on ३. १५. If we merely look to the bhāṣya on १. १., we can take samādhi to mean attention in general. Vācaspati confines it to the levels of मधुमती, मधुप्रतीका etc. But the word भूमयः is used by the Bhāṣyakāra for all the levels of attention, while Vācaspati at one time takes it to mean मधुमती etc. and just after that to mean the क्षिप्त, मूढ, levels etc. If we purely follow the bhāṣya, we can maintain that attention is mind, i. e. it is present in howsoever incipient*

1 Raja Yoga—P. 105.

2 सार्वभौम being defined as सर्वभूमिषु सर्वविषयेषु सर्ववैवाविदितव्यमिचाराः सार्वभौमाः ।

or *detended* a condition as it be in the state of sleep.¹ H. Kern in his *Manual of Indian Buddhism* says, "..... Mahāyānists with their ritualistic propensities invented a series of samadhis The number in the *Prajñā-Pāramitā* is no less than 108",² and we might hold with him that 'there can be as many samadhis as samāpattis.'

Attention, if we do not take it to be the same as mind, is at least the supreme function of it. The structure of mind is to a much extent *mechanical*, in the sense that left to itself it works with an automatism like that of habit. At a preliminary stage, the mind has to be coaxed into a *position*, before control can be established over it. For generally we live like automatons, *i. e.* allow the past to determine our present. This is why in the श्वे. २. १०, it is enjoined to begin practising Yoga in a cool and a quiet place. For under a recurring obstruction it becomes always difficult to fix one's attention, and distraction or the विक्षिप्तचित्त would naturally be the result. We might distinguish between the objective and subjective causes of distraction. Both these causes of distractions are given in the विक्षेप and the विक्षेपसङ्मुख, and the nature of these obstructions shows us in a negative way the nature of attention, They are—
अध्याधित्त्यानसंशयप्रमादालस्यविरतित्रातिदर्शनालक्ष्णभूमिकत्वानवस्थितत्वानि (चित्तविक्षेपस्तेऽन्तरायाः) ॥ १. ३०. ॥—(1) Disease, (2) Languor, (3) Doubt, (4) Carelessness, (5) Sloth, (6) Attachment, (7) False knowledge, (8) Non-attainment of the desired level, and (9) Incapacity to sustain the level after having once attained it. Along with these are given the impediments to *ekāgratā* which at times accompany

1 This is definitely in harmony with the सांख्य-योग सत्कार्यवाद. The only internal objection would come up from the original सूत्र. ३. ३. तदेवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं स्वरूपमव्यभिच समाधिः । Where the word is restricted to the intensest form of attention, in which consciousness of an object attended to is absent. We might reconcile this with the original definition of *samādhi* as attention in general, by saying that the *Yogadars'ana* being a practical guide to the *sadhakas*, begins with the most ordinary definition of *samādhi*, and arrives at the highest goal by a process of progressive restriction of its meaning which at the same time includes a general *Kaishoris*.

any of the above mentioned nine obstacles. They are:—दुःख-
दौर्मेनस्याग्मेजयत्वश्वासप्रश्वास विक्षेपसहभुवः ॥ १. ३१ ॥—Pain, Dispair, Shaki-
ness, and Irregular breathing. By श्वासप्रश्वास is meant not ordinary
inhaling or exhaling, but irregular breathing due to some violent
emotion, for Vāchaspati tells us,—अनिच्छितः प्राणो यद्वाह्यं वायुमाच-
मति.....अनिच्छितोऽपि प्राणो यत्कौष्ठ्य वायुं निःसारयति..... । It is the
case of breathing which is not under one's control.

Health is a necessary condition for the fixity of attention.
Generally speaking a sickly man cannot hope to make any pro-
gress on the Dhyānas. This gave rise to the HathaYoga branch
which was a discipline for the body to make it healthy, pure, and
ultimately fit for spiritual advancement. Ennui (स्वप्न), Carelessness,
and sloth these three are due to *tamas*, or torpor. When the body
or matter gets the upper hand we find ourselves listless and un-
able to attend to anything. The power of attention gets truncated
and flat. Incapacity to attain or sustain the same level is
also due to *tamas*, and false knowledge is cognitive by its
nature, and higher levels of attention would be made impossi-
ble with falsehood as an object of our mind, for attention
analysing its object at the सवितर्क level would destroy the piece
of false knowledge by bringing it into the *burning* touch with true
knowledge and with such an object a *sūdhaka* would not be able
to reach up to the निवितर्क level. In doubt too attention is divided.

Now अविरति—attachment, दुःख दौर्मेनस्य, अग्मेजयत्व, and श्वासप्रश्वास
amongst themselves cover a vast field of feelings or emotions.
Almost all these obstacles are in a way related to some feeling or
emotion. The emotions themselves are not mentioned, but their
physical expressions are contained in these obstructions to एकाग्रता.
अविरति literally means want of aloofness, or want of non-attach-
ment. When an object calling forth an instinctive reaction from
us fills our whole mind, not voluntarily for that would mean a
higher level of attention, but non-voluntarily, making us
almost as helpless as a reed in a strong breeze, when we are
swayed to and fro by the comings and goings of so many
thoughts and organic sensations—the emotion might be that
of anger or fear, love or lust, in all such cases it is अविरति. दुःख—
pain may be either physical, mental, or due to accidental

external causes. **भङ्गमेजयत्व**—Trembling of limbs may be due to sexual love or lust or fear or even anger, and so too with **श्वासप्रश्वास** irregular breathing. **दोर्मनस्य** is despair at being foiled in the attainment of a desired object. All these obstructions have to be overcome before **ekāgratā** of attention can be attained.

This definitely shows us that the relation between feeling or emotion on one side and attention on the other was known to the Indian thinkers. Yoga has always stood for a complete expurgation from emotions mainly because their relation with attention shows a variation of an inverse order. They do not increase proportionately, but the higher the pitch of emotion, the lower the level of attention and general voluntary control. 'Emotions are' as Pillsbury has said, "rioting of processes (which are) ordinarily under the control of attention.....and consequently the relation between them is of mutual opposition."¹ This is why in all the schools of Indian philosophy emotions are regarded as something from which a man ought to completely free himself before he may hope to start on the path of spiritual advancement.²

Practically the same relation is supposed to hold between emotions and attention in Buddhism too. The Nikāyan formula quoted by Mrs. Rhys Davids runs as follows:—"Come ye bhikkhus expelling the five hindrances" and they are—sensuous desire, ill-will, stolidity—and—torpor, excitement—and—worry, perplexity, nescience.³ These come very near to **अविरति**, **स्त्यान**—**आलस्य**, **दोर्मनस्य**, **संशय** and **मिथ्यादर्शन**—**अविद्या** given in the Yogadars'ana. Ill-will is **द्वेष** which according to the Yogadars'ana scheme is a **क्लेश** or a mental infection. Injunction to free one's mind from both attachment and ill-will **राग** and **द्वेष** is common to all the systems of Indian thought. Further on in a quotation from the Majjhima, we read Buddha saying to Anuruddha, "Also that my concentration had been dispersed through access of doubt, then

1 Attention P. 193.

2 For the Relation between emotions and Yoga Vide "Freedom from Emotions"—"A Physiological Necessity of Yogic Life" in the "Yoga Mimāṃsā" Vol. III No. 2, P. 146.

3 Bud. Psych. P. 103.

by want of attention, then by sloth and torpor, then by dread, then by elation, then by slackness, then by trying too much, then by sluggishness of effort, then by longing, then by awareness of differences,"² Here we find given—संशय doubt, अलसत्वभूमिकत्व—want of attention, स्थापन and आलस्य sloth and torpor etc. भय mentioned here is included in the conception of आधिमौक्तिक दुःख given in the Yogadars'ana and defined by Vāchaspati as आधिमौक्तिक (दुःखं) व्याघ्रादिजनितम्—टीका १. ३१, while *elation* and *trying too much*, & *straining* are the special features of psychological interest added by Buddha from his own personal experience. This is why in higher Jhānas पीति—that zest or emotional interest is replaced by the neutral feeling—"तन्मज्जमात्तता." Later on we shall see that this means the Buddhists knew a feeling to lose its tone and become neutral if attention be applied to it. Modern psychology tells us that the most efficient degree of attention is not co-extensive with a conscious straining to attend. "The most intense strain does not correspond to the period of greatest efficiency of attention. On the contrary strains are most pronounced when we are just beginning to attend, while we are warming up to work, and are still not working to advantage : they die away when the work alone is present in consciousness and we have reached the maximum of effectiveness. It is not when trying hardest that we obtain the best results, but when there is no need for effort, when the occupation of the moment seems to carry attention and nothing else is needed to reinforce it..... The rule is that when conditions of attention are most equivocal the sense of effort is greatest, and that there is no relation, except perhaps an inverse one, between efficiency of the attention and the accompanying feeling of activity."¹ The sense of effort too ought to vanish before one can be perfectly *en rapport* with the object of one's ध्यान or attention. A passage the from the Saṃyutta Nikāya is relevant to the point. "Now Ānanda saw Sāriputta coming afar off and.....he said to him—"Serene and pure and radiant is your look, brother

1 Bud. Psych P. 106.

2 Attention P. 59-60.

Sāriputta. In what mood has Sāriputta been to day ? ' ' I have been alone in Jhāna, brother, and to me came never the thought—I am attaining it ! I have got it ! I have emerged from it ! ' ”¹

It is often asserted that science cares only for laws, or form, never for the content of phenomena. Spiritual experiences form the aim and the content of all the Dhyānas in Indian thought. But we can legitimately abstract the mental functioning from the content thereof, so far as the scientific treatment of psychological material goes. For otherwise, we would have to devote ourselves to what from our point of view would be regarded as abnormal but truly speaking their supernormal experiences.

Before dealing with the actual process of attention in samādhi, we have still one point to consider. We know our consciousness is always leaning on towards a physically dynamic expression, on having either sensations from external objects or ideas supplied by mind. This is the truth contained in the ' *Idées-forces* ' of Fouillée. At first all attention is mixed up with movements. From such an original mass of undifferentiated *movements* (of body as well as of attention) we develop a complex system of physical movements on the one hand and volition itself on the other. Just as originally religious experience is found mixed up with magic, superstition and what not, so too attention is at first smothered under bodily movements and gets extricated therefrom, (like memory) only at higher levels of consciousness. Psychologists maintain that the activities of attention and volition are the same in essence, though the former is devoted to speculative thought and the latter to the practical needs. We saw how the sensations of strain at times accompany the application of attention. There are psychological theories based upon this fact of the motor accompaniments of attention. The purer functioning of attention (ध्यान) is no doubt at first mixed with the baser one of physical movement which comes out of रजस्, but whether attention is the outcome of the inhibition of these movements or it is

¹ Bud. Psych. P. 99.

an original function of reinforcement is, we can say, the question at issue. According to Ribot attention is an inhibition of movements, and movements mean for him outward movements and not those of cerebral states. Münsterberg in his *Aktionstheorie* refines these movements, and makes attention a product of inhibition of nerve centres. On the other hand Sully and Lipps take attention to be directly under the control of will, while for Kohn attention and consciousness are identical. To take a few more instances G. E. Müller takes it to be a direct reinforcement, while Wundt is equally sure of its being the outcome of inhibition only. Exner's view combines both and this seems to be not far from truth. Speaking introspectively it seems all a matter of mere expression of words, whether to call attention an inhibitory or a reinforcing process. We can maintain that every act of attention of a certain level inhibits those of a lower level while it directly reinforces the object at its own level keeping others in the background. The whole Yoga praxis is based upon this principle¹ Bergson regards attention to be no doubt primarily mixed up with movements, but at the same time he posits "a purely psychic factor "always entering" into voluntary attention." Bergson's view comes near enough the Sāmkhya-Yoga view that for the extrication and development of attention suppression of overt movements is absolutely necessary. It is only by the help of आसन and प्रयत्नशैल्य mentioned in यो. २. ४६-४७ that the coefficient of attention can be separated from the admixture of nascent movements. अंगमेजयत्-nervous shakiness is necessarily excluded by these practices. आसन is defined as—येन सस्यानेन अवस्थितस्य स्थैर्यं सुखं च सिध्यति तत्—स्थिरसुखम्—आसनम्—That is called āsana—when the posture carries with it (mental) steadiness, and comfort. In the Bhojavyntu we read—अस्मिन्नाऽऽसनजये सति समाध्यन्तरायभूता न प्रभवन्ति अंगमेजयत्सादयः । When one gets accustomed to a particular posture—literally when one gets control

¹ Even physiologically every motor stimulation is accompanied by two innervations one directly affecting the muscles and the other inhibiting the action of muscles opposed to the former group.

over an āsana, the obstructions to samādhi like nervous shakiness etc. no longer disturb a sādḥaka. (cf. the ब्रह्मनीमाला sūtra आसीनः सम्मत्तात् ।) About the relation between आसन and प्रयत्न-शैथिल्य, we would say that the former gives us the positive and the latter the negative sides of one and the same process. By प्रयत्न in प्रयत्नशैथिल्य, Vāchaspati means the-शरीरधारकोप्रयत्नः—actions that go to keep up the body. If we take this sense of the word, a sādḥaka would have to neglect his body and this would come to meaningless asceticism which is certainly excluded by Patañjali. We might, following Bhikṣu, take प्रयत्नशैथिल्य to mean inhibition of overt movements, that tendency of mind to allow each and every sensory current or an idea to run into motor expressions.

After the inhibition of external movements there comes the प्रत्याहार or *introversion* which is regarded as the necessary step to gain control over attention. The western authors do hold that in attention the object holds our consciousness for a longer time than usual. Even in experimental psychology "the truest test is how long one can attend to a single *monotonous* stimulation without losing it." For Stumpf the only characteristic of attention is the time that the object engages attention. The प्रत्याहारसूत्र says—स्त्वविषया-संप्रयोगे विसृत्स्वरूपानुकार इव इन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहारः ॥ ३. ५४ ॥ Pratyāhāra is that by which the senses do not come into contact with their objects, but follow, as it were, the nature of the mind. Positive side of such a process is the selection of one object, which necessarily carries with it its negative side—namely exclusion of all other objects. Intensity of attention as applied through one sense means that the other senses, as it were, withdraw within the mind, so that the specific stimuli of these senses do not draw the mind out. In experimental psychology the degree of intensity of attention is measured from the amount of distraction necessary to draw the attention out. Attention and inattention always in this sense go together. Such inattention is only negative in character, and might be termed "functional inattention" corresponding to "functional deafness" etc. It is on account of such "functional

inattention " reaching its absolute degree that the state of ecstasy in a Yogi would look like sleep ! Such instances of tense attention are not altogether unknown in European history too and all are acquainted with the instance of Archimedes buried deep in his experiment during the siege of Syracuse, or of Hegel writing his " Phinomenologie " with the battle of Jena fighting near him, and he not hearing a shot ! Sāṃkhya-Yoga would describe Hegel as deep in his samādhi, with all his senses turned inwards—following the pure activity of his mind, and dead to the response of the outward world ! चित्तनिरोधे चित्तवन्निरुद्धानीन्द्रियाणि न हृत्तरेन्द्रियजयवद् उपायान्तरमपेक्षन्ते ।—The senses are restrained like the mind, when the mind itself is restrained and they do not stand in need of other means like the studied control of senses etc Thus प्रत्याहार ultimately comes to mean a sort of defunctionalization of the senses which is only a negative aspect of a positively higher level of attention reached by mind.

Out of the many physiological approaches to the control of attention which are found in the Yoga praxis, we must make a mention here of प्राणायाम. We are not in a position, for want of space, to enter into the technique of the Prāṇayāma process. If there is any physiological function that directly varies as the efficiency of attention, and is at the same time such as to give a handle to work upon attention externally, it is breath. It would be quite impossible here to do full justice to the subject of the relation between Prāṇayāma and the physiology of attention, but there is one reflection regarding it which, though in the form of a mere hypothesis, the writer cannot help mentioning here.

The question has been much discussed as to whether attention increases not merely the clearness of an object, but its intensity as well. The problem is a complicated one, in that there is no absolute standard of intensity with which to compare the two kinds of intensities, the one due to subjective the other due to a purely objective factor. In case of non-voluntary sensations the intensity is purely objective, but even then our consciousness is continuous. (And this is in

keeping with the **संख्ययोग सत्कार्यवाद**, or even with the Buddhistic flux wherein one state of consciousness favours the next one with all its content—which is termed the relation of **उपकार** between two states of consciousness). Now in the case of a slow coming out of a sensation into the focus of consciousness from the surrounding sub-conscious fringe it becomes difficult to judge whether it is an increase in the intensity or in clearness of the object perceived. After a due consideration of the different views, Pillsbury has to maintain “that it is not at all certain that attention may not produce an increase in the intensity of the sensation proportional to the intensity of the stimulus, rather than an absolute, arbitrary increase.” Bergson places intensity at the junction between mind and matter. According to Dr. Ward intensity of a sensation is a function of two independent variables namely the *inherent* or the objective intensity and the other due to subjective attention. And if there be a sudden break in the objective intensity as in case of a non-voluntary sensation it is smoothly tided over by the continuity of our consciousness. Intensity is a subject-object relation, so dynamic that one might call it after the Relativity terminology, a relation between two relative series one of which at least is continuous.

The crucial instance is reached when the outward stimulus is reduced to the level of a *minimum sensibilum*. At this level, during clean-cut regular intervals, the stimulus is sensed and is again lost. These are what are called waves of attention, which rise and fall successively, the sensing of the stimulus corresponding to the wave-crest, and the absence of it to the trough. Now it is experimentally established that any continuous act of attention has its specific effects upon the non-voluntary or the sympathetic nervous system and the mechanisms governed by it. The heart and the diaphragm are affected by it, and there is a general contraction of the arterial walls in the limbs, with an appreciable dilation of the blood vessels in the brain. The muscles of these arterial walls are governed by a centre in the Medulla, through the sympathetic nervous system. Now these waves of attention have an intimate connection

with the length of what are called the Traube-Hearing waves. These latter waves are a complex physiological product generated by the circulation- and the respiration-cycles, combined with the action of the vaso-motor centre. From definite experiments the connection between the Attention and the Traube-Herring waves has been established, such "that the length of the Traube-Herring waves is always increased by sensory stimulation in subjects whose attention waves are also lengthened." Pillsbury informs us that, "Dr. Slaughter discovered one subject whose attention waves were of the same length as the respiratory cycle." "It would seem then," he goes on, "that the breathing rhythm takes (at times) the place of the Traube-Herring wave in some individuals and that in the others it has an influence in determining the place of change by prolonging the time of perceptibility during the active part of the respiratory process after the effect of the longer wave has disappeared."¹

So according to the rising and falling of the attention wave the stimulus comes and goes, is sensed and is again lost, just as if the intensity of the stimulus were intrinsically rising and falling. There is every reason to believe that by Prāṇāyāma, the subject is enabled to bring these Traube-Herring waves within voluntary control; the chain of action lying through the establishment of a voluntary control over the respiration rhythm, having its own specific effects on the diaphragm and the sympathetic nervous system affecting the vaso-motor action and ultimately catching or controlling the attention wave itself. If the attention waves depended upon the respiratory rhythm directly and not via the Traube-Herring waves, so much the better for the subject.

The possibility of catching the attention rhythm through its physiological accompaniment (we will not use the word counterpart) the Traube-Herring waves by means of Prāṇāyāma is posited here only as an hypothesis. It is a remarkable fact to note that from earliest times greatest importance was attached to the Prāṇas.

¹ Attention. Pp. 73 to 78f also 243-248ff.

That they do not mean mere breath is proved to a certainty. Even वायु literally meaning breath or air means the nervous impulse. Sir. B. J. Seal informs us that "Charaka describes वायु as that which keeps the machine of the body at work, the prime mover."¹ We know that skin regarded as the all pervading sense of touch is the product of वायु. So prāṇāyāma "is really a process of bringing under control the vagus nerve—the sympathetic nervous system—over which we have normally no control."² Ancient thinkers always identified the workings of the मनस् and the action of breath as co-extensive. We have—

चले वाते चलं चित्तं निश्चले निश्चलं भवेत् ।

योगी स्वाशुत्वमाप्नोति ततो वायुं निरोधयेत् ॥ २-२ ॥

माहते मध्यसंचारे मनःस्थैर्यं प्रजायते ॥ २. ४२ ॥

and यतो मस्तु तत्र मनःप्रवृत्तिर्यतो मनः तत्र मस्तुप्रवृत्तिः ॥ ह. ठ. प्र. ॥ otherwise expressed in verses like—

द्वे बीजे चित्तवृक्षस्य प्राणस्पन्दनवासने ।

एकस्मिंश्च तयोः क्षीणे क्षिप्रं द्वे अपि नश्यतः ॥

We need not quote more verses for fear of being too lengthy. The whole of Indian philosophic thought is shot through with one conviction that the मनस् or that function of mind which we call attention can be caught hold of and directly worked upon through the external lever of ordinary breath and its regulation. If one went beyond this and asserted that the so-called span of attention too could be controlled or altered by a corresponding control or alteration in its physiological accompaniment, it would be regarded rather an extravagant hypothesis. But the writer cannot think it to be altogether impossible. All this can only be proved by patient research and concrete experience of the Yogis. Till then one might console oneself with the thought that an hypothesis of today is very often the science of to-morrow !

मूढ, क्षिप्त, विक्षिप्त, एकाग्र and निरुद्ध are the levels of Attention. The first three have no place in a system of Yoga. An approach

1 Pos. Sc. An. Hin. P. 228.

2 The Mysterious Kundalini. By V. G. Rele. P. 18. Itatics are ours. We need not go in for a whole-hearted identification of the Kundalini with the Vagus nerve maintained in the book. We can take the vagus as representing the sympathetic nervous system.

to the ekāgra level is said to consist of three stages—that of धारणा, ध्यान and समाधि. धारणा is defined as देशकल्पयित्तस्य धारणा ॥ १. १ ॥ The meaning of Dhāranā is made more clear in the bhāṣhya नाभिचक्रे....., बाह्ये वा विषये चित्तस्य वृत्तिमात्रेण बन्ध इति धारणा ॥ Dhāranā is fixing (lit. relating—बन्धः सम्बन्धः) the mind in the form of a mode, in some part of the body like the navel or outside it. This is the preliminary application of voluntary attention. एषा वै धारणा हेया यच्चित्तं तत्र धार्यते ॥ तच्छ्रूयतामनाधारा धारणा नोपपद्यते ॥ (वाच० quoting वि. पु.)—‘The fact of the mind being held fast there is what is called Dhāranā.’ ‘There can be no Dhāranā without something for the mind to rest on.’ After this comes the stage of ध्यान. तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानम् ॥ ३-२ ॥ तस्मिन्देहे ध्येयालवनस्य प्रत्ययस्य एकतानता सद्दृष्टः प्रवाहः, प्रत्ययान्तरेण अपरावृष्टो ध्यानम् ॥ आ. ॥ Continuity of one and the same प्रत्यय (in consciousness) is ध्यान. This is the sustainance of the initial application of attention. प्रत्यय may be here construed as *the act of knowledge or the mental effort*. To explain the nature of such sustained attention Vāchaspati quotes विष्णुपुराण—‘तद्रूपप्रत्ययैकाग्र्यसंततिधान्यनिःस्पृहा । तद् ध्यानं प्रथमैरैः बहुभिनिष्ठाद्यते नृप ॥’—Oh king, with the help of the foregoing six preliminary accessories of Yoga, one attains to Dhyāna—that sustained continuous one-pointed attention to one and the same object, without any desire to draw one’s mind out to any other object at all. This is the ekāgra level where attention is paid to an object without any break, at the exclusion of all other objects. The third stage is that of Samādhi, तदेवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः ॥ ३. ३ ॥ ध्यानमेव ध्येयाकारनिर्भासं प्रत्ययात्मकेन स्वरूपेण शून्यमिव यदा भवति, ध्येयस्वभावावेकाग्रता समाधिरित्युच्यते । When sustained attention lightens up the object alone and becomes, as if, bereft of its own nature or form, it is called Samādhi. In such a state attention loses itself completely into the object, i. e. the consciousness of the mental effort reduces itself to zero, on account of the complete seizure of mind by the object. Changing a bit the order of sentences in the Tika we can say—न ध्यानकारनिर्भासः—ननु शून्यं चेत् कथं ध्येयं प्रकाशेत ?—ध्येयस्वभावावेकाग्रता—It is the sense of effort that reduces itself to zero, not attention. We know that the feeling of strain and the most efficient degree of attention do not correspond. Vāchas-

pati quotes a verse from विष्णुपुराण :-“तस्यैव कल्पनाहीनं स्वस्वग्रहणं हि यत् । मनसा ध्यानविषयाय समाधिः सोऽभिधीयते”-Samādhi is brought about by sustained attention. Therein the mind grasps the true nature of the object, without any admixture of the vikalpa process. The use of the word कल्पना is just the same as in the Buddhistic phrase कल्पनापोढम् अत्रान्तम् etc, meaning विकल्प.¹ Again Vāchaspati defines ध्येयाद् ध्यानस्य भेदः कल्पना तद् हीनमित्यर्थः । It is only by a process of differentiation in thought that we can distinguish between the act of attention from its object. We must note in this that he does not say that even the idea of the subject is arrived at by a process of such differentiation, for according to all schools of Indian thought (except Buddhism) the subject of experience is prior to the object of it. (cf. Surpa P. 134 -quotation from वाच० विकल्पितव्यायमभेदेऽपि गुणप्रधानभाव इति, where the distinction between ग्राह्य and ग्रहण are said to be products of विकल्प.)

In all these definitions there is nothing that is not scientific. In Dhāranā the mind determines to apply attention to some object. In Dhyāna, the mind holds the object before itself voluntarily at the exclusion of all others, still there is present the consciousness of duality between mind and its object. This consciousness of duality goes out absolutely in Samādhi. If we abstract from the progressive dhyāna-praxis its pure form, samādhi comes very near the most efficient level of attention as defined by Pillsbury quoted above.

The stages of धारणा, ध्यान and समाधि are equally recognized in Buddhism too. In a passage from the Majjhima Nikāya we read Buddha saying—“ Finally, I judged that my shortcomings in concentration were varieties of vitiated consciousness, and that, these being all got rid of I would practise threefold concentration, to wit, applying attention and sustaining it, sustaining attention without applying it afresh, and concentration without attention in either way.” This is exactly what is meant by Dhāranā, Dhyāna and Samādhi.

We have already mentioned that the capacity to attend

1 This reinforces our interpretation of the विकल्पवृत्ति.

to one monotonous object is taken to be the test of efficient attention. According to western thinkers our mind can attend to a single object only for a few seconds, after which, if it does not pass on to any other object, it dwells upon the different aspects of the object thus analysing it. Here lies the fundamental difference between the Western and the Indian points of views. According to our philosophy all such attention howsoever tense, would be only on the सवितर्क level. Beyond that lies the निर्वितर्क level giving us the higher निर्विकल्पप्रत्यक्ष. The idea underlying the different samāpattis is that when contemplating an object, our mind becomes *en rapport* with its object. Mere sustained attention or Dhyāna has within it a consciousness of duality between subject and object. Attention is drawn even to the act of attending. The further process of dhyāna lies towards consciousness trying to overreach it self, effort trying to forget effort. Thus the second stage of Dhyāna is on the सवितर्क level. There the subject tries to suppress the rivalry of all other objects to attract attention but consciousness is ill at ease with the sense of straining around it. This sense vanishes in Samādhi where the distinction between the subject and the object gets obliterated. From the external point of view we might say that it is the object that has taken possession of the mind, but from an experiential point of view it is mind holding the object all to itself¹ सर्वार्थिन्काप्रतयोः क्षयोदयो चित्तस्य समाधिपरिणामः ॥ ३. ३१ ॥—After the wayward attention is brought to hook one-pointedness comes up leading to Samādhi. ततः पुनः शान्तोदितौ नृत्त्यप्रत्ययो चित्तस्यैकाग्रतापरिणामः ॥ ३. १२ ॥ समाहितं चित्तस्य पूर्वप्रत्ययः शान्त उत्तररतत्त्वश्च उदितः समाधिचित्तम् उभयोरनुगतं पुनस्तथैवाऽऽसमाधिश्चेवादिति । स खलु अर्थ धर्मिणश्चित्तस्य एकाग्रतापरिणामः ॥ भा. ॥ When one act or one effort of mind is similar to the one preceding it, the mind is said to be ekāgra, one-pointed. When an act of attention of a completely collected mind is absolutely similar to the one following it, and the Samādhi-chitta (the completely collected mind) runs through both the acts of attention, (not like a thread through similar though different pearls, but

¹ In the भोजवृत्ति we read द्वावपि समाहितचित्तत्वेन तुल्यौ एकरूपौ अवलम्बन-त्वेन सदृशौ प्रत्ययौ उभयत्रापि समाहितस्यैव चित्तस्य अन्वयित्वेनावस्थानं, स एकाग्रतापरिणाम इत्युच्यते ॥ ३. १२. ॥

as an underlying substratum through its identical modifications) and when the same happens till the end of samādhi, then such a process is held to be the ekāgra modification of the mind-substance (not to use the word mind-stuff with its other associations). The movement of mind goes on without a break like one continuous flow of the descending fluid oil (तैलधारावत् सदृशप्रत्ययप्रवाही). Our consciousness is ordinarily made up of the static states and the dynamic links which James calls *feelings of relations*.¹ We can define one-pointedness as that state of mind wherein the *flights* as well as the *perches* are always the same. The truth underlying the practice of a repetition of a मंत्र is firstly to catch hold of the *perches* and make them identical, and when once they are brought within voluntary control, a sādhanika gets a lever to work upon and make even the transitive parts of consciousness identical to one another. After a time, one can say, that the मंत्र drops out, so that when the yogi outgrows that stage, all is pure dynamic identical flow of mind. The western mind would indeed find it difficult to arrive at the conception of a dynamic flow which is at the same time identical, but we need not enter into a consideration of such inconceivability. According to the Indian view-point the विक्षिप्त—vagrant attention is psychologically speaking a विलक्षण or a quality of mind, and so too is the ekāgra attention. The difference between the two is not merely of levels, but it lies deeper " than the depths of waters stilled at even." For on lower levels we can never know the true nature of our mind, which only shows itself to us upon higher ones.

We can now safely go beyond ekāgratā to the निरुद्ध level. Truly speaking it lies beyond normal psychology. According to the western standard, both the sub-normal as well as the super-normal modifications are *ab-normal* ! But to leave out completely a consideration of the निरुद्ध level would mean an impoverishment of not merely our material, but would rob us of that insight into the working of mind through its function of attention. Let us mention at the beginning, that the abnormality of the निरुद्ध level begins quite at the व्याप्त stage. " If the

mind " says Swami Vivekanand, " can be fixed on a centre for twelve seconds, it will be Dhāranā, Twelve such Dhāranās will be a Dhyāna, twelve such Dhyānas will be a Samādhi ! " In the स्कन्दपुराण it is laid down—धारणा पञ्चनाडीका, ध्यानं स्यात् षष्टिनाडिकं । दिनद्वादशकेनैव समाधिरभिधीयते ॥ (1) नाडीका is षष्टिका=24 minutes. So according to this calculation, a dharanā lasts for 2 hrs.; a dhyāna for 24 hrs, while a samādhi covers a period of 12 days ! Whatever the period be (and in that we may side with Swami Vivekanand as against the Skanda Purana to err on the safe side) we are here concerned with the mental functioning of attention. The निरुद्ध चित्त lies at the Self-conscious Level (not to use the word super-conscious, following Prof. Ranade). The spiritual experiences at the Self-conscious level might seem to be supernatural visitations, in the presence of which the subject would feel a sense of mere passivity. Thus Wm. James while speaking of mystical religious experiences at this level, puts down, (i) Ineffability (ii) Noetic quality (iii) Transiency and (iv) Passivity as its four characteristic marks.¹ But from the description of the निरुद्ध चित्त in the Yogadars'ana or from that of the Buddhistic Jhānas culminating in trance² one can say that even in ecstatic states, the mind is any thing but passive. For there is an amount of Synergy flooding the whole mind, the organism and even, as Swami Vivekanand says, the outside world. We can say that such activity and freedom at such heights are only possible on account of the moral basis laid down for spiritual advancement. The baser emotions have to go absolutely, and instead भैरी, करुणा मुदित्ता and उपेक्षा (or Buddhistic higher उपेक्षा) have to be cultivated. These emotions would appear anaemic and pale to the modern mind who would want a more violent mental coefficient in emotions. But it is with the help of those emotions that the mind is said to pass further on where श्रद्धा, वीर्य, स्मृति, समाधि and प्रज्ञा meet it on the way. (They are faith, energy, watchfulness³ or wakefulness, samādhi and higher intuitive knowledge.)

1 Var. Rel. Ex. Pp. 380-381.

2 Vide Warren's Bud. Trans. P. 387 e. s.

3 James says—" Just what 'memory' and 'self-consciousness' mean in this connection is doubtful " The meaning of Buddhistic स्मृति must not have been known to him. He merely satisfies himself by saying, " They cannot be the faculties familiar to us in the lower life. " op. cit. P. 431,

James puts the Vedāntic (Indian) view " that one may stumble into super-consciousness sporadically, without the previous discipline, but then it is impure." We might say that the passivity seems to be there because there is impurity. To the subject still clings his lower nature on account of which he thinks himself to be passive during the moments of ecstasy. It was pre-eminently reserved for the Indians to draw out a course of progressive *Katharsis* that would free a man from his baser nature and at the same time liberate his spiritual energy. " By the subjection " says Karl Kellner¹ " of his impulses and propensities to his will, and the fixing of the latter upon the ideal of goodness, he becomes a 'personality' hard to influence by others and thus almost the opposite of what we usually imagine a 'medium' so-called, or 'psychic subject' to be ". " The Dhyāyin seems to be " as Mrs. R. Davids has said " always master of himself and self-possessed, even in ecstasy, even to the deliberate falling into and emerging (as by a spiritual alarm-clock) from trance. " ²

(2) Levels of Perception

(*Corresponding to different Levels of Attention*)

From the above discussion it is clear that विहित, एकाग्र, and निरुद्ध are the three distinctly marked levels of yogic attention. Keeping apart the Niruddha level we can say that whatever the tension in attention, consciousness in a sense is always dual, always in need of some object. When the process is viewed from this point of view it is called a समापत्ति. Literally speaking a samāpatti means an " encountering. " We encounter very often one and the same object at different levels of attention, but then it is fraught with a difference of meaning owing to a difference in the intellectual systems left by past experience with which it combines and through which it gets its meaning. The four principal samāpattis given in the Yogadars'ana are the सवितर्क, सविचार, सलब्धा and सास्मिता (given in १. १०.). From the bhāshya we know that at the सवितर्क level, the mind has for its act of

¹ Quoted by Wm. James—op. cit.

² Bud. Psych. P. 115. also Bud. Trans. op. cit.

cognition a material object. At the next stage of विचार, the mind rests upon its finer aspects. When these two are suppressed, a general elation spreads over the four corners of the dhyāyin's mind. When this too goes out consciousness (अस्मिता) stands alone with itself. Then the mind has for its object its own अस्मिता-consciousness and it takes on the form of pure consciousness, calm and infinite like an ocean without a single ripple (to disfigure its surface). तथाऽस्मितायां समापन्नं चित्तं निस्तरंगमहोदधिकल्पं शान्तमनन्तमस्मितामात्रं भवति. भा. १. ३६)¹ These four samāpattis come very near the four Rupa Jhānas of Buddhism. There the first stage is that of वितर्क, meaning initial application, where any moral object is chosen to attend to. Then comes विचार or sustained application wherein the accidents of the object are dropped out. The third Jhāna is the stage of पीति which is pleasurable interest amounting almost to an emotional suffusion, its meaning being the same as that of the सानन्दा समापत्ति of the Yogadars'ana. As the dhyāyin goes higher up, the affective tone becomes finer and he experiences bliss or happiness (सुख). And at the last stage, even this rarefied hedonic tone drops off like a slough, and there remain nothing but higher उपेक्षा called तत्रमज्ज्ञासता and एकगता-supreme hedonic indifference and one-pointedness.² The third and the fourth Buddhistic stages of पीति and सुख might be brought under the same head of सानन्दसमापत्ति.³

1 In addition to our Ftn. 1 on P. 34 treating of the relation between अस्मिता and अहंकार, we might finally put it thus. अस्मिता as a क्लेश is one of the products of अविद्या, as a लक्षण of the अहंकार (इत्येतानि अस्मितालक्षणस्य अविशेषस्य । etc.—भा. २. १९. १) it is a product of the प्रकृति, while as a stage in the progressive Dhyānas we might compare it with the sattvika consciousness of mind unmingled with any elements of rajas and tamas, and reflecting the Puruṣa in its purity and thus preparing the Yogi for the final Nirrodha.

2 Bud. Psych. Pp. 97f, 110ff Comp. Phil. P. 56. अभिधम्मसूत्र. १.११-१८-१९ also cf. ७.१६.

3 Originally the first and the second Jhāna are taken as one. With the सवितर्क-सविचार-सानन्द-and सास्मितसमापत्ति, we might compare the four शुद्धयानाः given in तत्त्वार्थ. १. ४१.—named as पृथक्त्ववितर्क, एकत्ववितर्क, सूक्ष्मक्रियातिपात्ति and व्युत्पन्नक्रियानिवृत्ति. The terminology here differs. विचार is used in its Samkhya-Yoga sense of वितर्क defined as अर्थव्यञ्जन योगसंक्रान्तिर्विचार इति । भा. १. ४६ । Here the meaning of अर्थ is the same

Corresponding to these levels of attention there are distinctly higher प्रत्यक्ष which a Yogi is said to perceive. We have already referred to the निर्विकल्प परप्रत्यक्ष, in our treatment of Perception. It is शब्दसंकेतस्मृतिपरिहृत, free from the associative memory of words which cling to an object through convention. We know that in science the ordinary conception of a thing has to be broken up in order to deal with its underlying nature. That is what is said to take place at the निवितर्क level. That परप्रत्यक्ष is the source of all inferential and verbal knowledge and as these latter are based upon vikalpa, they (or as we would say science) can only deal with general concepts, and not touch the individual content of a thing.¹ सामान्यमात्रोपसंहारे च कृतोपक्ष-यमनुमानं न विशेषप्रतिपत्तौ समर्थमिति । भा. १. २६ । न च प्रत्यक्षस्य माहात्म्यं प्रमाणान्तरेणामिभूयते । प्रमाणान्तरं च प्रत्यक्षबलेनैव व्यवहारं लभने । भा. १. ३२. । यद्यपि हि तत्तच्छास्त्रानुमानाचार्योपदेशैः अवगतमर्थतत्त्वं सूक्ष्मेव भवति.....तथापि यावदेकदेशोऽपि कश्चिन् स्वकरणसंवेद्यो भवति तात्त्वं परोक्षमिव.....। तस्मात्.....कश्चिदर्थविशेषः प्रत्यक्षीकर्तव्यः । भा. १. ३५ । श्रुतानुमानप्रज्ञाभ्यामन्यविषया विशेषार्थत्वात् ॥ १. ४९ ॥ श्रुत-मागमविज्ञानं तत्सामान्यविषयम् । न हि आगमेन शक्यो विशेषोऽभिधातुं, तथानुमानं सामान्यविषयमेव । यत्र प्राप्तिस्तत्र गतिरैवाप्राप्तिः तत्र न भवति गतिः इत्युक्तम् । अनुमानेन च सामान्येन उपसंहारः । तस्माच्छ्रुतानुमानविषयो न विशेषः कश्चिदस्ति इति । भा. १. ४९. । The whole of the Yogadars'ana text reiterates on every possible occasion the fundamental primacy of concrete immediate experience. In appreciation of such an attitude James says that " their (our) test of its purity, like our (their) test of religion's value, is empirical. " Mere verbal knowledge can never take the place of experience. These (spiritual, because the content of all the dhyānas is such)

as that in शब्द, अर्थ, ज्ञान. The व्यञ्जन stands here for शब्द, while योग is technically defined as काय-वाङ्मनःकर्मयोगः, and the meaning of वितर्क is श्रुत as given in वितर्कः श्रुतम् ॥ १. ४५ ॥ In the first ध्यान differences exist, while in the second the singular unity of the object comes up before the mind. This is similar to the सवितर्कध्यान mixed with all references to शब्द, अर्थ and ज्ञान, which are absent in the परप्रत्यक्ष of the निर्वितर्क level mentioned in the Yogadars'ana. The underlying idea is almost the same but we would have to define very many Jain terms to show the parallelism, which for fear of being too lengthy we have to give up.

1 Cf. also वाच- in his टीका १. २४. प्रत्यक्षानुमानपूर्वं हि साक्षम् । etc.

immediate experiences come to the Yogi at every level. In all, three levels of immediate experiences are clearly mentioned in the Yogadars'ana. The first is the ordinary level of sense-experience or इन्द्रियप्रत्यक्ष which stands at the lowest level. Then there is the परप्रत्यक्ष mentioned in the bhāṣya on 1. 43. It is as we know the source of all inference and verbal knowledge. The third level of immediate experience (अपरप्रत्यक्ष) is reached in the ऋतंभरा प्रज्ञा. (यो. १. ४८-४९.). When a Yogi gets the experience of this level, he attains, it is said, purity or brightness or composure (प्रसाद). Free from any touch of grief, standing as if on the pinnacle of his spiritual height, he surveys all men toiling below in worry.¹ (यो. १. ४७). This is the highest अपरप्रत्यक्ष level. न चास्य सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टस्य वस्तुनो लोकोपत्यक्षेण ग्रहणमस्ति । भा. १.४९ । Ordinary sense-experience cannot cognize the subtle, the intercepted and the distant. समाधिप्रज्ञानिर्गोष्ठ एव सविशेषो भवति—The supersensuous particular can only be grasped in samādhi by Prajñā.

From factors like selection, exclusion and introversion implying freedom from associative memory and a progressive withdrawal from the outside object, it would seem that all the talk of sāmādhi is a mere process of abstraction in thought. Viewed externally absolute ekāgratā might look like abstraction, but to call it that is to lose the very kernel of its definition. We know that the process of abstraction in thought is included in vikalpa, and that has to be suppressed like any other mode of mind. A sādhanaka has to leave behind all the implications based upon such a process of thought, and by a progressive elimination of the object, has to reach the very centre of thought and be nothing but pure consciousness which, however, does not leave its dynamic nature. At each and every level the sādhanaka meets with *individual* content that fills his consciousness and even the final experience is said to be that of a विशेष, यः च भोगेनापवर्गेण चार्थेण अर्थवान् पुरुषः स एव परो, न पर सामान्यमात्रम् । भा. ४, २४ । We have again विशेषदर्शिनः आत्मभावभावनाविवृतिः ॥ ४. २५ ॥—That other is the Purusha who has for his objects enjoyment and final liberation, so that in the case of one that has seen the

¹ The negative or discursive content of प्रज्ञा is given in यो. २. २७.

विज्ञेय—the Supreme Individual, all curiosity as to the nature of the Soul vanishes! Even the trance-state has such *noetic* elements in it to the last. The Yogi's supreme *nôus*, the *nôus poiêtikos* of Aristotle is at work and all *dynamis* is transformed then into pure *energeia* with no element of *apatheia* or *ataraxia* in it.

Aung's meaning of Buddhistic एकगता reinforces our position. He explains एकगता thus—"the mental property by which the object of consciousness is necessarily regarded as an individual occupying a definite position in space, or time or in both, is termed 'individuality of object' (ekaggatā)".¹ Again while discussing the third Jhāna characterized by पीति, he says—"..... intense interest develops the element of individualization (ekaggatā) into ecstatic concentration." Now we know according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view mind assumes the form of its object when attending to it. The question might be asked as to how it can be. Keeping up the same phraseology we might say that the mind assumes the form of its object, by, as it were, lodging inside the object, piercing it with its one-pointed tense attention. And in the introductory essay to the Compendium we read—"Ordinary Vitakka (application of attention) merely throws its concomitants on to the surface, so to speak, of an object—i. e. it is the initiative element in cognition of a superficial kind. But appanā-vitakka (अप्यना-वितक्क ecstatic concentration) is mind penetrating into the inwardness or import of its object."²

The levels represented in इन्द्रियप्रत्यक्ष, परप्रत्यक्ष and the अपर-प्रत्यक्ष of प्रज्ञा or higher intuition correspond to Buddhistic सम्भा, विज्ञान and पञ्चा. Buddhaghosha explains the levels by means of different ways or capacities of perception exhibited by a child, a citizen, and a metallurgist on seeing a coin. The perception of the child is a लौकिकप्रत्यक्ष, or सज्ञा, that of the citizen विज्ञान or परप्रत्यक्ष, while the knowledge of the metallurgist is true प्रज्ञा based on अपरप्रत्यक्ष.

1 Intr. Comp. Phil. P. 14.

2 Comp. Phil: Pp. 57f. 129. n. 1. In the text it is अप्यना-जवन.

Beyond the *śrīyāyā* lies the *viruddhā*—the perfectly ecstatic state of mind. We had an occasion to mention that the functioning of mind remains the same at the lowest as well as at the highest level. At the lowest level of our mind we are not consciously aware of dreamless sleep, but all the same the *samskāras* of sleep-experience are left on our mind, and though such a mode of mind cannot itself be directly apprehended, we can have a memory of it through its *samskāras* deposited in the subconscious depths. It is indeed a strange phenomenon that even though a certain experience be not directly apprehensible its generic memory or a recall, not filled by definite details, is possible ! But if ever any one asserted that he had an experience of which he remembered nothing in particular as in the case of ecstatic experiences, but that he had only a *general feeling* of something that happened to him, which, as it were, transformed the whole structure of his mind lying otherwise inapproachable in the subconscious fastnesses of his mind, we as psychologists would take him to be talking mere nonsense. But looking deeper we can see that an absence of ordinary consciousness of a particular experience does not mean its non existence, for such a phenomenon daily happens to us in sleep.¹ Experience is surely wider than knowledge, but it is wider than consciousness as well; and at the lowest level of our mind we simply do not wonder at the truth of this remark because familiarity, if it does not always breed contempt, at least blunts the edge of curiosity.

The reason why the state of sleep and Trance appear very similar to each other is that in both our ordinary consciousness is suspended. In a qualified sense we might say that in sleep our conscious mind is in a state similar to that of *pralaya*—universal dissolution. For then mind sinks into darkness with all its *vāsanās*, and there is no real freedom for the soul.²

1 It is not a question with us at issue here whether the cause of sleep is the fatigue of the synapses or of some poisonous material overburdening the "cushions" between the nerves and the muscles. We are concerned with it first and last as a mental experience.

2 In sleep even the *vasana* or a *samskara* of a resolution made while awake to get up early does work up and wake up the man, meaning that

Hence sleep is at times called a नित्यप्रलय. We might compare the three states—one of sleep, the other of प्रकृतिलयपद, and the third of कैवल्य as under:—

—निद्रा	—प्रकृतिलयपद	—कैवल्य
(i) चित्तवृत्ति	(i) चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध	(i) चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध
(ii) साधिकारचित्त	(ii) साधिकारचित्त ¹	(ii) निरधिकारचित्त

The first is a mode of mind, wherein its structure remains untouched (except in the sense that sleep leaves its saṃskāras in the mind and thus modifies it a bit.) In the second state, the modes of mind are, as if, suppressed, but the underlying original structure, with vāsanās embedded in it, still goes on enduring. In the कैवल्यपद not only are the modes of mind suppressed, but its structure too is at the same time completely changed.

A Yogi has no direct conscious knowledge of the state of suspension or trance, as it lies, like sleep, beyond the precincts of our waking mind. But at the niruddha level there is one more difficulty which is not met with at the level of sleep. It has been anticipated by Vyās and explained by Vāchaspati in his Tikū with an equal insight². Even though our consciousness be suspended in sleep, it is nevertheless a mode of our mind, and a general memory of it as a concrete experience is possible by an objectification of the saṃskaras left by it. But the niruddha mind of the yogi leaves behind only the Saṃskāras of Nirodha, and they *qua* Nirodha-Saṃskāras cannot generate स्मृति which by its nature is one of the modes of mind. If they did,

the mind can work without the help of ordinary waking consciousness. यथा चैत्रः श्वः प्रातरोत्थातन्मयं मयेति प्रणिधाय द्युतः तदैवोत्तिष्ठति, प्रणिधानसंस्कारात् ॥ यो. टी. १.२४ ॥

1 Vide यो. भा. १. १९ प्रकृतिलयाः साधिकारे चेतसि प्रकृतिलोने कैवल्यपदमिवानुभवन्ति, यावन्न पुनरावर्ततेऽधिकारवशाच्चित्तमिति ॥

2 निरोधस्थितिकालक्रमानुभवेन निरोधचित्तकृतसंस्कारास्तित्वम् अनुभेयम् । भा. १. ५१ ॥ निरोधजसंस्कारसद्भावे किं प्रमाणं स हि प्रत्यक्षेण बाहुभूयेत, स्मृत्या वा कार्येणानुमीयेत । न च सर्ववृत्तिनिरोधे प्रत्यक्षमस्ति योगिनः । नापि स्मृतिः । तस्य वृत्तिमात्रनिरोधतया स्मृतिजनकत्वासंभवाद् इत्यत आह—“ निरोधस्थितिकालक्रमानुभवेन..... ” etc. । वाच's टीका १.५१ ॥

they would no longer be the Nirodha Saṃskāras they be. Even a general memory of such Nirodha-Saṃskāras is impossible. In spite of this difficulty it is held that the Nirodha-Saṃskāras are left on the mind by the concrete Nirodha-experience, which itself is to be inferred only from the interval of outside time during which the Yogi has the Nirodha-experience. The whole mind in the sense of its ordinary structure and waking consciousness is suspended, but even in the state of such suspension the dynamic functioning of the mind is said to remain the same, one moment of Nirodha followed by another such moment, till consciousness comes back, all the while the mind instilling the Nirodha-Saṃskāras in itself. There is a Gujarati proverb saying—The rope, even when it be burning, does not leave its twist! The mind is burnt up in Nirodha, the sādhanikāra citta is reduced to ashes, but still the functioning of mind goes on the same as ever—एवं वृत्तिसंस्कारचक्रम् अनिशमावर्तते ।

From above the threshold of consciousness the levels of attention begin. They correspond to the levels of immediate experiences, and to the levels of consciousness as well upto samādhi or the state of tensest attention. After that, it is said, consciousness comes into abeyance. We cannot say what the state of attention can be at the Niruddha level. It lies beyond the realm of even Prajñā. All relations seem to be lost there in the supra-relational experience of Absolute Feeling as Bradley would have put it.

As so often mentioned, all experiences leave their specific traces in our subconscious mind. But there is one more fact to tell about such depositing. The levels of consciousness sink in our subconscious mind even as they are above the threshold. We might compare our mind, though the metaphor does not bear on all points, to a spiral.¹ It is the वृत्तिसंस्कारचक्र

1 According to one view of modern physics the four-dimensional universe is like a spiral going up (or down) the length of a hollow cylinder, wherein one might return to the same space-point, but the time co-efficient never recurs. And Bergson would say, though the brain be the same, if at all it could be, the *durational* co-efficient of our consciousness always varies, thus knocking out the bottom of any determinism.

that goes on eternally, but the mind rises up from one level to another from crest to crest, at the same time that the higher saṃskāras firstly suppress, then suspend and ultimately burn out the lower saṃskāras. This is one of the reasons why even the saṃskāras of Nirodha are said to be deposited in mind. Yoga is not mere suppression, it is synthesis as well. It may look like suppression at the beginning even to the sādha himself, but it can only be such from the point of view of the lower self. When the complete purge comes, only the higher cycles of वृत्तिसंस्कार exist.¹ In our note on the dispositional masses we said that the mind at its lower levels works like an automaton. The Yogi has to free himself from these lower levels by rising up the spiral. On higher levels too the same law of वृत्तिसंस्कारचक्र obtains, *but there it becomes an expression of freedom and not of automatism*. The Niruddha state of mind lies no doubt beyond the perview of psychology, but an understanding of its nature and its relation with the lower levels of attention is necessary to give us an insight into the nature and the working of the ordinary levels of our mind. The final goal for a Yogi is the निवृद्ध state, and to attain to that, he has to know the nature and the working of his mind completely. And the truth of our earlier remark is contained in this, that the whole field of psychology proper, as it is understood at present, forms a vast **क्षेत्र of Yoga**—the sphere from which the Yogi has to free himself. सत्त्वगुणान्यताख्यातिमात्रस्य सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं सर्वज्ञातृत्वं च ॥ ३. ४९ ॥ तद्वैराग्यादपि दोषबीजक्षये कैवल्यम् ॥ ३. ५० ॥ and प्रसंख्यानोऽपि अकुसीदस्य सर्वथा विवेकख्यातेः धर्ममेघः समाधिः ॥ ४. २९ ॥ Supremacy over everything that exists, and omniscience come to him who has known the difference between the Buddhi-Sattva and Purusha. But

According to the above view, even the universe would be a free universe and one might add made up of the same stuff as our mind or spirit.

1 समाधिप्रज्ञाप्रभवः संस्कारो व्युत्थानसंस्कारास्य बाधते । व्युत्थानसंस्काराभिभवात् तत्प्रभवाः प्रत्यया न भवन्ति । (व्युत्थान) प्रत्ययनिरोधे समाधिरुपतिष्ठते । ततः समाधिजा प्रज्ञा, ततः प्रज्ञाकृताः संस्कारा इति नवो नवः संस्काराशयो जायते । ततश्च प्रज्ञा ततश्च संस्कारा इति ॥ भा. १. ५० ॥ Again—अथ व्युत्थानसंस्काराः विवेकज्ञानसंस्कारैः निरोद्धव्या, विवेकसंस्काराश्च निरोधसंस्कारैः, निरोधसंस्काराणाम् तु अभावाविषयत्वं दक्षितम् ॥ टी. ४. २८ ॥

even this may bind a man's Soul down, so when by supreme indifference or non-desire even towards this, the seeds of corruption or infection are absolutely consumed, he reaches the Kaivalya State. The धर्मयोगसमाधि is held to be the result of such highest *disinterestedness* in pure supreme Intellection even ! And this is why Vyāsa says—हेतुशक्यमक्षये सत्त्वस्य अयं विवेकप्रत्ययो धर्मः, सत्त्वं च हेतुपक्षे न्यस्तम् पुरुषश्च अपरिणामी बुद्धोऽन्यः सत्त्वादिति ॥ भा ३. ६०. ॥ Even the ultimate distinctive knowledge is a function of the Buddhi-Sattva, which is after all material in its nature, hence the Yogi has to throw that too overboard.

The difference between an artificial trance and the Yogic Trance is worth noting. We might compare the trance induced by some hyper-anaesthetic like ether or nitrous oxide with the प्रकृतिलयपद mentioned above. In the प्रकृतिलय state the modifications of mind are in a sense suspended or suppressed, but the structure remains intact. In artificial anaesthesia too consciousness is held in abeyance, but the structure endures, and at times projects itself in quite an ugly fashion upon the trance-state. No doubt as James maintains, during anaesthetic trance the subject may feel as if layer after layer of mystery were being unravelled before him, allowing him a peep into the meaning of all existence ! But it is only perhaps the structure of the subject's mind, which, losing all its cogency as in a dream, flies at a tangent, giving him a simulated show of some seeming inner reality. We might take the physiological counterpart of it to be a complete *weakening* of all the naturally associative connections between the myelinated nerve fibres of the cortex. There can evidently be no re-organisation of the nerve-paths in an artificial trance. Under such circumstances the whole mind of the subject might stand before him, as James says, reconciling all contradictions. In instances of drowning such flashes do come up, but they cannot be said to unravel the mystery of existence for they merely bring back details of past life and moreover the fear of being drowned to death must be there from the first to the last. The Yogis do record a remodelling of the old neural paths resulting into what we might call a new kind of canalization within the cerebral cortex. But Yoga begins from the lowest

level, and builds upon moral values, while any man might go in for a cheap artificial trance ! Thus if Wm. James were to take nitrous oxide as he did, the most cogent sentence would come to him in that Hegelian form:—" *There are no differences but differences of degree between different degrees of difference and no difference* ".¹ And the case of a friend of Havelock Ellis points to the same thing from only the other way round. "A friend of mine" says Havelock Ellis, "under the influence of nitrous oxide, once found himself face to face with the Almighty. Being a man of earnest and philosophic temperament, he took advantage of the opportunity to demand passionately the meaning and aim of this tangled skein of things in which we find ourselves. 'Why have you placed us here? For what purpose have you submitted us to all this strife and misery? What is the solution of the riddle of life?' And then, uttered in a characteristic bass came, in one word, the awful reply... .." *Procreation* ". I fear that that voice is or might have been, divine".¹ Perhaps Havelock Ellis too might have got the same reply. From such instances as these we can maintain without any exaggeration that in artificial anaesthetic trance, the shadow of the underlying structure of the subject's mind is thrown upon a vaster canvas, and he recognizes it as a solution because it is his own.

We can say that real Trance lies a very very long way off from this. There is an element of objectivity which gives it its "*noetic*" value. It is same everywhere, and in all religions. Its positive content may not be determined, for *determinatio est negatio* ! Amongst all relations, that of

1 "Will to Believe" P. 297. In such experiences Wm. James notes the "instantaneous revulsion of mood from rapture to horror" which he regards as the "inevitable outcome of the intoxication." He goes on—"A pessimistic fatalism, depth within depth of impotence and indifference, reason and stillness united not in a higher synthesis but in the fact that whichever you choose it is all one—this is the upshot of a revelation that began so rosy bright." This comes to mean an absence of that synergy we find described in the progression of Dhyanas.

1 "The New Spirit" By Havelock Ellis P. xv

knowledge too is finite, while the Niruddha state of mind views everything *sub specie aeternitatis*. We can only repeat the words of the Vedic Rishi:—

को अथा वेदं क इह प्र बोधत..... ।

.....को अस्यान्वक्षः परमे व्योमन्तो अग वेदं यदि वा न वेद ॥

Who knows it directly ? Who can tell here ? He who presides over this all, living in the infinite sky, he knows it or perhaps he too may not know !

Section 9 Manas and The Affective Tone

We have finished the five principal modes of our mind namely प्रमाण, विपर्यय, विकल्प, मिश्र and स्थिति. They imply the structure of our mind which is nothing but the whole mass of traces left in the subconscious realm by past experiences, and which are grouped in some organic way exhibited in their functioning. We have also seen the relation between these modes and the levels of attention. If sleep be excluded, the remaining four modes very nearly cover the field of what in western psychology is termed states of consciousness.

In modern psychology the connotation of the word feeling is confined to that of pleasure or pain. On account of its purely subjective character and its dependent nature, the feeling aspect of consciousness was very often lost sight of in either cognitive or in conative processes. Even in recent times Prof. Stout has almost left the old tripartite division of mental functioning, and chosen instead a bipartite scheme with cognition and conation as the two principal aspects of consciousness. Psychologists are divided on the question as to the number of specifically different kinds of feelings that one can experience. For instance Wundt has added to the feelings of pleasure and pain, those of strain and relaxation, and of excitation and depression, to which Royce adds those of excitation and quiescence. In Indian philosophy, feelings of pleasure and pain, सुख and दुःख, were definitely recognized.

These feelings of pleasure and pain are held to be the specific experiences of मनस् regarded as the sixth internal sense.

The functions of मनस् are rather ambiguous at the beginning of Indian thought. In the Upanishads it is at times regarded as the co-ordinator of all sense-experiences. Without the mind (attending) nobody can perceive or hear anything. (कौ. ३. ७. and ऋ. १. ५. ३.) It was also held at times to be co-extensive with chitta of the sāmkhya-Yoga. (ऋ. १. ५. ३. repeated in मै. ६. ३०.)

The same ambiguity is kept up in the Yogadarśana. We come across the word मनस् for the first time in the

bhāṣhya on 2. 19. In एकादशं मनः सर्वार्थम्, the meaning of the word सर्वार्थे is different from the meaning of the same word used with reference to चित्त in इष्टदृश्योपरकं चित्तं सर्वार्थम् ॥ यो. ४.२३ ॥ or in सर्वार्थतैकाग्रप्रतयोः क्षयोदयौ चित्तस्य समाधिपरिणामः ॥ ३.११ ॥ Here it only means that the manas is a *sensorium commune*, the lowest centre of interaction between the sensory and the motor mechanism, i. e. between the jñānendriyas and the Karmendriyas of the human organism. Manas is equally at home when engaged in perceiving the objects of sense, and even in transmitting the specific movements to motor organs. But in almost all other passages the word is used in the sense of चित्त. For instance in the bhāṣhya on 2. 28., and on 4. 11. मनस् means चित्त. The Sāṃkhya doctrine no doubt ascribes the feelings of सुखःदुःख ultimately to the बुद्धिसत्त्व—e. g. सुखदुःखानुभवो हि भोगः स च बुद्धौ, बुद्धिश्च पुरुषरूपा इव इति, etc.—(सां. त. कौ. on का. ३७.) The same view was held in the Yogadars'ana—अत्रापि तापकस्य रजसः सत्त्वमेव तप्यम् । कस्मात् ? तपिक्रिया नापरिणामिनि निष्क्रिये क्षेत्रज्ञे, दक्षितविषयत्वात् ॥ भा. २. १७ ॥ The misery or the feeling of pain is caused to the Buddhisattva. The whole doctrine is complicated on account of the theory of the three guṇas positing a hierarchy of different kinds of pain. The functional relation between the three guṇas is held to be such that the pure activity of the Sattva is accompanied by a sense of (unmixed) pleasure, that of Rajas resulting in *unpleasure* (not to use the ambiguous word pain) whether near or remote, while a preponderance of Tamas burdens the mind with a feeling of dulness, depression or ennui—(“प्रव्याप्रवृत्तिस्थितिरया”.....गुणा मत्स्वरजस्तमांसि परस्परानुग्रहतन्त्राः “शान्त” सुखारमकं, “चोरं” दुःखारमकं “मूढं” विषादात्मकमेव प्रत्ययं “त्रिगुणमारमन्ते.” भाष्य-टीका २. १५). Because of such a doctrine of guṇas the hedonic function of manas falls into the background, but we might say that on the whole the general tenor of the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga cannot be said to lie against the view that the elements of pleasure and un-pleasure though ultimately felt or “apperceived” by the Buddhi-Sattva are specific contributions of मनस् regarded as the eleventh internal sense.

The Nyāya view is absolutely definite on this point as it is not encumbered with the doctrine of guṇas. In

the Bhāṣhya on 1. 1. 16. the functions of Manas are enumerated as under—स्मृति, अनुमान, अगम, संशय, प्रतिभा, स्वप्न, ज्ञान, क्रुह and इच्छा, and along with these the specific experiences of pleasure and unpleasure are added.—सुखादिप्रत्यक्षमिच्छादयश्च मनसो लिङ्गानि ।..... अनिन्द्रियनिर्मिताः स्मृत्यादयः करणान्तरनिर्मिता भवितुमर्हन्ति इति । Memory, inference, verbal or book knowledge, doubt etc. cannot be the products of our outer sense organs and hence the internal sense is posited. Some of these functions ultimately belong to the Soul, and the manas is only an instrument for their outward manifestations. Just as, while dealing with the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view, we said that the feelings of pleasure and pain though contributed by manas were finally felt by the Buddhisattva, so in the Nyāya, though manas could yield the feelings of pleasure and pain, it could only do so because the Soul was there. इच्छा द्वेषप्रत्यक्षमुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गमिति ॥ न्या १ १. ११ ॥ Here it is not mentioned whether all these are *experienced* by the soul or not. But we can only say that desire, aversion, feelings of pleasure and pain and knowledge, all these are our *ratio cognoscendi* for the existence of Soul. Beyond this we cannot go and maintain that the existence of Soul is also the *ratio essendi* of all these, though in the Soul's state of bondage it may seem to be so. For of all these differential *liṅgas* according to the Nyāya view only absolute knowledge is left with the Soul in his state of Moksha.

According to Buddhism feeling (वेदना) is the result of contact (फस्स) between the subject series and the object series.¹ Vedanā is wider than the mere feeling of pleasure and pain inasmuch as it includes bodily feelings as well. Buddhistic Vedanā means pleasure and pain (physical), joy and grief (mental), and hedonic indifference or neutral feeling. As a pure mental experience it is held to be of three kinds namely feeling of pleasure, of pain and indifferent feelings.²

1 संफस्सजावेदना (Comp. Phil. Pp. 14. 111-112 fl.) or फस्सपञ्चवेदना—अभिधम्मसूत्र. ८. ४.

2 सुखं दुःखं उपेक्षया ति त्रिविधा तत्त्ववेदना । सोमनस्सं दोमनस्समिति भेदेन पञ्चधा ॥ अभिधम्मसूत्र. ३. ४.

Jainism holds that *Manas* is made up of atoms and that feelings of pleasure and pain are experienced by the Soul on account of specific interactions of *Pudgalas* or atoms.¹

The primary question about the two feelings of pleasure and pain is that of their individual value positive or negative and their mutual relation. From the different definitions of the final state of liberation given by various schools of philosophic thought we can say that for the *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga*, *Nyāya* and *Buddhistic* schools, the ultimate "Self-conscious" state of liberation has no element of positive pleasure, or happiness or bliss, but is characterized only by an absence of misery or pain, while in the *Upanishads* and the *Vedānta* an element of the qualitatively highest bliss forms an integral part in the state of a liberated soul.²

We need not enter into any detailed discussion about the existence of any feeling analogous to that of happiness or bliss in the final state of liberation. At least so far as our ordinary state of bondage is concerned, all the schools are at one in giving a negative value to our so-called feelings

1 In the *Nyaya* *मनस्* is definitely regarded as अतःकरण e. g. न्या. भा. ३.२.८—*सिद्ध हि मनोऽन्तःकरणं नित्यं चेति ।* but it is taken to be अर्भौतिक and अणु in size. According to the Jain view *मनस्* is made up of atoms, and though it is regarded as an *anandhya*, (तदिन्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तम्—तत्त्वार्थ १.१८.) it is taken to be one of the *favours* (उपकार) done by *Pudgalas* upon the soul along with other favours of feelings of pleasure and pain etc. (शरीरवाङ्मनः पुद्गलनाम् ॥ तत्त्वार्थ ५-१९ ॥—सुखदुःखजीवितमरणोपग्रहाश्च ॥ ५.२० ॥ पञ्चविधानि शरीराणि... वाङ्मनः...पुद्गलानामुपकारः ॥ भा. ५.१९ ॥ सुखोपग्रहो दुःखोपग्रहो जीवितोपग्रहो...पुद्गलानामुपकारः ॥ भा. ५.२० ॥

2 दुःखत्रयाभिधातान्निहासा तदपघातकं हेतौ । दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥ सां. का. १ ॥ संयोगस्याऽऽत्यन्तिकी निवृत्तिर्हानिम् ॥ यो. भा. २. १५ ॥ दृष्टद्वययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः ॥ यो. २. १७ ॥ तथा चांक्षम् (पञ्चशिखेन) तत्संयोगहेतुविषर्जनात् स्यादयमात्यन्तिको दुःखप्रतीकारः ॥ कस्मात् ? दुःखहेतोः परिहार्यस्य प्रतीकारदर्शनात् ॥ भा. २. १७ ॥ तदत्यन्त-विमोक्षोऽपवर्गः ॥ न्या सू. १. १. २२ ॥ तेन-दुःखेन अन्मना अत्यन्तं विमुक्तिरपवर्गः । ...नित्यं सुखं आत्मनः तेनाऽभिव्यक्तेनाऽत्यन्तं विमुक्तः सुखी भवति इति केचिन्मन्यन्ते । तेषां प्रमाणाभावादनुपपत्तिः ॥ भा. १. १. २२ ॥ The *Buddhistic* conception of *Nirvana* is too well-known, the Jain position does not seem to be so clear,

of pleasure. Pain is positive. Under the pressure of some want one experiences a feeling of pain and the fulfilment of the need is only a removal of that mental strain or tension which is mistaken for positive pleasure.¹

But the feelings of pleasure and pain are immediate experiences and an objection is raised in the Yogadars'ana that such a negative view of pleasure cannot be true. Any such theoretical view means only a verbal or an inferential refutation of pleasure, and such a refutation stands condemned in the face of the positive content of pleasure in concrete experience, as it cannot be so explained away. न चैषां प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयानुकूलता शक्या सहस्रेणाप्यनुमानायमैः अपाकर्तुम् । यो. टी. २. १४ । Moreover, as is held in the theory of Karma, good actions bear the fruit of pleasure, while bad acts result ultimately in a feeling of pain or misery and if all pleasure were ultimately nothing but misery, the distinction between the good and the bad acts would vanish and people would not be prompted to do good acts. This corollary is in a way anticipated by Vāchaspati in his Tika on 2. 14. where he does maintain the positive existence of both the feelings of pleasure and pain by saying—ननु अपुण्यहेतुका जात्यायुर्भोगाः परितापपला भवन्तु हेत्याः, प्रतिकूलवेदनीयत्वात् । कस्मात्पुनः पुण्यहेतवस्त्यजन्ते सुखपला, अनुकूलवेदनीयत्वात् ।.....न च ह्यदपरितापो परस्परविनाभूतौ, यतो ह्यद उपासीयमाने परितापोऽपि अवर्जनीयतयाऽऽपतेत्—तयोर्भिन्नहेतुकत्वाद् भिन्नरूपत्वाच्च । This would tell us that pleasure is positive, and unpleasure negative and that both are specifically different by nature and by their originating causes.

In the Nyāyadars'ana the definition of pain is given as—बाधनालक्षणं दुःखम् ॥ १. १. २१. ॥ mental pain is caused by physical pain. Even here in its further examination the question is put that if pleasure be an immediate mental experience of all living creatures, how can one hold it to be a mere absence of positive pain ? तस्मिन्निदं प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयस्य सर्वजन्तुप्रत्यक्षस्य सुखस्य प्रत्याख्यानम् ॥न वै सर्वलोकसाक्षिकं सुखं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुम् । न्या भा. ४. १. ५५. In the Nyāya as well as in the Yogadars'ana the question is taken to a court of appeal where the Yogi or the Rishi sits in judgment. As Mill brought the whole question of the qualitative difference between pleasures before the court of the

¹ Plato regarded the feeling of pleasure to be a mere "filling-up."

"Sense of Dignity" and held that it was "better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied",¹ So here too the question of a positive or a negative value of pleasure is to be decided by a Yogi whose sense of feeling either pleasure or unpleasure is as keen as the sensitiveness of the eye to feel the painful presence of even a mote ! परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैः...दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः ॥ यो. २. १५ ॥ एवमिदमनादि दुःखलोतो विप्रसृतं योगिनमेव प्रतिकूलत्वकत्वादुद्वेजयति । कस्मात् ? अक्षिपात्रकल्पो हि विद्वानिति ॥ यो. भा. २. १५ ॥ दुःखमाहचर्याद्वाधनालक्षणं दुःखमित्युक्तम् ऋषिभिः ॥ न्या. भा. ४. १. ५५ ॥

The negative value of pleasure is posited only from an ultimate point of view. Ordinarily pleasure is agreeable in experience to every one, while unpleasure is by nature disagreeable. The words used are अनुकूल and प्रतिकूल—as in यथा चेदं दुःखं प्रतिकूलत्वकमेवम्.....। भा. on २. १४ ॥ and एषां (सुखानाम्) प्रत्यात्मवेदनीया नुकूलता.....। (दि. on do). Now प्रतिकूल originally has the sense of 'being against the current' or 'that which is opposed to'—and only secondarily comes to mean "disagreeable". A certain diet is said to be अनुकूल or प्रतिकूल if it conduces to health or induces disease. Now the feeling of pleasure and pain are the immediate experiences of manas, so when pleasure is defined as अनुकूल and unpleasure as प्रतिकूल, we can say that a feeling of pleasure conduces to the "health" or expansion of mind (which as we have once remarked comes near functional attention) while that of pain has the opposite effect. We get the same root meaning from the definition of दुःख given in the Nyāya as बाधनालक्षणं दुःखम् ॥ १. १. २७ ॥ The outstanding feature of unpleasure is बाधना. बाधना comes from the root बाध् to obstruct to thwart, to oppose. Everything that opposes the mind is according to this unpleasant. These definitions come near the modern *Furtherance-and-hindrance Theory* of the feelings of pleasure and pain, held by Wundt, Stout, Dewey etc.²

1 Utilitarianism Chap. II.

2 For Herbart feeling is the index of the hindered or furthered progress in apperception. For Wundt it is the inner hedonic coefficient of the apperception process. Stout takes it to be a necessary accompaniment of cognition or conation. So too with Dewey feeling mixes up with

In the state of bondage everybody is said to be impelled to get at an object if it be pleasurable, and to get away from it if it be unpleasant. प्रमाणेन स्वस्यैवाज्ञाताऽर्थमुपलभ्य, तमर्थममीप्सति जिह्वासति वा । तस्यैवाभिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य समीहाप्रवृत्तिरित्युच्यते अर्थस्तु सुखं सुखहेतुव, दुःखं दुःखहेतुव । न्या. मा. १. १. १. Here it is laid down that after cognizing an object, 'one acts out of the motive of either getting pleasure or getting an object of pleasure or of avoiding unpleasure or an object of pain.' One half of this statement reads as if it were *prima facie* an acceptance of psychological hedonism, which it might seem hard to reconcile with the higher idealistic ethics. The position is common to all Indian thought. In the Upanishads such primary psychological hedonism is pressed into the service of Self-realization. According to the Upanishadic view, the Self as bliss is the highest stage that a person can reach. In this sense even a Yogi is not free from the clutches of such a fundamental hedonic law of the human mind. For after all he gives up all the worldly pleasures, because he is after purer and more permanent bliss of Self-realization. In a sense if the reference to self cannot be destroyed in knowledge, much less can it be done so in the sphere of feeling.

Different kinds of feelings of pleasure are qualitatively distinguished with reference to the objects to which they cling. The thought is implicitly contained in the Upanishads. Worldly pleasures are lower and ephemeral, spiritual pleasures are higher and more lasting. A psychological hedonism which takes its stand upon a qualitative difference between pleasures is, one might say, the last position that a hedonist might take. But if as a system it be not compact or has loopholes, as a statement of a fact it is nearer the actual law governing life. Upon such psychological hedonism Indian thought superimposes ethical values as a result of which we get a sort of *spiritual hedonism*.¹ Even in western psychology

cognitive experiences, and builds up a "will", the self re-acting in different ways according to moods or dispositions. Mc Dougall with his 'hormic' theory comes near this view in his own way.

¹ Vide Const. Sur. Up. Phil: P. 52. also 293-94.

we do meet with an annunciation of such hedonism, when Dr. Ward says—"How in the evolution of the animal kingdom do we suppose this advance to have been made? The tendency at any one moment is simply towards more life, simply towards growth; but this process of self-conservation imperceptibly but steadily modifies the self that is conserved. The creature is bent only on filling its skin; but in doing this, as easily as may be, it gets a better skin to fill, and accordingly seeks to fill it differently. Though cabbage and honey are what they were before, they have changed relatively to the grub now that it has become a butterfly. So, while we are all along preferring a more pleasurable state of consciousness before a less, the content of our consciousness is continually changing; the greater pleasure still outweighs the less, but the 'pleasures' to be weighed are either themselves different, or at least are the same for us no more."¹ In the realm of animal life an ethically indifferent law of pursuing the pleasures of mere stuffing might hold true as regards its further development, but when the question of the human species comes, the writer cannot be so optimistic as to allow the human mind to follow the purely biological law of pleasure-pursuit. For pleasure-seeking like any other activity would certainly change our consciousness, *but the change might not be for the better*. The fact of a general rise in the hedonic zero too has to be taken into consideration.² It was in view of all these things that in spite of a halting acceptance of a psychological hedonism, the Indian schools definitely ranged themselves against pleasure-seeking.

अर्थस्तु सुखं सुखहेतुव्यं, दुःखं दुःखहेतुव्यं ।—we said that one half of the statement meant an acceptance of a psychological hedonism. The other half is not merely a negation of pure psychological

¹ Psych. Prin. P. 268.

² Even in Physics they show the time's arrow, bringing in the concept of *Entropy*. (Vide The Nature of the Physical World: Eddington, Chap. V.) So while speaking of evolution we must show the *ethical arrow*; Dr. Ward's statement seems to be ethically colourless and might as well be applied to the '*Downward Way*' as to the '*Upward Way*'.

hedonism, but amounts to a refutation of it. It seems a hard task to reconcile the two sides of the statement. But if without any prejudice we look deeper into the statement we find in it an expression of a fundamental law of the human mind. Almost all the philosophical schools of India maintain that creatures want either pleasure or an object of pleasure. Now in the case of the very first experience of pursuing an object, there can be no fore-thought of the ultimate state of pleasure that one is going to experience, but all the same pleasure is the only guide in judging the success of one's reactions as to whether they bring one nearer or take farther away from the final attainment of the object. A second time when the subject pursues the same object, the original experience of the final pleasure as well as the feeling of pleasure that attended its progressive attainment² both come to reinforce the object. Not to suppose so would lodge us into an absurd psychological theory that consciousness can repeat itself a second time without changing! Now by such repetitions of an act a subject would arrive at the lowest rung wherein the original object would be all covered over with an overgrowth of pleasure clinging to it like moss on all sides, and he would merely go in for the object for the sake of the pleasure it gave him. So we come to a position where we cannot posit unqualified psychological hedonism as a proposition absolutely true always, for the truth seems to lie in the direction of a recognition of what we can term *Degrees of Psychological Hedonism*. We know there are degrees of reality and appearances, degrees of truth, degrees of individuality, and degrees of freedom etc. So we can posit degrees of psychological hedonism too. That feelings of pleasure and pain enter as figures of index to our activity at the very first occasion guiding us as to whether it furthers or hinders life, is a fact beyond which we cannot go. Even for the theory of evolution it is a datum not to be challenged. At the other extreme lies the life of the glutton

² Both these pleasures—the pleasure of pursuit as well as the final pleasure of attainment are qualitatively the same, and can be distinguished only by the process of *vikalpa*.

or the voluptuary always running after pleasures. In between these two extremes our ordinary acts lie, motivated by a variant coefficient of pleasure. So we can truly maintain—
अयंस्तु सुखं सुखहेतुम्, दुःखं दुःखहेतुम् ।

And still the ethical mandate is not to seek pleasure. Behind that seemingly external categorical imperative lies the psychological truth that the life of a pleasure seeker is an ultimate impossibility. Experiences of pleasure blunt our sense for it. या भोगेष्वास्त्रियाणां तृप्तेः उपशान्तिः तत् सुखम् । या लौक्यादनुपशान्तिः तद् दुःखम् । न चेन्द्रियाणां भोगान्यासेन वैतृष्यं कर्तुं शक्यम् । कस्मात्, यतो भोगान्यासमनु विवर्धन्ते रागाः क्रौञ्चलानि चेन्द्रियाणामिति । तस्मादनुपायः सुखस्य भोगान्यास इति । 'When the senses calm down (*i. e.* when the general tension of the organism tones down) after their need is satisfied, it is called pleasure. The tension resulting from their not being satisfied is the feeling of pain. One cannot purify or purge the senses by constantly catering to their wants. Because the mental coefficient in the form of राग-attachment to pleasure or to an object of pleasure—increases with each additional satisfaction of a need, at the same time that the capacity for enjoyment of the senses heightens.' The word क्रौञ्चलम् means literally 'skill' that comes through habit. After each and every satisfaction of a need, the senses become *skilful*, *i. e.* get habituated to such a course, the result being that next time greater demands are made by the senses and they stand in need of an intenser stimulus to produce the same mental feeling of pleasure. The fact of increasing mental attachment too points the same way. Thus the life of a pleasure-seeker ends only in heightening his *hedonic zero* to a point when perhaps he no longer can find any satisfaction from anything at all. This is the final *reductio ad absurdum* proof of the untenability of such a life showing us a blind alley on the side of pleasure pursued as an ideal.¹

Feeling of pleasure and pain leave their traces or *samskāras* on the mind, and it is held that a memory of such feelings is possible, though, as we should add, generally it remains as a moment in a total present state of conscious-

¹ Ib-en's Peer Gynt is such a typical case. Conditions of modern civilisation are favourable to the growth of such characters.

ness. Such a memory can be that of either a feeling of pleasure or of a feeling of pain. In the former case it takes on the form of a thirst or a hankering or a desire to possess the object of pleasure, while in the latter case the result is a repulsion or an aversion. सुखमिहस्य सुखानुस्मृतिपूर्वः दुःखे तत्साधने वा यो गर्भः तृष्णा लोभः स राग इति ॥ यो. भा. २. ७. ॥ अनमिहस्य स्मृतेरभावात्सुखमिहस्य इत्युक्तम् । स्मर्यमाणे दुःखे रागः, दुःखानुस्मृतिपूर्वो दुःखे तत्साधने वा यः प्रतिषःस द्वेषः ॥ यो. भा. २. ८. ॥

At our ordinary levels feelings of pleasure and pain do exist. It is only in evaluating them that the negative character of pleasure comes out. If man were to live in the mere present quite unmorally, he would be led by the rough guides given him by nature in the form of feelings of pleasure and pain. We are not concerned in psychology with the life of such an hypothetical man. Our problem is whether between pleasure and unpleasure, both regarded as positive experiences, there is any neutral zone which we might designate as a neutral feeling, or whether the curve of pleasure while passing down the slope cuts the original abscissa only at a geometrical point before changing its character. Buddhism asserts the existence of such a neutral zone of indifferent feeling. The passage quoted from the Majjhima Nikāya by Mrs. Rhys Davids reads:—"What has pleasant feeling that is pleasant, what that is painful? what has painful feeling that is painful, what that is pleasant? what has neutral feeling that is pleasant, what that is unpleasent?" "Pleasant feeling has stationariness as pleasant, change as unpleasent; painful feeling has stationariness as painful, change as pleasant. In neutral feeling a state of knowing is pleasant, a state of not knowing is painful."¹ Again "what is comparable to pleasant, to painful, to neutral feeling?" "pleasant and painful feelings are mutually comparable. Neutral feeling is comparable with ignorance, as this is with knowledge" Mrs. R. Davids goes on to say that "it is not easy...to acquit Buddhists here of confusing 'bare

1 For the sake of clearness, in this last sentence, Buddhaghosha's paraphrase given in the footnote (Bud. Psych. P. 47.) is quoted instead of the text.

feeling' 'feelings proper' with intellectual concomitants." As we have mentioned in a previous section, feelings on account of their having no definite localization were often classed with vague perceptions or even with error. At a first reading one might think that the recognition of neutral feeling is a special outcome of Buddhistic analysis. But when one goes deeper, one is able to find a marked similarity of thought between the Buddhistic classification of feelings and the Sāṅkhya-Yoga doctrine that—सर्वधिता वृत्तयः सुखदुःखमोहात्मिकाः सुखानुशयी रागः । दुःखानुशयी द्वेषः । मोहः पुनरविद्या इति ॥ यो. भा १. ११. ॥ We know that the original bipartite division of the modes given in वृत्तयः... द्विविधाः ॥ १. ५. ॥ is an ethical one. Now this latter division of modes into pleasant, unpleasant, and *Mohātmika* is arrived at from the point of view of their affective tone. Thus if Sukha and Duhkha be the feelings of pleasure and pain, Moha which is due to Avidyā must necessarily be neutral in its character; and the Majjhima Nikāya passage reads:—"Neutral feeling is comparable with ignorance." So when it is maintained that in neutral feeling a state of knowing is pleasant, a state of not knowing is painful', we must understand that the neutral feeling in itself is neither pleasant nor unpleasant, but that once the thirst for knowledge comes up, knowing is pleasant while a state of not knowing would be unpleasant. This again comes up to the Furtherance-Hindrance theory of pleasure and pain as applied to the apperceptive process, the pleasant feeling of knowing being an accompaniment of successful assimilation, a theory held by Herbart and Wundt.

In the section on the Levels of Attention we had an occasion to note the relation of opposition between feeling and attention. The indifferent or neutral feeling—the Buddhistic उपेक्षा, or the मोह of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga are not to be confused with the philosophic higher hedonic indifference which in Buddhism is called तत्रमग्नता and which is the result of continued fixed attention to an object. According to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga terminology it is उपेक्षा growing deeper due to Para and Aparā Vairāgya, bringing a yogi to the स्थितप्रज्ञ state defined in the Gīta adhyāya 2. The relation of inverse ratio is clearly meant in Aung's words,

" This hedonic indifference or neutrality of emotion is brought about by the continued voluntary exercise of the mind on the after image to which it has been directed. And by it ecstatic concentration reaches its full development in the fifth stage of Jhāna. "¹ It is this supreme disinterestedness which makes a Yogi " the spectator of all time and all existence. "²

1 Comp. Phil. P. 58.

2 Rep. 486 A.

Section 10 Emotions and Instincts

(1) Emotions

In Indian philosophical thought, we find a very meagre treatment of emotions. Its point of view is that of Yoga which includes Ethics. Emotions on account of their opposition to the final goal posited by such a system were never treated except negatively, so that in general an absolute freedom from emotions was enjoined upon any one aspiring after spiritual attainments. We have already mentioned in our introductory section that we would have to go to works on dramaturgy and poetics to gather any material on them to get at a psychological theory of emotions implied in Indian thought. Works on poetics are generally not included within the fold of philosophy proper, and hence we could safely have left them out. But for the completeness of our psychological synthesis we have to go to them so far as the treatment of emotions is concerned. Even then, as we shall see, the general theory of emotions implied in these works falls quite in a line with the whole trend of philosophic thought. But a work on aesthetic is not a treatise on psychology, any more than, for instance, *Pātañjala Yogadars'ana* is one. In our synthetic enquiry upto now, we had to disentangle the psychological material from amidst a vast field of Yogic practices, mixed with ethical maxims, logical theories and metaphysical notions. But here over and above such sifting, we shall have to invert the original aesthetic stand-point in order to arrive at the psychological point of view implied therein.

We shall base our enquiry principally upon Bharatamuni's *Nāṭyas'āstra*, and only supplement any necessary information from works on poetics.¹ What a work of dramatic art achieves is this. In a dramatic performance, the actors unfold a work of art both in time and space, and with the help of language,

¹ We have chosen dramaturgy, because it is the only branch of art which presents human emotions dynamically through their expressions and comes nearest the most concrete representation of our life.

gestures, emotional expressions, situations in the plot, and other technical accessories try to put before the audience a concrete picture of a complete emotion which *somehow* the audience catches up and experiences aesthetically.¹

We need not go deep into the theories of aesthetic experience as given by Bhatta Lollata or S'aṅkuka or Bhatta Nāyaka; but we must mention in passing that Abhinavaguptapādāchārya's theory has become more acceptable to the writers on poetics, for in a sense it gives us the basic psychological explanation as to why the emotion represented on the stage is caught up and lived by the audience.

Modern psychology approaches the problem of emotions from the side of instincts.² "Emotions are" in Pillsbury's words "theoretically either instinctive responses or complex feeling processes mingled with instinctive reactions." McDougall informs us that there is a conative factor in emotional experience and he further maintains that "all the bodily changes of any species of animal, which we call 'expressions of emotions' are adaptations of the body to the modes of instinctive activity proper to the species."³

In Indian thought both emotions and instincts are traced to a common root namely that of वासना. In a sense this is more scientific, for in case emotions be regarded as mere appendages to instincts, one may put a further question regarding the origin of the latter, while in case of a theory which explains emotions as well as instincts through their specific vāsanās, we arrive at an entity which requires no further explanation, inasmuch as it has an integral place in the structure of our mind. Rather than refer emotions to instincts, and instincts to the "*hormic*" urge or to *tropism*, it is much less offending and more scientific to regard emotions and instincts as specific differentiations of the vāsanās embedded

1 Croce would say "reproduces" it. Vide his *Æsthetic*—Bk. I. Chap. XVI. Pp. 118 e, s.

2 A theory of emotions as having their bases in instincts was first formulated by McDougall in his *Social Psychology*.

3 Out. Psych; P. 321.

in our chitta, the two sometimes joining together, often bifurcating and at times even contesting against each other.

The embedded vāsanās of a certain type manifested in an experience of a specific emotion form an affective mass which is called a *svāyikāra*. Thus a *svāyikāra* is rooted in our mind in the form of a *vasanāpūṇḍra* which we might identify with our *saṁskārapūṇḍra*. There are in all nine *Sthāyibhāvas*. They are those of *रति*—Love; *हास*—Laughter; *शोक*—Grief; *क्रोध*—Anger; *उत्साह*—Power or Firmness; *भय*—Fear; *व्युत्सा*—Aversion; *विस्मय*—Astonishment and *शम*—Quiet. 'Any creature that is born is endowed with the vāsanās of the nine *sthāyibhāvas*. For instance, it has an inborn dislike for misery, and always desires pleasures. All are surcharged with the instinct of mating (*रति*), and thinking they stand on a higher level, look down upon others and laugh at them (*हास*). So when anyone begins to doubt his superiority, he feels grief (*शोक*) and becomes angry (*क्रोध*). Then he resolves firmly (*उत्साह*) and collects all his powers to regain it (his lost position). Therein he fears a fall (*भय*) and feels aversion or disgust at any improper thing done (*व्युत्सा*). He also is astonished at any strange conduct, (*विस्मय*), and at times, prompted by a desire to renounce, settles down into tranquillity (*शम*). No creature is devoid of these tendencies. In some, one might be more predominant while in others it might be weak. But even while they seem to be dead, they do not pass out of existence, but remain there as *saṁskāras*. (S. 1)¹

We can compare the different *sthāyibhāvas* to permanent emotional dispositions. The structure of our mind, as shown in our section on Dispositional Masses, consists of systems of dispositions on the same or on different levels of sub-consciousness. Along with cognitive and conative "constellations",²

¹ The sources are given at the end of this subsection on Emotions. The passage originally appears in Abhinavagupta's Commentary on *अरतनाट्यशास्त्र* and has been taken over almost *en bloc* by Hemachandāchārya. Both are given in S. 1.

² The phrase "conceptual 'constellations'" is used by Dr. Ward. *Psych. Prin.* P. 312.

the structure contains the emotional ones too. Following Mc Dougall we might call them sentiments.¹ The several bhāvas do not *happen*, for they always are there in the structure of the human mind. Their particular manifestations are seen, but they remain pervadingly in the background and "perfume" the whole mind and its functioning. (S. 2)

Hemachandrāchārya has given the several characteristics of the different sthāyibhāvas when they get actualized in an emotion. This latter fact is not mentioned by him, but it is already implied when he says that the characteristic effect of Love is to create mutual trust or confidence. That of Laughter is विकास—lit blooming or growing, while Grief has the effect of वैधूर्य "widowedness", and Anger of severity and wakefulness. Energy and determination; bewilderment; contraction; expansion² and freedom from desire, these are the characteristics of Utsāha—Power, of Fear, of Aversion, of Astonishment and Quiet respectively. (S. 3) These characteristics of the different sentiments when actually experienced are the direct effects on our mind and as such they are psychologically true. Modern psychology talks of an expansion and a contraction of consciousness, which come not as results of intense or diffused attention, but as general effects of feelings of pleasure and pain or of emotions. To mere expansion and contraction, Indian thinkers have added several other coefficients of emotional experience.

Upto this point it is pure psychology. But now we can no longer keep away the aesthetic theory given in the Nāṭyas'ātra. The problem for a play is to waken up a particular sthāyibhāva

1 "The emotion is a mode of experience, a way of functioning and a fact of activity, the sentiment is a fact of structure, an organised system of dispositions, which endures, in a more or less quiescent condition, between the occasions upon which it is brought into activity." Out. Psych. P. 418. Abhinavagupta means the same thing when he says उत्साहादयस्तु संपादितस्वावश्यकर्तव्यतश्च प्रलीनकल्पा अपि संस्कारशेषता नातिवर्तन्ते ।

2 In his Var. Rel. Ex. P. 368, Wm. James makes a distinction between mere "expansion or extension of the self-conscious mind" and cosmic consciousness.

or a sentiment lying dormant in the mind of an audience, by its exhibition on the stage and thus bring it within the fold of *aesthetic* though not *actual* experience. The difference between aesthetic and actual experience can be seen in the fact that while the actual experience of any emotion like anger or fear may exhaust a man, its aesthetic experience always gives him pleasure. This is why aesthetic experience as such is compared with Brahmānanda (S. 4) A representation of a sentiment on the stage never results in an actual *induction* of a sentiment, but only in *inducing* it aesthetically.¹ We might say that this is the difference between Prof. James meeting firstly a chained bear and then a bear at large. In the former case Prof. James would present it a bun, in the latter, as has been said, "a clean pair of heels." We will say that in the former case Prof. James's aesthetic feelings, in their widest sense, get full scope for expression, in the latter it is pure seizure by actual fear.²

A purely aesthetic as distinguished from an actual experience of a sentiment is termed a Rasa. A sentiment manifested or actualized through its विभाव, अनुभाव and its व्यभिचारिभाव is called a rasa. Corresponding to the nine sentiments there are the nine rasas—viz. दृगार—love, हास्य—laughter, करुण—pathos, रोद—wrath, वीर—heroism, भयानक—terror, बीभत्स—disgust, अद्भुत—wonder and शान्त—tranquillity.

The rasas are the actualized (aesthetic) experiences of the sentiments. We know that a saṃskāra and its vṛtti mutually depend upon each other. So too, a sentiment and its rasa are held to be mutually interdependent, though it is maintained that it is the sthāyībhāva which is realized through its rasa and not *vice versa*. The vāsanās of the different sentiments are no doubt the *sine qua non* of their actual experience but every actual experience leaves the dispositions of the sentiments strengthened. A man without the specific vāsanās is

1 Cf. काव्यसाहित्यमीमांसा. P. 81

2 Abercrombie in his small book—entitled "Towards a Theory of Art" has dwelt fully upon the difference between the two attitudes.

held to be as dead as the inner walls of a theatre.¹ According to the Yogic point of view such *vāsanās* were regarded as the greatest obstacles to spiritual development, in aesthetic they are taken to be the very basis without which *rasa*-experience would be impossible. (S 5) The nature of a *vāsanā* and its relation to its *vṛtti* is the same, only its values differ.

A *rasa* which is an aesthetic experience of a *sthāyibhāva* is induced in us by its several *vibhāvas*, its *anubhāvas*, and its specific *sañchāri*—or *vyabhichāribhāvas*. Just as a drink mixed with different ingredients and condiments gives but one taste, so these *vibhāva anubhāva* and the several *vyabhichāribhāvas* end by inducing the experience of a single *rasa*. (S. 6) Here is a psychological distinction drawn between a multiple stimulus and the unitary sensation produced by it. A distant dashing of the sea-waves upon the shore and its rocks mix up together and make but one rumbling sound for us, and all the several notes lean on, or merge into, one another or, as we might say according to our terminology, do favour or *उपकार* on one another, so that the effect of a melody or a *rāga* is a unitary organic whole; so too these different elements form the moments in a total self-same experience of a *rasa*.

The *vibhāvas* are the causes, principal as well as subordinate. The *anubhāvas* are the external expressions of an emotion from which, in case of others, we are able to infer their mental states.² The *sañchāri* or the *vyabhichāribhāvas* are the subsidiary emotions "which come and go like so many waves upon the surface of an ocean;" they yield their quota to the completion of the original *rasa*, against the background of which they stand for a while and then pass away strengthening it. (S. 7)

1 It is from this point of view that Kalidas speaks to us of the वेदाभ्यासज nature of sages in his *साकुन्तल*. Cf. निर्वासनास्तु रंगान्तर्बेदमकुड्याश्म-संनिभाः ।—चर्मदास quoted in *काव्यसाहित्यमीमांसा*. P. 79.

2 From our own experience of an emotion with its expressions, we infer the existence of an emotion in another person from his outward expressions. But merely inferring the emotional state of some one else is not equal to its aesthetic experience in ourselves and the fallacy in S'ankuka's theory lies in holding such a proposition.

The mutual relations of the nine sentiments or *sthāyī-bhāvas* are not quite clearly defined in the *Nāṭyasāstra*. In the *Kāvyañusāsa*, it is said that any of the first eight *sthāyī-bhāvas* may play a secondary part in the experience of a particular *rasa*, while the last *S'ama* being by its very nature a pure *sthāyībhāva* cannot do so. (S. 8) As an expression of an affective disposition a *bhāva* is taken as *sthāyī*, but when it comes as an effect of a fleeting cause, it becomes *vyabichāri*. The relations from the point of view of origin between the different *rasas* are given by Bharatamuni. The *S'ānta* *rasa* is compared to the *Prakṛti* from which the different *rasas* come out as so many *vikāras* or specific differentiations. Again amongst the first eight *rasas* four are primary, and four secondary. Thus it is said that from love comes laughter, from wrath pathos, while heroism is said to yield wonder, and an experience of disgust to end in terror! The four primary *rasas* of love, wrath, heroism and disgust are held to be the *उत्पत्तिहेतुः* of the four secondary ones (S. 9). By deriving laughter from love we do not get at its theory, any more than by holding that the extremes of wrath and pathos meet. But the real reason of such a derivation lies in the mental effects which are held to be the same in case of love and laughter, wrath and pathos, heroism and wonder, and disgust and terror. The emotions get bracketed together not because they are viewed now *subjectively* then *objectively* as in case of love and laughter, or now as a cause then as its effect as in the case of wrath and pathos, but because they are viewed from the point of view of their similar effects on consciousness. The first two result in a *विकास*, the next two in a *विक्षेप* i. e. obstruction, while heroism and wonder leave the mind in a state of *विस्तर*—expansion, and the last two in *क्षोभ*—agitation.¹

1 *भयानक* is derived from *क्षोभ*, but they seem to have nothing in common. It seems they are put together merely for the sake of a completeness of the theory of derivation. (Vide Hist. San Lit. P. 390. There Keith has mentioned *विस्तर* and *विकास* though in another context. He has rendered *विकास* by pervasion.)

Here mental विकास is compared to that of a flower's bloom and बिस्तार to a tree spreading its branches on all sides, while we meet with स्रोम in the ocean's toiling agitation, and विक्षेप in obstructions lying across the path of a strong wind. (S. 10)

The several साँचहान or vyabhichāribhāvas, i. e. the subsidiary emotions come and go with their particular vibhāvas and anubhāvas, causes and expressions, strengthening a sthāyibhāva which remains the same to the last. Just as when waves dash against one another and throw up their spray in the air, still the ocean remains the same, so in a sthāyibhāva fleeting subsidiary emotions that may be even apparently opposed to it crop up for a while and then pass out, without any adverse effect upon the unitary experience of that sthāyibhāva. (S. 11) We can see that such a rasa which is an (aesthetic) actualization of a sthāyibhāva is an emotional experience containing an organic unity of its own, in which not only do several subsidiary emotions join in various combinations and shades,¹ but any one of the eight sthāyibhāvas except the S'ānta may play the roll of a subsidiary emotion.

The subsidiary emotions given are thirty-three in all. They are:—निर्वेद—self-disparagement; ग्लानि—languor; शंका—uncertainty; असूया—envy or jealousy; मद—intoxication; भ्रम—fatigue; आलस्य—sloth; दैन्य—misery; चिन्ता—anxiety; मोह—infatuation, feeling of obliteration; स्मृति—recollection; इति—satisfaction (that comes through non-vacillation.) शीघ्रा—shame; चपलता—fickleness; हर्ष—joy; आवेग—excitement, flurry; जडता—torpor, dulness; गर्व—pride; विषाद—despair; औत्सुक्य—anxious eagerness; निद्रा—sleepiness; अपस्मार—epilepsy (including the intensest fear paralyzing the limbs); सुप्त—sleep; विबोध or प्रबोध—waking-up; अमर्ष—intolerance as exhibited in a challenging attitude of the mind; अवहित्त्व—inhibition, concealment of an internal feeling; उग्रता—fierceness; मति—intellect; व्याधि—disease; उन्माद—madness; मरण—death; त्रास—fright; नितर्क—guessing. (S. 12)

All the emotions treated in western psychology like

¹ त्विदुदयप्रसामर्षविषादमदभ्रमजडताग्लानिचिन्ता, व्यभिचारिणः । काम्यानु० पृ. ८५.

The subsidiary emotions mix with one another in various order and degrees of intensity, and duration.

those of anger, fear, pride, shame, joy, envy, despair, misery are given here. But over and above these there figure the more intellectual aspects of our mind like doubt, guessing, memory, intellect, along with what might now be regarded as emotionally indifferent states like that of sleepiness (निद्रा) or actual sleep (सुप्त). At first sight it would seem that the intellectual operations and the indifferent states are classed along with emotions proper simply because Bharatamuni as a writer on dramaturgy was concerned purely with external expressions in order that through them may be conveyed the meaning of a situation in a play. From this point of view we might call him the first "behaviourist" of the land. But even then Bharatamuni would not be justified in enumerating all these as vyabhichārībhāvas, if the meaning to be conveyed by them was not an emotional one. When we realize that the vyabhichārībhāvas by their variagated permutations and combinations¹ induce a sthāyībhāva, it is through their emotional setting, and not their intellectual aspect that they do so. It is not any doubt-संका, but the *doubt* in Othello's mind as regards Desdemona's faithfulness; it is not any intellect or मति, but an intellect which works under the promptings of an emotion and sustains it, as we find in the case of Dus'yanta when he says:—सतां हि संदेहपदेषु वस्तु प्रमाणमन्तःकरणप्रवृत्तयः । Here evidently Dus'yanta's *intellect* is working only under the dictates of his love for S'akuntalā. Under such circumstances it is not *pure* intellect which is meant, but only that intellect which works as a hand-maid to an emotion.

Just as outwardly all men are alike in having two feet, two hands, but on account of a difference in their inner worth—

"The world is peopled with worthies,

and workers useful and clever.

There are men who are easily first

and men who come decently after—"¹

so too in emotions some are sthāyī and others only vyabhichārī. (S. 13)

Abhinavaguptapādāchārya has given quite explicitly

¹ Gardener: Rabindranath Tagore No. 42.

the relation between the sthāyī and the vyabhichārī bhāvas.¹ The vyabhichārī bhāvas come into existence only under the influence of their specific causes, in the absence of which an individual's whole life might pass out without any experience of either the one or other of those bhāvas. Even after a particular experience they do not necessarily leave their individual saṃskāras in the shape of permanent dispositions. As differing from these the sthāyībhāvas never pass out of their state of existence as latent dispositions. The vyabhichārī bhāvas are like so many beads kept together in their proper perspective by the inner running thread of a sthāyī bhāva.....On seeing a man full of languor, a question as to why he is such is relevant. But with regard to a sthāyī bhāva it is wholly out of place. A man might be languid, *because* of his love for some lady, but his love for the lady has to be accepted as a fact, behind which explanation cannot probe. These facts or expressions of the different sthāyī bhāvas are accepted without any further enquiry. While in the absence of their specific causes, the human mind remains completely free from the subsidiary emotions. (S. 14)

From this we can conclude that the vyabhichārī bhāvas have no place reserved for them in the structure of our mind. We might take it that their saṃskāras go to strengthen the original disposition or the sentiment in connection with which it was experienced, a conclusion not definitely drawn by Abhinavagupta, but which we might note in the light of our synthetic enquiry.

The eight Sāttvika bhāvas² differ from all the rest because they cannot be simulated without actually inducing them. (S. 15)

1 Abhinavagupta lived in the 10th century A. D. (Vide His. San. P. P. 26). Hemachandracharya has incorporated long passages from Abhinavagupta in his काव्यानुशासन almost verbatim. The passage given in (S. 1) is an instance of the Type and this too. Vide भरतनाट्यशास्त्र passage on P. 284 and the one appearing in काव्यानुशासन Pp. 83-84.

2 They are स्तम्भस्वेदोऽथ रोमांचः स्वरमेगोऽथ वेपथुः । वैषर्ण्याधु प्रसव इत्यष्टौ सात्त्विकाः स्मृताः ॥ नाट्य. ६.२३ ॥—Insensibility, Perspiration, Horripilation, Faltering voice, Trembling, Paleness, Tears and Swoon.

Here we come to the most difficult question of the relation between an emotion and its expression. We have already hinted at the fallacy contained in the James-Lange theory of emotions.¹ From the point of view of a drama, i. e. of aesthetically inducing an emotion, we may separate the feeling-content from the expression-content of an emotion, but it does not mean that we can do so in actual experience. The actual experience of a primary emotion differs from its aesthetic "reproduction", inasmuch as in the former we have an organic blending of an inner experience with its outward expression, while in the latter we seem to get at its inner coefficient only in its transfigured, and that too an impersonal or its universalistic aspect. In aesthetic experience we never get at a point where we begin to experience the emotion *actually*. An artistic representation of acutest *वीर्यसूत* does not "bring on" in us an actual feeling of disgust as we meet with it in concrete life. On the contrary as we have already said its representation results in *Ānanda*. A consideration of how such a pervading feeling of *Ānanda* is induced in us by a work of art would take us deep into the cause of it, namely the process of *साक्षात्करण* by which we arrive at the pure emotion leaving all its accidents of time, space and particularity of individuals etc. far behind, while we ourselves become perfectly *en rapport* with the aesthetic object.

But a consideration of the general theory of aesthetic does not fall within the scope of our synthesis. Our problem is whether such a theory of aesthetic experience of emotions can be helpful in constructing a psychological theory of emotions. In our hasty review we have seen that upto the description of the different *sthāyī bhāvas* the theory was purely psychological, inasmuch as it dealt with the ground from which both the actual experience of

1 The writer does not know whether any one in psychology has laid bare the aesthetic truth contained in the James-Lange Theory. We are of opinion that therein James the artist got the better of James the psychologist. Anyone might begin by imitating all the expressions of fear, and end by *really* experiencing fear; but we must remind him that it is only his *aesthetic* experience of fear and not an *actual* experience of it.

an emotion and its aesthetic counterpart bifurcated. In a rough tabular form we might put the whole scheme thus:—

The Nine Sthāyibhāvas

रति, हास, शोक, क्रोध, उत्साह, भय, जुगुप्सा, विस्मय क्षम.
(embedded as vasanas in the structure of our mind)

Their actualizations
in different 9 Primary
Emotions of—lust, amuse-
ment, distress, anger, elation,
fear, disgust, curiosity,
and क्षम.¹

Their aesthetic experience
in the nine Rasas.

संगार हस्य करुण रौद्र वीर भयानक वीमल अद्भुत क्षम

विभाव
क्रोधावर्षणाधि-
क्षेपावमानानुत-
वचनोपघात-
वाक्यपारुष्याभि-
द्रोहमात्सर्यादि-
मिविभार्वक्ष्यते ।

अनुभाव
साधन-पाटन-पीडन-च्छेदन-प्रहरण-
हरण-शस्त्रसंपात-संग्रहार-विश्राकर्ष-
णाद्यानि कर्माणि । पुनश्च रक्ततप्यम-
[स्वेद] झुकटिकरणवष्टम्बदन्तोदपी-
डनगंडस्फुरणहस्ताग्रनिधेयादिभिरनुभा-
वैरभिनयैः प्रयोक्तव्यः ।

Its Vyabhichāribhāvas

असंमोहोत्साहावेगधर्मवचपलतौघ्यगर्व [विकृतोत्प्रेषण] स्वेदवेपथुरोमांच्छाद्रवाद्यः ॥

Here we have taken as an instance the aesthetic emotion of wrath only. From our psychological point of view it is a great asset that even the vibhāvas are mentioned. We shall be able to note at a glance that an aesthetic experience of an

1 The several names—lust, amusement etc. are taken bodily from Out. Psych. P. 324, where the different primary emotions are equated with the corresponding instincts. The writer has accepted curiosity as coming near the connotation of अद्भुत, for the sthāyibhāva of अद्भुत is विस्मय wonder which very often is the cause of curiosity. Of course, MacDougall gives no place to क्षम, for he would not be able to conceive that it can be one of the expressions of his "hormic" energy ! We may note in passing that Royce's feeling of quiescence would come near our conception of क्षम.

emotion is the result of the total situation made up of *vibhāvas*, their *anubhāvas* and the *vyabhichārībhāvas* with their respective *anubhāvas* or expressions. Even in case of an aesthetic experience, an emotion considered as a purely mental feeling cannot be separated from its expressions though we may begin by differentiating between *विभाव*, *अनुभाव* and *व्यभिचारिभाव*. It is only by a process of *विवक्ष्य* that the two can be distinguished though never separated. On account of such an organic nature of an emotion, it is always better to use the word—emotion for the total situation and not merely for the abstract mental feeling. For in the sense of a mere mental experience an emotion like attention or will is essentially non-presentable¹ and can only be *known* either reflectively or through its more or less *spreading*² effects.³

Looking to the *vibhāvas* of the *Raudrarasa*, we find therein mentioned all the causes that would ordinarily inflame a man to wrath. For instance they include amongst others conviction of crime committed by some one, insult received, a lie, promise-breaking, harsh words, faithlessness etc. The *anubhāvas* mentioned are exactly the expressions that we find registered in any modern book on psychology. Moreover, it is of great psychological interest to note that in expressions a distinction is drawn between acts and expressions proper. The acts are those of beating, tearing up, breaking, striking, drawing out blood etc., while the expressions proper are eyes red hot, (perspiration) knitting of the brows, jaws firmly pressed, compressed lips etc. The *vyabhichārībhāvas* are mentioned in an order which is perfectly psychological, for it takes us from the most initial stage of anger to its most intense state where it very often defeats its own purpose. The subsidiary emotions are—*असमोह*—wakefulness. For anger at first comes as a general warming up of the organism; then comes *उत्साह*—firmness, power. At *आवेग*, the sub-

1 Psych. Prin. Pp. 57, 375-376 ff.

2 Time and F. W. P. 7 e. s. P. 20 ff.

3 This is another fallacy in James-Lange theory that it takes a thing which by nature is non-presentable to be firstly non-existent and ends by positing it again as an effect of its own effect in a *hysteron proteron*.

ject is already excited, the whole organism becomes highly strung and at अमर्ष the challenge is given. The subject seems to be most effectively angry when the vyabhichāribhāvas of अपक्वता-unsteadiness, शीघ्र-fierceness and गर्व-pride sway him to and fro. Here the whole universe would seem to him to be swallowed up in a single paroxysm of anger, till he would no longer be able to bear it up. वेपथु, रोमान and गद्गद—a general shiver, horripilation and crying—are certainly the stages of fatigue where the subject can do nothing to appease his anger by giving vent to it through any outward act. It is anger wrecking itself and not its object. The subject is only helplessly angry, and remains so till anger leaves him absolutely prostrate.

A similar treatment of all the sthāyibhāvas or sentiments except that of s'ama. is given in the seventh adhyāya of the Nāṭyas'āstra. Taking the instance of anger, we find that its vibhāvas and the anubhāvas are the same as those mentioned above in connection with the raudra rasa.¹ This means that an actualization of a bhāva and its aesthetic experience stand on par. We have already defined the sthāyibhāvas as the residual vāsanās which pervade or literally "perfume" a particular experience. Still in the face of such a definition, when a complete description of a particular sthāyibhāva is given in terms of an actual emotion, we must not conclude that at the time when Bharatmuni formulated his theory of aesthetic experience, particular emotional manifestations were not differentiated from their corresponding dispositions. For even in the Nāṭyas'āstra we find the sthāyibhāvas defined as dispositions which are brought within reach of aesthetic experience by their corresponding rasas as given in the sixth adhyāya. We can say that Bharatmuni had to take recourse to such a method simply because a disposition can be defined only in terms of its particular manifestations, for language cannot describe the subconscious. Hence it is that in the seventh adhyāya we find their general characteristics laid down in terms

1 In addition, five types of anger are mentioned which we do not find in the description of the raudrasa given in the sixth adhyāya.

of their particular realizations. In these definitions of the sthāyibhāvas the words.....आदिभिरनुभूतैरभिज्ञैः प्रयोज्यैः turn up but we can apply the whole description of the particularizations of the different sthāyibhāvas to our *actual* experiences.

As a matter of course we can drop the whole of the aesthetic theory and take over in psychology all the descriptions given of all the bhāvas. In a theory of aesthetic experience (not aesthetic creation) we go from outward expression to inner content, while in actual experience we go in the opposite direction from feeling to expression. This is why we have in a way to invert the aesthetic theory to arrive at the psychological one of emotions. The rasas then would correspond to the *actual* emotional concrete experiences made up of whole situations in which we might differentiate but not separate the causes as well as the expressions. These we might term the primary emotions. McDougall has discussed the question of the blending of the primary emotions, giving us what he calls the secondary emotions. No doubt there can be an infinite number of shades given in such blending. We have already mentioned the Indian view-point according to which a sthāyibhāva would play the roll of a vyabhichāribhāva. But the total generic resultant experience is not some unnamable type of emotion. For the character of the original primary emotion during the experience of which another sthāyibhāva worked as a vyabhichāribhāva, would remain the same.¹

The list of such secondary emotions (given by McDougall and which is not meant by him to be exhaustive) contains scorn, loathing, horror, awe, admiration, reverence, gratitude, reproach, envy, resentment, vengeful emotion, embarrassment, shame, jealousy etc. These correspond to our vyabhichāribhāvas, for even according to McDougall's theory they can have no permanent place in the dispositions forming the mental structure. The Indian view-point is silent on the question of the origin of the secondary emotions and hence it seems to defer from McDougall's treatment of secondary emotions only in that, according to the former the vyabhichāribhāvas are not

1 Cf. Out. Psych. P. 332.

described as originating from a blending of the primary sthāyibhāvas.¹

Over and above these secondary emotions the vyabhichāribhāvas contain derived emotions like those of joy, anxiety, despondency, despair—हर्ष, विन्ता, विषाद and a certain phase of निर्वेद. McDougall describes them as "varieties of feeling" distinguishing them from "the true emotions—the primary and the blended."² One can see that the primary and the secondary emotions can be traced to the instinctive tendencies, but the derived emotions seem to be the modifications of the original feelings of pleasure and pain at the higher conceptual levels of mental life. We cannot trace them to any definite instinctive disposition, but have to accept them as facts of inner life found as so many mental coefficients tacked on to actual conative operations, at its conceptual level. The relation between success and joy, or that between defeat and despair or dejection, has to be taken as a fact or a datum behind which psychology cannot go.

Such discussions we do not find in the theory of Indian aesthetic, and the vyabhichāribhāvas include both the secondary and the derived emotions as given by McDougall. It seems these emotions were put in the same class, because according to Indian philosophical thought, हर्ष, विन्ता, विषाद etc. would be explained by the same concept of वासना working through अविवक्षा.

From the short foregoing treatment of the theory of aesthetic experience we can safely say that the whole of it as given in the Nāṭyasāstra was based upon a parallel psychological theory arrived at by an introspective and observational knowledge of actual emotional experiences. A differentiation of the expression of an emotion from its mental coefficient was carried out from the point of view of the dramatic art which was meant to induce only the aesthetic counterpart of the actual experience of a particular sthāyibhāva and even as we saw such a distinction was swallowed up ultimately in the

1 Only in the treatment of rasas we find such derivation, but it is, pure and not through blending.

2 Out. Psych. P. 338.

aesthetic unity of a *rasa*. The actual as well as the aesthetic experience of an emotion were held to be possible because of corresponding *vāsanās* embedded in the *chitta*. As we shall see instinctive activities too were explained through this very basis. The distinction between the *ālambana* and the *udīpana* *viśaya* has a psychological value. No doubt an emotion can be experienced only if there be its specific *vāsanā*, but even then a *vāsanā* is incapable of bodying itself out from the mind. It always wants some *ālambana*. A particular object that calls forth a specific *vāsanā* is its *ālambana*. Other objects may come up to cement this relation between the object and the *vāsanā*. They may reinforce the affective side, and fan the flame. All the same the *Ālambana-vibhāva* is the primary excitant cause of an emotion. And the theory exactly fits in with the underlying view of the human mind which we have tried to lay bare. मनस्तु साधिकारमाभयो वासनानाम् ।.....यदमिमुखीभूतं वस्तु वा वासना व्यनक्ति तस्याः तदालम्बनम् । यो. भा. ४. ११ ॥ "The *ālambana* of a *vāsanā* is that particular object which calls it forth when presented."

Thus a concrete emotional experience is an organic whole, made up of a *vāsanā*, its *ālambana*, and its *anubhāvas*; all the three are the necessary inseparable moments in its organic unity, which growing larger might as well include the several *vyabhichārībhāvas* along with their specific *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*.¹

Sources:—

S. 1:—जात एव हि जन्तुरिषतीभिः संविद्भिः परीतो भवति । तथा हि—“दुःख-संश्लेषविद्वेषी सुखास्वादनसादरः” इति न्यायेन सर्वो रिरसया व्याप्तः, स्वात्मन्युत्कर्षमानीतया परमुपहसन्नमीष्टवियोगसन्तप्तस्तप्रेतुषु कोपपरवशोऽप्यकौ च ततो भीरुः किंचिदुज्जिजीवुरप्यनु-चितवस्तुविषयवैमुख्यात्मकतयाक्रान्तः किंचिदनमीष्टतयासिमन्यमानः तत्तत्स्वपरकर्तव्यदर्शनसमु-दितविस्मयः किंचिच्च जिह्वाधुरेव जायते । न हेतुचितवृत्तिबाधनाशून्यः प्राणी भवति । केवलं कस्यचित्कचिदधिका चित्तवृत्तिः काचिदुत्ता । कस्यचिदुचितविषयनियन्त्रिता, कस्यचिदन्यथा । अभिनवगुप्त on भरतनाट्यशास्त्र. पृ. २८४ । The same passage occurs in

¹ The terminology in the latter part of the subsection is used irrespective of its reference to aesthetic experience. The one-sided character of James-Lange theory is due to its identification of a part with its whole. The theory from this stand-point has been criticized by Prof. Stout in his *Anal. Psych.*, Vol. I. P. 161 a. q.

Hemachandrāchārya's काव्यानु० पृ. ८३.—यद्वा भावयन्ति व्याप्नुवन्ति सामाजिकानां मन इति भाषाः स्वायिनो व्यभिचारिणश्च । तत्र स्वायित्वमेतावतामेव । जत एव हि अन्युरिच्छीभिः संभिद्रिः परीतो भवति । यथा हि दुःखद्वेषी दुःखस्वादनाम्नासः सर्वो रिरसया व्याप्तः स्वात्मन्युत्कर्षमानितया परमुहसति । उत्कर्षासयशंकया शोचति । अपायं प्रति कुप्यति । अपायहेतुपरिहारे समुत्सहते । विनिपाताद् विभेति । किमिदमुक्तयामिन्नन्यमानो जुगुप्सते । तत्तत्स्वपरकर्तव्यवैविध्यदर्शनाद्विरस्यते । किञ्चिज्ज्ञासुः तत्र वैराग्यात्प्रशमं भजते । न होतचित्तवृत्तिवासनाद्यन्यः प्राणी भवति । केवलं कस्यचित् कायिदधिका भवति चित्तवृत्तिः, कायिद्व्या । कस्यचिदुचितविषयनियंत्रिता कस्यचिदन्यथा । and...सामाजिकानां वासनारूपेण स्थितः स्वायी रत्वादिको भावः... । काव्यानु० पृ. ५७ ।

S. 2:—भावा इति कस्मात् ? किं भवन्तीति भावाः किं वा भावयन्तीति भावाः । उच्यते...तथा च भावितं वासितं कृतमित्यनर्थान्तरम् । लोकेऽपि च प्रसिद्धमहो ध्वनेन कम्पेन रसेन वा सर्वमेव भावितमिति ॥ नाट्य अ. ७ ॥

S. 3:—तत्र परस्परस्थापनात्मिका रतिः । चेतसो विकासो हासः । वैभूयं शोकः । तैक्ष्ण्यप्रबोधः क्रोधः । संरंभः स्वेयानुत्साहः । वैकल्यं भयम् । संकोचो जुगुप्सा । विस्तारो विस्मयः । तृष्णाक्षयः क्षमः ॥ काव्यानु० पृ. ८४ ॥

S. 4:—सर्वात्रेकादखंडस्वप्रकाशानंदचिन्मयः । वेद्यान्तरस्पर्शद्वन्द्वो ब्रह्मास्वादसहोदरः ॥ २ ॥ कण्ठादावपि रसे जायते वत्परं सुखम् । सचेतसामनुभवः प्रमाणं तत्र केवलम् ॥ ४ ॥ किं च तंषु वदा दुःखं न कोऽपि स्वात्तुदुःखः । तथा रामायणादीनां भविता दुःखहेतुता ॥ ५ ॥ ... सुखं संजायते तेभ्यः सर्वेभ्योऽपीति का क्षतिः ॥ ७ ॥ साहित्यदर्पण परि. ३ ॥ also cf. स्वादः काव्यायै संभेदात्मानंदसमुद्भवः । दशरूपक प्रकाश ४. ४३ ॥

S. 5:—पुनश्च भावान्वयस्यामि स्वायिसंचारिसत्त्वजान् ॥ १७ ॥ रतिहासश्च शोकश्च क्रोधोत्साहो भयं तथा । जुगुप्सा विस्मययेति स्वायिभावाः प्रकीर्तिता ॥ १८ ॥ शृंगारहास्यकण्ठा रौद्रवीरभयानकाः । भीमत्साद्रुतस्त्रौ चेत्यष्टौ नाट्ये रसाः स्मृताः ॥ १९ ॥ अत्राह—किं रसेभ्यो भावानामभिनिर्वृत्तिरुताहो भावेभ्यो रसानामिति ? उच्यते..... दृश्यते हि भावेभ्यो रसानामभिनिर्वृत्तिर्न तु रसेभ्यो भावानामभिनिर्वृत्तिरिति । न भाषहीनोऽस्ति रसो न भाषो रसवर्जितः । परस्परकृता सिद्धिरतयोरभिनयो भवेत् ॥ ४० ॥ यथा बीजा-द्रवैर्बुद्धो वृक्षात्पुष्पं फलं यथा । तथा मूलं रसाः सर्वे तेभ्यो भावा व्यवस्थिताः ॥ ४२ ॥ एवं भावा रसाश्च भावयन्ति परस्परम् ॥ नाट्य. अ. ६ ४१ ॥

S. 6:—न हि रसादृष्टे कश्चिदर्थः प्रकर्तते । तत्र विभाषानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगात्प्रसनि प्यतिः । को दृष्टान्तः । अत्राह—यथा हि नानाव्यञ्जनौषधिरव्यसंयोगात्प्रसनिष्पत्तिर्भवति । यथा हि—पुष्पादिभिर्ज्यैष्ठ्यैर्जनौषधिभिश्च वाक्वापयो रसा निर्वर्तन्ते, तथा नानाभाषोपपत्ता अपि स्वायिनो भावा रसत्वमाप्नुवन्ति इति ।.....यथा हि नानाव्यञ्जनसंस्कृतमनं भुञ्जामा रसामा-स्वादयन्ति, सुमनसः पुष्पा हर्षादीन्वाधिन्यच्छन्ति..... ॥ नाट्य. अ. ६ ॥ काव्यायै संश्रित-विभाषानुभावव्यञ्जितैरेकोनपंचाद्वैः सामान्यगुण्योमेनामिनिष्पद्यन्ते रसाः.....स्वायिन एव भावा रसत्वमाप्नुवन्ति ॥ नाट्य. अ. ७ ॥ विभाषानुभावव्यभिचारिभिरभिन्विष्टः स्वायी भाषो रसः ॥ काव्यानु० पृ. ५६ ॥

S. 7:—अथ विभाव इति कस्मात् । उच्यते—विभावः कारणं निमित्तं हेतुरिति पर्यायाः । (विभाव्यतेऽनेन वार्गमसत्त्वामिनय इति विभावः) ॥ नाट्य. अ. ७ ॥ चित्तवृत्तयो विभाव्यन्ते विशिष्ट-
तया ज्ञायन्ते यस्तैर्विभावे...आलम्बनोद्दीपनस्वभावैः ॥ काव्यानु० पृ. ५६ ॥ अनुभाव्यतेऽनेन वार्गगन्तु-
तोमिनय इति ॥ नाट्य ७ ॥ अनुभाव्यते साक्षात्कार्यते यस्तेरनुभावैः ॥ काव्यानु० पृ. ५६ ॥ विवि-
धमामिमुख्येन रसेषु चरन्तीति व्यभिचारिणः ।...रसान्नयन्तीतिव्यभिचारिणः । कथं नयन्तीति ।
उच्यते...लोकसिद्धान्त एषः यथा सूर्य इदं दिने नक्षत्रं वा नयतीति ॥ नाट्यः ७ ॥ विविधमामि-
मुख्येन चरणशीलैर्व्यभिचारिभिः ॥ (कारणकार्यसहचारी सद्यव्यपदेशैः विभाव-अनुभाव-व्यभि-
चारिभिः) काव्यानु० पृ. ५७ ॥ विभावैरनुभावैश्च सात्त्विकैर्व्यभिचारिभिः । आनीयमानः
स्वाद्यत्वं स्थायी भावो रसः स्मृतः ॥ १ ॥ ज्ञायमानतया तत्र विभावो भावपोषकः ।
आलम्बनोद्दीपनत्वप्रमेदेन स च द्विधा ॥ २ ॥ अनुभावो विकारस्तु भावसंभूतनात्मकः ॥ ३ ॥
विशेषादाभिमुख्येन चरन्तो व्यभिचारिणः । स्थायिमुन्मत्तनिर्मा कण्डोला इव वारिधौ ॥ ७ ॥
दशरूपक. प्रकाश-४ ॥

S. 8:—रसलक्षण एव स्थायित्वरूपे निरूपिते पुनर्निर्देशः क्वचिदेष्टा व्यभिचारित्वव्या-
प्यार्थः । तथा हि विभावभूविष्टत्वे एषां स्थायित्वम्, अल्पविभावत्वे तु व्यभिचारित्वम् ।...
शमस्य तु यद्यपि क्वचिदप्राधान्यम्, तथापि न व्यभिचारित्वम्, सर्वत्र प्रकृतित्वेन स्थायि-
मतत्वात् ॥ काव्यानु० पृ. ८४ ॥

S 9:—समः सर्वेषु भूतेषु स शान्तः प्रथितो रसः ॥ १०६ ॥ भावा विकारा
रत्नावाः शान्तस्तु प्रकृतिर्मतः । विकारः प्रकृतेर्जातः पुनस्तत्रैव लीयते ॥ नाट्य. ६. १०७ ॥
शृंगारादि भवेद्भास्यो रौद्राश्च कर्णो रसः । वीराश्चैवाद्भुतोत्पत्तिर्बीभत्साश्च भयानकः ॥ ४४ ॥
शृंगारतुङ्गतिर्या तु स हास्यस्तु प्रकीर्तितः । रोद्रस्थैश्च च यत्कर्म स ज्ञेयः कर्णो रसः ॥ ४५ ॥
वीरस्यापि च यत्कर्म सोऽद्भुतः प्रकीर्तितः । बीभत्सदर्शनं यत्र ज्ञेयः स तु भयानकः ॥
नाट्य ६ ४६ ॥

S. 10:—....विकासवितरक्षोभविक्षेपः स (स्वादः) चतुर्विधः ॥ ४३ ॥ शृंगारवीर-
बीभत्सरोद्रेषु मनसः क्रमात् । हास्याद्भुतभयोत्कर्षकक्षणां त एव हि ॥ दशरूपक. प्र. ४. ४४ ॥
विकासः कुसुमस्येवं पादपस्थैश्च विस्तरः । क्षोभोऽप्येतिश्च विक्षेपो मारुतस्येव चेतसः ॥ quoted
in काव्यसाहित्यमीमांसा ॥

S. 11:—विरुद्धैरविरुद्धैर्वा भावैर्विच्छिद्यते न च । आत्मभावं नयत्यन्यान् स स्थायी
लवणाकरः ॥ दशरूपक ४. ३४ ॥

S. 12:—निर्वेदग्लानिशंकाख्यास्तथासुया मद भ्रमः । आलस्यं चैव दैन्यं च
चिन्ता मोहः स्मृतिर्धृतिः ॥ १९ ॥ व्रीडा चपलता हर्ष आवेगो जडता तथा । गर्वो
विषाद औत्सुक्य निद्रापस्मार एव च ॥ २० ॥ सुप्त विबोधोऽमर्षश्चाप्यवहित्थमयोप्रता ।
मतिर्व्याधिस्तथोन्मादस्तथा मरणमेव च ॥ २१ ॥ त्रासश्चैव पितर्कश्च विज्ञेया व्यभिचारिणः ।
प्रवृत्तिप्रसादमी भाषाः समाख्यातास्तु नामतः ॥ नाट्य. ६. २२ ॥

S. 13:—यथा हि समानलक्षणास्तुल्यपाणिपादोदरशरीराः समानांगप्रत्यंगा अपि
पुरुषाः कुलशीलविद्याकर्मशिल्पविचक्षणत्वाद्वाजत्वमाप्नुवन्ति...तथा विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिणः
स्थाचिभावानुपाधिता भवन्ति । बह्वाभ्यत्वात् स्वामिभूताः स्थायिनो भावाः ।...यथा नृराणां
नृपतिः क्षिप्याणां च यथा गुरुः । एवं हि सर्वे भावानां भावः स्थायी महानिह ॥ नाट्य. अ. ७ ॥

S. 14:—ये पुनरसी ग्लानिर्लक्षप्रभृतयः चित्तवृत्तिविशेषाः ते समुचितविभावात्मन-
मध्येऽपि न भवन्त्येव ।.....यस्यापि वा भवन्ति विभावबलात्तस्यापि हेतुप्रक्षये क्षीयमणाः
संस्कारशेषतां नावश्यमनुबध्यन्ति । उत्साहादयस्तु संपादितस्वावश्यकतव्यतया प्रलीवकस्या अपि
संस्कारशेषतां नातिवर्तन्ते कर्तव्यान्तरविषयस्योत्साहादेरसंबन्धात् ।.....तस्मात्स्यायिरूपचित्तवृत्ति-
सूत्रस्यूता एवामी व्यभिचारिणः स्वात्मानमुदयास्तमयवैचित्र्यक्षतसहस्रधर्माण प्रतिक्षममाना.....
(तस्मिन् सूत्रे) स्वसंस्कारवैचित्र्यमनिवेशयन्तोऽपि तत्सूत्रकृतमुपकारसंदर्भं विप्रतः स्वयं च....
विचित्रार्थस्यायिसूत्रं च विचित्रयन्तः.....पूर्वपरव्यभिचारिरत्नच्छायासबलिमानमवश्य-
मानयन्तः प्रतिभासन्त इति व्यभिचारिण उच्यन्ते । तथा हि ' ग्लानोऽयम् ' इत्युक्ते कुत इति
हेतुप्रभेनास्यायितास्य सूच्यते । न तु राम उत्साहशक्तिमानित्यत्र हेतुप्रभमाहुः । एव विभावाः
तत्रोद्बोधकाः सन्तः स्वरूपोपरजकत्व विदधाना रत्युत्साहादेरुचितानुचितत्वमात्रमावहन्ति । न
तु तदभावे सर्वैर्येव ते निरुपाख्याः, वासनात्मना सर्वजतूनां तन्मयत्वेनोक्तत्वात् । व्यभिचारिणां
तु स्वविभावाभावे नामापि नास्तीति.....॥ अभिनवगुप्त on नाट्य. पृ. २८४-२८५ ॥
The same passage occurs in क'व्यानु० पृ. ८४ ।

S 15:—इह हि सत्त्व नाम मनः प्रभवम् । तस्य च योऽसौ स्वभावो रोमांश्चाश्रु-
वैवर्ण्यादिलक्षणो यथाभावोपगतः स न शक्योऽन्यमनसा कर्तुमिति ।*

(2) Instincts

The bare feelings of pleasure and pain seem simple in their character when we compare them with the affective tone that clings to the experience of objects calling forth instinctive reactions. Instincts and emotions are mutually related. What might call forth a bodily reaction or an adaptation in case of an animal crossing an object of instinct, produces in man a general disturbance or an all pervading change in his organic kinaesthetic sensations, producing an emotion so that he feels himself a different man. We cannot say that an animal reacting to an object of instinct, has no inward experience of an accompanying emotion. Still emotions are so very private that going from man to beast, we would not be warranted to draw any conclusion based as it would be on such uncertain method as that of *projection* leading to a confusion between 'the stand-point of a given experience' which in the case of

* For want of space details of all the emotions are not given. These show acute powers of introspection and observation. What we have done is merely to lay bare the psychological ground underlying the theory of aesthetic experience of the rasas.

an animal we do not know, and 'the stand-point of its exposition' which somehow is got up.

Instincts too like emotions are treated negatively in Indian philosophy. The yamas of the Yogadars'ana contain moral injunctions to suppress the instinctive reactions as well. *अहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिमहा यमाः ॥ २. २० ॥* The sūtra enjoins upon a sād'haka to be free from violence, falsehood or lie, stealing, instinct of sex and lastly from the instinct of possession.¹ If we view these apart from the moral injunction to be free from it, i. e. purely psychologically, we would see in each of them an instinctive reaction—and this even in case of falsehood, for the 'will to lie' is only the other side of fear or false sense of self-defence and it seems to be so ingrained in man that we might add it on to the total list of instincts.²

In Jainism a more positive treatment of instincts is met with. There instincts are said to be the most universal concomitants of that incipient level of mental existence present even in worms termed *संज्ञा*, which enables them to preserve themselves physically. Bare *संज्ञा* is common to worms, ants, bees, and man—mentioned in *कृमिपिपीलिकाप्रमत्तनुत्यादीनामेवैकसंज्ञानि ॥ तत्त्वार्थ २. २४ ॥* Now *संज्ञा* as it passes from creatures of two senses to those having five senses becomes more and more specific, and develops from bare *संज्ञा* to *संप्रधारण संज्ञा* i. e., to take the instance of perception only, from mere *अवग्रह* to *धारणा*. We have clearly stated in our section on Perception that this in no way implies the dynamic concept of evolution. Nevertheless we can hold that in its own way it comes up to what might be called a "mental recapitulation" of all the stages of perception in man shown by other less or

1 Greater prominence was given to all these in Jainism and Buddhism.

2 Even in such ordinary verses as *स्मरणं कीर्तनं केलिः प्रेक्षणं गुणभाषणं । सफलपोऽप्यवसायश्च क्रियानिवृत्तिरेव च ॥ एतन्मैथुनमष्टांगं प्रवदन्ति मनीषिणः । विपरीतं ब्रह्मचर्यमेतदेवाष्टलक्षणम् ॥*—inspite of its negative treatment, we find the eight types of instinctive reactions to sex faithfully depicted namely—remembering the object of sex, praising it, playing with it, looking at it, indulging in secret talks with it, willing to have it, dwelling upon that wish or will, and the final act.

more developed co-existent "closed" species. The higher specifications of संज्ञा are classed under the संप्रधारण संज्ञा, as distinguished from the generic संज्ञा. संज्ञिनः समनस्काः ॥ तत्त्वार्थ-२. २५ ॥ संप्रधारणसंज्ञायां संज्ञिनो जीवाः समनस्का भवन्ति ।.....ईदोपोहयुक्ता गुणदोषविचारणात्मिका संप्रधारणसंज्ञा ।.....अन्यथा आहारमयमैथुनपरिग्रहसंज्ञाभिः सर्वा एव जीवाः संज्ञिन इति ॥ भा. २. २५. ॥ From this passage we understand that the most generic consciousness present even in worms expresses itself through the instincts of food-seeking, fear, sex and the instinct of possession. There is no Platonic idealism; no communism is possible except in the case of Souls that have expressly dedicated themselves to final Moksha and for them it is a necessity. The possessions of a man constitute his outermost self or his external life for he lives in and through them. The instinct of possession is based upon the tendency of mind or consciousness to spread over other objects.¹ This relation between the mind of a man and his possessions is definitely recognized in a quotation given in the Sarvadaśanasaṅgraha where it is said that depriving a man of his possessions is to rob him of, or kill, his outer life.

तदेतत्संप्रपञ्चमुक्तमईता—

अनादानमदत्तस्यास्तेयव्रतमुदीरितम् ।

बाह्याः प्राणः नृणामर्थो हरता सं हता हि ते ॥ सर्व-० पृ. ६५.²

संज्ञा is also divided into ज्ञानसंज्ञा and अनुभवसंज्ञा.³ ज्ञानसंज्ञा is the same as संप्रधारणसंज्ञा, while the latter according to the आचार्य-निरुक्ति गाथा ३८-३९ includes, over and above the आहार, भय, मैथुन, परिग्रह mentioned in तत्त्वार्थ-भा. २. २५, क्रोध, मान, माया, लोभ, ओष, लोक, मोह, धर्म, सुख, दुःख, शुश्रूषा and शोक, thus giving us a total of sixteen types

1 We might say that such *spreading* means imposition and implies in a sense *अध्यास*. Cf. "How greater is the pleasure when a man feels a thing to be his own, for the love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured." Artist quoted in Bosanquet's Companion to Plato's Rep. Also Cf. "When I as a free will am in possession of something, I get a tangible existence." "Property makes objective my personal individual will." and again "In property my will takes the shape of a person." Hegel's Phil: of Rights §44, §45, §46 a. s.

2 The references in the paragraph are taken from कर्मसंग्रह, Vol. 4. P. 38-39. (Hindi) by Pt. Sukhalalji.

of experiences contained in the most general consciousness. In भगवतीसतक ७, उद्देश ८-प्रज्ञापनापद ४, only the first ten are given while the last six are struck off from the list.¹

Here क्रोध is anger, मान is the sense of the ego, माया is the tendency to deceive, and लोभ is greed. Under क्रोध comes a very large class comprehending instinctive recognition (ओषज्ञान as opposed to intellectual knowledge—मति, धृत etc.) followed by specific instinctive reactions. Even the geotropism of plants, the tendency of the creeper to cling to something and climb higher up, is contained in ओषवृत्ति. लोक is the instinctive tendency to follow others and their beliefs. We might compare this favourably with the "herd-instinct." मोह is infatuation, the tendency to be attached to or possessed by something and धर्म is a general leaning to religiosity. Such a tendency to religious view of things is traced nowadays even into savages where it is found mixed with baser matter.² In Jainism this tendency towards religion is held to be common to all the 24 Daṇḍakas (kinds) of beings from the lowest to the vaimānika devas. सुख and दुःख are classed here along with instincts, simply because the purpose of the author (of भावारागनिर्वृत्ति) is not an enumeration of instincts, but to show the several concomitants of consciousness common to a worm and a vaimānika god. जुगुप्सा is the sense of aversion or disgust, and शोक is grief.

Some of these like मान, जुगुप्सा, शोक, क्रोध etc.³ might be lifted up to the level of an emotion, all the same in all these reactions the mind of the individual follows not the guidance of reason, but some "surd" contained in his own nature,

1 In the भगवती सतक we read : [प्र.] कति ण भंते । सप्ताओ पन्नत्ताओ ? [उ.] गोयमा ! दस सप्ताओ पन्नत्ताओ, तं जहा—आहारसप्ता, भयसप्ता, मेहुणसप्ता, परिगहसप्ता, कोहमप्ता, माणसप्ता, मायासप्ता, लोभसप्ता, लोयसप्ता, ओहसप्ता । एवै जाव वेमाणियणं । धीमब् भगवती सूत्र. ७ उद्देश ८. Vol. in. P. 27. (Gujarat Puratattva Mandir Publication)

2 Comparative Religion. F. B. Jevons.

3 जुगुप्सा "repulsion", मान "self-assertion" are regarded as instincts proper by McDougall. क्रोध would come under the "instinct of Combat" Vide—Out. Psych. Chap. V. Joy and grief are regarded by him as derived emotions. Vide. supra I'. 207.

which draws him out inspite of himself. At the centre of an emotion there is some object which appeals to the mind in some purely instinctive fashion. A physiologist might say that our emotional experiences are merely due to the outgrowth of the cerebral cortex over the little cerebellum. Perhaps it is the price a human being has to pay for having a larger brain.

This brings us to the most moot question of the origin of instincts. The only instinct that is positively discussed in the Yogadars'ana as regards its origin is that of fear. To this the Nyāyadaras'ana adds those of joy, grief and sucking.¹ The discussion is entered upon to prove the existence of innumerable past lives, saṃskāras of which we carry with us. Finally these instinctive propensities are evaluated from the point of view of Yoga.

This instinct of fear is the reverse side of instinctive love for life. According to the Upanishadic view, such fear always comes from the other.² That other is, we might say, the most universal death, which seems to be the law governing all things born. This love for life is not of any accidental origin, but has flown on from eternity past in the form of a vāsanā, which has become all the stronger because of the infinite number of similar experiences of death met with in lives past. It is held to be so strong that not even a learned man is free from it. स्वस्ववाही विदुषोऽपि तथा हृदोऽभिमिवेक्षः ॥ यो. १. ९ ॥

The theory of the origin of instincts is based upon the characteristic of our mind to preserve structurally all the experiences of an infinite number of past lives. According to the law of karma our present life itself is but the outcome of past actions bearing fruit. This process of fruition we cannot ordinarily know for the workings of the law of karma are never given directly. Over and above the adaptations and reactions acquired in the present life there are certain congenital reactions which can only be explained on the hypothesis of enduring traces left by the experiences of former lives.

1 पूर्वान्यस्तस्मत्पुनरुपजातस्य हर्षमयशोकसंप्रतिपत्तेः ॥ न्या. सू. ३. १. १९ ॥

2 Vide Const. Sur, Up. Phil: P. 115,

Thus the residua left by the experiences of all the deaths of bygone lives are sunk deep in a creature's mind. Each one of these residua was left by a unique experience of death inasmuch as after having it the individual no longer lived to re-call it. So the residua could only be carried forward structurally as a congenital disposition on the page of the next life, expressing itself in the most general form of an instinctive fear of death. Such fear could not have been acquired in the present life for the creature had no such experience of death. स चायमभिनिवेशः क्लेशः, स्वरसवाही, कुमेरपि जातमात्रस्य, प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमैरसंभावितो मरणत्रास उच्छेददृष्ट्यात्मकः पूर्वजन्मानुभूतं मरणदुःखमनुमापयति ॥ यो. भा. १. ९ ॥ cf. जातः सत्त्वयं कुमारकोऽस्मिन् जन्मन्यगृहीतेषु हर्षभयशोकहेतुषु हर्षभयशोकान् प्रतिपद्यते किमानुमेयान् । ते च स्मृत्यनुबन्धादुत्पद्यन्ते नान्यथा ॥ न्या. भा. ३. १. १९ ॥ That it is an instinct of fear unacquired by any experience in the present life is shown by the fact that even a young child on seeing something dangerous begins to tremble. जातमात्र एव हि बालको मारकवस्तुदर्शनाद्वेपमानः कम्पविशेषादनुमितमरणप्रत्यासत्तिः ततो बिभ्यदुपलभ्यते । And the conclusion comes तस्मात्तस्य तथाभूतस्य स्मृतिः परिशिष्यते । न चेयं संस्काराहते । न चायं संस्कारोऽनुभवं विना । न चास्मिन्नन्यनुभव इति प्राग्भवीयः परिशिष्यत इत्यासीत्पूर्वजन्मसंबन्धः ।¹ यो. टी. २. ९ ॥ तं च स्मृत्यनुबन्धादुत्पद्यन्ते । स्मृत्यनुबन्धश्च पूर्वान्यासमन्तरेण न भवति । पूर्वान्यासश्च पूर्वजन्मनि सति, नान्यथेति ॥ न्या. भा. ३. १. १९ ॥

The Nyāya argument given in the अनादिनिधनप्रकरणम् amounts to this very position. In the Yogadars'ana, the eternal unchanging nature of the soul is taken for granted, and it has only to prove the existence of past lives. This is done by means of the theory of instinctive fear. The Nyāyadars'ana, as it proceeds logically, proves the eternal nature of the soul with the help of the same theory about the origin of instincts. Along with fear it also brings in joy and grief and the instinct of sucking found in the child. This last is the food-seeking instinct. Why joy and grief should have been posited as instincts it is hard to see. It seems they have been

1 Cf. तासां (वासनानाम्) अनादित्वं चाऽऽशेषो नित्यत्वात् ॥ यो. सू. ४. १० ॥ also जातमात्रस्यजन्तोरननुभूतमरणधर्मकस्य द्वेषदुःखानुस्मृतिनिमित्तो मरणत्रासः कथं भवेत् । etc. भाष्य on ४. १०.

included, because they are in a sense the most elemental reactions of a living creature which defy any explanation based upon acquired habits. So too, the various affective dispositions resulting in the primary emotions could have been added, inasmuch as they have their source in the same structural stuff of *vāsanās*. Thus instinct might be defined as an unacquired capacity to feel or act in a certain specific way. Such a definition would cover the whole field of the sixteen concomitants of generic *samā* given in Jainism. Against such a definition of instinct either the Yoga or the Nyāya would not object. For क्लेशकर्मविपाकानुभवनिर्वर्तितामिस्तु वासनाभिरनादिकालस-
मूढितमिदं चित्तम् विचित्रीकृतमिव । यो. भा. २. १३ ।—The fabric of mind is as it were so very strange, pervaded through and through as it is from eternity by the *vāsanās* deposited by the experiences of infections, actions, and their fruitions

The reasoning used to establish the theory of instincts is closely given in the न्याय भाष्य ३. १. २२.¹ where the case examined is that of a newly born child trying to reach its mamma without any previous experience. The argument is the same, that instinctive reactions could not have been acquired in this birth, as they manifest themselves in their specialized form quite early. Hence they presuppose a former birth. An objection is raised against what we might term *The Past Lives Theory of Instinct*, that all instinctive behaviour might be classed along with such physical events as those of the opening and the closing down of a lotus, and be explained in the same way.² That phenomenon, it is held, can be explained by different causes while instinct alone is a surd which cannot be explained by any such method.

The Buddhistic explanation of unacquired reactions is the

1 सखल्वयमात्मा पूर्वशरीरात्प्रेत्य शरीरान्तरमापन्नः क्षुत्पीडितः पूर्वान्यस्तमाहारमनुस्मरन् स्तन्यममिलयति । The passage in the bhashya over and above giving us an explanation of instinct, tells us that a Soul in the state of bondage 'feels all the pangs of physical hunger' Vide Supra p. 181

2 Vide Supra. P. 121 for the explanation given in Yogadars'ana by वाच० of the phenomenon. Cf. The न्यायसूत्र-पद्यादिषु प्रबोधसम्पन्नीकृतविकारवसतद्विकारः ॥ ३. १. २. ॥

same. The Bhavaṅga-Sota or the Ālaya Viññāṇa contains the traces left by past experiences of all lives so that both these concepts in this respect come very near the conception of chitta regarded as the repository of vāsanās.

This brings us to the consideration of the Past Lives Theory of Instinct in the light of the modern evolutionistic theory of instinct based upon the principle of heredity. The theory of heredity has yet much to prove in the sphere of mental characters. The chromosomes furnish, we might grant, enough material for the acceptance of the principle of heredity working in the field of physical characters in case of living beings. But with mind, we seem to come up to a different entity. Even taking for granted that an instinct is a set form of inherited reactions in an organism, it seems an extremely uphill task for the first organism that must have groped in the absolute dark to arrive at the right sort of reactions. Life would seem impossible under such circumstances. If we take that the principle of life itself is such that some of its reactions are patent to it, and need not be acquired by an individual the theory lands us in a sort of vitalism that cannot console an individual. It merely says that the reactions are there, because life is there.

So far as automatic physical reactions are concerned the theory of heredity may posit "racial memory." Even then whatever the meaning of such a phrase as "racial memory" be in a system, it is at least dark to an individual with a life of his own. We may say that such concepts are only the products of the process of विकल्प. The appeal of Indian Philosophy lies to the individual, and hence instead of setting up a *biological law of racial heredity* it formulated a theory of instincts based upon *the fundamental fact of mental inheritance*. We do not want to make out a case for The Past-Lives Theory of Instinct, but only suggest in the words of Mrs. Rhys Davids, that 'whereas the vast field of possible antecedents for any individual rebirth make scientific inquiry fairly bootless, the theory does not break its shins as does our theory of heredity against the anomalies arising in the transmission of mental

faculties the 'conditions of which are yet unsolved by science.'"
(Bud. Psych. P. 26)

Note:—

There is a detailed reference to the contents of अनुभवसंज्ञा i. e. to instincts proper in the first volume of लोकप्रकाश called इव्यलोकप्रकाश P. 163 by श्रीविनयविजयजी. The passage reads:—

संज्ञा स्याद् ज्ञानरूपिका, द्वितीयानुभवात्मिका ।

तत्राद्या पंचधाज्ञानमन्या च स्यात्स्वरूपतः ॥ ४४२ ॥

x

x

x

भगवती सप्तमशतकाष्टमोदशके तु—

“ आहारमय परिग्रहमेतद्बुद्धं तद् कोह माण माया च ।

लोभोलोभो ओहो सन्ना दस सव्यजीवाणं ” ॥ ४४७ ॥

एतावद् बृक्षोपलक्षणेन सर्वकद्रियाणां साक्षादेव दर्शिताः । तथ्या—

“ रुह्मणा जलाहारो, संकोअणिआ भएण संकुद्धं ।

निअंतुएहि वेडइ बली रुह्मे परिग्रहेइ ॥ ४४८ ॥

“ इत्थिपरिभरणे कुरुमगतरणो फलंति मेहुणे ।

तद् कोनदस्स कंदे, हुंकारे सुअइ कोहेणं ॥ ४४९ ॥

“ माणे हरइ रुअंती छाया बली फलइ मायाए ।

लोभे विअपलासा, खिअंति मूले निहाणुवरि ॥ ४५० ॥

“ रयणीए संकोओ, कमलाण होइ लोमसप्राए ।

ओहे च इत्तु मग्ग चडंति रुह्मेखु बलीओ ” ॥ ४५१ ॥

x

x

x

भयसंज्ञान्विताः स्तोका मनुष्याः सूर्ययाकर्म ।

संख्येयप्रा भुक्तिपरिग्रहमेधुनसंज्ञकाः ॥ ४५५ ॥

x

x

x

आचारांगटीकार्या पुनरभिहितं ओघसंज्ञा तु अव्यक्तोपयोगरूपा बलीवितामरोहणादिसंज्ञा, लोकसंज्ञा स्वच्छदघटितविकल्परूपा लोकोपचरिता यथा न सत्यनपत्यस्य लोकाः श्रानोयक्षा, विप्रा देवा, काकाः पितामहाः, बर्हिणां पक्षावतेन गर्भ इत्यादिका इति ।

It tells us that, there are two types of संज्ञा, one the ज्ञानसंज्ञा, the other अनुभवसंज्ञा. The former consists of the five kinds of knowledge, (मति, ध्रुत, अवधि, मनःपर्याय, केवल). The latter according to Bhagavatis'ataka contains the ten concomitants mentioned above. Taking the instance of an ekendriya jīva i. e. वनस्पति (Vide the classification of Jīvas given on P. 47) we find that the वनस्पति lives on water (आहार), and through fear they get contracted (भय). The creepers with their winding threads

catch hold of a tree and climb up (परिग्रह), and a kurabaka tree (a species of amaranth) bears fruit when embraced by a woman (मैथुन), while the bulb of कोकलद (red lotus) gives out a sound through anger (कोष). A रुद्री creeper oozes through मान—self-respect, and the creepers through (parental) attachment hide their fruits while the विलपलस tree sends its roots in the earth through greed (लोभ). The lotuses close down at night on account of the लोकसंज्ञा. *s. e.* गतानुगतिकता through mutual imitation, and on account of the ओषसंज्ञा the creepers climb up. ... In the Āchārāṅga Tīkā the same instance of the geotropism of a creeper is given as an instance of the ओषसंज्ञा, while as instances of लोकसंज्ञा are given the cases of gratuitous false beliefs somehow formed by people with the help of the विकल्प process, e. g. people having no son cannot go to heaven, dogs are Yakshas while brahmins are gods and crows dead ancestors etc. While fear governs comparatively a less number, आहार, मैथुन and परिग्रह seem to be universal in man.

Section 11 Will

In a former section we have fully dwelt upon the levels of attention and their relation to the subconscious structure of our mind. Attention as such does not come up for discussion in Yogic literature. The levels of attention are only the levels of mind, and in the progressive dhyāna-praxis ekāgratā is treated in terms of the whole mind becoming one with its object. The higher levels of attention mean a wider outlook which can only be achieved by a purgation from the lower self. The moral values creep in here so inperceptibly and so naturally that Indian philosophic thought had no need to formulate a separate branch of a normative science called Ethics. In the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho there is a reference informing us that the Jhāna-praxis many result in grief into the hands of the immoral. सप्त ज्ञानेयानि । वितर्कः, विचारः, पीति, एकग्रता, सोमनस्स, दोमनस्स, उपेक्षा ॥ ७. १६ ॥¹ Here दोमनस्स seems to have been inserted to show the way the dhyāyin shall not go. Generally the the dhyānas at higher levels imply an absence of any reference to the lower self, where the subject with the help of progressive *Katharsis* is enabled to maintain the same higher tension of attention without the factor of an extraneous need forcing or aiding him to concentrate his attention. Attention at lower levels is no doubt at first seen mixed up with the fulfilment of needs. These petty needs may even pose as so many guides to the fixation of attention. The Yoga-praxis firstly frees the inner coefficient of attention from the impositions of any outward unity got up by a need, and afterwards develops it in a way so that it be able to impose its own unity upon the outside world.

While dealing with the levels of attention, we had to define attention throughout negatively. It is always so when we try to touch directly the functioning of Self in the present. Attention is pre-eminently non-presentational by its very nature. The outworks are seen, the inner activity eludes our grasp. If, while standing at the sea-shore, with the ocean rising

¹ Vide. Comp. Phil: P. 175 fn. 2.

in tide, the waters themselves were to become suddenly invisible, but each time a mightier wave were to show us the mysterious depositing of dregs as the highwater mark reached by the advancing tide and if even the din of the invisible waves were to fill our ears all the while, how should we explain the entity underlying such sense phenomena. Firstly a sādhaṅga is asked to get control over some āsana, then get rid of all the vikshepas and vikshepasahabhuvas like व्याधि, स्त्यान, भंगमेजयत्न etc.; then he is asked to go in for a प्रयत्नशयित्व and eliminate all the unnecessary nascent movements of the body as far as possible. Then comes प्रत्याहार—withdrawing of the senses from their respective stimuli, and all this while one might wonder as to whether the process corresponds to an actual intensification or to a general *de-tensification* of the sādhaṅga's attention. For there is always the possibility mentioned by Bergson that our sādhaṅga getting disinterested in the present would drop off into sleep! We find the same difficulty while treating of will.

Modern psychology tells us that the functions of attention and of will are at their root one and the same thing. Attention is will applied to the sphere of thought, while will is attention applied to one and the same idea till a change in the outside environment corresponding to the idea is achieved by a more or less complex series of movements. Whatever the degree of perfection attained over motor actions, our conative acts always fall short of our inner volitions. This is the reason why all external acts are regarded as mixed with good and evil—शुक्लकृष्ण, while mental acts alone are regarded as शुक्ल—unmixed with evil. In the outward acts of mixed moral values, the element of goodness is derived only from the pure act of mental volition. (Vide यो. भाष्य and ४. ७ ४.१०)¹

1 शुक्लकृष्ण बहिः साधनसाध्या ।.....शुक्ल तपःस्वाध्यायध्यानवताम् । सा हि केवले मनस्यायत्तत्वादबहिःसाधनाधीना न परान्पीडयित्वा भवति । ४-७ । तथा चोक्तम्—ये चेतो वैश्यादयो ध्यायिनां विहारस्ते बाह्यसाधननिरनुग्रहात्मानः प्रकृष्टं धर्ममभिनिर्वर्तयन्ति । Cf. "There is nothing in the world or even out of it, that can be called good without qualification except a good will." Also—"It is the only jewel that shines by its own light."—Kant—Metaphysic of Morals—Sec. I.

A mental discipline that primarily rests upon a definite recognition of the levels of attention cannot be wholly blind to the nature of volition. For all systems of Indian thought intellect and volition are inseparable. Here intellect or *Buddhi* is not that lower thought process based primarily upon *vikalpa*, but that higher intellect functioning by way of determining or deciding. The different *dhyānas* are calculated to train up this *Buddhi* and take it to higher levels, at the same time that external objects are removed from its orbit, thus developing what in ethics is called the pure timeless will.

In the progressive approach to the higher *dhyānas*, the subject is obstructed by many external objects and inward infections and attachments. At such moments he is advised to take off his mind, by an act of will, from the alluring object, and to keep up a diametrically opposite idea before his mind by voluntary attention. Even after overcoming all the *vikleṣas* and the *vikṣepas*, the *sādhaka* is way laid by such temptations. They arise either from the original structure of his mind from whence the older residua have not yet disappeared, or from the powers that come to him in the form of *Siddhis* as he advances on his spiritual path. The latter class of temptations fall within the sphere of abnormal psychology, and we need not dwell upon them. A passing remark is enough for us that the *siddhis* said to accompany the higher *dhyānas* are almost the same with all the different schools of Indian thought. But if we leave aside the content of the *siddhis*, we cannot do so with the psychological manner in which a subject is advised to be free from their disturbing influences. For it is said:—*स्थान्युपनिमंत्रणे संगमयाकरणे पुनरनिष्टप्रसंगात् ॥* यो. ३. ५१ ॥ When gods invite to pleasures, one should show neither any attachment or curiosity towards those temptations, nor show any haughtiness at not succumbing to them. In the *bhāṣya* it is more clearly expressed—*संगमकृत्वा स्मयमपि न कुर्वन्निमग्नं देवानामपि प्रार्थनीय इति ।* For even such arrogance stands in the way of further (spiritual) progress by weakening the strength of will. Here we find the truth of the oft-repeated statement that a man can advance only with humility by his side. This

is that positive humility which proceeds from inner strength and which must be distinguished from a wrongly termed one born of weakness.

In case of temptations cropping up in the mind due to the straggling time-old *samskāras*, the subject has to keep some other idea of good fixed in his mind as opposed to the temptation. विदुर्कथायने प्रतिपक्षमाचनम् ॥ २. ३३ ॥ ... एवमुन्मार्गप्रवणवितर्कज्वरेणातिवीर्येन बाध्यमानः तत्प्रतिप्रक्षान्मावयेत् ॥ भा. ॥—When evil thoughts come one should fix one's mind on good thoughts opposed to bad ones. When heated by the high fever of sins tempting to lead one along the wrong path, one should always think of thoughts opposed to those of sins. Sokratic intellectualism had this very meaning. When he maintained that "*epistēmē*" was "*aretē*", that knowledge was virtue, he meant that an ignorant man would never be able to free himself from the clutches of evil, because he was not in possession of any idea which he could oppose, in time of need, to the bad one. The maxim '*gnōthi seauton*'—'know thyself' was not used in the Upanishadic sense that one must know the inner Absolute Self, but it rather meant that one should know the exact connotations of all words that one generally used, and also know the exact meanings of concepts like good and bad. Indian philosophic thought is intellectualistic in the sense that knowledge of the good is held to be an essential factor leading to moral life.

If that necessary knowledge be not there, the mind being by nature dynamic, always goes on automatically in its usual rounds of कृतिशंस्कार expressing Avidyā through them. At this stage we are now able to fill the necessary links between a mode of mind and its *samskāra* and a future mode of mind which it induces. First there is the necessary relation between virtue and pleasure and vice and unpleasure. Then from pleasure comes attachment from pain aversion. Thence comes effort. Urged by this effort one either favours or hurts another by the acts of mind, body and speech; i. e. these acts in turn get the moral values of good or bad, virtuous or vicious. From these again come pleasure pain, attachment aversion and

again good and bad. Thus the six spoked wheel of the world goes on revolving, the prime mover of which is Avidyā, the root of all infections. धर्मास्तुल्यधर्माद् दुःखम् । सुखादप्यो दुःखाद् द्वेषस्ततश्च प्रकलः तेन ममता वाचा कथेन वा परिस्पन्दमानः परमनुशङ्कति उपहन्ति वा, ततः पुनर्धर्माधर्मौ दुःखदुःखे रागद्वेषौ इति प्रवृत्तिमिदं चर संसारचक्रमस्य च प्रतिक्षणमावर्तमानस्याविद्या नेत्रो, मूलं सर्वज्ञेयानाम् ॥ यो. भा. ४. ११ ॥¹ For the purpose of our section we have to find out between which spokes the living nexus of will lies. The spokes themselves are the comparatively extraneous factors. Now Dharma and Adharma lie in the past. They are the seeds of the past actions which bear fruit in the present in the shape of feelings of pleasure and pain. This much gives us the passive side (उपपत्तिश्च of Buddhism) of life. But attachment and aversion are already dynamic in their character. It is maintained that our determination to act, in the ordinary course, comes after rāga and dvesha. But this प्रयत्न which comes after rāga or dvesha is only a semblance of will, the outer will working itself out automatically. The inner will is prior to attachment and aversion. The fresh cycle binding the individual down to the world begins when he gives preference to प्रेयस् instead of श्रेयस् a distinction drawn at least as early as Kaṭha. The general tendency is to choose the more easy and it is against such reinforcing strength of pleasure, against this fundamental psychological hedonism, that a man has to work. The experiences of pleasure and unpleasure by themselves lie on the passive side of life, and as such they do not necessarily bring a man within the centripetal influences of the maelstrom-wheel. The binding factors come through अविद्या and hence will as exhibited in knowledge is regarded as the true deliverer.

The question then reduces itself to this—How shall a man choose knowledge and not allow the Avidyā with its shoreless past to turn him into an automaton. The bhāshya on 4. 25 tells us that in case a man has in his subconscious depths the traces of that love for knowledge called by Plato *Eros* then, and then alone, he may have some curiosity in matters

1 The number of spokes according to the Buddhistic doctrine of पञ्चसमुत्पाद is twelve, but the idea is the same.

spiritual, while in case he has no such saṃskāras to his credit he can have no *liking* for a *will* towards the higher path. This would mean that in a sense our will is influenced by our past. The choice of words in the bhāṣya is quite meaningful. बोद्धव्यमेवमेवैव रोमहांसुपातो दृश्येते तत्राप्यस्ति विशेषदर्शनबीजमप्यव्ययमणीयं कर्माभिनिर्वर्तितस्य इत्यनुमीयते । तस्याऽऽत्मभावभाषना स्वामात्रिको प्रवर्तते । अस्याभावादित्युक्तं स्वभाषं मुक्त्वा दोषायेषां पूर्वपक्षे दृष्टिर्भवति अदृष्टिश्च निर्जने भवति ।¹ Here we are definitely told that each and every act of ours leaves its trace on our mind which in turn affects our future acts. Modern psychology tells us that these saṃskāras of acts do not remain scattered in our sub-consciousness, but form themselves into organic groups functioning as wholes or conative dispositions. We already know that the saṃskāras mentioned in the Yogadars'ana are—ज्ञानजाः हि संस्काराः स्मृतिहेतवोऽविद्यादिसंस्कारा अविविक्तानां क्लेशानां हेतवः, विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगरूपः तस्य हेतवो धर्माधर्मयोः (कच's टीका on १. १८).—the traces left by knowledge i. e. by the five different modes of mind form one class; the others are deposited by Avidyā which in turn result in the particular infections of our mind. There is a third type of saṃskāras left by the elements of virtue and vice contained in different acts. The first type gives, as we have already seen, cognitive dispositions. The second type functions by inducing affective reactions. The third type of saṃskāras form themselves into total conative dispositions. It is only by a process of vikalpa that we can distinguish between these three kinds of dispositions; they work like the three guṇas in ceaseless *endosmosis* between one another. In a sense our several cognitions and affections are so many mental acts, and in their wider connotation the conative dispositions include these. कर्माभिनिर्वर्तितम् विशेषदर्शनबीजम्—the specific seed deposited by the act inclining a man towards self-realization is, we might say, the trace of an act along with its affective tone. (In the particular instance it is free from the klesh-

1 In the Nyayadars'ana too these Dispositional Masses are recognized as influencing our will in the present. पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धास्तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ ४. १. ४१ ॥ पूर्वकृतो जन्मान्तरोपचितस्तत्त्वज्ञानहेतुर्धर्मप्रविवेकः फलानुबन्धो योगाभ्याससामर्थ्यं, निष्फले हि अभ्यासे नाम्नासमाधिरूपः ॥ या. ॥ We can compare this passage with the above one from the Yogadars'ana.

samskāras.) These conative dispositions function in their own way to influence the will of the individual. There can be no *Deus ex Machina*, no *Fiat* of will that can enable a man to break away abruptly from his past. The organic link is always there between the past experiences lying embedded in the structure of our mind and the functioning in the present. But the link is never more than a mere influence, and never amounts to mechanical determinism. It at the most can result in रुचि or अरुचि which a man may follow or may ride over cleanly. The theory of the Karma accepted by all the schools of Indian thought in relation to an individual's life means just this relation between the past which is built up by his own acts, and the present *which he is building*. The future too is in a sense implied in the past and the present—तस्मादतीतानागतं स्वरूपतोऽस्तीति ॥ अ. ४. १२. ॥ But we must remind our critic that implication or organic connection cannot mean rigid determinism. स्वेनैव व्यङ्गेन स्वरूपेणानागतमस्ति “The future exists in its own form of a suggestion.”¹ Though the time-old debris of samskāras and vāsanās is carried by our mind like a burden which it cannot throw off, yet the initiative in the present belongs to mind. It is a power which can, if it will, give a wholly different meaning to the whole past, and this is the inner will.

The only reference to this inner will, free in itself, and never capable of being objectified appears in the Bhāṣhya on 3. 15. We have to go back to the perceivable and the inferable attributes of our mind. The different modes are the perceivable qualities, while the inferable ones are:—

“निरोधर्मसंस्काराः परिणामोऽयं जीवन्मू ।

चेष्टा शक्तिश्च चित्तस्य धर्मा दर्शनवर्जिताः ” इति ॥ अ. ३. १५. ॥

We have to consider here the last two namely चेष्टा and शक्ति. They are defined by Vāchaspati in his Tīkā thus:—एवं चेतसः चेष्टा क्रिया यथा यथा तैस्तैरिन्द्रियैः शरीरप्रदेशैर्वा संप्रयुज्यते । साऽपि तत्संयोगादेवावुमीयते ।

1 The sutra 4. 12. along with its Bhāṣhya gives the truest description of the relation between present, past and future which gives us an insight into the nature of our mind. In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga the same view of time is applied to the outside universe as well.

एवं कश्चिदपि उद्भूतानां कार्याणां सूक्ष्मावस्था चेतसो कर्मः स्थूलकार्यादुत्पत्त्यादेवाहुमीयत इति । चेतस्य is the movement or the operation of our mind which is inferred from the effects produced by it as it links itself with any of the organs or parts of the body. The word इन्द्रिय might mean either a sense organ or a motor organ. In connection with the sense organ this "movement of mind" must be supposed to carry out the necessary adaptations in a way such that the inner चेतस्य can only be inferred from its effects. In its relation to the motor organs, the चेतस्य would mean the effort to make a certain movement. According to the Yogadars'ana, this sense of effort is not directly apprehensible, since it can be inferred only indirectly from the movements of the body when actually carried out. Sensory attention (carrying out necessary adaptations) and motor effort – these two seem to the writer to be the only possible interpretations that one can put on चेतसः चेतस्य

In the history of western psychology we come across the problem of this "movement of mind" or चेतसः चेतस्य under the question of "sense of effort." For Locke and the French Spiritualists it was a primary experience. Wundt held fast to the view that the "feeling of innervation" was directly apprehensible due to the excitation of its specific nerve centre. According to this theory the motor or the efferent energy put forth was sensed as directly proportional to the effort made. Experimental psychology has now laid bare the fact that under a direct stimulation of the motor area of the brain by an electric current, no sense of effort is apprehended by the subject, and that the so-called innervation sense is peripheral in its origin. James after this gave a death-blow¹ to the Wundtian theory of innervation centre and went further on with Lange in applying it to emotions. Bergson too is of opinion that the intensity of effort is judged only from the extensity of the peripheral sensations.²

The position of McDougall is very peculiar; for he maintains that "to reject 'feelings of innervation' is not

1 Prin. Psych. Vol. II, Chap. 26. P. 493 e. s.

2 Time and Free-Will Pp. 22 to 28 ff.

to accept the sensationist view of our 'sense of effort'."¹ He thus tries to take up an intermediate position between Wundt and James, basing his thesis upon the common experience that "we often intend to make a movement with a certain force or energy before we begin to make it," and that "in so far as our motor apparatus faithfully executes our intention, we may truly be said to know the strength of our muscular effort before we initiate bodily action."

The primacy of effort we cannot deny but at the same time we cannot hold that we have an immediate apprehension of it apart from the specific experiences of the type when we actually carry out a movement. If one were to go deep enough into the question, the problem seems to reduce itself to that of the relation between mind and body—that unique relation, as Külpe has said, the like of which we never can have in our ordinary experience. We can hold that to maintain psychologically the sensationist view of the sense of effort is not to deny the primacy of effort. For it is not metaphysical sensationism which would crudely reduce that effort to mere sensations, as if they originated it! The चेतसः चेष्टा is there inaugurating all movements of the body, and we may in an act of after-analysis, talk as if we have an immediate experience of the degrees of intensity of effort. But in an actual act, it keeps in the background, only to be inferred from the movement of the body. We cannot be said 'to know *a priori* the strength of our muscular effort before we initiate bodily action,' for in a sense even our own body is known to us after a good deal of exploration carried out within the presentation continuum. We can put the case a little differently. If every time that we made some effort, no resistance ever turned up, we would never have any sense of effort *i. e.* consciousness of it. In such an hypothetical case there would still be the effort without the consciousness of it. The effort is *sui generis* in its character but it is the *ratio essendi* of the movement which in turn becomes our *ratio cognoscendi* of that inner effort. And this is the position accepted in the Yogadars'ana when Vāchas-

1 Out. Psych. P. 317 to 320 ff.

pati in his *Tikā* says :—एव चेतसः चेष्टा क्रिया यथा यथा तैस्तैरिन्द्रियैः शरीर-
प्रवेक्षैर्वा संग्रह्यन्ते—साऽपि तत्संयोगादेवावुमीयते ।

And now we come to will proper Vāchaspati says—एव
शक्तिरपि उद्भूतानां कार्याणां सूक्ष्मावस्था चेतसो धर्मः स्थूलावस्थानुभवादेवावुमीयत इति ।—
Our will is a function of our mind, which might be termed 'a
subtle state of all the outward acts,' and which is inferred
only from the outward grosser acts.¹ It is the pure will which
never can be objectified and apprehended directly, for it
externalizes itself only in corresponding acts. All the argu-
ments put in for the inferrable character of चेतसः चेष्टा would
be useful here too. The pure will is always there but the nature
of its functioning is such that we can know of it only through
outward acts.

The several Dharmas do not divide our mind into
so many "function-tight" faculties. We have already given
the relation that subsists between the structure and the function
of mind. The older experiences do some how affect both
the अपरिच्छेद धर्मसंज्ञा namely चेष्टा and शक्ति. In all the fulness of its
meaning the position taken up in the *Yogadars'ana* comes to
self-determinism. It is acceptable to all the schools of Indian
thought, even to Buddhism with its *Anattāvāda*. For the doc-
trine of Karma is taken by all to be the basis upon which
the world goes on as well as the law that would help an
enslaved Soul towards liberation.

According to Jainism the human soul by its very nature
is सत्; and the definition of Sat is उत्पादव्ययप्रौढ्ययुक्तं सत्. (तत्त्वार्थ
५. २९) In such a dynamic concept of soul the idea of will is
already contained. It is endowed with a capacity for effort or
determination which in perception manifests itself as ईश. For the *Nyāyadars'ana* the Soul is eternal and has the power
to direct the manas to cognitive as well as conative acts Bud-
dhism recognizes the freedom of the will in the act of appercep-
tion or ज्ञान. The very fact that consciousness functions in an

1 This act of will lies behind any outward act. Even reiterating
our inward determination by speaking it out does not strengthen the
inner act. 'सांख्यिकस्य संकल्पो बाह्यकार्यातिरिच्यते' (quoted by बाबू
in his *Tika* on २. १५.)

additive manner means that it cannot be a mere mechanical resultant of past forces. A man's life is not a mere उपपत्तिभव, but has its own active side called कर्म-भव. The past is fixed, the future lives as a 'suggestion',¹ and in between the two there is a small cleft, almost abysmal in its character, in which the free waters of the human will flow just enough to make a heaven of hell or a hell of heaven. According to the Yogadars'ana the soul is absolutely static and of the nature of pure consciousness,² while all experience, knowledge, effort, feeling, bondage, will and ultimate liberation are only for the mind.

We have looked at the functioning will as an inferable quality of the human mind. There is another approach to the question of will—that from the side of the guṇas. The references to the different functions of the three guṇas are scattered without number in the Yogadars'ana, e. g. प्रकृष्टाप्रवृत्ति-स्थितिरूपाः बुद्धिगुणाः.....शान्तिं चोरे मूर्धं वा प्रत्ययम्.....आरमन्ते । भा. २. १६ ॥ प्रकाशक्रियास्थितिशीलं भवेन्निर्यात्मकं.....इत्यम् ॥ २. १८ ॥ अतुल्यं रूपं व्यवसायात्मकः प्रकाशक्रियास्थितिशीला गुणा येषामिन्द्रियाणि साहकाराणि परिणामः ॥ भा. ३. ४७ ॥ etc. The function of Sattva is Knowledge, that of Rajas is outgoing activity, while that of Tamas is the maintenance of status quo. Here knowledge means inward activity, while outgoing activity means physical action or disintegration. A modern scientist would find the principle of activity even in Tamas by maintaining that even a state of rest in matter implies equal and opposing forces. But Sāṃkhya-Yoga approaches the question from the side of the human mind where tamas can only mean a comparative absence of any activity. From the descriptions given of rajas one might be tempted to identify it with the functioning will; and in a sense this might be held to be correct, if we follow the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā and Vāchaspati's Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī on it—

1 Or we might again quote योगदर्शनभाष्य on ३. १४. and say, अवयवपदेभ्यः के ?—सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति—what are the future attributes of a substance? So far as future attributes of a *वर्त्तमान* are concerned anything might change into anything. And this keeps the future "open".

2 Such a combination would seem impossible from the modern psychological point of view.

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैदुतादर्शकारित् ।

भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसः तैजसादुभयम् ॥ सां. का. २५ ॥

अनु यदि सत्त्वतमोभ्यामेव सर्वं कार्यं जन्यते तदा कृतमकृतिकरेण रजसा इत्यत आह—
 “तैजसादुभयम्”.....अथपि रजसो न कार्वान्तरमस्ति तथाऽपि सत्त्वतमद्वी स्वयमक्रिये
 समर्थे अपि न स्वस्वकार्यम् कुरुतः रजस्तु चलतया ते यदा चालयति तदा स्वकार्यं कुरुत इति ।
 There it is maintained that the senses develop from the
 Sāttvika and the several Bhūtas from the Tāmasika Ahaṅkāra,
 under the active pressure of Rajas. This would mean that
 Tamas as well as Sattva are devoid of any dynamicity, which
 is supplied by Rajas as the only principle of dynamic force.
 Herein the functioning of the three guṇas is described with
 regard to the cosmic evolution, but when we view the same
 relation as holding between the three guṇas in the individual's
 constitution, rajas would mean the functioning will giving
 the highest knowledge at the sāttvika level, degenerating to
 outgoing activity at the middle level, while at the lowest
 level, it would lie overpowered by tamas though not wholly
 absent. But if such a cardinal position be given to will, one
 would be at a loss to understand as to why the second level
 should be termed rājasika and not any other. On the contrary
 in such a case the highest level would have been termed rājasika,
 inasmuch as it would represent the purest expression of such will.
 But the relation between will and knowledge is not made explicit.
 We have no warrant to say that will without knowledge is blind
 while knowledge without will is lame. Such a recognition of the
 relation between knowledge and will would have saved at least
 the Sāṃkhya school from a charge of what looks like ethical
 intellectualism, for it could have boldly explained the paradox
 contained in, “*video meliora proboque deteriora sequor*” (जानामि
 चर्मे न च मे प्रवृत्तिः ।) The simile is Kantian reminding one of the
 analogous relation between sense and understanding. It is used
 in the Sāṃkhya Karika 21, where the relation between पुरुष and
 प्रकृति is compared to that between a lame and a blind man².

1 In a sense this relation between knowledge and will is implied
 in the relationship between पुरुष and प्रकृति; the former as pure conscious-
 ness is the source of all knowledge the latter being mere dynamicity.

The other course left open to us is to regard सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् as distinguishable levels of our mind, the will or शक्ति being one of the seven inferable qualities of mind. According to this view such a will would manifest itself in the pure thought-activity like that of Aristotle's 'Theoria' at the sāttvika level, while at the rajasika level it would result in the outgoing acts. This would mean that we give to will a wider field of operation than allotted to it by Vāchaspati, for he seems to restrict शक्ति to the sphere of physical activity by which in turn its existence is inferred by us. Can we say that Vāchaspati has mentioned physical activity only, simply because he was not dealing with the whole sphere of its operation, but was interested in giving us a mere *ratio cognoscendi* of will? We shall leave the question open with the hope that it will be decided by some better authority having greater insight in our old system of thought.

We may finish this section on will by noting one thing about its functioning. Looking on all sides, it seems as if the pure activity of inward will is always taxed upon by the structural existence of past experiences and that there seems to be no room left for any entity like that of a *Fiat* of will. All that the Indian thought maintains is that it is a slow and a laborious process of emancipation even in the sphere of several acts situated in the present and that it is more so in carrying that process as deep as the structure of one's mind which influences those acts. If we allow the mere structure of our mind to work without the intervention of our will, we become automatons, क्लेशसत्त्विकवसिकाया हि बुद्धिभूतौ कर्मबीजान्यङ्कुरं प्रसुवते. (सं. त. कौ. on का. १७) If the structure itself be changed altogether, good acts would flow equally automatically, but with an added sense of freedom for the soul. This was the implication of our earlier remark that though the mind worked in the same way at the lower as at the higher levels, in the former case it was bound down by the past, while in the latter it re-created itself in every durational moment of the present. तत्त्वज्ञाननिर्वाचनियमितसकलकलेससत्त्विकवसिकायाः कुतः कर्मबीजानामङ्कुरप्रसवः ?¹

1. The ultimate ideal posited is that of beyond good and evil—सम्बन्धानाधिगम्यत् कर्मबीजानामकारणमासी । का. १७ ॥

In spite of such a non-recognition of a *Fiat* there may come up a sudden change in a man's character through ईश्वरनुग्रह or grace of God. This grace does not work atomically like any fiat of will bursting forth on a single occasion, but works rather in the direction of overhauling the structure of a man's mind. ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद् भक्तिविशेषादावर्जित ईश्वरस्तमनुग्रहणाति अमिथ्यानमात्रेण । भा. १. २३. । also ईश्वरप्रसादाजितोत्तरभूमिकस्य च नाधरभूमिषु परचित्तज्ञानादिषु संयमो युक्तः ॥ भा. ३. ६ ॥ which means that a higher level of consciousness may be attained catastrophically by the grace of God. But even such grace could be had if one made oneself deserving of it by intense dedication or devotion to God.

Note:—

The value of keeping the power of will always fresh is recognized in अभ्यास. It is a constant effort to gain a higher level of consciousness. तां (स्थितिं) निमित्तीकृत्य यत्नः पुनः पुनः तथात्वेन चेतसि निवेशनमभ्यासः । The ultimate state to be attained is the Niruddha state, but the process is purely a psychological one. Wm. James has said that a man should always do some good act that would test his strength of will and keep it fresh, so that it would not break down at a time when greater demands be made on it. From this point of view we might say that even our will can be influenced by habit, and that it is as physical as our body. But the whole truth lies the other way round, for it is truer to maintain that the constitution of our physical body is an expression of our will. For the *bioplasm* is able to affect the *psychoplasm* only in so far as it was originally moulded by the latter. Whether the *bioplasm* is the structural outcome of the original *psychoplasm* we cannot decide in psychology. We need not enter into the controversy here. It is enough for our purpose to note that the three factors—दीर्घकाल, अनन्तरव, and सत्कार, long time, no break, and welcoming mood : *e.* devotedness or to use James's word *consent*,¹ the first two of which western psychology recognizes only in the field of mere memory, are applied in Indian thought

¹ Prin. Psych. Vol. II. P. 562 *e. s.* We can compare with this the stoic *consent* in judgment. Vide supra P. 133 Ftn. 1.

to Yoga praxis, intended to lift a man to higher levels of attention or will. (बोध. १. सू. १२. १३. १४. along with भाष्य —उपायप्रत्यय is recognized in यो. भा. १. १९-२०).

A Note on Doubt and Belief

In the Yogadars'ana doubt is taken to be one of the vikshepas given in 1. 30. In a state of doubt one's mind swings between two opposing characteristics both of which claim one and the same object, and evidently attention cannot be fixed as mind itself is unsettled. Vāchaspati makes a mistake in classing doubt and false knowledge together, for even false knowledge is psychologically opposed to doubt inasmuch as in the former a subject's mind is as settled as in a state belief.¹ Thus knowledge, false knowledge, belief, disbelief are not psychologically opposed to one another, but the state of doubt is truly opposed to all of them. In the Bhāṣhya there is no such reference that would warrant Vāchaspati's treatment of doubt as a form of false knowledge. There doubt is defined as उभयकांतिस्मृतिवद्भावेन स्यादित्येवं नैवं स्यादिति ॥ बो. भा. १.३० ॥ and Vāchaspati goes on—रात्यप्यतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठत्वेन संशयविपर्ययसंयोरभेदे, ... etc. in justification of his earlier remark अतः संशयोऽपि संगृहीतः । on the sūtra 1. 8 dealing with विपर्यय. In the light of the original text and the Vyāsa bhāṣhya we can maintain that the place given to doubt in both of them is not a wrong one.

In the Nyāyadars'ana there is a whole chapter on the nature and examination of doubt called संशयपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् We cannot go into all the details for fear of being lengthy. The psychological opposition between doubt and belief is implied in the Nyāyadars'ana. It must have been a thing of common occurrence that an opponent in a discussion, when cornered, would, if other fallacies failed him, fly at a tangent and begin to doubt the whole discussion. Hence in the Nyāya-

1 In his सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदी Vachaspati differentiates between संशय and विपर्यय while writing on का. ४. ५. Prof. Das Gupta in his study of Patanjali P. 185 follows Vachaspati's Tika in treating doubt under false knowledge. The same method of treatment is kept up in his 'Yoga as Philosophy and Religion' P. 172.

dars'ana we meet with certain principles laying down the limits of doubt within which only a subject would be entitled to doubt.

Doubt is defined there as—समानानेकधर्मोपपत्तेर्विप्रतिपत्तेरुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातश्च विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः सस्यः ॥ १. १. २३ ॥ The sūtra tells us that (i) समानधर्मोपपत्ति, (ii) अनेकधर्मोपपत्ति, (iii) विप्रतिपत्ति, (iv) उपलब्धि अव्यवस्था and (v) अनुपलब्धि अव्यवस्था are the causes that produce the state of doubt in a subject. The first is an instance in which 'two interpretations of an event are striving for mastery.' This kind of doubt is met with on the perceptual level. In the second case the object itself is known to us directly, but its characteristics seem to be such that we do not know under which head of classification to put it. This very often happens in science and we need not dwell upon it at length. The third condition of doubt is realized when different authorities hold opposite views. The fourth and the fifth causes of doubt deal with the nature of the real and our capacity of perception, wherein at times we meet with illusory perceptions which have no objective counterpart, while at others we fail to have any sense-experience of an object even though it be existing. These give us in all the five psychological grounds of doubt.

In our treatment of विपर्यय we saw that the means of deciding as to whether a piece of knowledge is true or false is to see whether it is contradictory to the system of knowledge representing things as they be. Thus the criterion of validity is made up of inner consistency joined with right correspondence. Whether these standards by themselves are enough to implant in us a belief in the validity of our judgments is the question. Indian thinkers are divided into two groups that of the स्वतःप्रामाण्यवादिन् and the other of the परतःप्रामाण्यवादिन्. The former group regards all knowledge as capable of carrying its own conviction, while the latter holds that knowledge by itself cannot amount to belief, as the feeling of conviction comes only after a piece of knowledge is tested by practice. This is why all kinds of mediate knowledge are said to be प्रत्यक्षासिमुक्ता.—

प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतःसाक्षाः समाश्रिताः । नैयायिकास्ते परतः सौमताश्चरमे स्वतः ॥

प्रथमे परतः प्राहुः प्रामाण्यवेदवादिनः । प्रमाणत्व स्वतः प्राहुः परतत्वाप्रमाणताम् ॥ इति सर्वं. पृ. २७९. ॥

According to these verses the Sāṃkhya system takes both true and false knowledge to be *स्वतः*, and the Nyāya regards both as *परतः*, while according to the Buddhistic view right knowledge is *परतः* while wrong knowledge is said to carry its own stamp. The Vedānta view considers true knowledge to carry its own conviction, while the falsity of a proposition is known through grounds which lie beyond it. The last view seems to be the true one, inasmuch as a false piece of knowledge is proved to be such by the contradictions which come up by accepting it as true. Such a criterion is nearly given in the Yogadars'ana—तत्र प्रमाणेन वाचनमप्रमाणस्य दृष्टम् । The discussions about the directness or indirectness of belief in the validity or otherwise of knowledge belong to the domain of Epistemology and so we need not enter into them.

The problem of the relation between knowledge and belief is a question that involves both cognition and conation. A belief does not belong to the 'bloodless category' of thought, for it has intimate connection with volition and action. A belief that does not come out in acts is not worthy of the name. But we must distinguish between different levels at which a belief might make its appearance. From the moment of contact between sense and its object, to the final act when the subject either attains it or averts it, there is a long *indivisible process of modification* in which a belief is carried from its incipient character of a mere make-believe¹ to a stage where it grows into a full fledged enduring belief finding its place in the structure of mind. We read in सर्व० (पृ. २८५)—यदत्र कुसुमाञ्जल-वृक्षेनेन कटिति प्रचुरप्रवृत्तेः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयाधीनत्वाभावात् आपादयता प्रपञ्चयति । प्रवृत्तिः हि इच्छामपेक्षते । तत्प्राप्त्यर्थं चेच्छाप्रार्थ्यम् । इच्छा चेष्टसाधनताज्ञानम् । तच्चचेष्टजातीयत्वलिङ्गानु-भवम् । सोपि इन्द्रियार्थसंनिर्कर्षम् । प्रामाण्यग्रहणं तु न कश्चिदुपयुज्यत इति । न तद् । यतः समीहितसाधनताज्ञानम् एव प्रमाणतया अवगम्यमानम् इच्छा जनयति, इति अत्रैव स्फुटः एव प्रामाण्यग्रहणस्य उपयोगः । The passage defines the relation between desire and knowledge and tells us of the necessary relation between a man's belief and his activity.

1 It was with reference to this level that Bain's remark (that the natural state is belief while doubt and disbelief need explanation) holds true.

Section 12 Nature of Mind

We know our mind only through our waking consciousness. Attention, perception, feeling, effort, emotion and action all belong to consciousness. In this sense we might say that consciousness *is* mind.¹ Two extreme views have been held regarding the nature of our consciousness in Indian Philosophy. One posits it as a reflection of Soul—which *is* the principle of consciousness, absolutely static in itself like a Platonic "Idea". The grosser world with such souls strewn in the midst of it and linked on to individual minds goes on from eternity onwards. Some souls free themselves with the help of true knowledge, which we might say is the only centrifugal force that can carry one outside the orbit of world's attractions. Others, and they are by far the many, toil on very much like men in Plato's cave, looking always at shadows, and conjuring out of them a world of '*doxa*' as opposed to that of '*epistēmē*'. The theory belongs to the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga in common. They are the pluralistic Ātmavādin.

The other extreme is represented by Buddhism according to which the self is purely a dynamic series without any substrate which changes.

The problem of relation between permanence and change remains yet to be solved in Philosophy as well as in science. In trying to subsume change under something that is permanent, the change seems to elude our grasp and only the void of permanence is left. While by putting greater stress upon change alone, the something permanent goes out of sight, and we are left with a purely dynamic series, with change alone and not with anything which changes!

Upholders of both these extreme positions had to go out

1 Cf. Mind Energy P. 13. "This is why in right, if not in fact, consciousness is co-extensive with life." Again on P. 55. "For there is nothing more immediately given, nothing more evidently real than consciousness, and mind is consciousness." We might call this a type of "Behaviourism" applied by the individual to himself.

of their way, not, as one would think, out of respect for the opponent's position, but in order to make their own doctrine at least intelligible. " Meeting of extremes in.....philosophy " is no new thing for it is as old as philosophy itself. But we shall do well to bear in mind, that such ' meetings ' take place in western thought under the pressure of thought and its necessities, while in Indian Philosophy the extremes come together under the welding influence of a practical recognition, as an ideal, of an individual's salvation. That this life of ours is not perfect, that if there be life, there cannot be a mere " downward way " for man as shown in the scientific conception of *The Running Down of the Universe*, but that there must be an " upward way " too leading man on to perfection and salvation, this is the one conviction common to all Indian thought. The different schools recognize no other necessity except the *real* necessity of striving for perfection and final liberation.

Buddha in his early attempts to seek enlightenment had tried the path of mental concentration and physical austerities; recommended to him by the Shramanas and the Ājīvakas.¹ Gifted with powers of deeper introspection than possessed by any of his teachers, he must have seen then what he afterwards propounded as a tenet that, if at all, any factor in us be taken to be comparatively more permanent, it should be the body and not the ape-like consciousness or mind.² He sought for the stable elements of salvation and found instead the ceaselessly changing mind. There was mutation everywhere, but it was more rapid so far as the human mind was concerned. The three daughters of Māra—desire, pinning, and lust—drove it on from one object to another. Psychologically all the three mean desire followed by conation. They bestow on our mind a sort of conative unity, at the same time that they bind it down. A plurality of desires would mean a plurality of selves, recognized in modern psychology and ethics.

1 Man. Bud. Pp. 18-20 (also बुद्धलील्यसारसंग्रह.)

2 Bud. Psych: P. 13. Bud. Phil: P. 77. Warren's Bud. Trans. P. 150 c. 5.

We can say that this was the meaning of Buddha's fight with the Māra wherein he was the fighter, the fought and the field of the strife. Even the same self in trying to fulfil a desire seems to be always changing.

But mere desire is too subjective an element to hold together the whole of the universe to make action possible in it. Our experience of the world tells us that action would be impossible if the criterion of validity were chained down to such a flux of sense-experience. Causality comes in here, because knowledge given by inference is valid enough to guide us in practice.¹ The law of causality goes along with the law of uniformity when applied to the outside world, for then alone inference would be possible. Still the real is not the general but only the particular.² Buddhists are thorough-going nominalists inasmuch as they take all names to be mere labels. Even proper names fall under the same category. In modern logic proper names are regarded as universals, for they are applicable to all the phases of that particular individual which it denotes. Much in the same spirit Nāgaseṇ maintains that his name is merely a label for the whole bundle of distinguishable changes going on in his life.³

To Buddha the flux was the only entity given as a datum that could not be challenged. Any rational structure based upon it in the direction of a substantial self would lodge one into the antinomies of Reason.⁴ All that could be done was to find out an inner law that governed the dynamic consciousness. That law was as we should say, the pure law of causality divested of its moorings with the law of uniformity. The Begsonian flux thus came early under the governance of the law of *karman*.

Causality + Uniformity would lead to determinism, but in the case of pure causality wherein one state was conditioned by

1 सर्व P. 49. e. s. Also Pos. Sc. An. Hin. P. 253 e. s.

2 Of course the law of uniformity is not mentioned.

3 Milind. in Bud. Trans. P. 129. e. s.

4 Bud. Phil: P. 42-43. where antinomies of reason are given as mentioned in Potthapada Sutta and Brahmajala Sutta.

another, pure dynamicity pushing on from moment to moment with all its gathering content and never repeating itself, the question of determinism never turns up as Bergson has so ably shown us. The problem for Buddhism as with all Indian thought is not whether our mind is free or not. The live question we might say lies quite the other way round. If we are purely dynamic, how is it that we feel so much bound down by the material things about us ?¹

If the problem is the same for Buddhism as that with the other schools, the reply too is the same. The source of all bondage is *तन्हा* springing up from the common root of all existence, the *अविज्ञा*.

Once the *अविज्ञा* be there, the objective content in the dynamic series comes up, and the twelve moments in causality appear as different stages leading one on from birth to death and death to birth. The doctrine of the *Patichcha-samuppāda* gives us the series of causes and effects developing under the influence of *Avijjā* in twelve stages—(1) *Avijjā* (2) *Saṅkhārā* (3) (*Paṭisandhi*)—*Viññāṇa* (4) *Nāma Rūpa* (5) *saḷāyatana* (6) *Phassa*, (7) *Vedanā* (8) *Taṇhā* (9) *Upādāna* (10) (*Kamma*) *Bhava* (11) *Jāti* (12) *Jarā Maraṇa*.²

But the chain of these causes does not give us the relation between the different states of consciousness any more than the cause of it. If consciousness be regarded as a result of compact between sense and object due to *avijjā*, it ought to cease with the removal of *avijjā*. The objective bias of Buddhism breaks down here. For it is held that even if *avijjā* were to be uprooted the current of consciousness would flow on in the same dynamic manner. Here we find the well-marked similarity of thought between Buddhism and *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*. We have already seen how the functioning of mind even at the *Niruddha* level remains the same, inasmuch as mind, though absolutely

1 For traditional schools of Indian Thought, the question would be worded thus:—If Soul is pure and free, how is it that bondage comes ? And as bondage is there, how can we achieve final liberation ?

2 Vide the diagram of the Wheel of Becoming, facing P. 263. Aung's Comp. Phil. also *Man. Bud.* P. 47-48. *अविद्यमूलक*. ८.४-७.

niruddha, goes on instilling the Nirodha Saṃskāras in its subconscious depths. In Buddhism it is the Bhavaṅgasota of the Hinayāna or the Ālaya-Vijñāna of the Mahāyānists that keeps on flowing in its pure state during the life of a Jīvan-Mukta or at the time of an Arahanta's death.¹

Ordinary states of consciousness, or modes of mind as Yogadars'ana would term them come into existence and vanish like so many waves (वीथिचित्त) or disturbances in the bhavaṅgsota, or the ālaya-vijñāna. They both are the repositories of all the saṃskāras left by experiences of all past lives. Thus they come up to the conception of चित्त as full of the time-old saṃskāras and vāsanās depicted in the Yogadars'ana. The distinguishable states of consciousness give up their traces to the bhavaṅgsota or the ālaya-vijñāna at the same time that they are smothered by the state that succeed them whom they "favour" with all their contents. The continuity is twofold. The one runs through all the different states of consciousness and is objective in the sense of having the same content, which changes only to the extent that each state modifies it. The other is that deeper continuity of our subconscious life. This is due to the bhavaṅga or the ālaya. We might compare this subconscious continuity with the "memory continuum"² of modern psychology, with this difference that while the memory continuum contains only saṃskāras of knowledge-ज्ञानजा संस्कारः, the bhavaṅga or the ālaya is the repository of the affective as well as the conative saṃskāras.

The वीथिचित्त is the विक्षिप्तचित्त.³ It is the monkey mind. "Just as an ape in the forest, roaming through the woodland, clutches a bough, lets go and clutches another, so is what is called the chitta that is mind ever changing as it arises and ceases." (संयुक्त.)

फन्दनं चपलं चित्तं दुरक्षं दुर्निवार्यम् ।

उज्जुं करोति मेघावी उडुकारो व तेजसः ॥ धम्मपद-चित्तवग्गो ॥

1 Vide. Aung's Intr. Essay. P. 75. Also Ind. Phil: Vol. I. P. 629 ff.

2 Psych. Prin. P. 191 a. s. also Cf. Encycl. Brit. Art. on Psych. 14th En.

3 For the similarity between the conception of वीथि and वृत्ति vide supra P. 50 fn. 1.

Just as a fletcher straightens the reed of his arrow, even so the wise man straightens his ever-throbbing and unsteady mind which is difficult to guard, difficult to keep back.¹

The problem is the same as in the Yogadars'ana—How to bring such a mind within voluntary control. The Jhāna processes in Buddhism are almost the same as those that we find in the Yogadars'ana. In both the final state is that of Nirodha, termed in Buddhism निरोधसमापत्ति.² But if mind be absolutely dynamic and without a substrate, we can no longer speak of it as one. The Yogadars'ana posits from the very beginning the unitary mind-substance at the basis of all varying experiences—एकमने-कार्यमवस्थितं चित्तमिति ॥ भा. १. ३२ ॥ The experience of such a subject is held to be immediate and necessary for an act of recognition, अहमिति प्रत्ययः सर्वस्य प्रत्ययस्य भेदे सति प्रत्ययिन्यभेदेनोपस्थितः। With a little more of psychological analysis, the subject of experience could have been explicitly posited at the very सविकल्प perceptual level. For the whole process of thought is one, implying everywhere the cumulative character of consciousness working through the accompaniment of vikalpa.

Buddhism carried the process of analysis beyond the concept of such a subject. In thus trying to catch the very ultimates of consciousness, mind was reduced to mere states of consciousness. In place of Herakleitos's metaphor of the flowing river into which one could never step twice, for fresh waters flowed in continuously, we have the simile of the flame of a lamp

1 Cf. चंचलं हि मनः कृष्ण प्रमाथि बलवद्दृढम् । गीता। Max Müller has translated चित्त by 'thought' Dhammapada 33.

2 In Buddhism there are the four Rupa and four Arupa Jhanas. According to the Yogadarshana, as interpreted by बाष्क there are eight kinds of samapattis, namely सवितर्क, निर्वितर्क, सविचार, निर्विचार, सामानन्द, निरानन्द, सास्मित and निरास्मित. The figure eight is kept up, as in अष्टांगयोग or as in आर्य अष्टांग मार्ग. Vijnana Bhikshu does not recognize निरानन्द and निरास्मित, total according to him coming upto six. Vide respective commentaries on योग. १. १७. ४१. ४२. ४३. ४४. also Das Gupta's Yoga as Phil: and Rel: Pp. 153-154. We have already mentioned in an earlier section that the number of samapattis does not matter for there can be any number of samapattis.

which though appearing the same is never such for any two consecutive smallest fractions of time, for it is always created afresh from moment to moment.¹

So in Buddhism we have the *vīthi-chittas*, atomic *chittas* forming a *चित्तसंतान*. The *chitta-santāna* is conceived as a series, and, as Keith informs us, phrases such as 'S'ākyā-Muni Santāna' and 'The Santāna of a multitude of a people' were definitely used. The latter phrase in its import would come up to the consciousness of a crowd taken as a whole or to the concept of "the group-mind". In a single individual *chitta-santāna* the different *vīthi-chittas* may be related to one another in six ways.² The relations are (1) contiguity or proximity, (2) immediate contiguity, (3) absence and (4) abeyance. Again antecedent apperceptions are related to consequent apperceptions by way of (5) succession (or recurrence), and co-existent states of consciousness and their mental concomitants are mutually related by way of (6) association. These six kinds of correlations are included in the total 24 kinds of correlations given in the eighth part of the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho* and are the same *en bloc* as those given in the *Paṭṭhāna* of the *Abhidhamma Pitaka*.³

These relations aim at explaining the phenomenon of flowing consciousness or the *चित्तसंतान*. The last relation as holding between co-existent states tells us that the present may be wide enough to contain two states of consciousness. The mutual relation between the two states or their mental concomitants might be compared with association by co-existence. The fifth relation gives us temporal succession, and in case of recurrence of an old apperception it leans towards association by similarity (or dissimilarity). The first four

1 In the *सां* का. the simile of a lamp is used to describe the harmonious workings of *सत्त्व*, *रजस्* and *तमस*—'प्रदीपवन्मूर्तिर्युतिः ॥ का. १३ ॥ यथा वृत्तिलेऽनलविरोधिनो, अथ मिलिते सहानलेन रूपप्रकाशक्षणं कार्यं कुरुतः एव सत्त्व ... ॥

2 Comp. of Phil. P. 193. *अभिधम्मसूत्र*.—c. १३. P. 43.

3 Comp. Phil. P. 42 ff. *Bud. Phil.*: Keith. P. 176.

kinds of relations merely describe to us the onward flow of consciousness. If the flow of mental states be represented under the symbols

$S_1 S_2 S_3 S_4 S_5 \dots \dots S_n \dots \dots$ etc.,

the relation between S_1 and S_2 would be that of immediate "contiguity". In the case of S_2 just yielding to S_3 the relation is that of "proximity," while S_1 is "absent" when S_3 comes into full existence and is in "abeyance" in relation to S_4 .¹

The fourfold relation does not explain *how* one state of consciousness gives place to another. The difficulty is peculiar to all relations of causality, and is shared in common by modern science trying to put down its finger on the causal nexus. For the whole is a process indivisible by its very nature, mutative, creative, conserving and destroying. As Keith has so well put it, "each moment is to be regarded as impressing itself on all that follows, *perfuming* it as the word वासना indicates it." The different states of consciousness do not cause those that follow them in any abstract way, but yield their content to their successors as we must add in a way not known directly. From the point of view of our constructive synthesis, we can say after the manner of the Yogadars'ana that the different states of consciousness are the directly apprehensible Dharmas of our mind (चित्तस्य परिदृश्यार्माः), while the dynamic links between them, where the सत्ति (शक्ति) works "favouring" a state that follows with the contents of the former one, are its inferable dharmas (चित्तस्य अपरिदृश्यार्माः) The flow itself is the flow of mind. But Buddhism would not assert that much. And still Buddhism maintained that there was the flow without the substrate. The position carries an inner contradiction inasmuch as the flow itself is inferred from the fact of the transference of content. This is why in the Yogadars'ana परिणाम in the sense of

1 We can favourably compare the Buddhistic states to what James calls *perches* of consciousness. They are the *substantive states*. We might say that in the *transitive states* the सत्ति works. In the latter James distinguishes between a *feeling of 'and'* and *feeling of 'if'*, while Buddhism views them merely from the point of their interrelations of substantive states.

गुणपरिणाम is held to be an अपरिहृत कर्म of mind. 'गुणानां परमे रूपं न रहियमवच्छति' । भा. ४.१३ । or एवं त्रिगुणत्वाच्चित्तस्य चलं च गुणवृत्तमिति प्रतिकल्प परिणामोऽनुमीयते । टी. ३.१५ ।

A single state of consciousness is a complex whole a part of which is made up of the contents of the state lying in immediate contiguity to it in the past. Two terms of such an ego series can only be equated thus:—

$S_n = a_{n-1} \{S_{n-1}\}, \dots, S_5 = a_4 \{S_4\}; S_4 = a_3 \{S_3\}; S_3 = a_2 \{S_2\}$ etc. where $a_{n-1}, \dots, a_5, a_4, a_3$ etc. are the *functional free coefficients* of consciousness making original contributions to the series. These coefficients give a new meaning to the fruitions of past actions. The fruitions by themselves can affect these coefficients only to the extent of lending them an incline towards this or that object. But *any coefficient by itself is free to choose the moral or the immoral*, because the free ज्ञान functions there.¹ The subject is asked to free himself from the influences of the structural content of the bracketed quantity containing the infinite past, i. e. to cut the bonds of अविवक्षा and work upon the free entity functioning in the present which is never a mere resultant. The Jhāna-praxis is calculated to work upon this free coefficient of our mind. If Buddha asserted anything most positively, it was the necessity of striving for and the possibility of attaining final liberation. A rigid system of mechanical determinism could never have left any room for ethics, and Buddhism is mainly a system of "Ethical Idealism". But A. B. Keith is of opinion that 'the conception of the rule of Karman' leaves no room for freedom of will, and that "if there is a series, each of which is in the relation of cause, effect, cause, and so on, then, while it can be said that the series as a whole is uncaused, it is equally clear that every single link in the chain is caused and without possibility of freedom".² We are not concerned here with the ethical question of the freedom of the human will, but with the psychological question of the nature of consciousness. From what we have said above it is quite clear that the onward flow of

1 Comp. Phil. Pp. 42-43 ff.

2 Bud. Phil; P. 174.

consciousness cannot be said to be determined in the sense in which Keith takes it to be, for it contains within it an element capable to give a different meaning to the whole past.

But if consciousness is a series, of what is consciousness itself a function ? The alternatives that seem to be open to us are (i)—according to which consciousness may be the result of one state knowing another (past) state, or (ii)—in which the whole series qua series knows itself, or (iii) wherein the series knows any one of its states. Buddhism accepts none of these alternatives. Pushed to its logical extreme the Buddhist doctrine would come to mean that it is one single state which comes to know the whole mind, for it carries within its womb all the past states, if only one could know it. In knowing any past state of the series the present state knows only a fraction of itself. It is necessary to make it clear that the relation between the fresh coefficient of any state and the contents inherited by it from its past state need not always be explicit in consciousness for it might as well be sunk beneath the threshold of consciousness. The meaning of *अविज्ञा* and *तन्हा* working stealthily towards bondage is simply this that all the old *saṃskāras* influence the small but free coefficient of a state of consciousness and blind it in a way that it is drawn towards the maelstrom in which the *saṃskāras* themselves lie.

According to such a view of consciousness, co-ordination between different sense-experiences would be explained through the different states carrying the same content. Buddhism would never go to the length of saying *यद्विषयस्य तत्त्वमस्मि* because it smacked of a reference to the substantival *अहम्* with which it would have nothing to do. All the same co-ordination of sense-experience and recognition taking place on the cumulative strength of consciousness did find a place in Buddhism though with greater prominence attached to the object. Memory too was explained on the same principle. When the whole content of a state of consciousness had within it all past experiences, it only had to look within itself to fish out any past experience.¹ Moreover localization of a

¹ Intro. Comp. Phil : P. 42. Bud. Psych. 173,

memory object is possible because, we can say, the coefficient of a single state of consciousness is impressed with its unique temporal sign and as the total content rolls forward from one state to another the coefficient sinks into the content along with its specific temporal sign. It is this that makes possible for the yogi to have पुष्पेनिवासानुस्मृति which is the same as the संस्कारसाक्षात्करण mentioned in the Yogadars'ana.

Buddhism does not bother itself with the continuity of one and the same static ethereal Soul wandering from life to life but posits the continuity of content rolling and gathering from moment to moment. It is this dead burden of lives past that makes the necessity of salvation such an urgent one. As we shall see both the transcendental continuity and the content-continuity are posited in the Yogadars'ana or to put it more truly the latter is held to be possible only because the former is there from the beginning. Buddhism tried to act more economically, as if it knew the principle of Occam's razor—*Entia non sunt practer necessitatem multiplicanda*.¹ Consciousness dies at each moment and is recreated afresh from its ashes like the phoenix, but the content is transferred from the one to the other.

We have reached a limit where a single state of consciousness is almost on the bursting point, filled as it is with the residua left by the experiences of all the lives past. Here the Buddhistic concepts of भवेणसोत and आल्यविज्ञान come to relieve the different states of consciousness of their unbearable burden. The law of karma is accepted by all the schools of Indian thinkers, inasmuch as the beginningless cycles of births and deaths are said to be going on because of the fruition of past Karma. According to all Indian thought it is the साधिकारचित्त that keeps a soul within the whirlpool of Saṃsāra. Now bhavaṅga means just the "cause, reason or indispensable condition" of

1 In the Yogadars'ana the principle is applied in the discussion of Theism तस्माद्यत्र कालाप्रतिरिक्तस्य स ईश्वर इति । न च तत्समानमैश्वर्यमस्ति ।.....तस्माद्यस्य साम्यातिशयैविनिर्मुक्तमैश्वर्यं स एवेश्वरः । etc. Vide भा. and टीका on १, २४. । In the Tika it is more explicitly expressed—अविच्छिन्नमिप्रायत्वे वा प्रत्येकमीश्वरत्वे कृतमन्वीरेर्नैवेधानायाः कृतत्वात् कल्पनागौरवप्रसंगात् ।

bhava.¹ The causes are the past acts that go on bearing fruit during several lives. Thus bhavaṅga comes secondarily to mean "the subconscious state of mind...by which we conceive continuous subjective existence as possible." The bhavaṅga-sota is the stream of subconsciousness which is, in a sense purely passive, being the resultant of past Karma. It belongs to the उपपत्ति भव—and not like जवन to the कम्म-भव side of life. This comes very near to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga conception of chitta, which is said to be the repository of all the saṃskāras and vāsanās. Such a chitta according to the sāṃkhya-Yoga has its purely passive side where it merely suffers the effects of past actions.² The Buddhistic view too is the same. It is on account of the continuous fruition of past acts that the stream of becoming (अवगच्छति—lit. Continuity of the factor of being) or the life-continuum flows on. The problem for all Indian thought is so to adjust the active side of चित्त or life,—the Buddhisattva or the Javana—that the Law of Karma would cease to operate.

We have accepted the Buddhistic doctrine that one state of consciousness yields its content to another. The question as to *how* it can do so still remains unsolved. If one state handed over its contents in the form of saṃskāras to the state that just followed it the relation would imply the existence of an entity like that of mind as an underlying substratum which structurally preserved all its functional acts. But Buddhism could only maintain that the acts themselves are preserved and bear fruit, or that the content is transferred as such without any medium. Now so far as the waking consciousness is concerned such a position might seem tenable. A Buddhist might hold that the several states of consciousness while they succeeded one another went on transferring and also increasing the content (each one adding its own quota to the content it inherited). But what when a man slept? The Bhavaṅgasota, the subconscious continuum alone flows on, the Vithichittas being

1 Comp. Phil: 255 e. s.

2 The active side of चित्त is the बुद्धिसत्त्व, in Buddhism it is जवन.

absent. Hence the latter must necessarily leave their content to the *Bhavaṅgasota*, which flows on even in sleep. Thus we see that Buddhism had every time to pay tribute to the principle of continuity. Firstly the contents of consciousness were said to be transferred from state to state. The principle could be accepted so far as the waking states were concerned, though even there, as we saw above, subconsciousness had to be posited to some extent.¹ With the break in consciousness that comes in sleep subconsciousness has to be explicitly posited with its necessary corollary that all the *residua* are stores up there.

According to the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* view the *saṃskāras* are stored up in *chitta*. Buddhism throws overboard the the concept of *chitta*, it being too substantial to be accepted by it. The word *Saṃskāra* is used by it rather ambiguously. Its typical uses can be seen in two instances in different contexts, firstly as the second item in the doctrine of *Pañcīcha-samuppāda*, and secondly as one of the *Khandhas* or aggregates. Different scholars translate the word differently.² From several renderings, we can at least surmise that Buddhism neglected a theory of highly psychological value and truth, in not accepting the general meaning of *Saṃskāras* as *residua*. A Buddhist might say that his *Saṃkhārā* do mean

1 Here we might make a distinction between the subconscious fringe that accompanies a state of clear consciousness; and the subconscious depths of mind. The distinction is not meant to imply any qualitative difference between the two.

2 As a link in the doctrine of *प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद*, *संस्कारा* is translated by Aung as—Will and Action (Vide. Comp. Phil. Diagram facing P. 263) more literally as he does it in the body of the book as—"actions of the mind—*संस्कारा* " P. 188,—by H. Kern as—"Impressions," Yamakami Sogen renders it by "conformations." Again *संस्कारा* as forming a *Khandha* is translated by Hardy as "Discriminations", while H. Kern renders it by "mental dispositions". This last rendering would seem to help us out of the difficulty but the option given by Kern turns the situation. For he says—"samkharas are in our opinion passing impressions, mental dispositions, comprising both intellectual affections and sentiments" Aung renders *samkharas* as acts.

residua and much more than that too. If they do, they only help to confuse between mind its function and its structure.¹ According to Buddhism it is purely the acts that bear fruition inasmuch as the very existence of the bhavaṅgasota, the stream of becoming or life, is held to be its result.

Aung says that the different bhavaṅgas—"the paṭisandhi-, chuti —, and bhavaṅga-chittas of an individual life are of one and the same class. They are alike in respect of their cause or conditions precedent (saṅkhārā), their component parts (Sampayuttadhamma)" etc.....Here we come across the word saṅkhārā, where they nearly mean the residua of past actions operating by way of keeping up the bhavaṅga-flow. It seems Buddhism was debarred from accepting that meaning of the word Saṅkhārā as residua, as such an interpretation would have implied a substratum like that of mind in which they are deposited. In spite of such a non-recognition of any such entity, the final state to be reached is much the same as given in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga. In the case of an Arahanta the bhavaṅga flows on as a mere resultant of past acts, even when he has absolutely uprooted avijjā or, to use the Sāṃkhya-Yoga metaphor, burnt down the seeds or the residua of past acts with the fire of true knowledge. "As for dying Arhants in general, moments of mere vital continuum or 'stream' (bhavaṅgasota) may intervene between consciousness and death."²

According to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view the अवसिताविवक्षित is said to flow on merely because the guṇas or mind cannot but keep flowing. Such a flow of mind in case of one who has attained Kaivalya ceases after death, much the same as the bhavaṅgasota of an Arahanta stops after death when Nirvāṇa comes.³

1 Taking the rendering of Samkhara as impressions and dispositions.

2 Comp. Phil. Pp, 75, 219 We might as well apply the description given in Sam. Kar. 67. to a Buddhistic Arahanta—निष्ठसि संस्कारवशात् चक्र-अभिषद् धृतशरीरः ॥

3 Such a state of mind according to the Buddhistic conception of Kriyā chitta is the same as that of a perfect Yogi from whom only

An individual's bhavaṅga-chitta is said to terminate in chuti-bhavaṅga, but all the same the last presentation or re-presentation at the time of death determines the character of the next individual which is to be born inheriting all the legacies of the dead one. A new (?) bhavaṅga thus comes into being "endowed or informed potentially with hetus good or bad," "as a resultant of the past janaka Kamma" of the deceased individual, through the link of a paṭisandhi bhavaṅga. So in spite of an earnest crusade against substantialism, Buddhism had to posit some sort of (subconscious) continuity over and above the continuity strained out of the bloodless category of causality. Patisandhi-bhavaṅga, bhavaṅga-chitta, chuti-bhavaṅga and again paṭisandhi-bhavaṅga—looking to such a series one might describe it as चरु च गुणवृत्तम्, इति क्षिप्रपरीणामि-चित्तमुक्तम्। We might compare the different individual bhavaṅgas to the several phases of the Kārya chittas mentioned in the Yogadars'ana 4-10. These Kārya chittas assume varying proportions in different lives. The Yogadars'ana posits a Kāraṇa chitta beyond the phenomenal chitta, while Buddhism stops merely at the phenomenal mind and tries to explain the whole individual without the assumption of any substrate.

If saṃskāras in the sense of residua implying a substratum are not accepted in Buddhism, the conception of vāsanā plays a large part in determining a man's own world. A vāsanā is more like Tīrthnā than a mere saṃskāra. The Yogācāra doctrine of subjective idealism is principally based upon a psychological truth that a man's perceptions (and so ultimately his world) are influenced, directed and even determined by his vāsanās.¹ If we translate the metaphysical idealism of the Yogācāras on to the psychological level we

अनुकूलान् acts flow, as mentioned in the Yogadars'ana 4. 7. Mr. Aung says—"the term kriya was made technical by Buddhaghosha, if not by some earlier authority to express the idea of mere doing." (Comp. Phil: P. 233) The Yogi or the Arābhanta goes on doing acts which however do not fall within the law of Karma. This is the निष्काम कर्म of Gita.

¹ Ind. Phil: Vol. I, Pp. 627-628 ff.

shall see that it does contain an element of truth accepted by almost all schools of Indian philosophy.¹

The conception of the bhavaṅgasota tries to keep away the notion of substantialism as far as possible, but in that of the ālaya-vijñāna the attempt to posit a mere flux absolutely breaks down. As Dr. Ward has put it, "however much assailed or disowned, the concept of a 'self' or conscious subject is to be found implicitly or explicitly in all psychological writers whatever—not more in Berkeley, who accepts it as a fact, than in Hume, who treats it as a fiction." The Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy has very little in common with the subjective idealism of Berkely and though Hume's sensationalism can not come on par with Buddhistic Ethical Idealism still Dr. Ward's remark would hold true when applied to the psychological material in Indian Philosophy as distributed in its range with Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Buddhism representing the two extremes.

There is a higher degree of ambiguity in the conception of the Ālaya-vijñāna than in that of the Bhavaṅga-sota. "There are indications that the Ālaya-vijñāna was sometimes used in the sense of the absolute self."² In this sense it comes near pure Being, Tathatā, or Nirvāṇa. If the Sāṃkhya-Yoga spiritualistic pluralism be given up, and instead be posited a supreme spirit in the Upanishadic sense, the conception of the Ālaya-vijñāna in the absolute state would answer to it in some way. Coming down to a lower level *i. e.* on the individuational stage the ālaya-vijñāna becomes the substratum, carrying the germs or the residua of past acts. Here a distinction is made between different vijñānas. They are held to be eight in all, the five are

1 The true relation between a *vasana*, and an object is laid down in यदस्मिन्सीभूतं वस्तु यां वासनां व्यनक्ति तस्यास्तदालम्बनम् ॥ बो. भा. ४. ११ ॥ It is a psychological fact that objects (in the psychological sense) are determined for a subject by his own *vasanas* or *created* as in cases of instinctive attraction. When this accepted psychological fact be raised to a metaphysical doctrine, the objections put forth in Vyāsa Bhashya on 4-14, do hold. नास्त्ययो विज्ञानवित्तहन्तः etc. "We cannot help saying that, in their eagerness to refute naive realism, they confused psychological and metaphysical points and countenanced a crude mentalism". Ind. Phil. Vol. I. P. 631.

2 Ind. Phil: Vol. I P. 629. also See. Pp. 631 and 640.

named after their *bases*—बुद्धि-, मोक्ष-, ज्ञान-, विद्या-, and कर्म-, while मनस् as the sixth internal sense gives the sixth मनोविज्ञान. The seventh is again the मनोविज्ञान while the eighth is the आत्मविज्ञान.¹ These eight vijñānas cover the lakshana or phenomenal, and the bhava or the noumenal aspects of the chitta.² The difference between the sixth and the seventh mano-vijñāna lies in this, that the former is that of the waking mind only, Manas being there regarded as a *sensus communis*, while the latter is the continually active subconscious mind which is always on move even during sleep. We can see that this corresponds to the Hinayāna conception of the bhavaṅga-sota. But the Yogācāras felt the necessity of a still higher principle of unity. The eighth is the ālaya-vijñāna, which is said to be mirrored in the seventh mano-vijñāna, which in turn mistakes it for the Ego or the eternal Individuality.³ This is exactly the relation between the pure Atman and the Chitta or the Buddhi-sattva as given in the Yogadars'ana.

The ālaya-vijñāna changes and develops the deposits or the germs of past experiences. The Yogācāras accepted the assumptions of Buddhism and remaining true to them they made their final entity dynamic. Looking to its ever changing character, and its transmigratory nature it might fairly be equated with the Sāṃkhya-yoga conception of chitta, carrying the old saṃskāras developing and working upon them at the same time that it suffers the resultant effects of the past karma. There is another similarity between the ālaya-vijñāna and the Sāṃkhya-yoga chitta in that both flow on till final release.

1 The sixth मनोविज्ञान is a तत्पुरुष comp. "consciousness belonging to मनस् the seventh is a कर्मचार्य comp.—"Mind which is itself conscious. ness." Vide—Yamakami Sōgen's Sys. Bud. Th. P. 243.

2 Ind. Phil: P. 639. Also Sys. Bud. Th. P. 218.

3 Sys. Bud. Th. P. 234 e. s.

4 Even if the Vyāsa Bhashya be taken to be coming after the Yogachara Idealism, the सहजयोग doctrine of the relation between पुरुष and बुद्धिसत्त्व was older. In passing we might mention that we meet with a curious hypothesis of the Duality of Brain used to explain the phenomenon of paramnesia. Vide Mind Energy. P. 116.

Thus we find that all Buddhistic thought in spite of itself, points towards the ultimate subject of all experience. Buddha preferred to observe¹ silence at the alter of the most sacred question regarding the existence of soul. His followers tried to build up cogent systems without accepting the pure subject of psychology. They accepted the ultimate ideal of Yoga, without positing anything at the centre. They could say न एतम् मम, न एसोऽहम् अस्मि, न मय्यो अत्ता, a formula which is the same as the one appearing in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā — नस्मि, न मे, नाहम्...। का. ६४। but they could never posit pure Consciousness or पुरुष of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, much less, say with the old seers— तत्त्वमसि.

Yogadars'ana accepts from the very beginning the pure psychological subject which remains identical through all the changing experiences. We have already seen how even co-ordination between sense-experiences or recognition was held to be impossible without the enduring subject of experience. Yogadars'ana takes this datum as immediately given in experience. अहमिति प्रत्ययः सर्वस्य प्रत्ययस्य भेदे सति प्रत्ययिन्यभेदेनोपस्थितः ।.....स्वानुभवप्राज्ञाधायमभेदात्माऽहमिति प्रत्ययः ।.....तस्मादेकमनेकार्थमवस्थितं न चित्तम् । Here the unitary mind is posited over against the Buddhistic theory of प्रत्ययनियतचित्त. According to Buddhism, the vithichittas crop up like waves in the vithimutta bhavaṅga-chitta.—“Because of eye and visible matter (रूप) arises visual consciousness. (chakkhu-viññāṇa).”² As against this *objective* bias of Buddhism, the stock arguments given in the Yogadars'ana are :—

(i) Without a unitary mind enduring through its changing experiences no co-ordination or integration of experience is possible.

(ii) If mind be atomic in nature, i. e. instead of one mind there be several atomic minds the phenomenon of memory cannot be explained—for a thing experienced by Chaitra can never be

1 'Who is it, lord that feeds on the food—विज्जाण ?' 'Tis no fit question. But who is it, lord, that comes into contact ? 'Tis no fit question. But who it lord that feels ? 'Tis no fit question,' etc. Samyutta N. Vide Bud. Trans.—Questions that do not tend to Edification. P.

2 Majjhima quoted in Bud. Psych 63.

recalled by another Maitra. कर्ममन्वप्रत्यवहृष्टस्यान्यः स्मर्ता भवेत् । भा. १. ३२. ॥ also तत्स्मृत्यभावश्च नान्यदृष्टस्य स्मरणमन्वस्यास्तीति । भा. ३. १४ । So too the law of Karma requires that the same individual shall suffer or enjoy the effects of his acts; (कर्मम्) अन्यप्रत्यवोपचितस्य च कर्माशयस्यान्यः प्रत्यव उपभोक्ता भवेत् ।

(iii) If the conception of an enduring ego be ruled out from Yoga, ekāgratā would be impossible. If the seemingly unitary mind be made up of momentary minds there would be left no basis to which we would be able to attribute ekāgratā. For ekāgratā means having one and the same object before mind. Now there can be no sense in attributing ekāgratā to each and every member of the mind-series, for the very basis of distinction between vikṣipta-chitta and ekāgra-chitta is destroyed, inasmuch as each and every atomic mind can never be anything but ekāgra.¹ What the Bhāshyakāra wants to posit here is that there is one single mind that runs as an अन्वयी through all its varied experiences.¹

Buddhism might reply that the contents of one of the members of the mind-series are some how transferred to its successor. Once we accept this proposition, we would be able to explain the phenomenon of memory etc; but the gist of the whole problem lies in the question—*Can one member of a series transfer its contents to the next one without there being any medium or substratum underlying both those states?* It is just this carrying forward, this cumulation which requires a psychologist to accept a unitary mind lying behind its changing aspects. And we have already seen that on account of its anattāvāda Buddhism had every now and then to bridge the gaps between atomic minds with the help of improvised concepts that never could totally embrace and explain the whole of (psychological) experience.

1 वक्ष्ये तु प्रत्ययनियतं प्रत्ययमात्रं क्षणिकं च चित्तं तस्य सर्वमेव चित्तमेकाग्रं नास्त्येव विक्षिप्तम् ।..... योऽपि सदृशप्रत्ययप्रवाहेन चित्तमेकाग्रं मन्यते तस्यैकाग्रता यदि प्रवाहचित्तस्य धर्मस्तदैकं नास्ति प्रवाहचित्तं क्षणिकत्वात् । अथ प्रवाहांशस्यैव प्रत्ययस्य धर्मः, स सर्वैः सदृशप्रत्ययवाही वा विसदृशप्रत्ययप्रवाही वा, प्रत्ययनियतत्वादेकाग्र एवेति विक्षिप्तचित्तानुपपत्तिः । तस्मादेकमेकाग्रधर्मवस्थितं चित्तमिति ॥ भा. १. ३२ ॥

If such a unitary mind be posited, the problem of its relation with its manifold changing aspects next comes up for solution. The relation between चर्या and its चर्ये discussed in the Yogadars'ana is just the problem of that relation between permanence and change. We shall try here to deal with the whole argument given in चो. १. ११-१४-१५ as shortly as possible with the help of symbols. Suppose M is mind, and p, q, r, s , etc. are its distinguishable modifications or attributes so that the subject series would be represented by— $pM, qM, rM, sM...$ etc. Now while p changes to q , it is called the चर्येपरिणाम of M . A चर्येपरिणाम is said not to transgress the limits set to it by the चर्या. At this stage, with such a change the coefficient of time becomes explicit, and we say that q is present, p is past, while r is yet to come. A characteristic which is present can very well be apprehended but what sort of existence do p and q lead? We find a reply to this given in the bhāṣhya on 4-12. *Our p exists as already experienced while q exists in its patent form of a suggestion.* M stands as a permanent substratum flooding or flooded by all the attributes that unfold themselves in time. What from the point of view of the substratum is a चर्येपरिणाम becomes a लक्षणपरिणाम when looked at from the point of view of the चर्ये. Thus the series $pM, qM...$ viewed from the substratum M gives us its चर्येपरिणाम, but viewed from the temporal perspective of say q it is a लक्षणपरिणाम of q . When an attribute leaves its character of futurity, and comes into existence, goes out of it and is relegated to the past, it is its लक्षणपरिणाम. The लक्षणपरिणाम in turn keeps close within the boundaries of its चर्ये. The series $pM, qM, rM, sM,$ etc. is one but as analysis digs deeper and deeper into it, the time coefficient gets more and more extricated. The same process brings about a further change in the point of view. When a characteristic is viewed in the specious present purely from the point of view of its getting more and more explicit (or old),¹

1 "Explicit" from the point of view of mind—वर्तमानलक्षणस्य ह्यन्तर्बालोचनस्य स्फुटत्वात्स्फुटत्वादिरूपस्वापरिणामः । 'Old' from an external point of view—वटाहीनामपि नवपुराणताऽनस्वापरिणामः । It is the height of synthesis that can subsume both the internal and external points of views under a single head of अवस्थापरिणाम. Viewed internally our mind is getting richer and

it is called an अवस्थापरिणाम of that क्षणी. अवस्थापरिणाम is not a change of qualities but a change *in* a quality. We started with a differentiation between क्षणी and क्षण, i. e. with change in the presentation of self or in perception, and here we arrive at the perception of change, for that is what अवस्थापरिणाम means. The क्षणी is spoken of as not lying within the flux of becoming 'न क्षणी व्यथा, क्षणस्य व्यथानः। मा. ३. १३। for it is the substratum underlying all the changes. If ever in the क्षणी a distinguishable change were to take place it would at once be referred to as an attribute falling in the time-series. But what can be the relation between such timeless substratum and its manifold temporal change? In such a case do we not lodge ourselves into a sort of transcendent substantialism, the static substratum on one side and the changing attributes on the other? Would it not mean that time is just like a box with one whole in it, from which we see the several changing qualities *p. q. r. s...* pass before our gaze with *M* standing all the while in the far away background? The objection is anticipated by the Bhāṣhyakāra, which he terms the कौटस्म्यप्रसंग-दोष. He refutes this by saying that the process as a whole is one and indivisible.¹ The Bhāṣhyakāra could have explained here that we can distinguish between क्षणी, क्षण-लक्षण-, and अवस्थापरिणाम only by a process of Vikalpa. In our symbolic representation of the series as *pM. qM. rM...* etc. *p* and *M*, *q* and *M* etc. do not bodily stand apart, but are welded into an organic unity. Mind is flooded by a continuous change; and still there is an अन्वयी or a क्षणी which as an अयुतसिद्धाक्षयवर्मेदानुगतसमूह² is posited as

years pass, viewed externally, it is getting only older every hour! It looks just like Bergson and Eddington put together. The former would say that our mind is getting richer every moment, while the latter reminds us that we all are clocks for we get old every moment. The Vyasa Bhashya would simply say that such is our अवस्थापरिणाम.


1 We have already seen in the section on विकल्प, that processes like that of cooking, breaking, or motion, are regarded as primarily indivisible. Vide Supra. P. 107 and Tika on 1. 9.

2 Different kinds of wholes are given in the Bhashya on 3. 44. They show degrees of organic unity or, as we might say, of individuality. Putting in a tabular form, they are:—

remaining constant, following all the changes unfolding in time.

We began by making a distinction between the unitary mind as a substratum and its several attributes; and we end with a series, wherein the distinction between *धर्मः*, *धर्मः*—, *सङ्गणः*—, and *अवस्थापरिणाम* seems to be all relative. If any one were to inform us that we are unable to point out exactly *where* the *धर्मः* or mind is, and *how* it changes, we can refer him now to change and now to the substratum. If still he were to corner us by charging us of going round in a circle, we can say—well, that *is* our mind. And the Bhāṣyakāra does draw this conclusion implicitly for he directly goes on to posit a hierarchy of Dharmies. A critical discussion of the relation between mind as a substratum and its several changing states would bring us to the toughest problem of the relation between permanence and change which belongs to metaphysics.

But can we give up the legitimate attempt of finding the pure subject of experience without which no constructive synthesis in



Sir B. G. Seal has rendered युतसिद्ध by coherent and अयुतसिद्ध by incoherent. "The process of evolution," he says, "consists in the development of the differentiated (*वैषम्य*) within the undifferentiated (*साम्यावस्था*), of the determinate (*विशेष*) within the indeterminate (*अविशेष*), of the coherent (*युतसिद्ध*) within the incoherent (*अयुतसिद्ध*)." (*Pos. Sc. An. Hin. P. 7*). The writer does not know from whence these references to युतसिद्ध and अयुतसिद्ध are taken, but the phrase अयुतसिद्धावयवमेदानुगतः समूहः as it turns up in the Vyāsa bhāṣya does not mean an *incoherent* collection but an organic individual whole which by being indivisible shows an inner coherence which can never exist in a mechanical whole. Cf. also *बो. भा. ३. ४७*.

psychology can be complete. The Sāṃkhya and the Yoga systems solve the problem in their own way, drawing upon their common metaphysical dualism. Remaining strictly within the sphere of psychology let us see how it tries to solve the question of the psychological Subject. The foregoing discussion has brought us up to the conception of mind as a substratum underlying its phenomenal series. Over and above these phenomenal changes which can be known in the ordinary sense of the word, such a mind has several other attributes the existence of which, as they are never presented, is known only inferentially. These latter are those which are but the substance itself—चित्तस्य द्वयेवर्माः परिरक्षाभ्यापरिरक्ष्यम् । तत्र.....वस्तुमात्रात्मका अपरिरक्ष्यः । Dr. Ward informs us that attention and feeling are not presentations The Bhāṣya-kāra enumerates seven such non-presentable Dharmas. It is these that function in the present, while all else is but the presentation of self. Piercing the outer shell of the phenomenal self we come to the aparidṛṣṭa dharmas of our mind. Now in turn if we try an approach to the inner self from the side of these inferential dharmas, what happens is that they bring us round to the point of the phenomenal self whence we started.¹ Over and above these several dharmas, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga posits the Janus-faced character of our mind. Mind itself is material and as all material things get their meaning from the ends of some immaterial entity whom they subserve, so too chitta exists for the Purusha. It is asserted that such a mind cannot know itself.² All the same there is a certain

1 The argument would require greater space than at our command. Moreover it has been so ably discussed by Dr. Ward (Psych. Prin. Pp. 371. e. s. 374-375 380 ff.) that we would have merely to repeat it. We may however mention that in science while bombarding an atom the scientists have been able to knock down the revolving electrons but not reach the centre at which a *proton* has been hypothetically posited. (The Nineteenth Kelvin Lecture—"The Revolution in Physics" by Sir Oliver Lodge—in Jr. of the Inst. of Elec. Engineering Oct. 1928) Much more so would it be in Psychology.

2 न तत्त्वाभावं दृश्यत्वात् ॥ वी. ४. १९ ॥ न ह्यग्नि आत्मस्वरूपमप्रकाशं प्रकाशयति ... etc. ॥ भा. ॥ एकसमये चोभयानवधारणम् ॥ ४. २० ॥

part of mind, the *Buddhi-sattva*, which is purer than the rest and which catches the pure Consciousness of the कूटस्थचित्तपुरुष in a reflection as a result of which it assumes the role of consciousness. The Janus-faced mind thus reflects on one side the world and its objects, on the other side the pure static consciousness of the Purusha. This secondarily comes to mean that what we can be absolutely sure of are our own states of consciousness and not the outside objects to which they refer, because the former are always known to us while the latter are at times known and at times not known.¹ The difficulty in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga is that of relating the disparate terms—पुरुष as pure static consciousness, and चित्त as pure dynamic matter. The difficulty is common to any dualism. The relation between the two is neither spatial, nor temporal but that of pre-established *Fitness*. संनिविष्ट पुरुषस्य न देशतः कालतो वा तदसंयोगाफितु योग्यतालक्षणः । वाच. १. ४ । Hence at times the *Buddhi-sattva* or the *chitta* is spoken of as both material and immaterial, while at other times it is the Purusha which is held to be different and still not absolutely different from the *Buddhi-sattva*. तदेतच्चित्तमेव द्रष्टृदृश्योपरकं विषयविषयिनिर्भासं चेतनाचेतनस्वरूपापन्नं, विषयात्मकमप्यविषयात्मकमिवाचेतनं चेतनमिव.....सर्वार्थमित्युच्यते ॥ भा. ४. २३ ॥ इष्टा दक्षिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपपन्नः ॥ यो. २. २० ॥ शुणानां तृणप्रष्टा पुरुष इत्यतो न सरूपः । अस्तु तर्हि विरूप इति । नात्यन्तं विरूपः । कस्मात् ? शुद्धोऽप्यसौ प्रत्ययानुपपन्नो यतः ॥ भा. २. २० ॥ Any one would be able to look through these makeshifts to relate the two incommensurable terms. As a final instance of the psychological relation between the Purusha and *Buddhi-sattva* we take the sūtra 3. 35. There it is held that the *Buddhi-sattva* has two aspects—one is called भोगप्रत्यय-
experience of enjoyment, wherein the *Buddhi* leans towards the world, assumes its shape and holds it before the reflection of the Purusha. The other is the पौर्वेयप्रत्यय—the knowledge which the *Buddhi-sattva* can have of the Purusha, through his reflection alone. In the Bhāṣya on 3.35 we read.....पौर्वेयः प्रत्ययस्तत्र संयमापुरुष-
विषया प्रज्ञा जायते । न च पुरुषप्रत्ययेन बुद्धिसत्त्वात्मना पुरुषो दृश्यते । पुरुष एव तं प्रत्ययं

1 ज्ञाताज्ञातविषयत्वात्परिणामिनी हि बुद्धिः :—तस्याच्च विषयो ज्ञादिर्घट्यदिर्घा ज्ञात-
वाज्ञातयेति ... । सदाज्ञातविषयत्वं तु पुरुषत्वापरिणामित्वं परिदोषयति ॥ भा. २. २० ॥
सदा ज्ञाताचित्तपुरुषतः तत्त्वभोः पुरुषत्वापरिणामित्वात् ॥ ४. १८ ॥

स्वात्मनिष्ठत्वं पश्यति । तथा बुद्धिः—‘ विज्ञातारमरे केन विज्ञानीयात् ’ ॥ वृ. २. ४. १४ ॥ By concentrating on the चैतन्यप्रत्यय, a power of intuition having for its object the nature of the Purusha is developed. This does not mean that the Buddhi-sattva can objectify the Purusha and know it like any other object. It only means that the Buddhi is purified to such an extent that as it no longer assumes the Protean shapes of outside objects, the Purusha himself is able to see finally his own reflection in the Buddhi-sattva. This is the passage where the Bhāṣyakāra seems to be completely under the influence of Upanishadic thought. For otherwise we find that the dualism is kept up, and the Purusha is regarded as absolutely inactive. But passages like these show that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga Purusha is not transcendent but only transcendental. The pure consciousness, the final Self or the Purusha can never be objectified. Plotinus used this metaphor of the mirror to elucidate the relation between Soul and his experiences and even Dr. Ward has used the same metaphor to describe the relation between the pure Subject and his phenomenal construction, the outward self.¹

This is how the Sāṃkhya-Yoga dualism is reconciled on the psychological level. Mind by itself is only a series or more properly a stream—चित्तनदी—and is a product of the Prakṛti which alone is the final चर्म. And still in a sense there is something more in it than in mere Prakṛti. The importance that attaches to chitta is derived from its being the only product of Prakṛiti that catches the reflection of the Purusha and thus becomes conscious of its own processes. It is because of its relation to Purusha, that while outside objects are at times known and at times not-known, the mental modifications, are always known immediately. The relation between Purusha and Buddhi-sattva is beginningless (or timeless), and hence we cannot say that the modifications of mind are firstly material and only secondarily become conscious on account of their nearness to Purusha. Still the modifications by themselves do not become conscious. It is not the stream of thought which thinks itself as James would hold it.

¹ Psych. Prin. P. 381.

In the Sāṃkhya kārikā we no doubt meet with the metaphor wherein the Prakṛiti is compared to a dancing girl, who plays her part before the Puruṣa and retires. But even as that she is the individual chitta attached to a Puruṣa. If we take for granted that the material modifications of mind are also at the same time some how conscious without the reflection of the Puruṣa, *i. e.* do away with the transcendental Puruṣa the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view of chitta with all its dynamism would stand on par with that of Buddhism. The quarrel of the orthodox schools with Buddhism was not regarding the purely dynamic nature of mind infected with kleshas and vāsanās, and working them out according to the law of Karma as modified by its own free functioning. It was on the point of the exclusion of the Puruṣa or the enduring Subject of experience that Buddhism was severely criticized. We can say that it too meant the same thing, but on account of its deep sense of the mystery that clung to such Pure Subject, it only did not say it.

On account of the acceptance of the Pure Subject, along with the dynamic relation between structure composed of the dispositional masses and function represented by the inferable Dharmas of mind which itself goes from lower to higher levels of attention or consciousness, while all the while the levels sink in subconsciousness keeping the same relations now between the sāmśkāras of different levels, and on account of all the psychological thought woven round these points, the view of mind as expounded in the Yogadars'ana comes nearer the modern exposition of it than the view held by Buddhism. But at the same time we must add that if the Yoga view excels in its synthetic vision, the Buddhist view* is richer in analysis.

If greater stress be laid upon the Sāṃkhya-Yoga dualism, the Puruṣa would become transcendent, while if it be toned down to a mere duality as implied and presupposed in psychological experience wherein the Puruṣa in his state of bondage seems to follow the modifications of Buddhi as coloured by external objects. (वै. २.२०), or, as stated above, sees its own

reflection in the now purified *Buddhi-sattva*, he would be only transcendental and not transcendent.¹ In any case the concept of such a pure subject must have been arrived at as a final term in the development of the idea of self. When in the *Yogadars'ana* we read—सर्वस्य प्रत्ययस्य मेदे सति प्रत्ययिन्यमेदेनोपस्थितः।..... स्वातन्त्र्यमवस्थायावममेदात्मनः इति प्रत्ययः। we can see that the consciousness of the subject which is taken as given immediately in experience can be regarded as primary only from an epistemological and not a psychological point of view. The fact that a concept is epistemologically unanalysable into more primary constituent elements does not mean that it has not been developed psychologically from cruder forms.

The different stages in the development of this idea of self are preserved for us only in Upanishadic thought. In तैत्ति० २. २-३-४-५ we find a progressive approach to the Brahman or the pure final self which is first identified with Food, then with *Prāṇa*, thirdly with mind, and after that with understanding. And "different from this which consists of understanding is the other inner Self, which consists of Bliss. The former is filled by this. It also has the shape of man. Like the human shape of the former is the human shape of the latter." This doctrine of sheath within a sheath, and even the innermost sheath having the form of man, jars on our sense, for the Self can never have a spatial coefficient. The reference to sheaths is definitely abandoned in तैत्ति. ३. १-६., where the whole series is repeated, *Bhṛgu Vārūṇi* learning the meaning of Brahman from his father *Varuṇa*. From the series we can see that the approach to the true self is not merely from "exterior to interior," but "from interior to superior" as well. We can understand the import of such a developmental point of view faithfully preserved in the different stages. We can

1 Cf. *Psych. Prin.* P. 379-380. "The attempt to discredit the concept of the pure Ego or experient subject by confusing or ignoring the wide difference of meaning between transcendental and transcendent is an attempt that can only impress the ill-informed. We do not maintain that the subject transcends experience.....the fact that experience without an experient is unintelligible is just what 'transcendental' here implies."

best evaluate it by comparing it with the well-marked stages in the development of the concept of Self. Taking Dr. Ward's treatment of the subject we can put the two series thus:—

The Series as given in तैत्ति.	The Series as given by Dr. Ward.
* (i) Self as Food;	(i) The vital sense, coenæsthesia or Somatic consciousness;
(ii) Self as Prāṇa;	(ii) Body as the self; sensitive and appetitive self.
(iii) Self as Mind: मनस्	(iii) Imagining or desiring self.
(iv) Self of Understanding: विज्ञान	(iv) Concept of Self as a person. Thinking and willing self.
(v) Self as Brahman. ¹	(v) The Pure Ego or Self. ²

Taking the first item of the Taittiriya series we can see at a glance that it cannot be equated with the Somatic consciousness given by Dr. Ward, but only with the Body as self. But we must add that when Food is identified with Brahman, the level of thought represented is not that of mere psychological differentiation but shows an approach to Brahman through ontological reflection too. Food is not merely the Body as self, but it is the principle, the '*arche*' that sustains all bodies and as such it must come at a higher level than the Body as self—the purely appetitive and the sensitive self. Food as self shows a higher level of thought than Body as self which comes at the merely perceptual level. Bodies must already have been differentiated before the principle of their sustenance could be formulated. In spite of this we might roughly identify it with the Body as self.

The second is the Prāṇa as self. At first sight it seems to have no correlate in Dr. Ward's series for it cannot come up to the self of desires. Now Prāṇa, is not mere breath.³ We have already mentioned in an earlier section that Prāṇa means a nervous impulse. The Prāṇa, Vyāna, Apāna are already referred to separately in वै. २. २. With this meaning of

1 The formula is worded—अन्नं ब्रह्मेति ज्वजानात्, प्राणो—मनो—विज्ञानं—आत्मनो ब्रह्मेति ज्वजानात् ।

2 Psych. Pp. 364 to 370.

3 Max Müller while translating the passage has rendered it by breath.

Prāṇa, we can safely identify the self as Prāṇa with the first item of Dr. Ward's series. The vague but stable coenaesthetic sensations yield a background to all other fleeting experiences; giving thus a physiological basis for the notion of the enduring self to rest on.¹ Dr. Ward has put such somatic consciousness before all others, saying—"The earliest and to the last a most important element in this presented self ... is somatic consciousness." Here we might distinguish between the two senses of the word "earliest" which might mean either earliest from the point of view of existence or earliest from the point of view of knowledge. The writer is of opinion that the word could have been used only in the former sense and not in its latter one. Even though coenaesthesia be earlier in the order of existence its consciousness comes definitely later in knowledge, for only after the body has once been differentiated as an object having a unique place in the midst of all other objects can such coenaesthetic sensations be taken as a basis of self. We do not mean that all the organic sensations with all their complexity, were fully known in the days of the Taittiriyaopaniṣad as they are at present scientifically. But we may add that a man may not have enough scientific knowledge *about* a thing, but may have enough psychological knowledge to assign its proper place in the psychological scheme. Hence we can safely equate Prāṇa² as Self with somatic consciousness.

The remaining stages in the series run parallel and can readily be equated without any inversion of the items. The third and the fourth stages of self as mind and self as understanding come up to the imagining or desiring self and the thinking and the willing self respectively. The former is on the ideational level, the latter on the conceptual level. For one of the functions of मनस् is चिन्तय, and we can take चिन्तान to be the same as understanding. The last is the Pure Ego, the Brāhmaṇi, or the Self of Bliss.³

¹ James resolves the notion of self into these sensations only.

² Prof. Ranade evaluating the connotation of the word Prāṇa calls it 'a bio-psycho-metaphysical concept.' *Con. Sur. Up. Phil* : P. 91 ff.

³ The idea of the final Self of Bliss was not accepted by Sāṃkhya.

Thus we see that the concept of self as it was developed psychologically has been faithfully traced out and preserved for us in the Upanishads. We have not to strain much in interpreting the several stages laid down in the *Taittiriyaopaniṣad* in the light of the modern treatment of the Presentation of self given by Dr. Ward. We do not mean that the Upanishatkāra wanted to deliver a discourse on one of the most difficult chapters in modern psychology. The ancient Indians searched pre-eminently for the Self of all self, and they merely noted down the milestones that came across their path to the innermost Self and we can say that in thus recording the several developmental stages their observations were quite faithful even to the extent that they put down Food or Body as self as coming prior to somatic consciousness.

One fact is noticeable, that the development laid down here takes no note of self as a member of a society, developing in and through it. We know that sociology as a science was the last to be formulated and that the concept of society is a comparatively modern one. The Upanishadic analysis was always presented for the sake of the individual against the background of its spiritualistic monism.¹ To the Indian thinker, the individual and not the society was a greater mystery. We have already seen how the theory of instinct was based not upon the biological principle of heredity, but upon the psychological fact of mental inheritance. The old Indian thinker always tried not so much to subsume or synthesize the social differences, as to explain the varied phenomena of the individual mind. Hence in Indra's attempt

Yoga, Nyaya, and Buddhism. (Vide Supra. P. 182). But just as the *Kleśhas* have been classified in the *Yogadarsana* vertically with *संन्यास* at its head, so too in a vertical classification of pleasures, Bliss could have been put at the top with pleasure below and joy in between the two.

1 We can well see that Dr. Ward's analysis of the Presentation of self, and his view of the Subjective Being or of the Pure Subject, points principally to his Pluralistic view of Reality as a "Realm of Ends". So we can pardon a similar bias in the Upanishatkāra's treatment of the subject inasmuch as his metaphysical background consisted of Spiritualistic Monism and not pluralism.

to reach "The self which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, which desires nothing but what it ought to desire, and imagines nothing but what it ought to imagine"; we find the four stages laid down as (i) Self as the body, (ii) Self as that in a dream, (iii) Self as that in deep sleep, and lastly (iv) "that Self which is immortal and without body". (शांख्य्य c. ४-८-१-१०). Here the innermost Self comes as the principle underlying all the manifestations of our life namely the body, the waking consciousness, and the states of dream and sleep. In the Upanishads the soul does not figure as any metaphysical transcendent figment but he is the living centre of all experiences. "He who knows let me smell this, he is the Self, the nose is the instrument of smelling. He who knows let me think this he is the Self, the mind is his divine eye." He is "the life of life, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind," (इ. ४. ४. १८. also cf. केन १. २. and जीवो. १. ८)

James calls Kant's transcendental unity "substantialism grown shame-faced, and the Ego—as ineffectual and windy an an abortion as Philosophy can show."¹ But such a criticism cannot hold against the Upanishadic Innermost Self, which comes as the most primary presupposition of all psychological experience. What is the relation between this Pure Self and his constructions namely the outer psychical states which Bergson compares to a balancing fly-wheel? Descartes compares the Soul to a spider sitting at the centre of the web which was his own creation. It is no *focus imaginarius*. Dr. Ward has said "These salient features of developing self-consciousness may suffice to shew what appropriateness there is in the figure by which the 'form of consciousness' has long been symbolized, that namely of lines converging inwards, towards, or diverging outwards from, a centre having circumferential area, which is the source of the one set of lines and the goal of the other. That area we call the Ob-ject...the presented. The centre to which

¹ Prin. Psycho. Vol. I P. 365. James is no doubt unjust to Kant in his remark as shown by Dr. Ward. Psych. Prin. P. 380.

all its lines belong is the Subject or Ego." We do not know whether Dr. Ward had any Upanishadic passage in his mind when he wrote this. But we do come across this very metaphor in कौषी १-७—"These ten objects (what is spoken, smelt, seen etc.) have reference to Prajñā, the ten subjects (speech, the senses, mind) have reference to objects. If there were no objects, there would be no subjects (i. e. senses) and if there were no subjects, there would be no objects. For on either side alone nothing could be achieved. But that (the Self of Prajñā—) is not many (but one). For as in a car the circumference of a wheel is placed on the spokes, and the spokes on the nave, thus are there objects (corresponding to circumference) placed upon the subjects (senses corresponding to spokes) and the subjects on the Prāṇa. And that Prāṇa indeed is the self of Prajñā, blessed, imperishable, immortal." Here both Prāṇa and Prajñā are identified with the innermost Self of Brahman. And in ऋ. ७. १५. १. we read: अथवा अत्र नामौ समर्पिता एवस्मिन्नात्रै तर्ध समर्पितम् ।

Thus it is that Upanishadic thought though ancient is not old but ageless and in some ways comes startlingly near our modern ways of thought. The whole of Indian Philosophy is rich enough in not merely material of thought but of Experience as well. If only one approached her with a proper point of view she would, as Plato would have said, lay bare her bosom,¹ and give out all her secrets.

A Note on the Relation between Body and Mind

In Bergson's *Mind Energy* we read:—"I have sometimes asked myself what would have happened if modern science, instead of setting out from mathematics to turn its direction towards mechanics, physics and chemistry, instead of bringing all its forces to converge on the study of matter, had begun by the consideration of mind - if Kepler, Galileo and Newton, for example, had been psychologists. They would have produced a psychology of which to-day we can form no idea just as before Galileo no one could have imagined what our physics would be — a psychology which

¹ Cf. Rep. 494 B. C.

probably would have been to our present psychology what our physics is to that of Aristotle.....The most general laws of mental activity once discovered (as, in fact, the fundamental principles of mechanics were discovered), science would have passed from pure mind to life.....and come at last to inert matter..... ”

When we read the literature on Yoga-praxis and all the reflections contained therein on the nature of mind and the possibilities of a variety of experiences, we cannot but feel that the ancient Indians leaving behind what little of positive sciences they had, launched themselves directly upon the most elusive entity namely their own mind, and by a series of experiments which could have been carried on only by an instinctive insight or as we should say Intuition, arrived at a direct experience of the possible levels which could be attained though such an entity.

Kant said that he was overawed with the sense of its sublimity by two things—‘ The starry heavens above and the Moral Law within ’. We can say that both these things can be traced to a still deeper mystery to which we are so near inasmuch as we ourselves are an expression of it. It is the mystery that hovers round the relation between our body and mind. The starry heavens in a sense represent our body, and the moral law our mind. It is the distinguishable though inseparable union of Space and Time. Bergson would have said that there is ceaseless *endosmosis* between time and space. Even the physicist can explain this union of space and time as it is found in the material universe only relatively. An assertion like that of Prof. Alexander that ‘ Space is the body of which Time is the mind ’¹ carries us no further, but brings us back to the relation between our body and mind.

Following B. Russell² we might say that a mightier brain than that of Einstein might push the thin end of a mathematical wedge into the domains of life and mind and by the most

1. Spinoza and Time by Prof. S. Alexander.

2 Taking the line of argument taken by him in his small book—*Icarus*, or the Future of Modern Science.

abstruse mathematical calculations using symbols and functions the meanings of which he himself does not know might arrive at a most general equation, from which by a gratuitous evaluation of infinity functions and certain *vital potentials* (in place of *gravitational potentials*) he might come down to its simplified version applicable to actual existence and might shew that at such and such a point in the space-time continuum we would meet with—an individual—which for it would be identical only with a *certain curvature in Space*! We would no doubt perhaps arrive at such a curvature and even touch the living individual, but only externally for all his inner content would be lost sight of.

From the point of view of such a science, an individual may be taken to be a mere resultant, but the forces of which he is a resultant would remain unknown—a conception not much unlike that of the Buddhistic law of Karma which speaks of certain conformations taking place somewhere in the shape of an individual as an effect of a chain of causes taking place here in a dying man.

Indian mind was averse to a materialistic point of view, because it would never bring one into touch with the individual. Still the Chārvāka view has survived the effects of time and come down to us in its fragmentary form as referred to in other works. According to his view consciousness or mind or Soul was the *emergent effect* of a certain combination of the four elements and which as such would be destroyed at the final break up in death¹ तत्र पृथिव्यादीनी भूतानि जलानि तत्त्वानि । तेभ्य एव देहाकारपरिणतेभ्यः किञ्चादिभ्यो मद्वाक्चैतन्यमुपजायते । तेषु विगष्टेषु सस्य स्वर्गं विनश्यति ।.....तच्चैतन्यमिच्छिष्टं देहं

1 The theory of Emergent Evolution was formulated by C. Lloyd Morgan. He traces such emergence down to the constitution of an atom in which a particular electron jumps from its orbit for no obvious reason, and either assimilates energy from outside, by jumping into a wider orbit, or liberates its own energy by following a narrower one orbit. (Vide—The Case for Emergent Evolution—by Morgan—Jr. Phil: Studies: Vol. IV P. 23. The theory has been accepted with different modifications by C. D. Broad or C. E. M. Joad.

एकान्तः वेदातिरेक आसत्ति प्रमाण्यानवात् ॥ सर्व- ३ २ ॥ Such a पिटरपाकमत has been referred to and refuted in the Nyāyadars'ana 3-2-47 etc. (इदं: शरीरपुनरावप्रकरणम्)

We shall not enter into the Nyāya view of manas for it is only a function of mind and not the whole mind. The Jain manas too is almost the same (though material.) The अवधि, अनःपर्व and केवल forms of knowledge are mentioned as the faculties developed by the Soul as it advances spiritually which according to the Sāṃkhya view are the powers developed by mind itself. As we have already remarked the siddhis mentioned by all schools of thought are the same. The Yogadars'ana view of mind seems to be psychologically more satisfactory inasmuch as it tries to keep away the Soul as far as possible bringing him in at the last stage when it be found that consciousness cannot be explained as a function of matter. It posits chitta as originally विभू but the form of its manifestations depend upon causes like चर्माफर्ष. The Sāṃkhya view of mind and its relation to body is referred to in बो. ४. १० as चटप्रासाद-प्ररीपकत्वं संकोचविकासि चित्तम् । According to the Yogadars'ana वृत्तिरेवास्व विभुनः चित्तस्य संकोचविकासिनी तच्चर्मादिनिमित्तापेक्षम् । निमित्तं च द्विविधम् बाह्यमाध्यात्मिकं च । शरीरसाधनापेक्षं बाह्यम् । चित्तमात्राधीनं अध्यात्मिकम् । These causes work only negatively. The inner urge is supplied by mind or प्रकृति, the causes only act as deterrent or liberating agents. This is the meaning of प्रकृत्यापूर,¹ which is likened to the flow of water that goes by itself down a slope when an obstruction is removed from its way. As an urge or force which pushes from behind we might compare it with Bergson's *élan vital*. What चर्मा does is that it merely removes an obstruction lying in the path of a superior manifestation of mind.

Our mind is present within the limits of our body so far as its dynamic effects are concerned, वेदप्रवेशवर्तिकावयवसंज्ञात्, वेदवृत्तिः सज्जदे चित्तस्य न प्रमाणमस्ति ॥ बाण० टीका, बो. ४. १० ॥ Still as James would inform us we are cognitively present to Orion whenever we perceive that constellation though we are not dynamically

¹ चित्तव्यवहारिणामः प्रकृत्यापूरम् ॥ बो. ४. २. ॥ etc.

present there for we work no effects.¹ So the question comes up—where is mind located? It would be no great wonder if we cannot locate mind in any absolute sense, for it is a greater wonder when we find that even physics is not able to locate a physical object like our familiar inkstand in an absolute sense. In science the ordinary conception of a thing is broken up and instead of physical matter it says that there are only whirling electrons (with their corresponding *protons* at their centre), and that such a mass throws out visual rays² which meet our eyes, where the impact is caught up by the nerve and transmitted to the cells in the brain. Then all of a sudden some how the sensation comes up. We have seen that the Nyāya view posits visual rays as emanating from the eyes. Certainly if an inkstand throws out visual rays, so can our eyes. Physiological Psychologists would say that the sensation is an event taking place in the Brain. But the position seems untenable. At least it is very difficult to assert it dogmatically. The inkstand is as necessary for our sensation as the brain, and if there be a whole series each item of which be as necessary as any other, we in pure psychology cannot give preference to one or the other. Though it would seem very extravagant, still it cannot be held to be absolutely impossible if any one held that our sensations should be regarded as events taking place in the outside world. This is at least maintained in the Yogadars'ana when it says—*प्रत्यक्षं परचित्तज्ञानम्* ॥ ३. १९ ॥ which comes up to the Jain conception of *मनःपर्याय*. In the sūtra, *बहिरकल्पिता वृत्तिर्महाविदेहा, ततः प्रकाशावरणक्षयः* ॥ ३. ४३ ॥ The word *प्रकाशावरण* turns up and the sūtra might be carrying the Jain influence, according to which view, such a *चारणा* or a direct going out of mind as—*शरीराद्बहिर्गमनसो वृत्तिलाभो विदेहा नाम चारणा*—alone could claim immediacy of knowledge. The whole universe according to such a view seems to

1 Prin. Psych. Vol. I. P. 214. In *न्या.* ३. २. ५१. it is maintained that such a mind is one and pervades the whole body. *न शरीरगुणव्येतना-शरीरव्यापित्वाद्* ॥ ... *शरीरव्यतिरिक्तव्याप्यव्येतना इति प्राप्तं चेतनमदुर्लभं* etc.

2 Art. on The Location of Physical Objects by Olaf Stapledon-Jr, Phil. Studies. Vol. IV. P. 64. c, s,

be a product of the process of *endosmosis* between outside objects, body, mind, Soul. etc.

And in spite of such considerations we can say that our bodies are the objects which are the most immediate to us. The Nyāya would define a body as a भोगसाधन, Jainism as a 'favour' done by the atoms on a Jīva, the Yogadars'ana and Buddhism would join in taking it to be an expression of our own acts according to the law of Karma. In the Nyāya we read:—

इन्द्रियाणि तावत् स्वविषयग्रहणेनैवानुमीयन्ते । अर्थाः प्रत्यक्षतो गृह्यन्ते । इन्द्रियार्थसंनिर्वाहस्तान्-
वरणेन स्मिनेनानुमीयते ... ॥ भा. २. १. १९ ॥ We become conscious of our

own senses simply because we sense the objects through them. A man having eyes but not seeing any object would not be conscious of his having eyes. We can apply this argument to our whole body. If we brought about no effects we would never be conscious of having a body of our own. As for the relation between body and the several senses we might draw upon the Yogadars'ana.

वृत्तिकारणं शरीरमिन्द्रियाणाम् । तानि च तस्य ॥ यो. भा. २. २८ ॥ And in the Tikā we read वृत्तिकारणं शरीरमिन्द्रियाणां, विचारकमिन्द्रियाणि च शरीरस्य सामान्या-
करणवृत्तिः हि प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च तद्भावे शरीरपातात् । The senses, including

मनस्, hold on to the body which lives favoured as it is by the them along with their sensori-motor reflex resultants the Prāṇas. The senses and the body are thus interdependent and form an organic whole. The underlying basis of the spatial body and purely durational mind (though not conscious) is one and the same

प्रकृति, the outside objects and the senses too are but the manifestations of the different aspects of the same guṇas. गुणानां हि द्वैक्यं
व्यवसेयात्मकत्वं व्यवसायात्मकत्वं च ॥ टी. ३. ४७ ॥ सर्वात्मनो गुणाः व्यवसायव्यवसेयात्मकाः
स्वामिने क्षेत्रज्ञे प्रत्यक्षोद्दृष्ट्यात्मत्वेन उपस्थिता इत्यर्थः ॥ भा. ३. ४९ ॥

If Reality has placed us in such a position favouring us with an intimate experience which is also unique in that our mind expresses itself outwardly through its body, if it could achieve such a mystery we can say that it would not be so poor and niggardly as not to give us that power with the help of which we would be able to know the singular relation completely. The whole of the Yoga-praxis is based upon not merely upon such a faith, but as it seems, upon a concrete experience of the relation.

The Yoga-praxis believes in the theory of interaction between body and mind. For the Sāṃkhya-Yoga the problem as such does not exist, for both body and mind are equally material. In G. Bose's Presidential address,¹ on 'The Psychological Outlook in Hindu Philosophy,' we read 'This view of the relationship of body and mind steers us clear of the pitfalls of both interactionism and psychological parallelism, and I recommend this theory to the consideration of modern psychologists.' The writer cannot be so enthusiastic, for by accepting such a position the question is merely shelved and not solved. The problem is similar to that of gravitation in physics. By mathematical calculations or by taking up a position like the one occupied by Jules Verne's projectile at the neutral point, one may, as Eddington informs us,² annul the gravitational field, but it does not mean that it disappears altogether. It has been compared to a "pucker" or a fold in space-time, so that if we try to remove the pucker locally, it is still bound to appear in a more heinous form somewhere else. So too if we accept the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view of mind-matter, the problem of the relation between mind and body is merely pushed further back to the relation between पुरुष and बुद्धिसत्त्व. If one were to maintain that the final settlement of the problem between body and mind belongs to metaphysics proper and not psychology, we would have to say that Psychology as a science may not decide it finally but must at least investigate into it. And such an investigation can be followed up without accepting any theory whatsoever. But we must add that in some of our experiences we seem to be determined by our bodies, while in others we live like pure minds. It is as if our body and mind interact on different planes so that psychology can boldly accept interactionism as found in experience and leave its further consideration to metaphysics. Psychology can help metaphysics in such evaluation by showing the interrelation between function and structure, at the lowest level of which

1 Section of Psychology, Sixth Ind. Phil. Congress, held at Dacca 22nd Dec. 1930.

2 Space, Time and Gravitation.

would lie habit as structure created by function and lying embedded in matter.

From such a point of view our whole body seems to be but an outward manifestation of the functioning mind. Ordinarily our consciousness remains centred in our brain, but in case of any acute pain at any place our whole mind seems to be located there. What happens only abnormally and non-voluntarily in life, the Yoga-praxis asks us to do voluntarily and in a healthy condition (देहावस्थः चित्तस्य कारणं). By such praxis, we cannot say *a priori* that a Yogi would not be able to descend in a Maeterlinckian fashion to the consciousness as lived by, say, his little thumb. Perhaps our reader might say that this is no psychology. But this comes nearer the forest of psychological material we meet with in Indian Philosophy. Old Indian thinkers did hold it possible to have a direct intuitive knowledge of our own physiology, but their principal aim was to link themselves on to the Universal Consciousness which otherwise lies beyond our ordinary mind.

Appendix: Sources:—

Section 2 Mechanism of Perception

S. 1: (P. 39):—चित्तस्य द्वये कर्माः परिरट्ठाभापरिरट्ठाः । तत्र प्रत्ययात्मकाः परिरट्ठा वस्तुमात्रात्मका अपरिरट्ठाः । ते च ससैव भवत्यनुमानेन प्रापितवस्तुमात्रसद्भावाः । ' निरोधधर्म्ये संस्काराः परिणामोऽथ जीवनम् । चेष्टा शक्तिश्च चित्तस्य कर्मा दर्शनवर्जिताः । ' इति ॥ यो. मा. ३. १५ ॥ परिरट्ठाः प्रमाणादयो रागादयश्च ।...धर्मग्रहणेन पुण्यापुण्ये म्रस्यति । सेवाऽऽगमसः सुखदुःखौपमोगदर्शनाद्वाऽनुमानतो म्रयेते ।...एष त्रिगुणत्वाच्चित्तस्य चलं च गुणवृत्तमिति प्रतिक्षणं परिणामोऽनुमीयते ॥ टीका ४ १५ ॥.....बहुत्वे सति चित्तस्य—वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः ॥ यो. १-६ ॥

S. 2: (P. 39):—प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयः ॥ यो. १-६ ॥

S. 3: (P. 40):—फस्तो, वेदना, सञ्जा, चेतना, एकगता, जीवितिन्द्रियं, मनसिक्वरो चेति सप्तमे चेतसिका सन्धचित्तसाधारणा नाम ॥ अमिधम्मत्थ २. २ ॥

S. 4: (P. 40):—प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानि ॥ यो. १. ७ ॥ एवं प्रमाण-सामान्यलक्षणे तु द्विशेषलक्षणे तु च तत्सु, यानि प्रमाणान्तराण्युपमानादीनि प्रतिवादिभिरभ्युपेयन्ते तान्युल्लक्षणेभ्येव प्रमाणेष्वन्तर्भवन्ति ॥ सां. त. कौ. का. ५ ॥

S. 5: (P. 43):—तथा ओत्रत्वक्चक्षुर्जिह्वाघ्राणानि बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि, वाक्पाणिपाद-पायूपस्थाः कर्मेन्द्रियाणि, एकादशं मनः सर्वार्यम्, इति ॥ यो. मा. २ १९ ॥ बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुः ओत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाह्यानि । वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाः कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ का. २६ ॥ एकादश मिन्द्रियामाह—उभयात्मकमत्र मनः....। का. २७ ॥ त्रयोदशविधकरणेऽवान्तरमिमांशं करोति—अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा बाह्यं.....। सांप्रतकालं बाह्यं त्रिकालाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ का. ३३ ॥

S. 6: (P. 43):—(इन्द्रियं द्विविधम् । अन्तरिन्द्रियं बहिरिन्द्रियं च । तत्राद्यं मनः । द्वितीयं घ्राणादि ।) ओगसावनानि पुनः—घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्ओत्राणीन्द्रियाणि भूतेभ्यः ॥ न्या. १. १. १२ ॥ पंचेन्द्रियाणि ॥ तत्त्वार्थ २. १५ ॥ स्पर्शरसनघ्राणचक्षुःओत्राणि ॥ तत्त्वार्थ-२. २० ॥ द्वार संगहे द्वारानि नाम, चक्षुर्द्वारं, सोतद्वारं, घ्राणद्वारं, जिह्वाद्वारं, कायद्वारं, मनोद्वारं चेति छान्दिधानि भवन्ति । तस्य चक्षुमेव चक्षुर्द्वारं । तथा सोतद्वारादीनि ॥ मनोद्वारं पन अवगं स्ति पनुचति ॥ अमिधम्मत्थ. ३. १३-१४ ॥ Comp. Phil: Pp. 117-118. (तत्र रूपग्रहणलिंगं चक्षुः, शब्दग्रहणलिंगं ओत्रम्, गंधग्रहणलिंगं घ्राणम्, रसग्रहणलिंगं रसनम्, स्पर्शग्रहणलिंगं त्वक् ॥ सां. त. कौ. का. २६ ॥ ध्वन्यदानविहरणोत्सर्गनिर्वाद्य पंचानाम् ॥ का. २८ ॥ जिघ्रस्यनेन घ्राणं गन्धं गृह्णातीति etc । न्या. मा. १. १. १२ ॥ स्पर्शरसनचक्षुर्जिह्वास्तोषामर्षाः ॥ तत्त्वार्थ-२. ११ ॥

S. 7: (P. 44):—प्रकाशक्रियास्थितिशीलं भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं भोगापवर्गाय दृश्यम् ॥ यो. २. १८ ॥ अर्थाणां पंचमं रूपमर्थवत्त्वं, भोगापवर्गायैता गुणेष्वेवान्वयिनी, गुणास्तन्मात्रभूत-भौतिके तु इति सर्वमर्थवत् । यो. मा. ३. ४४ ॥ (इन्द्रियाणाम्) पंचमं रूपं गुणेषु यदनुवर्तते पुरुषार्थवत्त्वमिति ॥ यो. मा. ३. ४७ ॥ पुरुषार्थान्वयानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः केवलम्....॥ यो. ४. ३४ ॥ कृतभोगापवर्गाणां पुरुषार्थान्वयानां चः प्रतिप्रसवः.....॥ मा. ४. ३४ ॥

S. 8: (P. 45):—सर्वश्रोत्राणामाकाशं प्रतिष्ठा सर्वं शब्दानां च ॥ भा. ३. ४१ ॥ सर्वश्रोत्राणामाकाशकारिणामप्याकाशं कर्णशुष्कलीविवरं प्रतिष्ठा, तदायतनं श्रोत्रं, (तदुपकारापकाराभ्यां श्रोत्रस्योपकारापकारदर्शनात् ।) शब्दानां च श्रोत्रसहकारिणां पार्थिवानि शब्दग्रहणे कर्तव्ये कर्णशुष्कलीविवरवति श्रोत्रे स्वाभयनभोगात्साधारणशब्दमपेक्षते । ...श्रोत्राधिष्ठानमाकाशं शब्द-गुणतन्मात्रादुत्पन्नं शब्दगुणकं येन शब्देन सहकारिणा पार्थिवादिःशब्दान् गृह्णाति ॥ यो. टी. ३. ४१ ॥

S. 9: (P. 47):—संसारिणो मुक्ताश्च ॥ २. १० ॥ ते जीवाः समासतो द्विविधा ॥ भा ॥ समनस्कासनस्काः ॥ २. ११ ॥ समासतस्तं एव जीवा द्विविधा ॥ भा ॥ संसारिणः त्रसस्थावराः ॥ २. १२ ॥ पृथिव्यपवनस्पतयः स्थावराः ॥ २. १३ ॥ तेजोवायू द्वीन्द्रियादयश्च त्रसाः ॥ तत्त्वार्थ. २. १४ ॥

S. 10: (P. 49):—(भा) एकमिन्द्रियम्—स्वगव्यतिरेकात् ॥ न्या. ३. १. ५५ ॥ (भा) त्वर्कमिन्द्रियमित्याह । कस्मात् ? अव्यतिरेकात् । न त्वचा किचिदिन्द्रियाधिष्ठानं न प्राप्तम्, न चासत्यां त्वचि किचिद्विषयग्रहणं भवति, यथा सर्वेन्द्रियस्थानानि व्याप्तानि यस्यां च सत्यां विषयग्रहणं भवति सा त्वर्कमिन्द्रियमिति । नेन्द्रियान्तरार्थानुपलब्धे स्पर्शोपलब्धिविश्लेषायां सत्यां त्वचि गृह्यमाणे त्वगिन्द्रियेण स्वर्शे इन्द्रियान्तरार्था रूपादयां न गृह्यन्ते, अथादिभिः । न स्पर्शग्राह्यरूपादिन्द्रियविन्द्रियान्तरमस्तीति, स्पर्शवदधादिभिर्गृह्यन्ते रूपादयां, न च गृह्यन्ते, तस्मान्नैकमिन्द्रियं त्वगिति ।.....यथा त्वचोऽव्यवविशेषः कश्चिच्चक्षुषि सनिष्ठो धूमस्पर्शे गृह्णाति नान्यः, एव त्वचोऽव्यवविशेषा रूपादिग्राह्यस्तेषामुपघातादधादिभिर्न गृह्यन्ते रूपादय इति ।... एव च सति नानाभूतानि विषयग्राहकाणि विषयव्यवस्थानात् तदभावे विषयग्रहणस्य आवा-त्तदुपघाते चाभावात्, तथा च पूर्वो वाद उत्तरेण वादेन व्याहन्यत इति ।

S. 11: (P. 52):—न महदणुमात्रादभौतिकत्वं विभुत्वं चेन्द्रियाणां शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुम् । इदं खलु—रश्म्यर्थसंनिकर्षविशेषात्तदग्रहणम् ॥ ३. १. ३५ ॥ तयोर्महदण्वोर्ग्रहणं चक्षुरश्मेर्यस्य च संनिकर्षविशेषाद्भवति, यथा प्रदीपरश्मेर्यस्य चेति । रश्म्यर्थसंनिकर्षधावरणलगाः । चाक्षुषो हि रश्मिः कुण्डधादिभिरावृतमर्थं न प्रकथयति यथा प्रदीपरश्मिरिति ॥ भा. ३५ ॥ आवरणानुमेयत्वे सतीषमाह—तदनुपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ ३७ ॥ नानुमीयमानस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धेरभावहेतुः..... यथा चन्द्रमसः परभागस्यपृथिव्याध्वाधोभागस्य ॥ भा. ३७ ॥ नर्कचरणयनरश्मिदर्शनाच्च ॥ ४६ ॥ दृश्यन्ते हि नर्कं नयनरश्मयो नर्कचराणां वृषदंशप्रभृतीनां, तेन शेषस्यानुमानमिति ॥ भा. ४६ ॥ बाह्यप्रकाशानुपलब्धत्वं विषयोपलब्धेः अनभिर्व्यक्तितोऽनुपलब्धिः ॥ ४४ ॥ बाह्येनप्रकाशेनानुगृहीते चक्षुर्विषयग्राहक तदभावेऽनुपलब्धिः..... ॥ ४४ ॥ कस्मात्पुनरभिभवोऽनुपलब्धिकारणं चाक्षुषस्य रश्मेर्नोच्यत इति ?—अभिव्यक्तौ चाभिभवात् ॥ ४५ ॥ मच्चन्द्रिनोल्काप्रकाशानुपलब्धि-त्तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ ३. १. ४२ ॥

S. 12: (P. 53):—आदित्यरश्मिः कुम्भादिषु न प्रतिहन्यतेऽविघातात् । कुम्भस्थसुदकं तपति, प्राप्तौ हि द्रव्यान्तरगुणस्य उष्णस्य स्पर्शस्य ग्रहणं तेन च शीतस्पर्शाभिभव इति । स्फटिकान्तरेतेऽपि प्रकाशनीये प्रदीपरश्मीनामप्रतिघातः, अप्रतिघाताद्यास्य ग्रहणमिति ।..... प्राप्तौ तु दाहो नाप्राप्यकारि तेज इति ।

S. 13 (P. 53):—(भा.) स्वगुणाभोपलभन्ते इन्द्रियाणि । कस्यादिति चेत्—

समुपानामिन्द्रियभावात् ॥ ३.१.७२ ॥...प्राणं स्वेन गन्धेन समानार्थकारिणा सह बाधं गन्धं
 दृष्ट्वाति, तस्य स्वगन्धप्रवृत्तं लङ्कारिवैकल्यान्न भवति, एवं शेषाणामपि ॥ भा. ॥ न
 शब्दगुणोपलब्धेः ॥ ३.१.७४ ॥ स्वगुणानोपलभन्त इन्द्रियाणीति एतन्न भवति । उपलभ्यते
 हि स्वगुणः शब्दः श्रोत्रेणेति ॥ न्या. भा. ३.१.७४ ॥

S. 14: (P. 54.55)—इदमिदानीं ममाग्नीमांसामहे । प्राप्यकारीन्द्रियाण्यप्राप्यकारीणि
 वेति । तत्र प्राप्यकारीण्येवेति कृणमक्षाक्षपादग्नीमांसकसांख्याः समाख्यानि । चक्षुः श्रोत्रेतराणि
 तानि तथेति तत्रागतः । चक्षुर्वर्जानीति तु तथा स्याद्वादावदातइदयाः ॥

“.....कीदृशी दृग्दिग् धर्मितयोक्ता । किं नु मांसमयगोलकस्या सूक्ष्मताशृदपरा
 किमुक्षपि ॥ ४ ॥ चक्षुषः सूक्ष्मतापक्षे सूक्ष्मता स्यादमूर्तता । स्याद्वात्पपरिमाणत्वमित्येषा
 कल्पनोभयी ॥ ८ ॥ बहिर्यप्रदोन्मुख्यं, बहिः कारणगन्धता । स्थायित्वं वा बहिर्दृष्टे किं
 बाधेन्द्रियता भवेत् ॥ १७ ॥ पक्षे तृतीये विषयप्रदेशः शरीरदेशो यदि वा बहिः स्यात् ।
 स्थायित्वमाद्ये विषयाश्रितत्वे यद्वाप्रवृत्तिविषयोन्मुखी स्यात् ॥ ४२ ॥

.....सर्पन्न वस्तु प्रतिविक्षेपेऽक्षि । संसर्पणे वास्य सकोटरत्वप्राप्त्या पुमान् किञ्च
 जरद्भुमः स्यात् ॥ ७ ॥

दंभोलिप्रवृत्तिप्रभिमिदुराधेश्रोत्रविषयचक्षुषः संसर्गोपगता पदार्थपटली पश्यन्ति तत्र स्थिता ।
 एवं तर्हि समुच्छलन्मलभरं भित्वा जलं तत्क्षणात् तेनाप्यन्तरितस्थितौनिमिषानालोकयेयुर्न किम्
 ॥७१॥विध्यातास्तेन ते चेद्विमलजलभरात् किं भजन्ते न शान्तिम् किं चांभः काचकूपोदरविभरणतं
 निष्पतेत्तत्तदानीम् । दोषवेधैवर्तुणं यदयमुदयते नूतनव्यूहस्यः संप्रेषुरतर्हि नैताः कथमपि रुच्यो
 लोचनस्यापि तस्मिन् ॥ ७२ ॥ रत्नाकरावतारिका टीका on प्रमाणनय. २.५ ॥

Section 3. Perception

S. 1:—(P. 63): अतिदूरात्सामीप्यात् इन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् । सौक्ष्म्याद्व्यव-
 धानात् अभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ का. ७ ॥ ‘अतिदूरात्’...यथा उत्पतन् विद्यति पतन्त्री
 अतिदूरतया सन्नपि प्रत्यक्षेण नोपलभ्यते । ‘सामीप्याद्’ यथा लोचनस्यमल्लनमतिसामीप्याच्च
 दृश्यते । इन्द्रियघातोऽन्वत्ववधिरत्वादिः । ‘मनोऽनवस्थानात्’ यथा कमायुपहतमनाः...इन्द्रियसंनि-
 कृष्टमर्थं न पश्यति । ‘सौक्ष्म्याद्’ यथा इन्द्रियसंनिकृष्टं परमाण्वादि... । ‘व्यवधानात्’ यथा कुड्या-
 दिव्यवहितं राजदारादि... । ‘अभिभवात्’ यथाऽहनि सौरीभिर्भाभिरभिभूतं प्रह्ननक्षत्रमण्डलं न
 पश्यति । ‘समानाभिहारात्’ यथा तोयदविमुक्तानुदबिन्धु जलाशये न पश्यति ।

S. 2:—(P. 64): सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसां चेन्द्रियार्थयोः संनिकर्षनिमित्तत्वात् ॥ न्या.
 २. १. २६ ॥यदा तु तीव्री च्चनित्यस्य प्रबोधकारणं भवतः तदा प्रसुप्तस्येन्द्रियसंनि-
 कर्षनिमित्तं प्रबोधज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । तत्र न ज्ञातुर्मनसश्च संनिकर्षस्य प्राधान्यं भवति । किं तर्हि...
 न हि आत्मा जिज्ञासमानः प्रयत्नेन मनस्तदा प्रेरयतीति ।...यदा...निःसंक्रस्पस्य निजिज्ञासस्य
 च व्यासक्तमनस्ते बाह्यविषयोपनिपातनाज् ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षस्य प्राधान्यम् । न
 हि अत्रासौ जिज्ञासमानः प्रयत्नेन मनः प्रेरयतीति । भा. २. १. २६ ॥ (न) अर्थविशेषप्राव-
 स्यात् ॥ न्या. २.१.२९ ॥ अर्थविशेषप्रावल्याद्धि सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसां ज्ञातोत्पत्तिरेकदा भवति ।...
 तस्यप्रावत्यं तीव्रतापटुते । तत्प्राव्यविशेषप्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षविषय न आत्ममनसोः

संनिर्वाणविषयम्, तस्मादिन्द्रियार्थसंनिर्वाणः प्रधानमिति ॥ भा. ॥ Also cf. यथा कालचरं व्यासकर्मणाः क्वचिद् देशे शर्करया कष्टकेन वा पादव्यवहारोति तदाऽऽत्ममनः संयोगविशेष एषितव्यः ॥ न्या. भा. ३. २. ३२ ॥

S. 3:—(P. 68): ततश्चाद्यो द्विविधः—प्राज्ञा अव्यवसेयः । तत्र निर्विकल्पकं [प्राज्ञास्व] ग्रहणं प्रमाणम् । कल्पनापोढत्वात् । अव्यवसायः सविकल्परूपोऽप्रमाणम् । कल्पना-ज्ञानत्वात् । “कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तं प्रत्यक्षं निर्विकल्पकम् । विकल्पो वस्तुनिर्मासात् असंवादादु-पप्लवः ॥ प्राज्ञं वस्तु प्रमाणं हि ग्रहणं यदितोन्यथा । न तद्वस्तु न तन्मानं शब्दस्मिन्निद्र्या-दिजम् ॥” ननु सविकल्पस्य अप्रामाण्ये कथं ततः प्रवृत्तस्य अर्थप्राप्तिः संवादश्चोपपद्येयातामिति चेत्—नेतद् भद्रम् । अग्निप्रभाविषयमग्निकल्पन्यायेन पारंपर्येणार्थप्रतिभंभवेन तदुपपत्तेः । (सर्वं बौद्धदर्शन. P. 44. 45.) संमुखं वस्तुमात्रं तु प्राग्गृह्णात्यविकल्पितम् । तत्सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां कल्पयन्ति मनीषिणः ॥ अस्ति ह्यालोचितज्ञानं प्रथमभिविकल्पकम् । बालभूषादिविज्ञानसदृशम् मुखवस्तुजम् ॥ ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिमिर्यया । बुद्ध्याऽवसीयते साऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सम्मता ॥ सां. त. कौ. का. २७ ॥ नामजात्यादियोजनारहितं वैशिष्ट्या-नवगाहि निष्कारकं प्रत्यक्षम् । ज्ञानमात्रस्य सविषयकत्वेन निर्विकल्पकेपि विषयतापेक्षितेति, प्रकरता, विशेष्यता, संसर्गता एतत्प्रयातिरिक्ता तुरीया विलक्षणविषयता स्वीक्रियते इति ।... सविकल्पज्ञानान्तरं हानोपादानोपेक्षाबुद्धयो जायन्ते । तदा निर्विकल्पकं ज्ञानम् करणम् । सविकल्पकमवान्तराध्यापारः । हानादिबुद्ध्यः फलमिति ॥ज्ञातृज्ञेयादिविभागद्वयं ब्रह्मैकत्व-विषयमलंकारकं विशेष्यविशेषणसंबन्धरहितं ज्ञानमिति वेदान्तिनः ।

S. 4:—(P. 70): प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमेकदेश ग्रहणादुपप्लवः ॥ न्या. २. १. ३० ॥ यद्विमिश्रितार्थसंनिर्वाणवस्तुपश्यते ज्ञानं वृक्ष इति, एतत् मिश्र प्रत्यक्षं, तत् खल्वनुमानमेव । कस्मात् ? एकदेशग्रहणात् वृक्षस्योपप्लवः । अर्धभागस्य गृहीत्वा वृक्षमुपलभते । न वैकदेशो वृक्षः । तत्र यथा धूमे गृहीत्वा वह्निमुमिनोति तादृशेन तद्वति ॥ भा ॥ एकदेशग्रहण-माश्रित्य प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानत्वमुपपाद्यते । तच्च—न, प्रत्यक्षेण यावत्तावदुपपलंभात् ॥ २. १. ३१ ॥ न प्रत्यक्षमनुमानम् । कस्मात् ? प्रत्यक्षेणैवोपलंभात् ।

S. 5:—(P. 71): अवग्रहेष्टापायधारणाः ॥ तत्त्वार्थ १. १६ ॥ तदेतन्मतिज्ञान-सुमयनिमित्तमप्येकशब्दवृद्धिर्भवति । तद्यथा । अवग्रह ईहापायो धारणा चेति । तत्राव्यक्तं यथा स्वमिश्रितैर्विषयाणामालोचनावधारणमवग्रहः । अवग्रहो ग्रहणमालोचनमवधारणमित्यनर्थ-न्तरम् ॥ अवग्रहीते विषयार्थैकदेशाच्छेदानुगमने निश्चयविशेषजिज्ञासा ईहा । ईहा कदा तर्कः परीक्षा विचारणा जिज्ञासा, इत्यनर्थान्तरम् ॥ अवग्रहीते विषये सम्यक्सम्यगिति शुणदोषविचा-रणाव्यवसायापनोदोऽपायः ।...धारणा प्रतिपत्तिरवधारणमवस्थानं निश्चयोऽवग्रहः अवग्रह इत्य-नर्थान्तरम् ॥ भा. १. १५ ॥ The definitions given in the सम्प्रतिर्तर्क प्रकरणम् are as follows:—(i) विषयविषयिसंनिपातान्तरमावग्रहणमवग्रहः ॥ (ii) पुनरवग्रहित विषयाकाङ्क्षणीहा ॥ (iii) तदनेतरं तथैहितविशेषणियोऽशयः ॥ (iv) ज्ञेयविषयस्मृतिहेतुः तदनेतरं धारणा ॥

S. 6:—(P. 79-81): तत्र वाग्वर्णेष्वेवार्थवती । ओत्र च ज्ञानपरीणाममात्र-विषयम् । पदं पुनर्जादुसंसारबुद्धिनिर्माद्यमिति । यथा एकसमयासंभवित्वात् परस्परनिरजुमहा-

स्मान्ते पदमस्यैव अनुपपन्नम् अभिर्भूतास्तिरोमतामेति प्रत्येकमपदस्वरूपा उच्यन्ते ।
वर्णः पुनरेकैकः पदात्मा सर्वाभिधानात्मिकाप्रवृत्तिः सहकारिवर्णान्तप्रतिबोधित्वाद् वैश्वरूप-
मिवाऽऽपन्नः पूर्ववत्तरेणोत्तरस्य पूर्वोक्तं विशेषेऽवस्थापित इत्येवं बहवो वर्णाः क्रमानुरोधिनोऽर्थ-
संकेतेनावच्छिन्ना इवन्त एते सर्वाभिधानात्मिकापरिवृता गम्भीरकारदिसर्वनिधाः सास्नादिमन्तमर्थ-
द्योतयन्तीति । तदेवमर्थसंकेतेनावच्छिन्नानाम् उपसंहृतचनिक्रमाणां च एको बुद्धिनिर्भासस्तत्पद-
वाचक वाच्यस्य संकेत्यते । तदेकं पदमेकबुद्धिविषय एकप्रयत्नाक्षिसम् अभागम् अक्रमम्
अवर्णम् बौद्धम् अन्त्यवर्णप्रत्ययव्यापारोपरथापितं भोतुमिरनादिवाक्यद्वयव्यापारानुविद्यया लोक-
बुद्ध्या सिद्धवत्संप्रतिपत्त्या प्रतीयते ।

S. 7.—(P. 81-82) कव्यकानुभवाच्च प्रायः संस्काराधानकमेण व्यक्तमनुभव-
मादधाना दृष्टा यथा दूरद्वन्द्वस्पर्ता अस्तिप्रत्यया कव्यक्या क्वचित्तवनस्पतिप्रत्ययवैतवः । न च
एवविधा वर्णानामर्थप्रत्यायने संभवति । नो कलु वर्णाः प्रत्येकमव्यक्तमर्थप्रत्ययमादधस्यन्ते,
व्यक्तमिति शक्यं वक्तुम् । वर्णाधेयस्त्वर्थप्रत्ययो न प्रत्यक्षः तदेव वर्णभ्यो जायमानः स्फुट
एव जायते । न वा जायेत, न तु अस्फुटः । स्फोटस्य तु चानिर्णयस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य सतः
स्फुटास्फुटये कल्पयेते । (प्रयत्नविशेषव्यव्यतवा...) एवं प्रत्येक वर्णानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहित-
श्रोत्रलक्षजन्मन्यनुसंहारबुद्धौ संहता वर्णा एकपदस्फोटभावमापन्नाः न च निमित्तविषयत्वं संस्कारयोः
भागद्वयविषययो अनुभवयोः तज्जन्मनोश्च संस्कारयोरेकपदविषयत्वात् ।

Section 5. चिकल्पः.

S. 1.—(P. 107) : “ शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुज्ञान्यो विकल्पः ॥ १. १ ॥ स न
प्रमाणोपारोही । न विपर्ययोपारोही च । वस्तुज्ञान्यत्वेऽपि शब्दज्ञानमाहात्म्यनिबन्धनो व्यवहारो
दृश्यते । तद्यथा चेतन्यं पुरुषस्य स्वरूपमिति । यथा चित्तिरेव पुरुषस्तदा किमत्र केन व्यप-
दिश्यते । भवति च व्यपदेशे वृत्तिः । चैत्रस्य गौरिति । तथा प्रतिविद्धवस्तुधर्मो निश्चयः
पुरुषः ; निष्ठति बाण स्थस्यति स्थित इति, गतिनिवृत्तौ घातवर्धमात्र गम्यते । तथाऽनुत्पत्ति-
धर्मो पुरुष इति उत्पत्तिधर्मस्य अभावमात्रमवगम्यते न पुरुषान्वयी धर्मः । तस्माद्विकल्पितः स
धर्मेस्तेन वास्ति व्यवहार इति ॥ भा. १. १ ॥

S. 2.—(P. 108): तदिदमाह—“ भवति च व्यपदेशे वृत्तिः । व्यपदेशव्यपदेश-
योर्भावो व्यपदेशः । विशेषणविशेष्यभाव इति यावत् । तस्मिन्वृत्तिर्वाक्यस्य यथा चैत्रस्य
गौरिति ।..... लौकिकमुदाहरणमाह—तिष्ठति बाण इति । यथा ही पचति मिमसि इत्यत्र
पूर्वापरिभूतः कर्मक्षणप्रचय एकपक्षवच्छिन्नः प्रतीयत एवं तिष्ठति इत्यत्रापि । पूर्वापरिभ-
वेवाऽऽह—“ स्थास्यति स्थित इति ” । ननु भवतु पावकपूर्वपरिभूतयाऽवस्थानक्रियया
बाणाद्विषया बाणस्य व्यपदेश इत्यत आह—“ गतिनिवृत्तौ घातवर्धमात्रं गम्यते ” । गतिनिवृत्ति-
रेव तावत्कल्पिता तस्या अपि भावरूपत्वं तत्रापि पूर्वापरिभाव इत्यदो रूपान्तरपरा इत्यर्थः ।
अभावः कल्पितो भाव इव चादुगत इव च सर्वपुरुषेषु गम्यते न पुनः पुरुषव्यतिरिक्तो धर्मः
कश्चिदित्युदाहरणान्तरमाह—तथाऽनुत्पत्तिधर्मेति । प्रमाणविपर्ययाभ्यामन्या न विकल्पवृत्तिरिति
वादिनो बहवः प्रतिपेदिरे । तत्रातिबोधनायोदाहरणप्रपञ्च इति मन्तव्यम् । ...एतद्वक्तुं भवति—
क्वचिदभेदे भेदमारीपयति क्वचित्पुनर्मिथ्यामभेदम् । ततः भेदस्याभेदस्य च वस्तुतोऽभावा-
त्तदाभासो विकल्पो न प्रमाणं नापि विपर्ययो व्यवहारविसंवादादिति । किं विशेष्यं केन व्यप-

दिश्यते विशेष्यते, नामेदे विशेष्यविशेषणभावो, न हि गवा गौविशेष्यते । किं तु भिन्नैव
षेत्रेण ॥ टी. १. १ ॥

S. 3:—(P. 108): तत्र शब्दार्थज्ञानविकल्पैः संकीर्णा सवितर्का समापत्तिः ॥
योः १. ४२ ॥... सवितर्का समापत्तिः प्रतिपत्तव्या । कीदृशी शब्दस्वार्थज्ञाने च तेषां
विकल्पाः । वस्तुतः भिन्नानामपि शब्दादीनामितरेतराग्न्यासाद्विकल्पोऽप्येकस्मिन्नेदमादर्शयति
भिन्नेषु चाभेदम् । तेन शब्दार्थज्ञानविकल्पैः संकीर्णा व्यामिश्रा इत्यर्थः । ‘तद्यथा गौरिति
शब्द इति’ । गौरित्युपात्तयोरर्थज्ञानयोः शब्दाभेदविकल्पो दृष्टितः । गौरित्यर्थ इति ।
गौरित्युपात्तयोः शब्दज्ञानयोरर्थभेदविकल्पः । गौरिति ज्ञानमिति...शब्दार्थयोर्ज्ञानाभेदविकल्पः ।
तदेवमभिभिगणि विभक्तानामपि शब्दार्थज्ञानानां ग्रहणं लोके दृष्टं दृष्टव्यम् । यदि अविभागेन
ग्रहणं कुतस्तर्हि विभाग इत्यत आह—विभज्यमानाश्च अन्वयव्यापितरेकाभ्यां परीक्षकैः ॥
टी. १. ४२ ॥

S. 4:—(P. 109): यदा पुन शब्दसंकेतस्मृतिपरिशुद्धौ श्रुतानुमानज्ञानविकल्प-
शून्यायां तस्माद्विप्रज्ञायां स्वरूपमात्रेणावस्थितोऽर्थस्तत्स्वरूपकारमात्रतया एवावच्छिद्यते । सा च
निर्वितर्का समापत्तिः । तत्पर प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्यथाश्रुतानुमानयोर्बोध्यम् । ततः श्रुतानुमाने प्रभवतः ।
न च श्रुतानुमानज्ञानसहभूतं तार्शनम् । तस्मादसंकीर्णं प्रमाणान्तरेण निवृत्तिकर्ममाध्वं दर्शन-
मिति । या शब्दसंकेतश्रुतानुमानज्ञानविकल्पस्मृतिपरिशुद्धौ । भा १. ४३ ॥ यदा
पुन...संकेतस्मृतिपरित्यक्ता, तत्प्रागे च श्रुतानुमानज्ञानविकल्पो तन्मूलो त्यक्तो तदा तच्छून्यायां
समाधिविप्रज्ञायां स्वरूपमात्रेण अवास्थितोऽयः तत्स्वरूपमात्रतया, न तु विकल्पिताऽऽकारेण परि-
च्छिद्यते । सा निर्वितर्का समापत्तिः इति । तद् योगिनां पर प्रत्यक्षं असदांगपग्न्यवस्थायाभावात् ।
स्यादेतत्परेण प्रत्यक्षेणागैतत्त ए गृहीत्वा योगिना उपदिशन्त्युपपादयन्ति च । तस्मादागमानुमाने
तद्विषये ते च विकल्पो इति परमपि प्रत्यक्षे विकल्प एवेत्यत आह—‘तच्च श्रुतानुमानसहभूतं
तदनुपपन्नं स्याद्, भयेरगैर्गणं, तयोस्तु बीजमेव एतत्ततो हि श्रुतानुमाने प्रभवतः । न च
यद्यस्य कारणं तत्तद्विषये भवति । तस्माद्विकल्पेन प्रत्यक्षेण गृहीत्वा, विकल्पाय, उपदिशन्ति
चापपादयन्ति च । संकेतस्थाने गौरिति शब्दार्थज्ञानानामितरेतराग्न्यासात् । (ततश्चाऽऽगमानु-
मानज्ञानविकल्पो भवतः । टीका १. ४३. १

S. 5:—(P. 110): तदेवं विकल्पितवर्णभागान् एकमेव पदं व्युत्पद्य कल्पित-
पदविभागे वाक्ययथैवमनस्य व्युत्पादयितुपाद । टीका ३. १७ ॥ [P. 110 नास्म्यर्थो
विज्ञानविमहचरः, अस्ति तु ज्ञानम् अर्थविराहचरः, ..इति प्रत्युपस्थिते इदं स्वमाहात्म्येन वस्तु
कथमप्रमाणत्वमेव विकल्पज्ञानवलेन वस्तुस्वरूपमुत्तमं तदेवापलपन्तं शब्दयवचना स्युः ।
भा ४. १६. ॥ यस्मादर्धेन स्वकीयया ग्राह्यशक्त्या विज्ञानमजनि, तस्मादर्धेन ग्राहकं तदेवभूतं
वस्तु कथम् अप्रमाणात्मकेन विकल्पाज्ञानवलेन विकल्पस्य अप्रमाणिकत्वात् तद्व्यलस्यापि तदात्मनोऽ-
प्रमाणात्मकत्वं तेन वस्तुस्वरूपमुत्पन्नं उपपन्नं भूत्वा . . . । न चाविकल्पवद्विकल्पोऽपि
स्वाकारमात्रगोचरः तस्य चाऽस्थूलत्वात् स्थूलमाचरो भवितुमर्हति । न च प्रत्यक्षमाहात्म्ये
विकल्पमात्रेण अपोद्यते । टी ४. १६]

Synopsis of a Thesis on

The हेयपक्ष OF योग

or

Towards—

A Constructive Synthesis
Of Psychological Material in Indian Philosophy



By

Pranjiwan Vishwanath Pathak



The Scheme of Transliteration given below and followed in the thesis is the one given by Pro. S. K. Belvalkar and Prof. R. D. Ranade in their "History of Indian Philosophy Vol. II, The Creative Period."

a	â	i	ī	u	ū	ṛ	ṝ
ḷi	e	ai	o	au	m̐* or ṁ	ṅ	ḥ
ka	kha	ga	gha	ṅa			
cha	chha	ja	jha	ṅa			
ṭa	ṭha	ḍa	dha	ṅa			
ta	tha	da	dha	na			
pa	pha	ba	bha	m̐			
	ya	ra	la	va			
	s'a	sha	sa				
		ha	ḷa				

* For the convenience of the press in which this is printed n as an option to ṁ is charged to ṁ



Synopsis of a Thesis on The हेयपक्ष Of योग

Or

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Material in Indian Philosophy

—x—

Section 1. Introduction

The earliest beginning of Indian thought lying in the pre-historic past, though mainly 'projective' in its tendency to personify or hypostatise different aspects of natural phenomena, was still marked by reflective heights to reach the "Beyond".

Theory of bifurcating or cross-planer evolution as applied by Jevons to the development of religion.

The enquiring spirit of the Vedic Rishis. The agnostic depth of the नास्तवीयसूक्त—ऋ. १०. १२९.

One early reference to the Nature of मनस् as the most active principle in man appearing in शुक्ल यजु. अ. ३४.

These are some of the earliest references to रजस्, तमस्, क्लम, तप्स् along with मनस् and its functionings. Introspection too mentioned as one of the means of an approach to truth or reality.

The "Reflective" stage of the Upanishads as different from the "projective" stage of the Vedic times.

The System of caste or the Varna Dharma had purely a social setting, and was a part of the wider Ās'rama Dharma. One-fourth of an individual's life was devoted to the upkeep of society while three-fourths of it was dedicated to learning and self-realisation. Possibilities of Introspection, and growth of spiritual knowledge.

Two types in humanity the Platonic and the Aristotelian—The inward-looking man and the "Extrovert"-type. Favourable social conditions helped the accumulation of spiritual knowledge.

Relation between philosophic thought and positive sciences is exhibited in Indian thought, in the influence of the method of **आनुवंशिक** on different philosophical systems.

Treatment of psychology not included in Sir B. J. Seal's book on "the Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus." Such exclusion not meaningless, for it is due mainly to the difference between the points of views of all other sciences on the one hand and the point of view of Psychology on the other.

The "individualistic" point of view of psychology

Yoga includes both the approach to and the result—namely self-realisation. It is not a process of abstraction, but a sort of synthesis of both subject and object in higher pure consciousness. Relevant psychological references on the meaning of self-realisation given from some of the Upanishads.

Upanishads form the watershed not merely of philosophical currents, but of psychological thought as well.

Attitude of Buddha towards the spirit-mongering recluses. He mainly objected to the identification of the soul with the phenomenal self. Buddha's silence when pointedly questioned about the existence of soul does not mean its negation but it only showed his disinclination to enter into discussions regarding subjects that lie beyond the pale of reasoned proof.

The highest achievement of Buddhistic Anattāvāda is that, even though a sort of phenomenalism, it is joined to the highest ethical idealism.

The dynamic concepts of the subjective flow as well as of the objective world necessitated Buddhism to posit the **निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष** as real. The **सर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष** even though sufficiently valid for practical purposes, was removed from reality. The Sāmkhya, Yoga and Nyāya regard soul as static, Buddhism is pure dynamicity without any recognition of an entity like that of soul; Jainism strikes a *via media* by regarding soul as a principle synthesising change in permanence. The two extreme positions, with Jainism as intermediate, give us ample material for a synthetic construction of psychology.

Self-realisation as the positive goal of individual effort is accepted by all schools of Indian thought. Freedom from or the suppression of the ordinary expressions of the human mind was regarded as the most necessary step of all for the attainment of that goal. A sufficient knowledge regarding the human mind and its workings was a *sine qua non* of the yogic practices. The nature of the mind had to be known, before one could think of freeing oneself from it. Hence we find a more or less negative treatment of psychological subjects in Indian Philosophy. Thus the क्षेत्रज्ञ of योग forms a vast field dealing with psychological material enough to give a basis for such an inquiry as the present one.

The purpose guiding the discussions of psychological topics is other than a mere scientific interest in psychology as such. Still we do find a good deal of matter regarding perceptions etc. and the relation between the structure and the function of the mind. The truth about the cognitive and the conative dispositions as influencing the present was definitely accepted though not expressly stated by all the schools. As the ideal of self-realisation was a moral one, necessity of freedom from emotions was recognised. This fact is mainly responsible for the meagre treatment of emotions and instincts.

The point of view of the different schools of philosophy was thus diametrically opposite to the writings on Poetics and Dramaturgy. Necessity of going to the literature on aesthetics for the material on emotions to complete our constructive synthesis.

The system of संप्रदाय handing down the traditional lore from generation to generation. In spite of this some mutilations in the link are there. The question of exact dates not absolutely important for the synthetic review, though a rough time perspective is necessary to mark the different developments on several sides.

The relation of योगदर्शन to the different schools of Indian thought.

Yoga in the Upanishads. References to Yoga in the Nyāya. S'ankara's reference to some other Yogadars'ana.

योगदर्शन and Umāswāti's तत्त्वार्थविवरणम्. Parallelisms between the two.

Similarities between Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Buddhism.

Scope of our enquiry. Yogadars'an pre-eminently a purely psychological system is taken as the nucleus of our synthetic construction, our method being that of accepting the basis of psychological material given in that dars'an, and supplementing it with necessary matter from other sources.

The psychological discussions of original worth appearing in Yogadars'ana such that can proudly find a place in any modern text book on psychology and on which the writer of the thesis has based his synthesis and critical interpretations are mainly :—

- (1) Its theory of auditory perception;
- (2) Its treatment of चित्त as a specific mode of the mind covering both—the process of thought—abstraction as well as relating;
- (3) Express recognition of Dispositional Masses;
- (4) A definite Theory of Levels of Attention or Levels of Consciousness, giving us corresponding levels of perception and reality and Levels of Subconsciousness.
- (5) And the dynamic concept of mind—चित्त which comes very near to the Buddhistic view of consciousness as flux, if we do not take into consideration the transcendental Purusha.

Necessity of defining certain philosophical terms for the proper understanding of Indian psychological thought.

The Sāṃkhya series as appearing in the Upanishads—उपनिषद् and श्वेताश्वतर. The Upanishadic view is definitely inclining towards a spiritualistic monism or mysticism and not towards Sāṃkhya dualism.

Elder Sāṃkhya theistic as opposed to the later Sāṃkhya of Īs'varkṛishṇa. In that case Yoga theism not an innovation.

The Sāṃkhya Series—the senses, the Manas, the Ahankāra or the lower principle of individuation, the Buddhi, or the determining Intellect, Purusha, the higher principle of Individuality—defined.

The relation of “योग्यता (संबन्ध)” between Purusha and Buddhi.

Antahkarana defined—same as the Sāṃkhya-Yoga Chitta.

Buddhistic concepts of विज्ञान, चित्त, and मनस् and the Yoga terms of बुद्धि and चित्त.

The Sāṃkhya-Yoga Dualism most favourable to psychological point of view of naive realism positing a duality between subject and object.

Habits of thought in the east and the west, the one synthetic the other mainly analytic. The genus-species horizontal method of classification not workable when dealing with qualitative entities. Point of view of the western method of classification mainly externalistic. The other method is the synthetic one of 'Vertical Classification' as applied by the Indian thinkers. Instances of Vertical Division of purely qualitative entities. Morality is pure quality or value and as such can be included in the vertical method. Mrs. Rhys Davids on the Buddhistic habits of thought.

Section 2. Perception

(1) Mechanism of Perception*

The classification given in Yogadars'ana of the several, directly apprehensible and the indirectly inferable Dharmas of the mind.

The different specific modes of the mind are the directly apprehensible Dharmas. Classification of these modes into प्रमाण, विपर्यय, विकल्प, निद्रा and स्मृति.

Yogadars'ana division more objective than the non-moral characteristics of consciousness given in अभिषम्मत्यसंग्रहो.

Classification of प्रमाण into प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and आगम. Sāṃkhya-yoga view of perception.

(1) Number & Nature of Senses

The meaning of the word इन्द्रिय :—

- (i) That which suggests (the objects)
- (ii) That which lords over (the objects)
- (iii) That which grasps its specific object.

* Used not in the sense in which Bergson uses it, (Vide his Mind Energy—p. 97 ff) but in the sense of a preliminary discussion on the nature and number of senses etc.

Mention of Indriyas in the Upanishads—the five Jñānendriyas and the five Karmendriyas

The ten indriyas as mentioned in the सांख्यकारिका.

The outer sense organ and the inner faculty of sensing as distinguished from each other in the Upanishadic thought. A पूर्वपक्ष view mentioned in Nyāya taking the indriyas as non-material, considered.

Origin of senses according to

(i) Upanishads (the Nyāya view compared)

(ii) Sāṃkhya-yoga view.

Relation between the outer sense, the inner faculty and the Sāttvika Ahaṃkāra and the modern factors contained in the physiology of sensation—namely the sense, the nerves and the specific area of the cortex yielding a particular sensation.

Impairment of a sense organ and defective sensation (बो०)

Distinction between the outer and the inner sense pushed a step further in तत्त्वार्थ in the further divisions of इन्द्रिय and भावेन्द्रिय into निर्वृति and उपकरण इन्द्रिय and into लब्धि and उपयोग भावेन्द्रिय respectively.

The Jain classification of Jīvas into those possessing one, two, three, four, five and six indriyas respectively. This cannot be said to mean a classification from the point of view of an “evolutionary concept of increasing connotation.” The theory of evolution a modern one. Aristotle’s “closed” species and the Jain Jīvas.

The primary character of the sense of Touch recognised by Jainism as well as, though indirectly, by Nyāya. A Nyāya पूर्वपक्ष upholding *A theory of the Non-specificity of different Senses*, regarding them all as identical with the sense of touch, considered.

(2) Nature of contact between Sense and its object

The general Sāṃkhya-yoga view regarding the outgoing nature of the mind.

The प्राप्यकारि nature of the ear as expounded in योगदर्शन by बाचस्पति.

Democritus’s theory of “eidola” and sense perception compared.

The Nyāya view re the प्राप्यकारि nature of the eye—The theory of invisible visual rays—The inner relation between a

sense organ and its specific faculty or capacity to sense a specific stimulus—the sense unable to sense its own faculty, for in trying to catch it, it would have to be without that particular faculty—The sense of hearing an only exception to this otherwise general relation.

रत्नप्रभाचार्य has taken a complete, though not an impartial review of the प्राप्यकारि or अप्राप्यकारि nature of the different senses in his रत्नाकरावतारिका टीका on प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालंकार by बाजिदेवसूरी. Some of his definitions of an organ of sense.

The Buddhistic views re the अप्राप्यकारि nature of the eye and the ear. The nature of contact between skin as the sense of touch and its object—Different senses and their relation to the primary and the secondary qualities of a body.

Upanishadic metaphor of senses as so many apertures—echo of this metaphor in Buddhism.

Section 3. Perception

(2 As a mode of the mind)

(1) Preliminary Discussion

प्रत्यक्ष—लौकिक and अलौकिक, both included in immediate knowledge according to all schools of philosophy except Jainism which takes sense-knowledge to be mediate.

Functioning of mind necessary for perception—re this we have the Upanishadic view that perception is impossible if mind be 'elsewhere'. Comparatively the earliest mention of the expectant character of "senses", and hence of mind as using those senses met with in Upanishadic thought.

Object of perception an organic whole (योग); and perception taking place in the " specious present " (सांख्य). Corresponding to such a view of the present we have the three moments of उत्पाद, स्थिति and भंग in a state of consciousness in Buddhism..

Scope or limits of sense experience as given in Sāṃkhya.

Distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary sensations, the Nyāya view—Recognition of a free effort of soul in perception. The Buddhistic view.

Subconscious Sensations and the Threshold of Consciousness

and the Buddhist theory of perception including 17 thought-moments. Recognition of the active principle of consciousness in perception.

(2) Relation between निर्विकल्प and सविकल्पप्रत्यक्ष

Definition of प्रत्यक्ष as given in योग and न्याय.

We find the cardinal process of विकल्प—abstraction in thought most necessary of all to lift a man from the narrow limits of private sense experience. Relation between sensation and thought.

निर्विकल्पप्रत्यक्ष defined—सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदी, सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह etc.

The process from निर्विकल्प to सविकल्पप्रत्यक्ष according to Jainism consisted of four stages—अवग्रह, ईहा, अपाय or अवाय and धारणा. The four stages defined as in तत्त्वार्थ.

The Buddhistic 17 moments of preception distributed over the four Jain stages—parallelism between the two.

The four stages as defined in प्रमाणनय.

The process from निर्विकल्प to सविकल्पप्रत्यक्ष according to Yogadars'ana—the अवस्थापरिणाम.

Mind not a *tabula Rasa*; not passive in perception, but actively synthesising.

अनुगमज्ज्ञान—"incopresentability" of two sensations due to subjective causes—Span of Attention.

(3) Theory Of Perception

(Auditory perception of meaning.)

Process from निर्विकल्प to सविकल्पप्रत्यक्ष and the cumulative character of consciousness.

The स्फोट theory as appearing in Yogadars'ana in the Bhūshya and Vāchaspati's Tikā on 3 17.

Process from निर्विकल्प to सविकल्पप्रत्यक्ष possible only with objects spatially spread out and enduring in time—Incapacity of spoken syllables to co-exist—Possible co-existence only in memory—Infinite capacity of a syllable to enter into different combinations, and name any object—This nebulous character of the syllable deter-

* The word is used not in the sense as Prof. Ward uses it, of "incopresentability" due to the nature of objective reality, but due to subjective span of attention.

mined only in its relation to other syllables—This means mutual modification of the saṃskāras as they cohere in memory—The linear atomic time sensations “contract” in consciousness and by the utterance of the last letter the final modification comes up and the meaning “breaks” upon the hearer’s mind (स्फोट), in a single act of consciousness

Relation between निर्दिष्ट and सविकल्पप्रत्यक्ष which exists in case of spatial enduring objects is absent in case of the syllables for they do not endure and have no space-coefficient. A quotation from Bergson similar to that of Vyāsa Bhāṣhya

सम्यक्स्फोट—The unit of preception is a sentence—the words as well as the syllables are arrived at by a process of विकल्प or abstraction in thought, breaking up a unity into differences; अविवक्षितान्वयवाद and अविवक्षितान्वयवाद.

स्फोट at its worst a mere hypostatisation of the process of perception of meaning in consciousness.

(4) Perception

and (a) Recognition, (b) Interpretation, (c) of similarity and of dissimilarity.

(a) Recognition—

Recognition and memory, Memory and the enduring subject. Recognition and the enduring substance of a changing object (योग०) Recognition and perception of one object inspite of two eyes. (न्याय०) Recognition and प्रत्यक्षज्ञान (सर्व०)

(b) Interpretation—

Perception of meaning and the structure of the mind (सर्व०). The Buddhistic view. Interpretation and action (सर्व०). Association.

(c) Perception of Similarity and Dissimilarity.

Perception of जाति (न्याय०)

Perception of भेद and पूर्णप्रकाशदर्शन (सर्व०)

Section 4. Relation of प्रत्यक्ष to Other Pramāṇas

अनुमान and आगम

प्रत्यक्ष the only basis of all thought construction, the final court of appeal—शङ्ख्य, योग and न्याय views.

(इन्द्रिय) प्रत्यक्ष not the sole criterion of reality, hence no degene-

rate form of sensationalism is to be found in any of the Indian schools. The principle of बोध्या in perception.

Relation of Inference and Āgama to Pratyaksha.

अनुमानः—स्वार्थानुमान—परार्थानुमान

आगमः—

Āgama defined—abstract character of Inference and verbal knowledge. Standard of verbal authority defined (योग०)

Definition of Āgama given in Nyāya.

Note 1. विषयव्यवहार

Nature of false knowledge : its contradictory nature to true knowledge; coherence theory of truth implied in such a definition of false knowledge. (योग०) द्विकन्द्रदर्शन—Nyāya View. Prabhākara's Theory of Error.

Note 2. निद्रा

Sleep a positive mode of the mind—The three Gunas and levels of consciousness—Sleep and Tamas—Functioning of the mind in Sleep—Three kinds of Sleep—Sleep and Ekāgratā—and Samādhi.

Section 5. विकल्प

Implications of the 'Vikalpa' operations in Perception.

विकल्प rendered in English by the word "Imagination" but विकल्प is not कल्पना in its ordinary sense. Difficulty in fixing down the connotations of terms used by different schools of Indian thought; the only safe method, under such circumstances can be to follow closely all the possible references.

Sūtra I. 9. with Bhāṣya, and Tīkā; Tīkā on I. 42; Bhāṣya and Tīkā on I. 43, Tīkā on 3.17; Bhāṣya and Tīkā on 4.15 quoted.

The several points that get established as regards the meaning of Vikalpa from the above quotations are as follows:—

(i) Disposition to social intercourse is ingrained in the very nature of man from timeless past.

(ii) Intercourse only possible through thought that sets up in mutual opposition a subject and a predicate in a proposition.

(iii) Process consists of breaking up the original unity of immediate experience and showing a difference where there is unity.

(iv) The lower निर्विकल्प and the higher निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष—विकल्प processes lie between the two.

(v) Instances of विकल्प—The Purusha and his attributes, The flying arrow—i. e. motion and its relation to the object moving.

(vi) The धर्मी, the धर्म and the परिणाम all comprise only distinguishable moments in a single indivisible process—distinguishable only with the help of विकल्प process

(vii) Problem of Relations originate only because of विकल्प.

(viii) विकल्प not mere thought analysis, विकल्प is conventional relationing as well.

(ix) अभ्यास—The correlative of विकल्प on the objective side.

(x) अनुमान and आगम based fundamentally on विकल्प.

(xi) विकल्प wider than Meinong's "Suppositions."

(xii) विकल्प cannot mean "Imagination," but is a process of thought analysis and of synthesis based on social convention or objective Adhyāsa.

Section 6. संस्कारपिंड—Dispositional Masses

वृत्तिसंस्कारवक्त्र—meaning of the word संस्कार—wider than masses of Apperception—गतिसंस्कार—स्थितिसंस्कार—संस्कार as an अपरिहृत चित्तधर्म—Relation between mind and its Saṃskāras—Saṃskāras of knowledge, of infections or affections—and past acts. Saṃskāras of knowledge, and Apperceptive Masses—संस्कारपिंड, Systems of dispositional masses and their relation to the present—Past experiences, stored up in the inapproachable subconscious depths of our mind, form its structure and function in the present—Uprooting of old Saṃskāras i. e. changing the structure of the mind—Law of the Specificity of the Saṃskāras—Saṃskāra and वासन, आशय and आलम्बन of Vāsanā. Systems of Saṃskāras and their relation to the experiences of pleasure and pain.

Section 7. स्मृति

(I)

Relation between Saṃskāra and memory just the same as that between the fund of memory and the act of memory—

Memory already implied in perception—Meaning of the word स्मृति as watchfulness or wakefulness—An attempt to guess the relation between this meaning and the ordinary meaning of स्मृति as an act of memory—Definition of Memory as a mode of mind not transgressing the limits of past experience. Nature of other modes of mind as “stealing” or appropriating outside reality—memory of a memory and reduplication in consciousness—Memory as a partial recall.

The content of an act of memory—Does memory bring to the present the object of knowledge or the act of knowledge?—Memory dependent upon Samskāras, and the depositing of these traces or Samskāras in the subconscious mind is done in the present—Memory formed in the present along side of concrete experience, analogous view of Bergson re the memory of the present—The samskāras of both the object and the act of knowledge These are mere moments in a single indivisible process, distinguishable by the process of Vikalpa though not separable—The reply to the above question comes here—that memory contains principally the object of knowledge, while in Buddhi greater stress is laid upon the act of knowledge.

Memory and its relation to the temporal series—The प्रमुह्यताकात्मरूप is not recognition, but an act of memory without definite location in the past—संस्कारसाक्षात्करण not an act of memory but a plunge in the subconscious depths taken by a Yogi with the help of his higher powers—Possibility of such a plunge considered from the point of view of what Bergson terms “disinterestedness in life.”—The panoramic vision of whole past coming up to Yogi alone with full coefficients of space, time and causality. परसंस्कार-साक्षात्करण and Bergson's view of *endosmosis* between different minds.

In between the two extremes, represented by the प्रमुह्यताकात्मरूप and the संस्कारसाक्षात्करण, there lie several acts of memory corresponding to the degrees of intensity of effort at recollection.

(2) Causes of Mental Recall

Psychology of an act of recollection according to Nyāya view—Contact between the Ātmā and the Manas and the existence

of a *samskāra*—these two are the generic conditions of an act of memory while the specific immediate cause of an act of memory is held to be an उद्बोधक.

Problem of अयुगपत्स्मृति—If all past experiences co-exist in the form of *samskāras* in our subconsciousness, why do they not all come up together? Solution given by Nyāya—because the several *udbodhakas* do not come to the mind simultaneously but consecutively. The true reply ought to lie rather in the direction of recognising स्मृति itself as the effort of mind *sui generis*, that wakefulness or watchfulness suppressing all other memories and allowing only the relevant one to pass the threshold of consciousness.

The twenty five *Udbodhakas* given in Nyāya 3. 2. 42. *Udbodhakas* given in *Milindapañhā*.

Parallel instances from western psychology—Association by Resemblance, Contrast and Contiguity (Arist.) Hume substituting Cause and Effect for Contrast Hamilton's Law of Redintegration—the parts of a whole recalling one another,

Law of Neural Habit (McDougall) and some instances from Buddhism.

The whole trend of Indian thought is definitely set up against any kind of atomic associationism, mind recognised as an ever active entity.

A Note on Dreams

Yogadars'ana view about the relation between memory and dreams. भावित and अभावितस्मृत्यव्य—Object of memory in a dream is imagined to exist in a novel combination of a new space and a new time Not reproductive but constructive memory at work in dreams—Upanishadic reference to construction in dreams—A reference from Jainism on construction in dreams—Nāgasena's definition of a dream.

Sāttvika, Rājasika, and Tāmasika kinds of sleep do not correspond to the different levels of consciousness as it gradually falls into sleep from waking consciousness. Nāgasena recognised a twilight of consciousness between waking and sleeping, but not

when coming back to waking consciousness from sleep. Buddha-ghosa's view of dreams in "monkey sleep."

Dreams not real, for they come within the definition of false knowledge given as that which is contradicted by true knowledge. Yogadars'ana view of dreams is the same as that of Nyāya in holding dreams to be invalid.

Section 8. Levels Of Attention

Levels of attention definitely recognised in the psychology of Yoga, for the very meaning of Yoga is to leave the lower levels of consciousness and reach the higher ones by developing higher and higher intensity of attention.

Upanishadic references to yoga and प्रत्याहार—Introversion and restriction of Attention. Max Müller's view about the impossibility of attaining to the level of Ekāgratā in our modern days.

Levels of Attention—मूढ, क्षिप्त, विक्षिप्त and एकाग्र.

Meaning of the word समाधि—following Vyāsa Bhūshya we can identify it with attention, a quality of the human mind pervading all the levels of it. Vāchaspati restricts Samādhi to the Madhumati, Madhupratīkā (etc.) levels of consciousness.

Obstacles to concentration of Attention as enumerated in Yogadars'ana 1. 30-31. Some of these obstacles are the external expressions of emotions, and the injunction, that the Sādhak ought to free himself from these, means that a comparative freedom from emotions is held to be a necessary condition for the advancement in Yogic practices. Relation of opposition between Attention and Emotions.

Obstacles to Ekāgratā as given in Buddhism, their relation with those given in Yogadars'ana. Straining as a definite obstacle to fixity of attention, the relation between the two being an inverse one. Sense of Effort is not the true index of efficient attention.

Our method of dealing with the levels of attention is to abstract from the concrete Dhyānas their psychological character and leave aside their spiritual content.

Relation of Attention and Will to motor movements. Inhibition theory of Ribot and Munsterburg's Aktiontheorie—Inhibition

of overt movements recognised as a necessary primary condition for the concentration of Attention in Yogadars'ana—in its recognition of आसन and प्रत्यक्षचित्त mentioned in योग० 3. 46-47. प्रत्याहार (योग० 3. 54) and restriction of attention, intensity of attention and narrowing the field of consciousness—Attention and inattention go together—Archimedes and Hegel as instances of प्रत्याहार.

प्राणायाम and Attention—An hypothesis regarding their mutual relation.

Effect of attention upon the sympathetic nervous system. The moot question of relation between attention and intensity of stimulus. Pillsbury and Bergson on this—An instance of a minimum sensibillum and waves of attention—The relation of dependence of the Attention waves upon the Traube-Herring waves which are the product of circulation and respiratory cycles. Possibility of catching the very movement of attention waves through प्राणायाम.

Levels of Attention—Progressive approach to tense Ekā-gratā and धारणा, ध्यान and समाधि, their definitions—धारणा is voluntary application of attention, ध्यान is sustained attention but is accompanied by consciousness of the त्रिषुष्टि—namely subject, object and the act of attending. समाधि is at-one-ment with the object—Instances parallel to धारणा, ध्यान and समाधि given from Buddhism. Ekāgratā defined as one continuous flow of mind like that of the descending fluid oil.

The निरुद्ध level of self-consciousness the final goal of all योग, as such it falls outside the क्षेत्रज्ञ of योग, but it is necessary to dwell upon it in order to know the true nature of our mind, for only a proper understanding of the lower and the higher limits of mind, as we find it in निद्रा and निरोध, can give us an insight into its working.

No passivity at the निरुद्ध level—Dhyān Synergy.

(2) Levels of Perception

(Corresponding to levels of attention or consciousness)

Meaning of समापत्ति—The सवितर्क, सविचार, सामन्स and सास्मिता समापत्ति of योग०—The corresponding four Jhānas of Buddhism, and the four Dhyānas (सुखध्यान) given in तत्त्वार्थ-9-41.

The higher विबिक्त्य or परप्रत्यक्ष of योग at the निर्विकल्पा समापति level, as the source of all inferential i. e. scientific and verbal knowledge—The अपरप्रत्यक्ष at the प्रज्ञा level—Higher levels of consciousness not a product of abstraction in thought, but only a deepening of the experience of the particular or the individual. Abstraction can never bring one to the immediate knowledge of the विशेष. Meaning of Buddhist Ekaggatā—Ordinary इन्द्रियप्रत्यक्ष; the intermediate परप्रत्यक्ष and the अपरप्रत्यक्ष of प्रज्ञा correspond to सञ्ज्ञा, विवक्षा and पञ्चा of Buddhism. Buddhaghosa's explanatory similes.

Beyond प्रज्ञा lies the निरुद्ध चित्त—Relation of निद्रा, and प्रकृतिलयपद to कैवल्य—The functioning of the mind same even at the निरुद्ध level, the निरोध संस्कार and its relation to other Samskāras—levels of subconsciousness too recognised.

Highest knowledge of बुद्धिसत्त्व the final item in हेयपक्ष after which कैवल्य comes—Relation between artificially induced anaesthetic trance and the yogic trance.

Section 9. Manas and The Affective Tone

Feeling of pleasure and pain are the specific experiences of मनस् regarded as the sixth internal sense.

Ambiguity in the connotation of the word मनस् appearing in Upanishadic thought, and in Yogadars'ana as well.

The feelings of pleasure and "unpleasure" ultimately experienced by the बुद्धिसत्त्व; it is the Rajas that causes pain to the pure Sattva according to Sāṃkhya-Yoga.—Nyāya, Buddhist and Jaina views.

Nature of pleasurable and painful feelings and their mutual relation. सांख्य, योग, बौद्ध and न्याय views take pleasure to be negative, the वेदान्त and the जैन views regard it as not a mere absence of pain, but give it a place in the ultimate experience of self-realisation.

A negative view of pleasure is contradicted by immediate experience which shows that we do have definite feelings of pleasure and pain. Negative value of pleasure proved in Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Nyāya by an appeal to the keen sense of a Yogi—

Mill's view of—qualitative differences of pleasures—*Doctrine of Degrees of Psychological Hedonism*—Superimposed upon this, lies the ethical idealism. Rise in Hedonic Zero through satisfaction of physical wants.

Buddhistic recognition of neutral feeling—its definition and its counterpart in Yogadars'ana—

Relation between Attention and feeling—Lower neutral feeling and the higher philosophic indifference—Buddhistic उपेक्षा and तत्रमज्ज्ञातता

Section 10. Emotions and Instincts

(1) Emotions

Necessity of going to works on dramaturgy and poetics.

Relation between वासना as embedded in the structure of the mind and रस—Capacity for an emotional experience ingrained in man, outward things being mere occasions to fan the inward potentiality to actual heat. Relation between an emotion—भाव and sentiments—व्यभिचारिभाव; Emotions and their expressions, the भाव and its अनुभाव. Effect of emotional experience on consciousness of different Bhāvas—चेतसो विक्रान्तो हासः । विस्तारो विस्मयः । Classification of emotions—those whose external expressions can be imitated without any mental affection, and those inimitable emotions, expressions of which come up only if there be present the concrete experience.

(2) Instincts

Negative treatment of Instincts in Yogadars'an and Nyāya—Instincts included in संज्ञा of Jainism. The ten instincts mentioned in भगवतीशतक.

Origin of Instincts—Yoga and Nyāya view—The Past—Lives Theory of Instincts and Evolutionistic Theory of Instincts considered.

Section 11. Will

Higher levels of attention and "disinterestedness"—Moral nature of disinterestedness—Attention and will nearly alike—The moral value attaches to inward acts only, to pure will only—

Will as keeping an idea fixed in the mind—प्रतिपक्षभावम् (योग० २-२३)
 Relation between knowledge and virtue—So-called Intellectualism
 in Indian Ethics—The psychology of an act, the six-spoked wheel
 of life—Conative Dispositions—चेतसः चेष्टा (योग०) and sense of effort—
 Yogadars'an does not accept the exploded Innervation Theory—
 "शक्ति" of the mind meaning will—Self-determinism—Relation between
 the past as built up by the individual himself and the
 present. Conative dispositions as influencing but not determining
 the acts of volition—The future not fixed but present in the
 shape of a 'suggestion'—No 'fiat' of an individual will but the result
 of ईश्वरलुप—divine grace may work up to a catastrophic attainment
 of a higher level of consciousness.

Section 12. Nature of Mind

Purusha the supreme principle of consciousness regarded as
 absolutely static by Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Buddhistic view of con-
 sciousness as a purely dynamic series—'Meeting of extremes
 in (Indian) Philosophy' of these two diametrically opposite
 views not under the pressure of an abstract necessity of thought, but
 under the cementing influence of a 'real' necessity of striving for
 final liberation.

The Buddhistic view of consciousness as pure dynamicity
 —तन्मात्र and conative unity—not able to give sufficient unity to the
 objective universe to make action possible for an individual—Principle
 of Causality invoked—Causality and Uniformity in Nature, pure
 Causality in inward flux—The doctrine of प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद does not
 give us the inner relation between the different states of con-
 sciousness—Kinds of relations between different states of con-
 sciousness give us merely a description and not an explanation
 of *how* the content of one state of consciousness is delivered
 over to the other—The relation between different states of
 consciousness as mysterious as that between Purusha and
 Buddhi in Sāṃkhya. The relatively stable states of consciousness
 and the dynamic relation between them compared with James's
 'substantive parts' and 'transitive parts' of the mind—Memory in rela-
 tion to the ego as a series—Bergson's view compared—The problem
 for Buddhism is to explain relative stability in a pure flux.

The hardest problem for Sāṃkhya-Yoga is to explain dynamicity.—Difficulty of compromising the two terms Purusha and Prakṛti of a dualism. If we once accept the relation between the two, and take the material changes of chitta as already conscious, then the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view of Chitta comes absolutely near to the Buddhistic view of dynamic self.

चित्त and the three Gunas—Relation between structure and function of mind—चित्त as an organic unity—धर्म, लक्षण, अवस्थापरिणाम of चित्त—Hierarchy of Dharmis and different *kinds of wholes* showing different degrees of organic unity—Nature of time and its relation to change in mind—एकाग्रता as सत्समस्त्यवस्थाहिता—the Buddhistic conceptions of भवेगसोत and आलस्यविज्ञान. Final reconciliation between Buddhism and Sāṃkhya-Yoga.

A note on the relation between Body and Mind and A few Reflections.

A NOTE ON—

THE RELATION BETWEEN BODY AND MIND AND A FEW REFLECTIONS.

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